Theresa Lynn DeYoung, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After pleading guilty to Level 2 felony aiding, inducing, or causing voluntary manslaughter, Theresa Lynn DeYoung was sentenced to seventeen and a half years. She now appeals her sentence, arguing the trial court erred in identifying certain aggravating factors and that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] DeYoung and her husband Matthew lived with DeYoung's three children in Newton County. In May 2025, DeYoung was also engaged in an “intimate” relationship with Dennis Griede. Tr. Vol. II p. 56. On May 21, DeYoung and Griede went to a local bar. Matthew drove by and, upon seeing DeYoung's car in the parking lot, stopped and went inside. He approached DeYoung and Griede, “appeared quite upset[,]” and eventually left, while DeYoung and Griede remained at the bar drinking and dancing together. Id. at 58. Matthew later returned and got into a verbal altercation with Griede before leaving again.

[3] Griede and DeYoung left the bar together and went to Griede's camper. Soon after, Matthew arrived at the camper and another verbal altercation ensued. At some point, Matthew took out a pistol, fired two shots—which did not hit anyone—and left. DeYoung then drove Griede to a friend's house and returned to her home where her three children were present. From there, she called Griede and “complained” to him about Matthew “while aware of a high probability that [the conversation] may cause a violent confrontation” between the two men. Id. at 15. Based on this conversation with DeYoung, Griede believed “that he needed to protect her” and drove to her house. Id. at 59.

[4] When Griede arrived at DeYoung's house, he confronted Matthew in the front yard, “display[ed] a shotgun[,]” and fired a round. Id. at 59. Griede then began to drive away, and Matthew fired his own pistol toward Griede's car. Matthew went inside and told DeYoung to call 911, but she did not. Matthew then left the house again and DeYoung went to sleep. She awoke approximately twenty minutes later “to more gunshots[.]” Id. at 60. Around this time, Matthew attempted to get back into the house but DeYoung “locked the door and wouldn't let him in.” Id. at 57. At some point, she left the home with her pistol and “fire[d] one round [in] the air.” Id. at 61. Griede then approached her and gained possession of her pistol.

[5] Matthew and Griede “got into a physical altercation[.]” Id. at 62. At this point, Matthew was armed with his own gun and Griede was armed with DeYoung's pistol. During the fight, Matthew shot Griede twice. Matthew again told DeYoung to call 911, and this time she did. Griede later died of his injuries.

[6] The State charged DeYoung with murder; aiding, inducing, or causing a murder; Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit murder; Level 6 felony criminal recklessness; three counts of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent; Level 6 felony obstruction of justice; and Class A misdemeanor false informing. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, DeYoung pled guilty to an amended count of Level 2 felony aiding, inducing, or causing voluntary manslaughter and the State dismissed the remaining counts. The plea agreement called for DeYoung's sentence to not exceed seventeen and a half years.

[7] At sentencing, Indiana State Police Detective Christopher Eagles testified as to the “confusing” events of that night. Id. at 76. In particular, he testified to various statements given by Matthew and DeYoung after the incident. DeYoung gave “conflicting” statements about her role, particularly as to the involvement of her firearm. Id. at 63. She stated that after she exited the house and fired a round, Griede gained possession of her gun. At one point, she stated he took it from her but later stated “[m]aybe [she] gave it to him.” Id. at 61. Detective Eagles also testified that although Griede was armed with DeYoung's pistol during the final altercation with Matthew, officers did not find the gun near Griede's body when they responded. Rather, upon searching the home, officers found the gun in a cooler in the basement. Matthew reported to Detective Eagles that he put it there because DeYoung “told him to hide the gun” after the shooting. Id. at 63.

[8] The court found the following aggravators: (1) DeYoung “acted to avoid detection or conceal facts relating to her involvement” in the crime; (2) she committed the crime while on pretrial release for another offense; and (3) the overall “manner in which [DeYoung] committed th[e] crime[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 214, 215. The court also identified the following mitigating factors: (1) DeYoung “was previously the victim of significant trauma and as a consequence now suffers from some level of post-traumatic stress disorder[,]” (2) she pled guilty, and (3) she “demonstrated material family support” to assist her in rehabilitation. Id. at 212. Finding the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the court sentenced DeYoung to seventeen and a half years, with fourteen years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) and three and a half years suspended to probation. DeYoung now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Aggravating Factors

[9] DeYoung first argues the trial court erred by considering improper aggravating factors. “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. A court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-91. “A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence.” Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[10] DeYoung challenges portions of the following aggravating factors identified by the trial court:

(1) The facts in evidence strongly support the conclusion that the Defendant acted to avoid detection or conceal facts relating to her involvement in this crime. This factor is considered as aggravating because it denotes a clear level of criminal planning and an intent to deceive.

In this case, the Court finds that the evidence and testimony provided by both Indiana State Police Detective Eagles, as well as his reference to the Defendant's own inconsistent statements during the investigation, clearly establish that the Defendant told numerous lies throughout the investigation, and directed her husband to move and conceal the location of the murder weapon, a firearm which originally belonged to her.[1]

Further, the Defendant provided numerous factual variations in attempting to explain how the victim obtained the Defendant's own firearm prior to being killed by her husband. While these particular facts remain in dispute, the Court finds the totality of the evidence strongly supports the State's conclusion that the Defendant was not truthful in explaining how Dennis Griede obtained her firearm.

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(3) ․ The Court further notes additional findings that the totality of the evidence establishes that the manner in which the Defendant committed this crime is also an aggravating factor. The Defendant failed to call 911 for help when requested by her husband, and while having had ample opportunity to do so. The Defendant likely provided the victim her own firearm which clearly escalated the situation to a lethal encounter. The Defendant further locked the door to their residence during the altercation to prevent her husband's retreat back into the house. The Defendant's actions were calculated to manipulate both men into a foreseeable and dangerous confrontation, and she did so while fully aware of a high probability that her actions would cause Matthew DeYoung to kill Dennis Griede.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 214-16 (emphases added).

[11] DeYoung argues there is no evidence to support the trial court's determination that (1) she directed Matthew to move and conceal the location of her pistol and (2) she provided Griede with that pistol. We first note that DeYoung challenges only portions of each aggravator. Notably, the trial court's first aggravator was that DeYoung “acted to avoid detection or conceal facts relating to her involvement” in the offense. Id. at 214. In support of this determination, the trial court cited several pieces of evidence, including the portion challenged by DeYoung. She does not challenge the other findings—namely that she “told numerous lies” and gave inconsistent statements throughout the investigation. Id. at 215. This unchallenged finding alone supports the aggravator. Similarly, the court found the manner in which DeYoung committed the crime to be an aggravator, citing that she failed to call 911, provided Griede with her firearm, and locked the door to prevent Matthew from retreating. DeYoung challenges only the court's determination that she provided Griede with the firearm, yet the remaining unchallenged findings certainly support the aggravator.

[12] Nonetheless, we find there is sufficient evidence to support the challenged portions of the aggravators. Detective Eagles testified that Matthew stated DeYoung told him to hide her pistol after the shooting.² Detective Eagles also testified that DeYoung gave conflicting statements as to how Griede got her pistol, including that “[m]aybe [she] gave it to him.” Tr. Vol. II p. 61. Although DeYoung points to evidence that conflicts with these statements, it was within the trial court's discretion to credit this evidence over her own. DeYoung's argument amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[13] Finally, DeYoung argues the trial court improperly found as an aggravator that she “committed this crime while serving on pretrial release and was out on bond for unrelated criminal charges” and thus failed “to abide by the conditions of her bond.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 215. Specifically, she argues there was no evidence presented as to the conditions of her bond and thus the court erred in assuming she had failed to abide by them. We agree with the State that DeYoung invited any alleged error here, as DeYoung conceded at sentencing that this was a valid aggravating factor. See Tr. Vol. II p. 98. Thus, her argument regarding this factor is waived for appellate review. Gamble v. State, 831 N.E.2d 178, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (invited errors are not subject to appellate review), trans. denied.

[14] Moreover, even if we were to agree this aggravating factor is improper, we have already determined the trial court properly found two other aggravators. Given a single aggravator is sufficient to support an enhanced sentence, Baumholser, 62 N.E.3d at 417, these aggravators are certainly sufficient to support an advisory sentence. Thus, we are confident “the trial court would have imposed the same sentence” even without this allegedly improper aggravator. McDonald v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. 2007).

[15] DeYoung has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in identifying aggravating factors.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[16] DeYoung also argues her sentence is inappropriate and asks us to revise it pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve the “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a rare avenue for appellate relief that is reserved for exceptional cases. Even with Rule 7(B), sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference. Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Absent such a sufficiently compelling evidentiary basis, we will not override the decision of ․ the trial court.

Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied.

[17] A person convicted of a Level 2 felony shall be sentenced to a fixed term of between ten and thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and a half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5 (2014). Here, the trial court imposed an advisory sentence of seventeen and a half years, with fourteen years executed in the DOC and three and a half years suspended to probation. This was below the maximum allowed under the plea agreement, which was seventeen and a half years fully executed in the DOC.

[18] A defendant's “ ‘conscious choice to enter a plea agreement that limits the trial court's discretion to a sentence less than the statutory maximum should usually be understood as strong and persuasive evidence of sentence reasonableness and appropriateness’ and appellate relief should be granted ‘only in the most rare, exceptional cases.’ ” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006) (Dickson, J., concurring)). Furthermore, “[a] defendant who receives an advisory sentence has a particularly heavy burden to prove it inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).” Kincaid v. State, 171 N.E.3d 1036, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. This is especially true where, as here, the aggregate sentence is advisory but the executed portion is below the advisory. See Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010) (“We decline to narrowly interpret the word ‘sentence’ in Appellate Rule 7 to constrict appellate courts to consider only the appropriateness of the aggregate length of the sentence without considering also whether a portion of the sentence is ordered suspended or otherwise crafted using any of the variety of sentencing tools available to the trial judge.”).

[19] As to the nature of the offense, DeYoung argues her conduct was “passive” and that “she made no threat, struck no blow, and fired no shot.” Appellant's Br. pp. 30, 31. Contrary to this assertion, the evidence shows DeYoung did fire a shot and her conduct was anything but passive. DeYoung was aware that Matthew and Griede had been in two verbal altercations that evening and that firearms had been involved. Nonetheless, she continued to provoke further conflict by calling Griede from her home and complaining about Matthew, knowing this could prompt him to engage in a violent confrontation. When such a confrontation occurred, she refused to call 911 despite Matthew asking her to and despite the fact that her three children were in the home. During the altercation, she left the home to fire a gun into the air and then provided that gun to Griede. And after Griede's death, DeYoung engaged in deception and concealment by instructing Matthew to hide her gun and telling “numerous lies” to law enforcement. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 215. The nature of the offense supports the sentence.

[20] As to DeYoung's character, she emphasizes her family support and lack of criminal history. But as noted above, DeYoung's conduct in this matter, especially her refusal to call for help and attempts to hide her involvement, reflects poorly on her character. Given this, we cannot say an advisory sentence is inappropriate.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note the trial court refers to this firearm as “the murder weapon,” although it appears from the record this is incorrect. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 215. Rather, Matthew used his own pistol to shoot Griede, who was armed with DeYoung's pistol. This error is not the basis of DeYoung's challenge, nor do we find it has any bearing on the outcome of this case.

2.   DeYoung also argues this testimony contained unreliable hearsay. However, she did not object to the testimony at the hearing and has thus waived any challenge to it on appeal. See Hedrick v. State, 124 N.E.3d 1273, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“The failure to object at trial waives any claim of error and allows otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence to be considered for substantive purposes.”), trans. denied.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.