Arreon D. Neely, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] During a workplace confrontation, Arreon Neely punched his supervisor in the face, causing him to fall backward and hit his head on a forklift. As his supervisor lay on the ground, Neely continued to strike him. Neely was charged with and convicted of battery resulting in serious bodily injury. Neely appeals and raises three issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding certain evidence;

2. Whether the trial court deprived Neely of his right to present a complete defense by not permitting Neely to offer redirect testimony; and

3. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Neely's self-defense claim.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the early afternoon, on November 6, 2023, Neely was working at a factory in Goshen, Indiana. Corey Baker was Neely's supervisor. Baker believed Neely was slowing down production by not properly handling a metal container full of springs Neely had transported by forklift. The container was as “heavy as a car.” Tr. Vol. V at 29. Baker asked Neely, “what was going on,” and Neely told Baker to “shut up three times” in an “[o]ffensive” manner. Tr. Vol. IV at 117. Baker instructed Neely “to go home,” id., and he removed Neely's keys from the forklift.

[4] As Baker gave the keys to Neely, the altercation turned physical. According to one witness, when Baker took the keys from the forklift, Neely “charged at him,” and Baker put his hands up to “stop [Neely] from approaching him.” Tr. Vol. III at 171. Neely then punched Baker “[w]ith a closed fist on his face,” causing Baker to “f[a]ll back onto the sharp ends of the forklift.” Id. at 172. According to another witness, Neely “had walked away,” Tr. Vol. IV at 59, but “came ․ back” toward Baker, id. at 59–60. Baker “put his hand out” on Neely's “chest area” to signal, “you're in my bubble” and “back up,” but Neely “proceeded to hit” Baker in the face, causing him to fall. Id. at 60.

[5] After Baker collapsed to the ground, Neely in his own words “hit him again[,] knocking him out.” Tr. Vol. V at 45. Several witnesses later testified that Neely hit Baker at least two or three times on the ground. Baker suffered “lacerations on the head and lip,” Tr. Vol. III at 98, a broken nose, and a “blowout fracture” of the “bones around his [left] eye socket,” id. at 38. Baker's eye was “swollen to the point where it wouldn't even come open.” Id. at 85.

[6] After leaving the factory following the incident, Neely called 911 to “press charges” against Baker. State's Ex. 19.2 at 6:06–6:12. Neely told the dispatcher he was “already gone” and in “South Bend.” Id. at 6:40–6:42. When the dispatcher told Neely he was “not mapping in South Bend,” Neely hung up the phone. Id. at 6:59–7:14. Law enforcement officers began a search for Neely, and an officer near a park spotted him “come through the wood line,” which was “not a traveled area on foot.” Tr. Vol. IV at 8. When the officer got out of his vehicle, Neely “took off walking the other way,” and the officer “had to run and catch him.” Id.

[7] The State charged Neely with battery resulting in serious bodily injury as a Level 5 felony. A jury trial ensued, during which Neely sought to offer testimony from Jeffrey Albrecht, who did not witness the incident but had conversations with Neely concerning Baker before and after the incident took place. Neely sought to elicit testimony that (1) before the incident, Neely told Albrecht he “felt like he was talked down to and treated poorly in general” by Baker, Tr. Vol. V at 9–10; and (2) after the incident, Neely told Albrecht that Baker had “smacked his butt at one point in time,” id. at 11.¹ Neely sought to offer this testimony as character evidence pertaining to himself. The trial court excluded the testimony as inadmissible hearsay.²

[8] Throughout the trial, the trial court had to repeatedly admonish Neely not to interject, make “head gestures,” Tr. Vol. III at 66, and “silently communicat[e]” with the jury, id. Before Neely's testimony, the trial court again admonished him not to “stray from the questions that are asked,” otherwise he could “forfeit [the] right to testify.” Tr. Vol. IV at 206. Despite this instruction, during his testimony, Neely repeatedly interrupted the proceedings; offered testimony beyond the scope of the question before him; and “insinuat[ed]” that “things [were] being kept from [the jury] purposely,” Tr. Vol. V at 41. Based on Neely's misbehavior, the trial court ordered that, following the State's cross-examination of Neely, “there w[ould] be no redirect” examination, to which Neely did not object. Id. at 88.

[9] The substance of Neely's testimony was that he acted in self-defense. Neely claimed that Baker “pushed” him in the face “with [Neely's] keys.” Tr. Vol. V at 44. Neely then punched Baker, who “went limp,” id. at 44, hit the forklift, and “went down,” id. at 45. When Baker was on the ground, “he put his hand like to get up,” and Neely “made a split[-second] decision to defend [him]self” and hit Baker again. Id. Regarding his 911 call, Neely claimed he said he was in South Bend because he was “not from Goshen” and “had no idea where [he] was at.”³ Tr. Vol. V at 52. Neely did not attempt to testify about the conversations he had sought to admit through Albrecht.

[10] The jury found Neely guilty as charged. Neely was sentenced to six years in prison, with one year “authorize[d]” to be served in community corrections and one year suspended to probation. Tr. Vol. V at 176. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Excluding Albrecht's Testimony

[11] Neely claims that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Albrecht's testimony as hearsay. We generally review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 424 (2024). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[12] Neely argues that the trial court should not have excluded Albrecht's testimony as hearsay because “the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the underlying allegations” but rather to show “Neely's perception of the workplace environment, his fear of continued confrontation, and his state of mind leading up to the incident.” Appellant's Br. at 9. As an initial matter, Neely has waived this argument. “A party may not object on one ground at trial and raise a different ground on appeal.” White v. State, 772 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind. 2002) (citing Brown v. State, 728 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ind. 2000)). Moreover, “[i]t is well established that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” Alexander v. State, 275 N.E.3d 521, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (citing Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). At the trial, Neely only argued that Albrecht's testimony should be admitted as character evidence, and he did not argue that the testimony was not hearsay or fell under a hearsay exception. The argument Neely now raises was not raised during the trial and is therefore waived.

[13] Waiver notwithstanding, Neely's argument is unavailing. Whether Albrecht's testimony constitutes hearsay or falls under a hearsay exception is of no moment because the testimony fails to meet a more fundamental requirement— relevance. Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.” Id. 402. That is to say, even if evidence is not excludable as hearsay, it must still be relevant to be admitted. Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 919 (Ind. 2003).

[14] Neely argues Albrecht's testimony is relevant to his claim of self-defense because it shows the incident was not “an isolated workplace dispute” but rather “the culmination of an ongoing conflict.”⁴ Appellant's Br. at 10. Albrecht's testimony did not concern the incident with Baker at issue in this case. Rather, the testimony only concerned Neely's interactions with Baker at unspecified points beforehand. And nothing in Albrecht's testimony was relevant to the defense of self-defense ⁵ ; in other words, it did not concern Neely's beliefs regarding imminent use of force by Baker in the moments before Neely punched him. Albrecht's testimony was therefore not relevant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it.

2. Neely Has Waived His Argument that the Trial Court Deprived Him of the Right to Present a Complete Defense

[15] Neely next argues that the trial court abused its discretion and “deprived Neely of his constitutional right to present a complete defense” by not permitting Neely to offer redirect testimony.⁶ Appellant's Br. at 13. However, we cannot address this argument because Neely fails to present “cogent reasoning” in support of his argument, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). The purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).

[16] Here, Neely's argument is not cogent for several reasons. First, Neely does not address his failure to object to the trial court's decision to bar his redirect testimony. The failure to object at trial generally “waives appellate review” unless the defendant can show “fundamental error.” Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024). An error is only fundamental “if it ‘made a fair trial impossible’ or constituted a ‘clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process that presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’ ” Id. (quoting Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022)). Neely does not contest that his complete-defense argument is waived nor does he argue that the trial court's decision constitutes fundamental error.

[17] Second, Neely claims that by barring his redirect testimony, the trial court “foreclosed [Neely's] opportunity to clarify testimony, rehabilitate credibility, and address issues first emphasized during cross-examination.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Neely, however, does not identify what testimony he would have clarified, how he would rehabilitate his credibility, or which issues on cross-examination he would address. “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364). For these reasons, Neely has waived this argument.

3. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Rebut Neely's Self-Defense Claim

[18] Last, Neely argues that the State failed to rebut his self-defense claim. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence rebutting the defendant's self-defense claim, “the standard of review remains the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim.” Turner v. State, 253 N.E.3d 526, 533 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999)).

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[19] “Self-defense is a legal justification for what would otherwise be criminal conduct,” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 534 (citing Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021)), and is “a complete bar to conviction,” id. (citing Hill v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ind. 1986)). “Once the defendant invokes self-defense, the State has the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element of the justification.” Id. (citing Hill, 497 N.E.2d at 1064).

[20] Indiana's self-defense statute provides that a “person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). Importantly, to assert self-defense, the defendant must have “acted without fault.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 541 (quoting Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670). “A person who provokes, instigates, or participates willingly in the violence does not act without fault for the purposes of self-defense.” Id. (quoting Richardson v. State, 79 N.E.3d 958, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied). Additionally, “[t]he amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself must be proportionate to the urgency of the situation. When a person uses more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, the right of self-defense is extinguished.” Hall v. State, 231 N.E.3d 868, 874–75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Pinkston v. State, 821 N.E.2d 830, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied, 238 N.E.3d 639.

[21] Neely appears to argue that the State failed to disprove that he acted without fault. The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Neely punched Baker in the face after Baker put his hands up in a defensive position. After Baker hit the forklift and fell to the ground, Neely used disproportionate force by “hit[ting] him again[,] knocking him out.” Tr. Vol. V at 45. Neely's actions more resembled willful retaliation than self-defense; he merely requests that we reweigh evidence and find his testimony regarding the incident more credible than the jury did, which we cannot do. Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[22] Moreover, during the 911 call after the incident, Neely told the dispatcher he was in South Bend and hung up when the dispatcher pointed out he was not “mapping” there. State's Ex. 19.2 at 6:59–7:14. Later, after being spotted by law enforcement officers in a wooded area not generally “traveled ․ on foot,” Tr. Vol. IV at 8, Neely walked in the other direction, prompting the officer to chase him. The jury could have reasonably considered these actions as “[e]vidence of flight,” which is “circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.” Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Brown v. State, 563 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. 1990)). For these reasons, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Neely's claim of self-defense.

Conclusion

[23] In sum, the trial court did not err by excluding Albrecht's irrelevant testimony, Neely waived his argument that the trial court prevented him from presenting a complete defense, and the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Neely's claim of self-defense. We thus affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Albrecht also claimed Neely “felt his direct boss was blocking him from HR.” Tr. Vol. V at 11. It is not clear from the record that Albrecht's reference to Neely's “direct boss” meant Baker, but this does not affect our analysis. See infra Part 1.

2.   Albrecht was permitted to testify only to the fact that Neely called him after the incident.

3.   Neely had been working at the factory for approximately six months.

4.   Incidentally, this argument necessarily relies on Albrecht's testimony being offered for the truth of the matter asserted and thus hearsay, as the trial court found. See Evid. R. 801(c).

5.   Indiana's self-defense statute provides that a “person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c).

6.   Neely also argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to present a complete defense by excluding Albrecht's testimony. Notwithstanding the right to a complete defense, “[a] defendant must comply with the rules of evidence in presenting [his] case ‘to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.’ ” Crossland v. State, 256 N.E.3d 517, 528 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). As discussed above, Albrecht's testimony was not admissible under the Indiana Evidence Rules, so its exclusion did not impair Neely's right to present a complete defense.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.