J.E., Appellant-Petitioner v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

[1] J.E. appeals the decision of the Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (the Review Board) that he is not entitled to unemployment benefits. Because J.E. failed to provide a record for our review and to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, he has waived appellate review. Notwithstanding waiver, we affirm the Review Board's decision.

[2] J.E., who proceeds pro se, is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and, “therefore, must be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action.” Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “While we prefer to decide cases on their merits, alleged errors are waived where an appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors.” Id.

[3] Here, the only documents J.E. filed in this appeal were his brief and the appealed order. J.E. did not request a copy of the transcript of any hearings in this matter, so the clerk did not file one; and he did not file an appendix with any evidence for our review. It is the appellant's burden to provide us with an adequate record for us to consider the alleged error, and J.E. has failed to do so. See Wilhoite v. State, 7 N.E.3d 350, 354-55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (the appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record for meaningful review).

[4] In addition, J.E.’s substantial noncompliance with the Appellate Rules impedes our review. His Statement of Facts is in a numeric bullet point form and contains no citations to the appellate record, undoubtedly in part because J.E. did not provide a sufficient record. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) (Statement of Facts shall be in narrative form and supported by page references to the record on appeal). Substantively, J.E. refers to incidents with his former employer with such imprecision and vagueness that we are unable to evaluate the legal issue he attempts to raise for review. For example, he states that a supervisor told him “the task was ‘becoming a liability,’ but did not direct the Claimant to discontinue it[,]” Appellant's Br. p. 5; that he requested feedback from management “but no concerns were ever communicated[,]” id.; and that there were allegations of excessive cell phone usage, id. Because these facts lack particularity, we are unable to review how they relate to J.E.’s assertions on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) (Statement of Facts shall describe facts relevant to the issues presented for review, supported by references to the record). Moreover, his argument also lacks relevant citations to an appellate record and contains incomplete citations to authority (in that they omit reporter citations), all of which further impede our review. For all these reasons, J.E. has waived appellate review.

[5] Notwithstanding waiver, we affirm the Review Board's decision.

When reviewing a decision of the Review Board, our standard of review is threefold: “(1) findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed questions of law and fact [․] are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal propositions are reviewed for correctness.” Recker v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2011) (citing McClain v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (Ind. 1998)). Further, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses; rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board's findings.” J.M. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 975 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2012) (citing McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1318). We will reverse the Review Board's decision “only if there is no substantial evidence to support the Review Board's findings.” Id.

Z.C. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 213 N.E.3d 1101, 1105-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Additionally, we note that J.E. does not challenge any of the Review Board's factual findings in the order denying his unemployment benefits. We accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See id. at 1106 (citing Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied).

[6] According to the unchallenged findings, J.E.’s employer operated a tire and automotive repair shop. J.E.’s duties included consulting with mechanics to obtain an estimate of repair cost, communicating the estimate to customers, and taking in the vehicle. In August 2025, a mechanic inspected a customer's vehicle and indicated on the inspection report that the vehicle should not be accepted for repair. “Instead of following the mechanic and owner's instructions, [J.E.] accepted the vehicle for repair and ordered parts.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 124. The vehicle remained in disrepair on the employer's lot for weeks. J.E.’s employer instructed him to inform the customer to have the vehicle towed off the lot, but the vehicle remained. J.E. told his employer that the customer was waiting for insurance to approve the towing of the vehicle. Ultimately, J.E.’s employer contacted the customer directly, and the customer indicated the insurance carrier had already approved the towing. In November, J.E. was discharged from employment for “not following the Employer's repeated instructions[.]” Id.

[7] J.E.’s sole issue presented on review is whether he was “discharged for ‘just cause’ under Indiana Code [section] 22-4-15-1 where there is no evidence of willful or knowing misconduct.” Appellant's Br. p. 4. But J.E.’s argument is misplaced. As an initial matter, the Review Board concluded J.E. was discharged for just cause under Indiana Code section 22-4-15-1(d)(5), which defines “discharge for just cause” as “refusing to obey instructions.” Although knowledge and willfulness are elements of some definitions of discharge for just cause, they are not explicit elements of the subsection upon which the Review Board relied. Compare Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(2) (“knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer”) and § 22-4-15-1(d)(4) (“damaging the employer's property through willful and wanton misconduct”) with § 22-4-15-1(d)(5) (“refusing to obey instructions”).

[8] However, in reaching its conclusion, the Review Board partially relied on Graham v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 386 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) for the proposition that “[w]hen the authority of those in whom the employer has confided responsibility for day-to-day operations is flouted by an employee's willful disregard of reasonable directives, just cause for discharge of that employee exists.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 124 (quoting Graham, 386 N.E.2d at 702). From this, the Review Board inferred that “[r]easonableness is an implicit element” in section 22-4-15-1(d)(5)’s refusal-to-obey definition. Indeed, the implication in Graham is that refusal to obey is a deliberate act against an employer's direction. See Graham, 386 N.E.2d at 702 (evidence that employee did not follow directions after being told to do so by employer showed that employee willfully disobeyed reasonable direction). Graham does not require that an employee willfully intend to harm the employer, as J.E. seemingly asserts. See Appellant's Br. p. 6 (asserting a showing of intentional disregard for the employer's interests is required). Here, the findings demonstrate that J.E. accepted the vehicle despite being told not to, and that he then failed to have the customer remove it as directed. J.E. did not follow these instructions, and the Review Board concluded the employer's decision to discharge him was reasonable.

[9] For these reasons, J.E. has not successfully challenged the Review Board's legal conclusion that he was discharged for just cause. The remainder of J.E.’s assertions amount to requests to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Z.C., 213 N.E.3d at 1106. Accordingly, we affirm the Review Board's decision.

[10] Affirmed.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.