J.S., et al., Appellants-Petitioners v. Review Board, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.J. and J.S. (collectively, Claimants) received a combination of state and federally funded unemployment benefits during the COVID pandemic. Years later, the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the Department) determined that Claimants were not eligible for some of the unemployment benefits they had received and, therefore, had been overpaid. Claimants each applied for a waiver of the requirement to repay their overpaid benefits, but their requests were denied. Claimants both appealed the initial waiver determinations to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following hearings before separate ALJs, each ALJ ruled that K.J. and J.S. were not eligible for a waiver. Claimants then sought review by the Unemployment Insurance Review Board (the Review Board), which adopted the ALJ's findings, conclusions, and decisions denying the Claimants’ requests for waiver of their respective obligations for repayment.

[2] In this consolidated appeal, Claimants challenge the decisions of the Review Board affirming the decisions of each ALJ that neither of them was without fault in creating the overpayment, and therefore, neither was eligible for a waiver of overpaid benefits under state or federal law. Claimants present six issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Did the Department apply the proper standard when determining that Claimants were not “without fault”?

2. Is the Department statutorily foreclosed from collecting Claimants’ overpayments because it did not send overpayment notices in within the statutory timeframe?

3. Is the Department equitably estopped from requiring repayment from K.J. because it failed to act on information in its possession?

4. Was K.J. denied a fair hearing when she was not permitted to develop the record regarding the full processing of her unemployment claim?

[3] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

K.J.

[4] In 2020, K.J. was self-employed at a daycare and worked as an instructional assistant at a public school (School Employer). After the COVID pandemic began, K.J. remained employed by School Employer but lost her job at the daycare and did not return to her employment there. As a school employee, K.J. worked and was paid by School Employer only when school was in session; she did not receive pay during school breaks in the fall, spring, and summer.

[5] In May 2020, after she was laid off by the daycare, K.J. filed for unemployment insurance benefits with the Department. In her initial application for benefits and for the second week she claimed unemployment, K.J. reported that she remained employed by School Employer and listed her rate of pay as $17.63 per hour. K.J. Exhibits Vol. 1 at 113. She also indicated that her “last day of work” with School Employer as “05/15/2020.”¹ Under employment history, K.J. did not mention her employment by the daycare.

[6] The initial application contained a Benefit Rights Agreement (the Agreement), which stated:

I understand that I must report all earnings from employer or self-employment, regardless of source, including:

- regular payroll

- part-time employment

- temporary employment

- payments made in cash

- payments made by some other method (room and board, trading labor, being given a material item)

Id. at 115. The Agreement further advised K.J. that, if she worked during a week in which she claimed benefits, she was required to “report that work and the gross amount of the earnings ․ on the voucher for the week that the work was performed, regardless of when the earnings will be paid.” Id. K.J. electronically initialed the advisements in the Agreement, indicating that she read and understood the requirements.

[7] On June 9, 2020, the Department issued a determination that K.J. was not eligible for unemployment benefits based on the information contained in her initial application. Specifically, the Department determined that K.J.’s employment with School Employer was expected to resume “when the recess ends.” K.J. Exhibits Vol. 3 at 188. K.J. contacted the Department and explained that she was trying to establish eligibility based on the loss of her self-employment with the daycare, which was not reflected on the initial application. K.J. was advised to complete an application for Federal Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits.

[8] As a condition of receiving unemployment benefits, K.J. was required to submit weekly vouchers reporting her earnings for the weeks she was seeking unemployment benefits. Each voucher contained language that required K.J. to “certify” that she had “reported any and all work, earnings, and self-employment activity for this week, even though [she] may not have yet been paid.” K.J. Exhibits Vol. 1 at 122. Each voucher also included the following language:

I understand making false statements on this weekly unemployment claim is unlawful and I could be subject to penalties including criminal prosecution. I am aware that if I knowingly fail to disclose information or give false statements to receive unemployment benefits, I may lose my unemployment benefits, be required to repay benefits received improperly with interest and penalty, and may be subject to civil and criminal prosecution.

Id. K.J. electronically signed or initialed these advisements on her weekly vouchers. See, e.g., Id. at 118, 122.

[9] When K.J.’s employment resumed with School Employer at the end of July 2020, K.J. changed the way she completed her weekly vouchers to reflect only the loss of earnings from her self-employed position with the daycare. Despite the advisements she had received, K.J. did not report that she still worked for School Employer and earned a wage during periods when school was in session. K.J. explained that she believed that she was not required to report earnings from School Employer because she was only seeking unemployment benefits for loss of her part-time employment with the daycare.

[10] The Department approved K.J. for state unemployment insurance benefits, along with COVID emergency unemployment assistance through the federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). K.J. received CARES Act benefits from different programs: Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC), PUA, Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC), and Mixed Earner Unemployment Compensation (MEUC) (collectively, Federal Benefits). K.J. received CARES Act payments totaling $12,611, broken down by program as follows:

•PEUC—$1,323

•PUA—$1,288

•MEUC—$1,600

•FPUC—$8,400

Id. at 106.

[11] At some point, a claims investigator from the Department contacted School Employer as part of the Department's review of K.J.’s benefits and requested weekly paystubs, payroll information, and earnings summaries for K.J. for weeks ending between March 8, 2020, to May 22, 2021. On or about September 20, 2024, the School Employer provided the Department with the requested information, which showed that, when school was in session during the requested timeframe, K.J. usually worked between 30 and 80 hours per pay period and brought home gross pay ranging from $394.22 to $1,475.43.

[12] On October 8, 2024, the Department issued three Determinations of Eligibility (the Determinations) regarding the deductible income that K.J. received while claiming unemployment benefits. With each Determination, the Department notified K.J. that she had earned more than the weekly benefit amount for the specified weeks. As a result, the Department retroactively suspended K.J.’s benefits for those weeks. K.J. was advised that the Determinations “may result in an overpayment of benefits.” Id. at 65, 68, 70.

[13] The following day, the Department issued three notices of overpayment of unemployment benefits for the respective periods. After reviewing K.J.’s earnings information, the Department concluded that K.J. had been overpaid unemployment benefits in the amount of $15,992, which included $3,381 in state benefits and $12,611 in various Federal Benefits.

[14] On February 25, 2025, K.J. submitted an overpayment waiver request to the Department. On July 23, 2025, the Department issued a Determination of Waiver Eligibility, finding that K.J. did not meet the statutory requirements for a repayment waiver for the benefits she received. Specifically, the Department noted that K.J. was “not considered to be without fault” for the overpayment because she “did not report wages” earned during the applicable time periods. Id. at 62. The Department denied K.J.’s request for a waiver and ruled that K.J. was “liable for overpayment in the amount of $12,611.00.”² Id. at 63.

[15] K.J. appealed the Department's denial of her waiver request to an ALJ. At the hearing, K.J. testified that she only intended to collect partial unemployment insurance benefits for the wages lost because of being laid off from the daycare. She admitted that she failed to disclose wages from School Employer in her weekly vouchers, explaining that she did not think she needed to provide such information because she “wasn't filing off of” her “normal job” at School Employer. Transcript at 47. K.J. testified that she did not disclose any wages because she “didn't have any wages for [her] self-employment” with the daycare. Id. at 46. K.J. also testified that she had previously received “wrong information” from Department employees about how to seek unemployment for her part-time, self-employment at the daycare. Id. at 52. And, once she was approved for benefits, K.J. believed “nothing was wrong” and used the benefit payments to sign a lease on a new apartment and “catch up on [her] bills.” Id. at 61.

[16] During closing arguments, K.J. asserted that she was not at fault for the overpayment of benefits because the Department “delayed action on the information it had” by not pursuing collection of the overpayment until October 2024 and that the inaccurate information K.J. provided was “due to conflicting, changing, or confusing information and instructions from” the Department. Id. at 67. K.J. also argued that equitable estoppel barred the Department from denying the waiver because she relied on the Department's representations to her detriment when obtaining her new lease. She maintained that the Department had ample information that she was still working for School Employer when it processed her benefits, and yet, the Department did not issue an overpayment notice for four years. K.J. argued:

It's fundamentally unfair for the government to induce reliance and then penalize the person for that reliance. [K.J.] relied on the payment of benefits she received to pay her rent and entered into a new lease. She had every reason to believe the [Department]’s payment of benefits to her was correct, and she detrimentally relied on the determination by using and accepting the benefits for their intended humanitarian purpose.

Id. at 69.

[17] On November 26, 2026, the ALJ issued a decision in which it rejected K.J.’s claims and affirmed the Department's fault determination. In the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the ALJ found that K.J. misreported her earnings even though she “initialed she had read the Claimant Handbook and that she had the link to the handbook” and “swore each time she filed a voucher that she was reporting all income she had received for the week.” K.J. Appendix Vol. 2 at 4. (capitalization corrected). The ALJ did not accept K.J.’s arguments that she was confused by changes to the Claimant Handbook, noting that although changes had been made to the Claimant Handbook during the relevant time period, the “section entitled ‘Claim Voucher’ [was] the same in both versions,” making “any difference in the handbooks [ ] irrelevant to how Claimant reported wages when filing her vouchers.” Id. at 5. The ALJ also found that equitable estoppel did not apply to K.J.:

Reliance on misinformation provided by a government employee is not a basis for estoppel because the government could be precluded from functioning if it were bound by its employees’ unauthorized representations. Courts are reluctant to apply estoppel against the government where a party claiming to have been ignorant of the facts had access to the correct information.

Id. at 3. The ALJ found that K.J. was at fault for the receipt of overpaid benefits and therefore remained liable for the overpayments. On December 10, 2025, the Review Board adopted the ALJ's decision. K.J. now appeals.

J.S.

[18] J.S. is an individual with a documented disability recognized by the Social Security Administration. Prior to the COVID pandemic, J.S. worked as a full-time home health aid with a home health provider (Home Health Employer), earning approximately $11.35 an hour. In March 2020, J.S. applied for and was found eligible for two types of unemployment benefits: State Unemployment Insurance benefits (UI) and FPUC. In his initial application for unemployment benefits, J.S. indicated that he was disabled and noted that he received disability pay and social security disability. He also indicated that he was applying for unemployment because his employer had reduced his hours due to the COVID pandemic and that the “latest date of separation from [his] employer” was March 18, 2020. J.S. Exhibits Vol. 1 at 131.

[19] Like K.J., J.S.’s unemployment application contained the Agreement that required J.S. to initial each section to indicate his understanding thereof before he could submit the application. J.S. affixed his initials to the section that stated he understood that he was required to “report all earnings from employment or self-employment regardless of source, including regular payroll, part-time employment, temporary employment, payments made in cash, payments made by some other method.” Id. at 133. J.S. also initialed the section in which he acknowledged that if he worked during a week in which he claimed benefits, he was required to report on his voucher any work for that week and the gross amount of his earnings that he received or would receive at some future date regardless of when the earnings would be paid.

[20] Although he initially indicated that he was employed by Home Health Employer, on subsequent weekly vouchers, J.S. failed to report that he continued to be employed by Home Health Employer and he did not report any work or earnings for Home Health Employer for the weeks ending April 4, 2020, through September 26, 2020, and March 28, 2021, through September 25, 2021.³ In doing so, J.S. maintains that he followed the directions of Home Health Employer and a union representative. With each voucher, J.S. certified that he “reported any and all work, earnings, and self-employment activity for this week, even though [he] may not have yet been paid.” See, e.g., Id. at 136. J.S. also believed that Home Health Employer reported weekly to the Department the number of hours he worked, further confusing him about what he was supposed to report on his weekly vouchers. Contradicting J.S.’s assertions in his weekly vouchers, Home Health Employer submitted quarterly records to the Department indicating that J.S. earned $13.10 per hour and worked 875 hours during the first period and 910 hours during the second, which is equivalent to J.S. having worked 35 hours per week.

[21] Because J.S. reported no earnings on his weekly vouchers, he received a total of $10,218 in UI and $17,100 in FPUC for the weeks he was working and received $459 in weekly gross pay.⁴ After the Department discovered the inconsistency between J.S.’s vouchers and the work reported by Home Health Employer, the Department issued two Determinations of Eligibility, dated May 22, 2023, informing J.S. that he worked and earned wages from Home Health Employer that exceeded his weekly benefit amount. The Department therefore suspended J.S.’s unemployment benefits for the affected time periods.

[22] J.S. initially appealed the Determinations of Eligibility, but on July 31, 2025, he notified the ALJ of his intent to withdraw his appeals. J.S. did not request reinstatement of the appeals, and thus, the Determinations of Eligibility became final seven days after J.S. withdrew his appeals.

[23] Thereafter, J.S. filed a request for the Department to waive his financial liability stemming from the overpayment. In his waiver request, J.S. disputed the earnings Home Health Employer reported for him in 2020 and 2021 and disputed his identity as the individual who sought unemployment benefits during those times, suggesting that the overpayment may have resulted from “issues with [his] ex wife . . and a gentleman ․ using [his] identity and taking out credit cards in [his] name[ ].” J.S. Exhibits Vol. 1 at 52.

[24] On September 4, 2025, the Department issued a Determination of Waiver Eligibility, denying J.S.’s waiver request. Specifically, the Department determined that J.S. was “not considered to be without fault for the overpayment” and did “not meet the requirements of IC 22-4-13-1(i)” or “the requirements of CARES Act 2104(f)(2)” to be eligible for a waiver under state or federal law due to his failure to report deductible income. Id. at 63.

[25] On October 28, 2025, J.S. sought administrative review of the Department's denial of his waiver request before an ALJ.⁵ At the waiver hearing, J.S. presented an evaluation conducted in 2008 for Social Security Disability and another conducted in 2016 as evidence of his diminished cognitive abilities. The ALJ issued a decision on November 17, 2025, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, that affirmed the Department's denial of J.S.’s overpayment waiver. On December 5, 2025, the Department's Review Board adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions and affirmed the ALJ's decision. J.S. now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

Standard of Review

[26] Our review of decisions of the Review Board is three-fold. As this court has explained, in Review Board cases, “(1) findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed questions of law and fact—ultimate facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal propositions are reviewed for correctness.” Z.C. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 213 N.E.3d 1101, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Recker v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136. 1139 (Ind. 2011)). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses; rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board's findings. Id. (citing J.M. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 975 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2012)). Further, we will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. Id.

1. Determination of Fault

[27] When Congress passed the CARES Act, Congress anticipated that some cases would result in overpayment of such emergency benefits and created mechanisms for the state agencies responsible for administering its new programs to recoup overspent dollars. 15 U.S.C. § 9025(e)(2) and the other federal CARES Act benefits statutes provide that once an individual is found to owe an overpayment, “the State shall require such individuals to repay the amounts of such” unemployment compensation, unless it elects to “waive such repayment.” See also 15 U.S.C. § 9021(d)(4) (stating that the State “shall require”); 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2) (same). Congress conditioned the allocation of repayment waivers on the claimant acting “without fault” and on repayment being “contrary to equity and good conscience.” 15 U.S.C. § 9025(e)(2) (PEUC); 15 U.S.C. § 9021(d)(4) (PUA); 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2) (MEUC).

[28] Indiana's state unemployment insurance benefits work similarly to their federal counterparts. Ind. Code § 22-4-13-1(a) states:

Whenever an individual receives benefits or extended benefits to which the individual is not entitled under this article or the unemployment insurance law of the United States, the department shall establish that an overpayment has occurred by issuing a determination of eligibility and shall establish the amount of the overpayment.

Pursuant to state law, once an overpayment determination is made, the individual claimant “is liable to repay the established amount of the overpayment.” I.C. § 22-4-13-1(b). And like Congress, the General Assembly also gave the Department the discretion to waive a claimant's financial liability for an overpayment in certain circumstances. I.C. § 22-4-13-1(i) provides:

Liability for repayment of benefits paid to an individual for any week may be waived upon the request of the individual if:

(1) payment of the benefits was without fault of the individual, regardless of intent; and

(2) repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience.

(Emphasis supplied).

[29] Here, the Review Board affirmed the ALJs’ decisions that neither K.J. nor J.S. met the requirements for a waiver of their liability because neither was without fault regarding the overpayment of unemployment benefits. Specifically, it was found that Claimants did not report wages earned during periods they also sought unemployment benefits.

[30] The Review Board's conclusions that Claimants are not eligible for a repayment waiver of their unemployment benefits presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review for reasonableness.⁶ Z.C., 213 N.E.3d at 1107. We further note that decisions about whether to award or deny overpayment waivers fall within the Department's discretion, as the waiver statutes provide that the Department “may waive”—but is not required to waive—repayment. See I.C. § 22-4-13-1(i); 15 U.S.C. § 9025(e)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 9021(d)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2). See also Welch v. 1106 Traub Tr., 204 N.E.3d 243, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (recognizing that the use of permissive language, such as “may,” carries discretionary import). But even before the Department can exercise its discretion, a claimant must meet the eligibility requirements set out above.

[31] On appeal, Claimants argue that the Department failed to apply the governing “without fault” standard when denying their requests for overpayment waivers. They direct us to an Unemployment Insurance Program Letter (the Letter) issued by the U.S. Department of Labor that provides guidance as to circumstances under which a state may waive recovery of unemployment benefits. In short, the Letter advises that it is appropriate to waive recovery of overpayment on an individual, case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances. Claimants argue that here, the Department applied a narrow inquiry and based the denial of their waiver requests solely on the fact that both failed to report earned wages on their weekly vouchers; they assert that had the Department undertaken a broader inquiry and considered their respective circumstances, such would have dictated that the Department grant their waiver requests.

[32] When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, “our primary goal is to ascertain the legislature's intent[,] ․ look[ing] first to the statutory language itself.” Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). If the legislature has not defined a word, we give the word its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, consulting English language dictionaries when helpful in determining that meaning. State v. Hancock, 65 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2016).

[33] As a matter of statutory interpretation, the term “without fault” is plain, unambiguous, and means that a claimant must lack responsibility for the action, inaction, or mistake that caused an unemployment overpayment before being deemed eligible for an overpayment waiver. The plain language of the waiver statutes provides that any fault on the claimant's part is enough to disqualify him or her from receiving an overpayment waiver, including, as the Department found in K.J. and J.S.’s cases, misreporting earnings information while receiving unemployment benefits. See Z.C., 213 N.E.3d at 1107 (affirming reasonableness of the Review Board's denial of a waiver where claimant's incorrect reporting of wages constituted “fault” for the overpayment of benefits).

[34] As to Claimants, they both offered their explanations as to why they did not report earned income. K.J. explained that she did not report her earned wages from School Employer because she was only seeking unemployment benefits for the loss of her job at the daycare. She also claimed to have received wrong information from Department employees about how to pursue unemployment benefits for the loss of part-time self-employment. J.S. testified before the ALJ that he was instructed by his employer to omit his earned wages, disputed the earnings his employer reported, and disputed his identity as the individual who sought unemployment, suggesting that his ex-wife may have made such requests. J.S. also pointed out his disability status and explained that he has profound hearing loss and multiple intellectual challenges.

[35] In both cases, the ALJs set out findings of fact in which they acknowledged the arguments presented by K.J. and J.S. respectively. The ALJs further found that K.J. and J.S. were advised numerous times to report all wages and they both initialed and/or signed such advisements indicating their understanding thereof and that K.J. and J.S. had also affixed their initials next to express statements certifying that they had reported all wages. In both cases, the ALJ who heard the appeal rejected K.J.’s and J.S.’s respective arguments and concluded that K.J. and J.S. were not without fault because they did not report wages. Clearly, the ALJs considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the failure to report all of their earned wages when seeking unemployment benefits. The Review Board adopted the findings and conclusions issued by the ALJs.

[36] Contrary to Claimants’ arguments on appeal, it is clear that the individual circumstances of each case were considered in deciding whether to grant K.J.’s and J.S.’s requests to waive their repayment obligations. Further, whether to grant a waiver request is a matter with the Department's discretion. And, finally, having considered the circumstances, we cannot say that the Review Board's decisions denying the requested waivers are unreasonable. See Z.C., 213 N.E.3d at 1107 (affirming the reasonableness of a waiver denial).⁷

2. Statutory Time Restiction

[37] Claimants argue that the Department was statutorily foreclosed from collecting overpayments because the Department did not timely notify them of possible overpayment. I.C. § 22-4-13-1(a) establishes the deadlines for the Department to issue notices of overpayment based on the discovery that a claimant has been paid benefits in excess of the amounts they are legally entitled to receive. Z.C., 213 N.E.3d at 1110. For an individual who fails to report wages received during a week in which benefits were paid to them, “the department has four (4) years from the date of the department's discovery of the overpayment to send notification to the individual of possible overpayment.” I.C. § 22-4-13-1(a)(1).

[38] K.J. and J.S. have waived this argument for our review by failing to raise such before the Department. T.C. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 930 N.E.2d 29, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (providing that “a party who fails to raise an issue before an administrative body has waived the issue on appeal”) (quoting Cunningham v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 913 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[39] Waiver notwithstanding, the record does not support their assertion that the Department discovered their overpayments more than four years ago. The Department issued the Determinations of Eligibility in March 2023 and October 2024 after it was discovered that Claimants had failed to report deductible income, resulting in the Department suspending their unemployment benefits. The suspension of benefits resulted in the determination that Claimants had been overpaid benefits. The Department's overpayment notices were issued in October 2024 for K.J. and May 2025 and August 2025 for J.S., well within the four-year deadline provided by statute.

[40] Claimants attempt to reframe the issue by arguing that the Department “should have discovered the wage reporting issue” soon after Claimants sought unemployment benefits and that this triggered the time limit under I.C. § 22-4-13-1(a)(1). The wage reporting issue, however, is not the triggering event under the statute. The overpayment determination did not occur until the Department suspended Claimants’ benefits and a recalculation was completed. The triggering event, i.e., the discovery of the overpayment, did not occur until after the Department issued the Determination of Eligibility, which occurred in 2023 and 2024. The Department was not constrained from seeking repayment of unemployment benefits by statutory time constraints.

3. Equitable Estoppel

[41] K.J. argues that the Department is equitably estopped from establishing an overpayment against her because the Department had ample information and opportunity to notify her that she was not eligible for unemployment benefits in a timely manner. K.J. asserts that she relied on the Department's silence to her detriment in that she signed a new lease and used the unemployment benefits she received to pay bills.

[42] As a general matter, government entities are not subject to equitable estoppel. Equicor Dev., Inc. v. Westfield-Washington Twp. Plan Comm'n, 758 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. 2001). Indeed, we have held that equitable estoppel is generally inapplicable when asserted against a government actor based on a party's “reliance on misinformation provided by a government employee.” DenniStarr Envtl., Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 741 N.E.2d 1284, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. In certain situations, however, the government may be estopped when the party asserting estoppel “has detrimentally relied on the governmental entity's affirmative assertion or on its silence where there was a duty to speak.” Equicor, 758 N.E.2d at 39.

[43] K.J. points out that she started out completing her weekly vouchers in the way the Department considered correct. It was only after she received the June 9, 2020 determination, which stated her school wages could not be used, along with a verbal instruction from Department representatives to complete a PUA application that she started to complete her weekly vouchers differently. K.J. also points out that School Employer reported to the Department four separate times that she was still employed between May 27, 2020 and April 15, 2021, and thus, such information was known to the Department. K.J. maintains that if the Department had acted promptly on the information in its possession, her overpayment would be much lower than it is.

[44] K.J.’s theory of estoppel centers on a contention that (1) unidentified staff from the Department gave her erroneous information about how to apply for partial unemployment benefits after she was laid off from the daycare; and (2) she relied on the Department's decision to pay out benefits to her detriment when she put those funds toward rent and a new lease.

[45] Turning again to Z.C., this Court held that estoppel does not apply when government actors allegedly provide mistaken information about a claimant's unemployment insurance benefits. The Z.C. court rejected a claimant's assertion that the Department was estopped from denying his waiver request because government employees violated a fiduciary duty by giving him “misguidance and misinterpretations” regarding the Claimant Handbook. 213 N.E.3d at 1107.

[46] K.J.’s estoppel argument essentially boils down to a contention that she relied on misinformation provided by state actors to her detriment, which is precisely the kind of claim that the Z.C. court held is “not a basis for estoppel.” Id. at 1108. Here, K.J. had access to correct information through the Claimant Handbook, the Agreement that was contained in her application for benefits, and her weekly vouchers about how to report her weekly earnings. K.J. signed/initialed these instructions acknowledging her understanding thereof and yet, she still failed to report her work and earnings for School Employer.

4. Due Process

[47] K.J. argues that the ALJ deprived her of the opportunity to present evidence in her defense and that the ALJ declined to make findings of fact on “key issues central to the waiver analysis.” Appellant's Brief at 37.

[48] Procedural due process “ensures that, in different situations entailing different procedures, individuals are guaranteed government proceedings which are fair and impartial.” Clifft v. Ind. Dep't of St. Revenue, 660 N.E.2d 310, 318 (Ind. 1995). Although unemployment hearings are informal and ALJs retain jurisdiction over evidentiary matters, it remains that the proceeding must be fair. Ind. Code § 22-4-17-3 (noting that an ALJ is to provide notice and afford the parties “a reasonable opportunity for [a] fair hearing”).

[49] K.J. argues that she was denied the opportunity to present evidence that was necessary for meaningful consideration of her claim that she was entitled to a repayment waiver. She asserts that she was not permitted to testify as to why she completed her weekly vouchers the way she did. The ALJ determined that such evidence went to her intent, which was irrelevant to the matter at hand. K.J. does not further explain how such limitation on her testimony amounts to a denial of due process.

[50] K.J. also argues that the ALJ limited evidence to isolated weeks of overpayment and excluded broader evidence of claim processing by the Department. She baldly asserts that such was “directly relevant to the governing waiver standard” and whether she was at fault and how she understood the Department's instructions. Appellants’ Brief at 36. K.J. fails to explain, however, how such amounts to fundamental unfairness.

[51] The procedures implemented by the ALJ satisfied the core requirements of procedural due process. K.J. appeared at the hearing before the ALJ, where she was represented by counsel and had the opportunity to testify, to present her own evidence, and to confront the Department's witnesses against her. Although the ALJ interjected during K.J.’s testimony about her application for unemployment benefits and urged counsel to move on to a different topic, she did so after allowing counsel to ask several questions about the issue and only because she found the testimony to be irrelevant as the line of questioning about K.J.’s understanding went to intent. As noted above, I.C. § 22-4-13-1(i)(1) provides that the Department must deny a repayment waiver if the claimant is at fault “regardless of intent.” K.J.’s understanding about how to apply for benefits was not at issue with respect to the waiver and had no tendency to make her any more or less at fault for the overpayment that resulted from her misreported earnings. See Terex-Telelect, Inc. v. Wade, 59 N.E.3d 298, 304 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (defining relevant evidence). And even though the ALJ voiced similar concerns when K.J. offered exhibits related to her understanding about her benefits application, she has not shown that the ALJ's remarks impeded her ability to present her case. The ALJ ultimately admitted most, if not all, of the exhibits K.J. proffered and considered her defenses when issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law.

[52] K.J. also argues that ALJ's decision is “independently deficient because it fails to include adequate findings of fact.” Appellants’ Brief at 37. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ did not “meaningfully address the evidence she submitted, does not grapple with how she reported her employment, and omits findings on key issues central to the wavier analysis.” Id. K.J.’s argument in this regard fails. Due process guarantees K.J. a right to present evidence, not a right for the fact finder to agree with her. The mere fact that the ALJ declined to consider “how [K.J.] reported her unemployment” and make certain findings on issues that K.J. advanced, does not amount to a violation of due process. Id.

[53] In summary, the Department applied the proper standard for determining that Claimants were not without fault as such pertains to their requests for waiver of the requirement that they repay the unemployment benefits. The Department timely notified Claimants of the possibility of overpayment of benefits and was therefore not foreclosed from seeking repayment of such benefits. Equitable estoppel does not apply to bar the Department's repayment demand. And, finally, K.J. was not denied due process in presenting her case.

[54] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   By the third week for which she was claiming unemployment, K.J. was not working for or earning wages from School Employer because the school system had started summer break.

2.   The ALJ found, and K.J. does not dispute, that her state unemployment insurance benefits are not waivable because her employer is reimbursable.

3.   Home Health Employer filed a notice with the Department on April 1, 2020, indicating that J.S. separated from employment and noting that the separation was “disaster related” and that his total wages earned after March 29, 2020 was $0. J.S. Exhibits Vol. 1 at 85. They submitted another separation response regarding J.S. on March 29, 2021, that indicated J.S. was “laid off/lack of work” and that his total wages earned after March 28, 2021 was $0. Id. at 86.

4.   Initially, the total overpayment was calculated as $27,318 in overpaid UI and FPUC benefits. After applying additional adjustments and offsets to J.S.’s overpayment, the total amount of his overpayment was reduced to $26,580.

5.   The Determination of Waiver Eligibility was mailed to an old address for J.S. Although he had put in a forward mail request with the post office, this Determination was never forwarded to his new address. J.S. maintains that he was unaware of the denial of his waiver request until October 10, 2025, when he received information regarding garnishment. J.S. and his counsel inquired further and on October 14, 2025, a Department representative notified J.S. of the September 4 Determination. The ALJ determined that under the circumstances, J.S. timely sought review of denial of his request for wavier.

6.   K.J. does not argue that she is entitled to a repayment waiver for overpaid State benefits. Indeed, her employer elected to make payments in lieu of contributions to the State unemployment insurance benefit fund thereby choosing to be classified as a “reimbursable employer.” K.J. Exhibits Vol. 1at 11. Under such circumstances, a request for a repayment waiver will not be considered. I.C. § 22-4-13-1(i), (l).

7.   J.S.’s attempt to distinguish Z.C. due to a 2025 amendment to Indiana's overpayment waiver statute is unavailing. While the General Assembly amended the waiver statute in 2025 after Z.C. was handed down, the changes to the law did not alter the “without fault” standard. The General Assembly's 2025 amendments largely brought Indiana's state law into line with the CARES Act eligibility criteria that already existed under federal law when this court decided Z.C. Compare I.C. § 22-4-13-1(i) (2021) with I.C. § 22-4-13-1(i) (2025) and, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f). The General Assembly accomplished this by eliminating an eligibility requirement limiting waivers to “benefits” received as “the result of payments made ․ because of an error by the employer or the department,” I.C. § 22-4-13-1(i) (2023), and rewriting the fault provision to allow a waiver if “payment of the benefits was without fault of the individual, regardless of intent,” I.C. § 22-4-13-1(i) (2025) (emphasis supplied). J.S. argues that the latest version of Indiana's statute required consideration of all the circumstances that led to the overpayment of unemployment benefits. As we already concluded, it is clear all of the circumstances J.S. put forth were considered in deciding whether J.S. was “without fault,” regardless of intent. In short, the statutory amendment does not necessitate a different result regarding the denial of J.S.’s request for waiver of his overpayment liability.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.