Brandon Devin Williams, Appellant/Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee/Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In July of 2025, Laura Durham and Brandon Williams were cohabitating when, after a night of drinking, Williams beat her during an argument. The State charged Williams with Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury. A jury found Williams guilty of the Level 6 felony charge, and the trial court sentenced him to two years of incarceration. Williams contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction and that the jury's verdict is fatally inconsistent. Because we disagree with both contentions, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In July of 2025, Durham and Williams were living together in a Muncie apartment. On July 22, 2025, Durham and Williams ate dinner and drank alcohol, running out of alcohol around 10:30 p.m. After the pair obtained more alcohol, they resumed drinking and watched a movie. At some point, an argument about a telephone call became heated, and Williams started punching Durham in the face. Durham managed to escape the apartment and run to her truck, but Williams caught up to her as she was trying to close the door. Williams slammed Durham's head into the steering wheel multiple times and pulled her from the truck. Durham, believing that Williams had left, returned to her apartment, where she locked herself in her bedroom.

[3] At around 6:00 or 7:00 the next morning, Durham went to Burger King, where she worked. Police were summoned, and the responding officer saw that Durham had blood on her clothing and that “her left eye [․] was already swelled shut or getting there, and her nose was also swelled up and face was swelled up.” Tr. Vol. II p. 73. Durham also had a puncture wound on her right arm. Several hours later, Durham went to the hospital, where she was examined, diagnosed with a concussion, and given morphine. Durham spoke again with police at the hospital, identifying Williams as her assailant, which she had not done previously. Durham later testified about the lasting effects of her injuries: “I have headaches every day and I get lightheaded and I feel like I'm gonna pass out at times. That's what I go through every day.” Tr. Vol. II p. 47.

[4] On July 29, 2025, the State charged Williams with Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury. On November 5, 2025, a jury found Williams guilty of the Level 6 felony but not guilty of Level 5 felony. On November 24, 2025, the trial court sentenced Williams to two years of incarceration.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Williams contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). “All probative evidence, even where it might be conflicting, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment of conviction.” C.S. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 668, 679 (Ind. 2014). “[A]ppellate courts must affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 n.4 (Ind. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Reversal is warranted only if the defendant can show that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty on the evidence in the record. McAlpin v. State, 80 N.E.3d 157, 161 (Ind. 2017). To convict Williams of domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6 felony, the State was required to show that Williams had knowingly touched Durham, who was a family or household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner resulting in moderate bodily injury to her. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a), - 1.3(b)(3).

[6] Williams contends only that Durham's testimony cannot be believed and that the jury's finding that he had committed Level 6 felony domestic battery was fatally inconsistent with its finding that he had not committed Level 5 felony domestic battery. As to Durham's testimony, the jury heard her testimony regarding the incident as well as her testimony that she had been drinking at the time and was an occasional alcoholic. Whether and to what extent a witness's use of intoxicants affects the reliability of their testimony is a question for the jury to answer. See Woodford v. State, 273 Ind. 487, 492, 405 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1980) (“However, Boone's ingestion of these drugs did not render his testimony inadmissible; rather, it merely affected the weight and credibility to be assigned to his testimony by the jury.”). The jury weighed this evidence as it saw fit, and we will not second-guess it. This argument is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Suggs, 51 N.E.3d at 1193.

[7] As for Williams's second argument, he argues, without further elaboration, that the jury's guilty verdict for Level 6 felony domestic battery is fatally inconsistent with its not-guilty verdict for Level 5 felony domestic battery. As the State points out, however, “[j]ury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable.” Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). In any event, there is nothing inconsistent about the jury's verdicts, as the jury clearly found that Williams had caused the moderate bodily injury necessary to prove a Level 6 felony domestic battery but not the serious bodily injury required to prove the Level 5 felony. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a), -1.3(c)(1). Williams has failed to convince us that his conviction is either supported by insufficient evidence or that the jury's verdict is fatally inconsistent.

[8] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bradford, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Felix, J., concur.