J.K.-P., Appellant-Petitioner v. D.P., Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.K.-P. (“Petitioner”) petitioned for a protective order against D.P. (“Respondent”) on behalf of J.K.-P., II (“Child”). The matter proceeded to a hearing, at the conclusion of which the trial court dismissed Petitioner's action, noting that Petitioner had presented no evidence to support his claims. The trial court also awarded $6000.00 in attorney's fees to Respondent. Petitioner appealed. In a memorandum decision dated July 28, 2025, we affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's petition and remanded the matter to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees. See J.K.-P. v. D.P., 2025 WL 2102424 (Ind. Ct. App. July 28, 2025), trans. denied. After the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer, the trial court ordered Respondent to submit additional documentation in support of his fee request. The trial court reviewed the documentation and again ordered that Petitioner pay $6000.00 in attorney's fees to Respondent. Petitioner moved the trial court to reconsider, for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60, and for the trial court to recuse itself, which motions the trial court denied. We affirm.¹

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The underlying facts, as set forth in our memorandum decision issued in the parties’ prior appeal, are as follows:

Petitioner and S.H. [are the parents of Child]. S.H. also has two children with [Respondent]. S.H. and Petitioner are parties to a paternity action in cause number 06C01-2407-JP-245 (“Cause No. 245”). On December 12, 2024, Petitioner filed a “Petition for an Order for Protection and Request for a Hearing – Filed on Behalf of a Child” (the “Petition”) against Respondent in cause number 06C01-2412-PO-2038 (“Cause No. 2038”), the cause from which this appeal arises. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 26 (capitalization omitted). The Petition alleged that Respondent attempted to cause physical harm to Child, threatened to cause physical harm to Child, placed Child in fear of physical harm, committed stalking against Child, and committed repeated acts of harassment against Child. On December 13, 2024, the court scheduled a hearing in Cause No. 2038 for 2:00 p.m. on December 23, 2024. At 10:00 a.m. on December 23, 2024, the court held a hearing in Cause No. 245 at which Petitioner and S.H. were present.

At approximately 1:12 p.m. on December 23, 2024, the court held a hearing in Cause No. 2038 at which Petitioner appeared pro se and Respondent appeared with counsel. Petitioner presented the testimony of S.H. and his own testimony. Petitioner indicated that he wished to establish a pattern of conduct by Respondent which placed Child at risk. Upon questioning by Petitioner, S.H. testified regarding several incidents involving Respondent consuming alcohol or prescription medication. She testified regarding an incident involving Respondent becoming intoxicated at a festival in 2008 before any of the children were born and an incident involving Respondent taking medication prescribed to someone else and falling down the stairs in 2016 when she was pregnant with Child. She testified regarding a third incident which occurred before Child was born when she received a text from Respondent containing a picture of him in a parked car with their two children in car seats and a message about having a glass of wine, that she was worried that Respondent drove while intoxicated, and that Respondent was clear that he did not drive while intoxicated. S.H. testified that Respondent participated in treatment, “we haven't had anything like it since,” “I have zero concerns that he's drinking heavily now,” and “I'm not worried about it happening now and all of that happened well before [Child] was born.” Transcript Volume II at 19. Petitioner asked if the incident when Respondent fell down the stairs caused her fear, S.H. responded, “I was really scared for [Respondent]. I wasn't personally scared for me that I recall. I mean, that whole thing's alarming, but mostly I was worried about [Respondent].” Id. at 25. When asked “it's true that you sometimes let our minor child spend the night at the Respondent's house,” she answered, “Yes. He loves to visit there. He begs to go all the time and he goes sometimes on Saturdays if his brothers are there,” “it's good for him to go there,” “[h]e gets to be around [Respondent] and [his] girlfriend,” his girlfriend “is lovely and they're kind to one another,” and “I just ․ think it's really good.” Id. at 27.

On cross-examination, S.H. testified that Respondent had never been abusive to her, “physically, mentally, or otherwise.” Id. at 28. She indicated that she never observed or was aware of any abuse by Respondent against any of her three children and Respondent never placed her in fear for her physical safety. Respondent's counsel asked if she “[e]ver felt like [Respondent] was a danger to any of the three children,” and S.H. answered, “[w]ell, briefly after this thing where he was drunk and passed out, I was concerned that he was maybe not in a great condition,” “I was concerned that it might happen again, but he got the help that he needed and treatment and I haven't had any concerns,” and “I haven't had any concerns, no. I don't think he's a danger to us in any way.” Id. When asked if Child ever expressed that he is afraid of Respondent, she replied, “No. He loves [Respondent]. He calls [Respondent] Daddy.” Id. at 29. Respondent's counsel asked if she was aware of any attempts or threats of harm against Child by Respondent, and S.H. answered “No.” Id. When asked if she was aware of Respondent “having had any unwelcome or unwanted communication with” Child, she replied “No.” Id. The court asked S.H., “[t]here's been no incidents of domestic violence in your home between you and the Respondent,” and S.H. replied, “No” and “None.” Id. The court asked, “you're not afraid of [Respondent],” and she answered, “No. We're good friends and we're good co-parents. I think we're a good team. I'm not afraid of him. He's a big help to us.” Id.

Petitioner stated that he would like to offer statements of medical treatment or diagnosis from his therapist, and the court denied the request. Petitioner also stated that he “would like to offer as a present-sense impression ․ a number of text messages that [he] ha[d] with [S.H.] with respect to [their] conversations about” Respondent “[l]abeled T1 and T2.” Id. at 32. He indicated the messages were on a flash drive. Respondent's counsel stated “they are hundreds and hundreds of pages,” “it appears there are other people besides the two individuals the Petitioner has indicated [ ] in the messages throughout these communications,” and “[t]hey also appear to be redacted in that they are not a continuous stream, so they don't appear to [ ] fairly and accurately represent the content of those messages.” Id. at 33. Petitioner indicated T1 was 225 pages and T2 was 177 pages. The court stated, “[i]f you've got specific pages within there that you think shows that either she believed he was a credible threat or document some type of domestic violence incident that occurred ․, then you can submit that ․ Do you have that?” Id. at 34. Petitioner replied, “Not curated. I'll just offer testimony with what it says if that's the more streamlined way.” Id. The court asked “is your testimony going to be that she's told you that he has either been violent with her or some kind of abuse,” and he responded, “[n]ot violent with her, but certainly put her in fear of harm and fear of harm for the kids and repeated acts of harassment that caused her to feel and caused me to feel terrorized, threatened, intimidated, etcetera ․ [a]s a pattern of conduct between 2016 and 2020.” Id. at 34–35. The court stated, “[w]hy don't you just testify as to that,” and Petitioner replied “Okay.” Id. at 35.

Petitioner testified “I recall [S.H.] and when [Respondent] was around, she was like her tone changed everything changed.” Id. He testified, “[t]here is ․ a number of incidents where I was terrified based on what I heard from [S.H.] that [Respondent] was a threat to my son while he was in utero and after he was born,” “I recall the taking the pills and falling down the stairs,” and “I recall telling [S.H.] that, like, the kid could have been on the stairs, that it's like he could have been holding ․ one of the kids, um, it was my – with the drunk driving and the all of that just made me - and he never apologized.” Id. at 37. He testified, “it was just this constant stream of negativity” and “he got her to kick me out of the house after being invited in.” Id. at 38. On cross-examination, Petitioner indicated that he disliked Respondent and that he previously stated that he wished Respondent would die. He stated, “I was living in denial of [S.H.’s] abuse towards me and how it was just constant, like, being told everything I was doing was wrong.” Id. at 45. Petitioner stated, “I would like to try to curate present-sense impressions to the Court with respect to text messages,” the court stated, “I'm still not clear why you think they're relevant to the issue in front of the Court today, which is is [Respondent] a danger to [Child],” and Petitioner replied “[i]t's not only text messages from her, but it's purported recollections by myself.” Id. at 47–48. The court denied his request. The court asked Petitioner if he ever heard Respondent make a threat to Child, and he replied “No.” Id. at 49.

Respondent's counsel requested that the court dismiss the Petition under Ind. Trial Rule 41(B). He argued, “Petitioner offered no evidence whatsoever to get anywhere near establishing any of the bases for the issuance of a protection order that he alleged in the petition.” Id. at 51. Respondent's counsel requested an award of attorney fees, arguing that Petitioner's action was frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless. The court asked, “[h]ow much fees have you incurred,” and Respondent's counsel replied, “The flat fee of $6,000.00 for this PO case, Your Honor. I'd be happy to ․ provide an affidavit to the Court.” Id. at 54. The court stated:

I'm just looking at your petition․ [Y]ou allege the Respondent attempted to cause physical harm to the child who needs protection. I didn't hear any evidence of that. The Respondent threatened to cause physical harm to the child who needs protection, so I didn't hear any - you yourself testified you didn't hear him threatening or causing physical harm to your child, yet you checked that off as one of the allegations. You also allege “The Respondent placed the child who needs protection in fear of physical harm.” I didn't hear any evidence about that either. You checked off the Respondent committed stalking against the child who needs protection. I didn't hear any evidence on that, as well. And finally, that the Respondent committed repeated acts of harassment against the child. I heard nothing about that․ Okay, maybe you based upon what [S.H.] had told you several years ago, but she came in here and testified today that those things aren't true. [Petitioner], I have no other option than to dismiss this case. You haven't proven it by a preponderance of the evidence and you haven't even gotten close.

Id. at 54–55. The court dismissed Petitioner's action. The court also stated, “I'm just going to enter an order finding that this matter does warrant sanctions. It is frivolous and I am going to award the $6,000.00 for your client's fees in proceeding to defend himself on allegations that have absolutely no merit in this Court's opinion.” Id. at 56.

J.K.-P., 2025 WL 2102424 at *1–3 (footnotes omitted, first two sets of brackets added, all other sets of brackets and ellipses in original).

[3] On appeal, Petitioner claimed that the trial court had demonstrated bias against him, denied him due process, erred in denying his petition, and erred in awarding Respondent attorney's fees. Id. at *3–6. With regard to his claim of bias, Petitioner claimed that the trial court judge was an adjunct professor at the same school where S.H. was a professor. Id. at *3. We noted that “[t]he law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced” and that “[i]n order to overcome that presumption, the appellant must demonstrate actual personal bias.” Id. (internal citations omitted). We concluded that

we cannot say that Petitioner has demonstrated the trial judge was biased. Petitioner does not point to the record in support of his claim that S.H. had any influence relating to the trial judge serving as an adjunct instructor. While the court did not rule in favor of Petitioner and ultimately found that his action was frivolous, Petitioner does not point to the transcript to show that the judge made remarks evidencing actual personal bias, and the record reveals that the court issued a ruling after admitting extensive testimony by S.H. and Petitioner related to the Petition and that it carefully weighed the evidence. Petitioner has not overcome the presumption that the trial judge was unbiased.

Id. at *4. We likewise concluded that Petitioner had not been denied due process, as he had been given the opportunity to present his case and that the trial court had not erred in denying his petition because Petitioner “did not present evidence supporting his allegations.” Id. at *5. As for attorney's fees, we concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in awarding Respondent attorney's fees but remanded for a hearing to determine the reasonable amount of attorney's fees. Id. at 6. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.

[4] On remand, the trial court ordered Respondent to provide additional documentation in support of his request for attorney's fees. On February 3, 2026, Respondent submitted additional documentation, including the $6000.00 protective order flat-fee agreement (“the Fee Agreement”) executed by Respondent and his counsel. After considering the additional documentation, the trial court found that “the evidence supports a $6,000.00 award for Respondent's attorney's fees and that this amount is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. The Court therefore ORDERS that Petitioner pay $6,000.00 to the Respondent for Respondent's reasonable attorney's fees.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 56–57. The next day, Petitioner moved to strike Respondent's documentation, claiming that it had been untimely filed. The trial court denied Petitioner's motion.

[5] On February 9, 2026, Petitioner requested the trial court to reconsider its order awarding Respondent $6000.00 in attorney's fees. On February 10, 2026, Petitioner requested that the trial court “recuse itself under Indiana Trial Rule 79(D), ․ reconsider its attorney's fee award, and after the appointment of a new judicial officer, [grant him] relief under Ind. Trial Rule 60[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 65. On February 24, 2026, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider and motion for recusal, reconsideration, and relief. Discussion and Decision

[6] As an initial matter, we note that Petitioner proceeds pro se.

A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Rather, it is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.

Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal brackets, citation, and quotation omitted). “These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal [․] where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues[.]” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

[7] Additionally, we note that although Respondent has filed an appearance before our court, he did not file an appellee's brief. “In such a case, we need not undertake the burden of developing arguments for the appellees.” Dreyer & Reinbold, Inc. v. Leib, 811 N.E.2d 858, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “Applying a less stringent standard of review, we may reverse the trial court if the appellant establishes prima facie error.” Id. “Prima facie is defined as at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

I. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Accepting Respondent's Submission

[8] Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in accepting Respondent's submission regarding the Fee Agreement, claiming that it had been untimely filed. On December 10, 2025, the trial court ordered Respondent to submit additional documentation supporting his request for attorney's fees “within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 48. Respondent did not file his response until February 3, 2026. We find the trial court's request for additional documentation to be akin to a discovery request.

[9] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on issues of discovery and in determining appropriate sanctions for failing to comply with a trial court's discovery order. We will reverse a trial court's ruling regarding discovery sanctions only when the appealing party can show an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court reached a conclusion that is against the logic and effect of the circumstances before it.

Nagel v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 26 N.E.3d 30, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal citation and quotations omitted), trans. denied. “Trial courts stand much closer to litigants than appellate courts, and thus they are better equipped to have a better sense of what sanctions, if any, are appropriate in the case of a discovery violation.” Id. “We presume that a trial court will act in accord with what is fair and equitable in each case.” Id. at 40. The trial court accepted Respondent's late filing and denied Petitioner's request to strike it. Based on the limited record before us, we cannot say that the trial court, who we presume acted in accord with what is fair and equitable in this case, abused its discretion in accepting Respondent's late filing.² See id.

II. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering Petitioner to Pay $6000.00 in Attorney's Fees to Respondent

[10] Petitioner next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $6000.00 in attorney's fees to Respondent, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support that amount.

The amount recoverable for an award of attorney's fees is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. An award of attorney's fees will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. The amount of the trial court's award of attorney's fees must be supported by the evidence.

Franklin Coll. v. Turner, 844 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

[11] After the trial court requested additional documentation regarding Respondent's request for attorney's fees, Respondent submitted a copy of the Fee Agreement that he had entered into with counsel. The Fee Agreement indicated that the attorney's services would be billed at “a flat fee of $6,000[.00].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 52. The Fee Agreement further listed counsel's hourly rate as $375.00 and his paralegal's hourly rate as $175.00.

[12] In awarding Respondent $6000.00 in attorney's fees, the trial court found as follows:

In this case, although the hearing lasted approxi[ma]tely ninety (90) minutes, it ended only after the Court granted the Respondent's Motion to dismiss pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B). It is not unreasonable to conclude that Respondent's counsel had to meet with Respondent and to prepare for a significantly longer hearing. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that Respondent's counsel was required to review discovery, prepare discovery requests, conduct witness preparation, and do some legal research prior to the hearing. It is further noted in the record that Respondent's counsel did in fact review hundreds of pages of discovery provided by the Petitioner in this case. See Memorandum Decision 25A-PO-172 page 5 which states:

Petitioner also stated that he “would like to offer as a present-sense impression ․ a number of text messages that [he] ha[d] with [S.H.] with respect to [their] conversations about” Respondent “[l]abeled T1 and T2.” Id. at 32. He indicated the messages were on a flash drive. Respondent's counsel stated “they are hundreds and hundreds of pages,” “it appears there are other people besides the two individuals the Petitioner has indicated in the messages throughout these communications,” and “[t]hey also appear to be redacted in that they are not a continuous stream, so they don't appear to fairly and accurately represent the content of those messages.” Id. at 33. Petitioner indicated T1 was 225 pages and T2 was 177 pages.

Finally, the nature of the allegations made against Respondent by Petitioner, which were wholly unsupported at the hearing, warranted a serious defense by Respondent.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 56 (first set of brackets added, all other brackets and emphasis in original).

[13] Petitioner asserts that the trial court's order represents a “post hoc justification of the original flat-fee award.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. We cannot agree. The trial court considered the evidence submitted by the parties and made an award based on that evidence. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Petitioner to pay $6000.00 in attorney's fees to Respondent.

III. Petitioner did not Establish that He is Entitled to Relief Pursuant to Trial Rule 60

[14] Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for relief pursuant to Trial Rule 60. “A grant of equitable relief under Indiana Trial Rule 60 is within the discretion of the trial court.” Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 72 (Ind. 2006). “Accordingly, we review a trial court's ruling on Rule 60 motions for abuse of discretion.” Id.

[15] In relevant part, Trial Rule 60(B) provides that

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party ․ from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect;

****

(8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).

The motion shall be filed within a reasonable time for reasons (5), (6), (7), and (8), and not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken for reasons (1), (2), (3), and (4). A movant filing a motion for reasons (1), (2), (3), (4), and (8) must allege a meritorious claim or defense.

Petitioner moved for “relief under Ind. Trial Rule 60” on February 10, 2026, and the trial court denied his request. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 65. Petitioner's request restated his argument that the trial court should not have ordered him to pay Respondent's attorney's fees and restated his argument from the first appeal that he had been denied the opportunity to present his case in a complete and full manner.

[16] To the extent that Petitioner's claim in this regard is based upon his assertion that he was denied the opportunity to fully present his case below, we rejected this assertion in the first appeal. See J.K.-P., 2025 WL 2102424 at *4–5. As such, this assertion is barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The law-of-the-case doctrine “operate[s] to preclude litigation regarding matters that have already been litigated.” In re Adoption of Baby W., 796 N.E.2d 364, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “Specifically, the law-of-the-case doctrine provides that an appellate court's determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the court on appeal in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts.” Id.

The law-of-the-case doctrine stands for the proposition that: [f]acts established at one stage of a proceeding, which were part of an issue on which judgment was entered and appeal taken, are unalterably and finally established as part of the law of the case and may not be relitigated at a subsequent stage.

Id. (brackets added, internal quotation omitted). Petitioner argues that he has demonstrated mistake, surprise, and/or excusable neglect. Petitioner, however, has failed to point to reasons beyond those covered by the law-of-the-case doctrine that he claims would warrant relief under Trial Rule 60(B). As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's request for Trial Rule 60 relief.

IV. Petitioner's Bias Argument is Barred by the Law-of-the-Case Doctrine

[17] Petitioner last contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for the trial judge to recuse herself, claiming that the cumulative effect of the trial court's actions would lead a reasonable person to conclude that it was biased against him. We denied a substantially similar claim in the parties’ first appeal. See J.K.-P., 2025 WL 2102424 at *3. Petitioner does not appear to have raised any new concerns that would substantially differentiate his current claim of bias from the claim that we previously rejected. As such, our prior ruling established the law-of-the-case on this issue and Petitioner is barred from relitigating this issue in the instant appeal. In re Adoption of Baby W., 796 N.E.2d at 372.

[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petitioner has requested oral argument and that we take judicial notice of the related custody proceedings. In an order handed down simultaneously with this memorandum decision, we deny Petitioner's request for an oral argument and grant his request that we take judicial notice of the related proceedings.

2.   We are also unconvinced that Petitioner was prejudiced by the trial court's action simply because he chose to forego filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.