Benjamin Price Jackson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Benjamin Jackson appeals his twenty-eight-year sentence for six counts of theft, Level 5 felonies; two counts of theft, Level 6 felonies; one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor; and nine counts of official misconduct, Level 6 felonies. Jackson argues that he is entitled to the consecutive sentencing limitation found in Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2 and that his sentence is inappropriate. We disagree and affirm.

Issues

[2] Jackson raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether Jackson's offenses amount to a single episode of criminal conduct, entitling him to the consecutive sentencing limitation found in Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2.

II. Whether Jackson's sentence is inappropriate.

Facts

[3] From 2013 to 2024, Jackson was the Columbus Township Trustee in Bartholomew County. In 2018, Jackson took over the task of paying and verifying the Township's credit card bills. In October 2024, the State Board of Accounts (“SBOA”) received an anonymous tip that Jackson was misappropriating township funds. An investigation revealed that, beginning in 2016, Jackson used the Township credit card and Sam's Club card for personal expenses, including travel, home improvements, utilities, groceries, and college tuition for his children. Jackson used Township funds totaling $1,123,334.27 for personal expenses between 2016 and 2024. The funds were used for extravagant trips for Jackson and/or his family members to Europe, Dubai, Australia, Canada, Puerto Rico, ski resorts, and Florida. The following charts detail the improper expenses:

Personal expenses incurred by Jackson of $1,123,334.27 by year were as follows:

Year Amount 2016 S 529.64 2017 8,205.83 2018 31,756 00 2019 92,668.48 2020 138,020.63 2021 208,242.30 2022 183.446.13 2023 253,296.05 2024 207,169.21 Total $ 1,123,334.27

The SBOA further categorized the $1,123,334.27 in personal expenses by category as follows:

Category Amount Travel $ 657,831.46 Retail 150,078.95 Tuition/School 90,915.97 Utilities 39,913,97 Meals 31,306.65 Vehicle 27,036.76 Grocery 23,596.69 Home Improvement 18,990.65 Health 16,487.08 Entertainment 15,002.97 Subscriptions 13,689.98 Fuel 12,814.45 Personal Services 5,164.81 Mailing 4,806.47 Gift Cards 3,735.00 Conferences 1,980.81 Taxes 1,969.23 Alcohol 1,816.34 Dry Cleaning 1,401.23 Cannabis 1,124.56 Pet 1,119.89 Cosmetic 1,079.72 Fees/Interest 960.73 Phone 509.9 Total $ 1,123,334.27

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78.

[4] On July 22, 2025, the State charged Jackson with six counts of theft, Level 5 felonies; two counts of theft, Level 6 felonies; one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor; and nine counts of official misconduct, Level 6 felonies. Jackson was charged with one count of theft and one count of official misconduct for each of nine years that he stole township funds.

[5] On November 10, 2025, Jackson pleaded guilty to all charges. At the sentencing hearing on January 21, 2026, the trial court found the following aggravators: (1) Jackson's position of trust; (2) the harm was greater than necessary for some of the counts; and (3) the nature and circumstances of the extravagant expenditures and the length of the offenses. The trial court found the following mitigators: (1) Jackson's guilty plea; (2) his lack of criminal history; (3) his cooperation with the investigation; and (4) his remorse.

[6] The trial court sentenced Jackson as follows:

Count Offense Level/Class Sentence I Theft Level 5 Felony 6 years II Official Misconduct Level6Felony 2 years, concurrent with CountIbut consecutive to the other counts III Theft Level 5 Felony 5 years IV Official Misconduct Level6Felony 2 years, concurrent with CountIIIbut consecutive to the other counts V Theft Level 5 Felony 4years VI Official Misconduct Level 6 Felony 2 years, concurrent with Count V, but consecutive to the other counts VII Theft Level 5 Felony 4years VIII Official Misconduct Level6Felony 2 years, concurrent with Count VII, but consecutive to the other counts IX Theft Level 5 Felony 3 years X Official Misconduct Level6Felony 1year,concurrent with Count IX, but consecutive to the other counts XI Theft Level 5 Felony 3 years XII Official Misconduct Level6Felony 1year, concurrent with Count XI, but consecutiveto theother counts XII Theft Level6Felony 1year XIV Official Misconduct Level6Felony 1year, concurrent with CountXIII,but consecutive to the other counts XV Theft Level6Felony 1year suspended to probation with home detention XVI Official Misconduct Level6Felony 1year suspended to probation with home detention; concurrent with Count XV, but consecutive to the other counts XVII Theft Class A Misdemeanor 1year suspended to probation without home detention XVIII Official Misconduct Level6Felony 1year suspended to probation with home detention; concurrent with Count XV, but consecutive to the other counts

Id. at 129-34. The trial court, thus, ordered an aggregate sentence of twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) with two years suspended to probation. The trial court also ordered restitution of $1,123,334.27 to Columbus Township. Jackson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Illegal Sentence

[7] First, Jackson argues that his sentence is illegal and exceeds the maximum allowable sentence for his crimes. Jackson contends that his offenses amount to a single episode of criminal conduct and that the trial court should have capped his consecutive sentences in accordance with Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2.

[8] We review this claim of sentencing error for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Waldon v. State, 259 N.E.3d 318, 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. “But because our legislature is responsible for fixing criminal penalties, a trial court's sentencing discretion must not exceed the limits prescribed by statute.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1143 (Ind. 2022).

[9] The State argues that Jackson waived this issue. At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Jackson's offenses did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct, and Jackson's counsel stated that he did not “disagree with that argument.” Tr. Vol. II p. 41. We conclude that Jackson invited any error.

[10] A “party will not be permitted to take advantage of errors which he himself committed or invited or induced the trial court to commit, or which were the natural consequences of his own neglect or misconduct.” Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 557 (Ind. 2019) (internal emphasis and quotation omitted). Our Supreme Court has noted:

[T]o establish invited error, there must be some evidence that the error resulted from the appellant's affirmative actions as part of a deliberate, well-informed trial strategy. A passive lack of objection, standing alone, is simply not enough. And when there is no evidence of counsel's strategic maneuvering, we are reluctant to find invited error based on the appellant's neglect or mere acquiescence to an error introduced by the court or opposing counsel.

Id. at 558 (internal quotations marks omitted). “[W]hereas waiver generally leaves open an appellant's claim to fundamental-error review, invited error typically forecloses appellate review altogether.” Id. at 556. Here, Jackson specifically agreed that his offenses did not constitute a single episode of criminal conduct, leaving the trial court no reason to address the issue. We conclude, accordingly, that Jackson invited any error.

[11] Despite this invited error, Jackson argues that this Court has a duty to correct an illegal sentence regardless of counsel's concessions below. Appellant's Reply Br. p. 6 (citing Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190, (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that, despite defense counsel's concession, “if a mistake in Senn's credit time or time served is apparent, it is our duty to correct that mistake”)). Even if we address Jackson's argument, invited error notwithstanding, Jackson's argument fails.

[12] Jackson's offenses were committed between 2016 and 2024, and Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2 has undergone multiple amendments during and after this time period. Throughout the relevant time period, though, the statute provided in relevant part that, “except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment ․ to which the defendant is sentenced for felony or misdemeanor convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the period described in subsection (d).” Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(c).

[13] Theft and official misconduct are not crimes of violence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(a). Subsection (d), thus, contains the following limit on consecutive sentences: “the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct may not exceed” seven years if the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 5 felony. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d). An “ ‘episode of criminal conduct’ means offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b).

[14] Our Supreme Court has explained that the determination of whether offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct is “ ‘a fact-intensive inquiry.’ ” Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1144 (quoting Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002)). In Waldon, we distilled the following test for determining whether offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct:

We balance the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the time span over which the offenses occurred and the time between the offenses, with extra weight given when the offenses are simultaneous or contemporaneous; (2) whether the offenses occurred at separate locations, and if so, the distance between them; (3) whether the offenses each stand alone, that is to say, can be described without reference to one another; and (4) whether the offenses are united by a common scheme or purpose beyond the mere desire to commit multiple crimes. No one factor is determinative, although the first two are the most important. Ultimately, the time, place, and circumstances must demonstrate that the offenses are but parts of a larger or more comprehensive series such that they can be fairly described as a single episode of criminal conduct.

Waldon, 259 N.E.3d at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[15] Here, Jackson's offenses were not simultaneous or contemporaneous; rather, the offenses occurred over a period of nine years.¹ Jackson and the State describe the location of the offenses differently. Jackson argues that each offense was committed at the same location in Bartholomew County when he paid the credit card bills with Township funds. The State, however, argues that Jackson's conduct occurred in “dozens of different destinations involving distinct vacation settings in separate locations all over the globe.” Appellee's Br. p. 28. Jackson is correct that, technically, his theft and official misconduct offenses were committed in Bartholomew County when he exerted unauthorized control over Township funds by paying the credit card bills, but he incurred the expenses and paid with the credit card on his travels all over the world.

[16] Jackson also contends that it is difficult to describe one offense without referring to the others, but we do not find such difficulty. Rather, Jackson's offenses are easily described without reference to the offenses in other years. Finally, Jackson argues that “each offense is simply a sub-part of the overreaching criminal enterprise” and he used the same two credit cards, with the same victim and the same purpose in the same way. Appellant's Br. p. 17. Although the victim was the same in each of Jackson's offenses, we cannot say the offenses were united by a common scheme or purpose beyond Jackson's mere desire to commit multiple crimes. Jackson committed the offenses for multiple different types of expenses in multiple locations over many years.

[17] Under these circumstances, Jackson's offenses were not closely related in time, place, and circumstance. Accordingly, we conclude that Jackson's offenses were not a single episode of criminal conduct. See, e.g., Slone v. State, 11 N.E.3d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (offenses were not a single episode of criminal conduct where the three burglaries were committed over six months); Grimes v. State, 84 N.E.3d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (eighteen counts of incest committed over nine weeks were not a single episode of criminal conduct), trans. denied; Searcy v. State, 279 N.E.3d 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (offenses of possession of child pornography for ten images created on ten different dates over a one-year period were not a single episode of criminal conduct). Jackson's consecutive sentences, thus, do not violate Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[18] Next, Jackson argues that his sentence is inappropriate. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[19] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[20] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025), cert. denied. In the case at hand, Jackson was convicted of six counts of theft, Level 5 felonies; two counts of theft, Level 6 felonies; one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor; and nine counts of official misconduct, Level 6 felonies. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-6(b) provides: “A person who commits a Level 5 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(b) provides: “A person who commits a Level 6 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 1/212 ) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Finally, Indiana Code Section 35-50-3-2 provides: “A person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year.” Here, the trial court sentenced Jackson to an aggregate sentence of twenty-eight years with two years suspended to probation.

Nature of the Offense

[21] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). We consider whether “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality)” exists. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025).

[22] Jackson was the Township trustee from 2013 through 2024. “The legislature has enacted legislation for the relief of poor persons through township assistance.” 26 IND. LAW ENCYC. Social Welfare § 3. “The township trustee is responsible for the oversight and care of all poor individuals in the township as long as the individuals remain in the trustee's charge.” Id. § 4; see also Ind. Code Chapter 12-20-5.

[23] Instead of distributing funds to those in need, over a period of nine years, Jackson stole $1,123,334.27 from the Township. Jackson started slowly, stealing only $529.64 in 2016, but his conduct escalated. In 2021, 2023, and 2024, he stole over $200,000 each year. Jackson used the Township monies to fund an extravagant lifestyle. He spent $657,831.46 on sixty-one vacations for himself and his family, including seven trips to Walt Disney World, a trip to Dubai, a trip for one of the children to Australia, three European vacations, and multiple skiing trips. Jackson paid the college tuition of his children; made home improvements; and paid his personal utility expenses, vehicle expenses, event tickets, furniture expenses, and personal services expenses, including massages and online cannabis purchases. To hide his wrongdoing, Jackson reassigned the duties of reviewing credit card bills to himself. Jackson repeatedly breached his position of trust with the taxpayers of his Township.

[24] Jackson argues that “the gravity of that breach does not justify a 28-year sentence for a non-violent property offense.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. Jackson argues that such lengthy sentences are usually reserved for violent offenders. According to Jackson, if he stole the same amount of money during one act, his maximum sentence would be eight and one-half years. Jackson's offenses, however, were not a single isolated incident of poor judgment; rather, Jackson repeatedly, and over a period of many years, stole Township funds. We find nothing in the nature of the offenses that warrants a reduced sentence.

Character of the Offender

[25] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020).

[26] Jackson argues that he had no criminal history, pleaded guilty, cooperated with law enforcement, started paying restitution, and has volunteered with refugees and the unhoused after his arrest. Jackson also asserts that a twenty-eight-year sentence “effectively destroys any prospect of meaningful restitution.” Appellant's Br. p. 22.

[27] Although Jackson pleaded guilty and expressed remorse for his offenses, Jackson's comments during his presentence investigation (“PSI”) are enlightening. In his PSI, Jackson explained that his reason for committing the current offenses is “complicated.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 68. Jackson stated that he enjoys travel, he “like[s] to live out of [his] means,” and he liked to have the appearance of “status.” Id. Jackson was “ ‘amazed’ that the Board did not catch what was happening” and noted that “he was responsible for several audits for the Township that were passed without any issues.” Id. at 70. We agree with the State that Jackson's actions “reflect skill at deceptiveness [and] a dedication to stealing.” Appellee's Br. p. 35.

[28] As for Jackson's argument that the twenty-eight-year sentence removes his ability to pay restitution, we note that Jackson is fifty-seven years old, and full payment of the restitution, even with a shorter sentence, is unrealistic. As the State notes, “justice is not simply a matter of money.” Id. at 36-37. We do not find that Jackson's character warrants a reduction of his sentence.

Conclusion

[29] Jackson's offenses do not qualify as a single episode of criminal conduct and, thus, Jackson is not entitled to the consecutive sentencing limitations found in Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2. Further, Jackson's sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jackson contends that the State arbitrarily chose to charge him by aggregating every credit card purchase within each calendar year into a single count of theft and a single count of official misconduct. Jackson argues that this decision “shrinks the gap between consecutive offenses” to the “turn of midnight from December 31st to January 1st.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. First, prosecutors have “broad discretionary power to choose the persons whom they prosecute, and the charges to bring against those persons.” Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461, 486 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. “We do not substitute our discretion for that of the prosecuting attorney on such matters.” Id. Moreover, we find Jackson's description of the offenses to be too simplistic. Jackson's offenses were completed at multiple times over the course of nine years. The offenses were not just separated only by the strike of midnight on December 31 each year.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.