IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.H. (Minor Child); (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her child, C.H. (“Child”). We affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother presents one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court clearly erred by concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

Facts

[3] Prior to Child's birth, Mother was charged in 2018 with possession of and dealing in marijuana and cocaine; she eventually pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of maintaining a common nuisance. Around the same time, she was ordered in a dissolution case to submit to drug screening before visiting a previously born child.¹ The year before Child's birth, Mother began to use fentanyl.

[4] Child was born to Mother and A.H. (“Father”) in July 2023. Testing of Child's umbilical cord revealed the presence of fentanyl in his blood. Mother stated that she had been using fentanyl for pain management and to help her function.

[5] On September 14, 2023, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) because Mother failed to provide Child with a home free from substance abuse. The petition alleged that Child was born with fentanyl in his system and that Mother appeared to be under the influence of a controlled substance when she met with a service provider. The following day, the trial court held an initial/detention hearing at which it ordered Child removed from Mother and Father. Child was placed in relative foster care with his paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). On November 23, 2023, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS based on her substance abuse issues.

[6] The trial court held a dispositional hearing on December 1, 2023, and entered a dispositional order that required Mother to complete home-based therapy, submit to random drug screens, and undergo a substance abuse assessment if she missed a drug screen or tested positive for drug use. Mother failed to appear at a September 11, 2024 permanency hearing, at which the trial court continued Child's out-of-home placement and changed the permanency plan from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption.

[7] In the fall of 2024, Mother completed inpatient detox and outpatient treatment, but she relapsed before finishing the program. In 2025, Mother completed drug-treatment services but relapsed again that summer. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Jarell Ruth noted that Mother had a pattern of attempting to obtain sobriety, participating in drug treatment, and then relapsing. Between July 2024 and July 2025, Mother's compliance with random drug screens was inconsistent, and when she did comply, she frequently tested positive for illicit drug use; she tested positive for fentanyl, amphetamines, or norfentanyl twenty-seven times during this period.

[8] When initially assigned to Mother's case in 2023, Tamra Wilkerson facilitated Mother's supervised visitation with Child. In June 2025, Mother lost her employment, and Wilkerson also began providing home-based case management services to Mother. Wilkerson set goals for Mother of securing stable housing and employment. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother remained unemployed, and she had not successfully completed the home-based case management program. Although Mother received temporary rent assistance for June and July 2025, she had no other source of income to support herself or Child.

[9] Although Mother was referred to home-based therapy with Spencer Kuhn in 2023, she did not begin to participate in therapy until May 2025, after DCS filed its petition for termination of parental rights. Kuhn's goals for Mother included maintaining sobriety, identifying triggers for Mother's drug use, and improving Mother's emotional regulation. Mother, however, made minimal progress; she was not honest with Kuhn and initially denied being addicted to drugs. It was not until shortly before the termination hearing that Mother admitted to Kuhn that she had a history of using illicit drugs, including fentanyl. Mother also acknowledged struggling with anger and using drugs as a coping mechanism. Mother identified Father as a significant trigger for her drug use.

[10] On March 13, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child.² The trial court held fact-finding hearings on the petition on August 20 and September 3, 2025. At the time of the hearings, Child remained in the care of Grandmother, and the plan was for her to adopt Child. Case manager Wilkerson testified that, although Mother did not need parenting classes and had a strong bond with Child, Mother's visitation with Child remained supervised throughout the pendency of the case. Mother failed to meet the goals of securing stable housing and employment. FCM Ruth testified regarding Mother's inconsistent involvement with services and pattern of relapse. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”), Rocky Harvey, testified that he had visited Child multiple times in Child's current placement and found Child to be doing well. GAL Harvey expressed his concerns regarding Mother's drug abuse and believed that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. GAL Harvey also noted that Child needed permanency and had been out of Mother's care for almost two years at the time of the hearing, but he acknowledged that, even if Mother's parental rights were terminated, she would still have contact with Child via Grandmother. Mother testified and admitted that she had cared for Child while under the influence of fentanyl. On February 21, 2026, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

A. Standard of Review

[11] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). When determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights, we recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[12] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c).³ DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

[13] If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c). The trial court here entered such findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence, and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence, that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

B. The trial court did not clearly err by concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[14] Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact as clearly erroneous; she has, therefore, waived any arguments relating to these unchallenged findings. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (explaining that we will accept unchallenged trial court findings as true). Mother challenges only the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests.⁴

[15] In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Z.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. In so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[16] Here, Mother has a long history of substance abuse, which predates Child's birth. Even after learning that she was pregnant with Child, Mother continued to use illicit drugs, resulting in Child testing positive for fentanyl at birth. DCS offered Mother services to help her with her substance-abuse problem, but Mother was either incapable of fully benefiting from these services or unwilling to do so. Mother demonstrated a pattern of attempting to attain sobriety by participating in treatment and then relapsing into drug use. Mother did not consistently submit to random drug testing, and when she did, she routinely tested positive for illicit drugs. Mother also lacked stable employment and failed to demonstrate an ability to provide or maintain suitable housing for Child.

[17] Still, Mother claims that termination of her parental rights was unnecessary because Child has been placed in relative care with Grandmother. Mother, therefore, argues that Child already has permanency and stability, and continuing services would better serve Child's best interests. Our courts have recognized that a child's placement with a relative may, in some circumstances, weigh against termination. See In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 630 (Ind. 2016) (“[W]hen a child is in relative placement, and the permanency plan is adoption into the home where the child has lived for years already, prolonging the adoption is unlikely to have an effect upon the child.”). But we do not take this to mean that a child's placement with a relative is an absolute bar to terminating a parent's parental rights. Adoption provides stability by severing parental rights, whereas relative foster care does not. When a child remains in relative foster care, the parent retains a legally recognized relationship with the child.⁵

[18] Mother also cites Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4.5(d), which allows for dismissal of a petition to terminate parental rights under certain circumstances, including when “the current case plan ․ has documented a compelling reason for concluding that ․ a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship is not in the best interests of the child.” And a “compelling reason” “may include the fact that the child is being cared for by a custodian who is a relative.” Id. § 4.5(d)(1).⁶ Mother notes that DCS acknowledged that this factor was applicable in the present case.

[19] But the fact that a child's placement with a relative may be a compelling reason to conclude that termination is not in the child's best interests does not mean that such placement always compels that conclusion. See D.H. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 122 N.E.3d 832, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that DCS is not “required to, but rather permitted to, state whether there is a basis for filing a motion to dismiss the termination petition and, if there is such a basis, to file a motion to dismiss.”), opinion on reh'g. At most, this statute reflects a recognition that relative placement is a pertinent consideration when determining whether termination is necessary to provide a child with permanency. It does not mean that termination is not in a child's best interests merely because the child is in relative care.

[20] Mother also argues that termination of her parental rights harms her by depriving her of DCS's assistance with her substance abuse issues. But DCS had already attempted to help Mother over an extended period of time, yet Mother failed to make any progress in addressing her substance abuse issues. Indeed, DCS began to provide Mother with services aimed at her substance abuse after the December 1, 2023 dispositional decree. Over the next twenty-one months, Mother participated in inpatient detox, outpatient treatment, and medication-assisted treatment. Still, Mother continued to use fentanyl.

[21] Mother argues that termination will cause harm by permanently foreclosing the possibility of her reunification with Child. But this is true in every termination case. Our statutes and case law do not require a child to remain legally bound to a parent who has not demonstrated an ability to provide a stable, drug-free home for the child, merely to preserve the possibility of future reunification. Instead, our courts have repeatedly held that a child “cannot wait indefinitely for [his] parent[ ] to work toward preservation or reunification,” and that courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 648 (Ind. 2014) (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Given Mother's lack of progress in addressing her substance abuse issues, the trial court could reasonably conclude that further delay was unwarranted.

[22] Mother's reliance on R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, and In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. 2009), is misplaced. In R.S., our Supreme Court reversed the trial court's termination order because the father had a close bond with the child, regularly attended visitation, completed fifty-two weeks of domestic-violence counseling, and completed a substance-abuse assessment and treatment; the child also had a stable home with his maternal grandmother. 56 N.E.3d at 629-30. Under those circumstances our Supreme Court held that prolonging the adoption was “unlikely to have an effect upon the child.” Id. at 630. And in G.Y., the Court reversed the trial court's termination order because it was based on a generalized interest in permanency. 904 N.E.2d at 1265-66. The mother in that case had also made progress in addressing her issues by completing parenting and drug-treatment classes; she also obtained housing and employment in addition to consistently attending visitation with her child. Id. at 1261-63.

[23] In contrast, here, the trial court's conclusion regarding Child's best interests was not based merely on a generalized need for permanency. It was also supported by Mother's continued issues with substance abuse and housing. Mother did not complete services, and she continued to relapse into substance abuse. Shortly before the termination hearing, Mother admitted to her therapist that she never stopped using fentanyl. And Mother admitted that she had cared for Child while under the influence of fentanyl. Thus, unlike in R.S. and G.Y., the record here shows that Mother continued to use illicit drugs and did not obtain suitable housing or employment. And, even though Child was in relative foster care with Grandmother, he had been removed from Mother's care for almost two years.

[24] Still, Mother claims that her unresolved substance abuse issues are insufficient to support terminating her parental rights. We disagree. This is not a case where Mother has made progress toward treating her addiction issues. Instead, Mother has been using drugs since prior to Child's birth, continued using during her pregnancy and after Child was born; she failed to successfully complete any substance abuse treatment and instead repeatedly tested positive for drugs. From this, the trial court could reasonably conclude that terminating Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. See A.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (concluding that termination of mother's parental rights served the children's need for permanency where mother's severe, ongoing opiate addiction left no foreseeable date for reunification); A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (mother's unremedied issues with substance abuse and domestic violence were themselves sufficient to support trial court's conclusion that child's best interests were served by terminating parental rights).

Conclusion

[25] The trial court did not clearly err by concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests, and this is the only conclusion of the trial court that Mother challenges on appeal. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in terminating Mother's parental rights. Accordingly, we affirm.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time of the termination hearing in this case, Mother did not have custody of her older child.

2.   DCS also filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights. In August 2025, Father voluntarily consented to Child's adoption, and Father was dismissed from the termination case.

3.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again on July 1, 2025. Here, DCS filed its petition on March 13, 2025. We, therefore, apply the 2024 version of the statute, which was in effect at the time the petition was filed.

4.   Mother makes no argument that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that there was a reasonable probability that: (1) the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for his continued placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied; or (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and Child poses a threat to Child's well-being; and (3) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c), (d).

5.   Mother also argues that termination offers no real benefit to Child because he will remain in the care of Grandmother and will, therefore, likely continue to see Mother. But any contact between Mother and Child after termination of Mother's parental rights is at the discretion of Grandmother, or whoever is ultimately awarded permanent custody of Child. Mother has no right to any further contact with Child. See In re M.B., 921 N.E.2d 494, 500 (Ind. 2009) (holding that, absent compliance with the open adoption statutes, a parent's continued contact with a child cannot be guaranteed as a condition of terminating parental rights).

6.   A petition to dismiss under this statute may only be filed by “[a] person described in section 4(a) of this chapter,” I.C. § 31-35-2-4.5(d), which does not include the child's parent. See In re R.L.-P., 119 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that father was not statutorily authorized to file a motion to dismiss the petition to terminate father's parental rights). Here, none of the parties authorized to file such a petition did so.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.