Perry William Elliott, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Perry Elliott guilty of Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine; Level 6 felony intimidation; and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. The trial court imposed an aggregate fourteen-year sentence, four years of which are to be served on community corrections. Elliott appeals, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his possession of methamphetamine conviction and (2) his sentence is inappropriate and should be revised under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2023, Elliott began living with his sister, C.C., after his home was destroyed in a fire. Elliott and C.C.—who were both in their early sixties—were the oldest of nine children and had a close relationship. But during the year Elliott lived with C.C., he began directing rageful outbursts at her, which worsened over time.

[3] Elliott did not sleep the night of May 13-14, 2024. As Elliott would later describe, he stayed awake for over twenty hours and spent the night installing a new shower in C.C.’s bathroom. His work made considerable noise, which prevented C.C. from sleeping through the night. C.C. got out of bed at around 5:00 a.m., made a cup of coffee, and sat down to drink it at the kitchen table.

[4] Elliott, who was diagnosed with diabetes when he was eighteen years old, mentioned to C.C. that he needed to check his blood sugar. Before he had done so, however, he started “talking nonstop” for an hour and a half, “explaining all [his] projects and what he was working on ․” Transcript Vol. 3 at 76. Eventually, C.C. reminded him to check his blood sugar. Elliott flew into a rage, yelled at C.C., and started throwing objects at her face, including a candle in a glass jar. He punched C.C. near her eye and used the kitchen table to pin her in the corner of the room. He eventually let her go but said “that if [she] opened [her] mouth he would cut [her] throat.” Id. at 70.

[5] C.C. called 911 but was unable to speak with the dispatcher because she was hiding the phone from Elliott's view. Indiana State Trooper Kevin Jeffries and Chief Deputy Greg Grimmett with the Warren County Sheriff's Department arrived at C.C.’s home a few minutes later. The officers separated Elliott and C.C. and asked each of them what happened. Elliott explained that he had yelled at C.C. and was “shaking” the kitchen table when she called 911. Id. at 7. To explain his behavior, Elliott said “that it agitates him when he is constantly reminded to check his blood sugar” because he is “an adult that ․ knows what he's supposed to do ․” Id.

[6] When Jeffries spoke with C.C., she was “visibly shaken[,]” “[h]er hands were trembling[,]” and “she had been crying.” Id. at 8. The left side of her face was red and puffy, and Jeffries observed marks below her right check that looked like she had been hit. She told Jeffries that when she reminded Elliott to check his blood sugar, “he immediately became agitated, started throwing things around the house at her, struck her in the face, [and] had her cornered in the kitchen ․” Id. She explained she called 911 because “she felt trapped and cornered” and Elliott said “that he was going to slit her throat ․” Id. at 9.

[7] The officers arrested Elliott and transported him to the Warren County Jail. During the ten-minute drive to the jail, Elliott was cordial and cooperative. Jeffries escorted Elliott into the jail and searched him during the book-in process. In Elliott's back-pocket, Jeffries found a hard plastic storage box, the kind commonly used to hide a spare key underneath a car. As soon as Jeffries removed the box from Elliott's pocket, Elliott's “demeanor immediately flipped” from cooperative “to pure aggression.” Id. at 19. With his hands still cuffed behind his back, Elliott pulled his arm out of Jeffries’ grip, turned to face him, and shouted, “You can't have that. You're not allowed to look in there. That's mine.” Id. Once the officers had Elliott back under control, Jeffries opened the box. Inside, he found a small baggy and a plastic condiment cup, both of which contained a crystal-like white powdery substance. Laboratory testing would later confirm that the baggie and the cup contained methamphetamine with a net weight of 10.44 grams. Also inside the box was a bank receipt with Elliott's signature and a pair of keys.

[8] On the day of his arrest and as later amended, the State charged Elliott with Count 1: Possession of Methamphetamine, as a Level 3 felony;¹ Count 2: Intimidation, as Level 6 felony;² Count 3: Domestic Battery, as a Class A misdemeanor;³ and Count 4: Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor.⁴

[9] Elliott was ordered to attend a pre-trial conference on March 6, 2025, but he failed to appear, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Elliott was later found in the state of Washington near the Canadian border, and he initially resisted efforts to extradite him. Then, after Elliott willingly agreed to return to Indiana, he falsely represented to the first contractor hired to transport him that he had “a laundry list of medical issues” that made it unsafe for him to travel by plane. Exhibits at 25. That required the State to hire a second transport service, which used ground transport to bring Elliott to Indiana. In total, Indiana spent almost $7,000 to transport Elliott back to the state.

[10] A jury trial was held on February 24, 2026. In the State's case-in-chief, it called Jeffries, Grimmett, and C.C., who each testified consistently with the facts outlined above. During C.C.’s testimony, the deputy prosecutor showed her the bank receipt the officers found in Elliott's storage box next to the methamphetamine. Referring to the signature on that receipt, C.C. testified, “[T]hat's definitely [Elliott's] ․” Tr. Vol. 3 at 74. The State also called a forensic scientist from the crime lab, who had analyzed the methamphetamine found in Elliott's possession.

[11] Elliott decided to testify in his defense. He admitted to having the plastic box in his possession but said the box wasn't his and he didn't know it contained methamphetamine. According to Elliott, two weeks before his arrest, he purchased a small storage box, in which he had placed a spare key to his SUV, certain medicines and supplements, and pictures. The day before his arrest, he was mowing C.C.’s lawn and saw a storage box lying in the neighbor's yard that looked “exactly like” the one he had purchased two weeks earlier. Id. at 92. Thinking it was his, he picked it up and put it in his back pocket, where it remained until he was booked into jail the next day. As for why he reacted so aggressively when Jeffries removed it from his pocket, Elliott explained that he thought the box was his, which he had filled to the brim with his “personal property[.]” Id. at 93. He was worried that when Jeffries opened the box, it would “pop open and everything would just go all over the floor ․” Id. Two weeks after his arrest, Elliott claimed to have found his box in his SUV, which was when he realized the box Jeffries found on him wasn't his.

[12] On cross-examination, the State tried to impeach Elliott's testimony by confronting him with certain statements he made to Jeffries about the storage box. Referring to the substances in the baggie and condiment container, Elliott said, “That's my medicine. My medicine. I take that for my pain.” Id. at 103. He also told Jeffries he purchased the substances from a man in Lafayette. When Elliott denied those statements, the court permitted the State, over Elliott's objection, to play a portion of Jeffries’ body cam footage which recorded Elliott making them.

[13] After the close of evidence and the parties’ closing arguments, the jury found Elliott guilty of possession of methamphetamine, intimidation, and domestic battery, and not guilty of resisting law enforcement. The court entered judgments of conviction on the guilty verdicts and ordered the probation department to complete a presentence investigation report (PSI). The State filed the PSI on March 9, 2026. It noted that Elliott had an extensive criminal history, which included:

• Eight prior misdemeanor convictions, including: two convictions for driving under the influence in 1986 and 1987; a 1990 battery conviction; a 1994 conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated; and a 2018 conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, endangering a person.

• Seven prior felony convictions, including: four convictions for theft, each in 1993; a 1994 conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated; a 1999 criminal recklessness conviction; and a 2024 conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

[14] Two of Elliott's prior convictions had resulted in incarceration in the Department of Correction (DOC), as well as several stints on probation. Elliott violated the terms of his probation several times—mainly by consuming alcohol. Moreover, while awaiting trial in the present case, Elliott violated the conditions of his bond by contacting C.C. in violation of a no contact order. As a result of that violation, Elliott was charged with invasion of privacy in Cause No. 86C01-2501-CM-16, though that charge was later dismissed. Moreover, because he did not appear at the March 6, 2025 pre-trial conference, Elliott was charged with and ultimately convicted of Level 6 felony failure to appear in Cause No. 86C01-2508-F6-196. For that conviction—which was Elliott's eighth felony conviction—he was sentenced to two years in the DOC. Moreover, while in jail awaiting trial for his present offenses, Elliott was disciplined by jail staff for “insolence” and for “assault on an inmate.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 181.

[15] The PSI further indicated that Elliott felt no remorse for his present offenses. When asked what he thought about his convictions, he said “I was helping a disabled woman mowing her lawn. I picked up a substance in a box. It had meth in it. This is a corrupt county. I've been wrongly accused.” Id. at 184. When asked about C.C., Elliott said, “[M]y sister said I hit her. She's a control freak. But I never touched her․ I'm more the victim. I'm wrongly accused.” Id. Elliott also appeared to downplay his substance abuse. Though he admitted to abusing alcohol in the past, smoking marijuana in the 1970s and 80s, and trying methamphetamine “once in 2023[,]” he denied “consum[ing] any other illicit substances” and said he “[didn't] believe in drugs or using drugs[.]” Id. at 183-84.

[16] At the sentencing hearing on March 16, 2026, Elliott's attorney indicated there were no errors or omissions in the PSI. After briefly testifying about his claimed medical issues, employment history, and his prior alcohol use, Elliott asked to address why he absconded to Washington. He claimed he traveled to Washington not to avoid the criminal proceedings in Indiana, but to meet with a doctor to get a “second opinion on [his] life span and [his] conditions ․” Tr. Vol. 3 at 165. He also claimed he was not trying to obstruct the first transport service but rather refused to fly back with that service because he had chronic pain that required him to travel by car or train.

[17] The State asked the trial court to recognize several aggravating circumstances; including: (1) Elliott's substantial criminal history; (2) the fact that Elliott violated the pre-trial no contact order; (3) that Elliott violated the conditions of his pre-trial release by fleeing the state; (4) Elliott's misconduct against jail staff and another inmate while awaiting trial; (5) that Elliott had, in the State's view, committed perjury at his trial by contradicting his prior recorded statements; and (6) Elliott's failure to take accountability for his actions. The State further requested that Elliott be sentenced to a total of fourteen years in the DOC, with four years suspended to probation.

[18] Elliott asked the court to consider his work history and poor health as mitigators and requested an aggregate twelve-year sentence, with four years in the DOC, four years on community corrections, and four years on probation. The court agreed to recognize those factors in mitigation, but found they were outweighed by the aggravating factors of Elliott's criminal history and that Elliott violated the conditions of pre-trial release. The court sentenced Elliott to fourteen years for possession of methamphetamine, with concurrent sentences of two and a half years for intimidation and one year for domestic battery. It ordered ten of those years to be served in the DOC, and four to be served on community corrections.⁵

[19] Elliott now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[20] Elliott first argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of methamphetamine.⁶ When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that it is the jury's role, not ours, “to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). As such, “[w]e consider only the evidence most favorable to” the conviction, together with any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable jury could have found “the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[21] To convict Elliott of Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine as alleged, the State had to prove that he, “without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner's professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesse[d] methamphetamine (pure or adulterated)” and that “the amount of the drug involved [was] at least ten (10) but less than twenty-eight (28) grams and an enhancing circumstance applie[d].” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d)(2) (2014). Elliott concedes that he possessed at least ten grams of methamphetamine and that an enhancing circumstance applied, but he challenges whether he acted knowingly or intentionally.⁷ For its part, the State makes no argument on appeal that Elliott acted intentionally and instead contends that he acted knowingly. Thus, we confine our analysis to whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Elliott knowingly possessed methamphetamine.

[22] A person acts “knowingly” when, at the time “he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (1977). Because “[t]he knowing possession of a drug concerns the defendant's mental state[,]” jurors are “entitled to make reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances.” McClendon v. State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Hammond v. State, 594 N.E.2d 509, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied). A conviction for possession of an illicit substance “may rest upon proof of either actual or constructive possession.” Perry v. State, 956 N.E.2d 41, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). And “[i]f possession is established, knowledge of the character of the drug and the fact that it is possessed can be inferred therefrom.” Thomas v. State, 291 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind. 1973) (quoting Feltes v. People, 498 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Colo. 1972)).

[23] Here, the jury heard testimony from both Jeffries and Elliott that Elliott had methamphetamine in his actual possession when he was booked into the jail. Actual possession means just that, “i.e., actual physical control.” McClendon, 671 N.E.2d at 488 (quoting Corrao v. State, 290 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972)). And because Elliott had actual physical control of the methamphetamine, the State was not required to prove anything further for the jury to reasonably infer his knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance in his possession. Cf. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174-75 (Ind. 2011) (to prove a defendant constructively possessed narcotics found on premises he did not exclusively control, the State must prove “additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence and the nature of the item.”).

[24] Even so, the jury heard additional evidence from which it could have reasonably inferred that Elliott knew he had an illicit substance in his pocket. Despite being cordial and cooperative while en route to the jail, he became aggressive and combative after Jeffries found the storage box. He demanded that Jeffries not open the box and exclaimed, “That's mine.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 19 (emphasis added). When Jeffries asked him to explain why he had what appeared to be methamphetamine in his possession, Elliott said it was his medicine and he purchased it from a man for $100. Moreover, C.C. identified Elliott's signature on the receipt found in the storage box, further supporting that Elliott was aware of the box and its contents.

[25] Elliott's argument on appeal relies entirely on his self-serving testimony that “he found the black, plastic box in question, while mowing and provided explanation of the potential source of contraband contained therein.” Appellant's Brief at 16. But the jury had no obligation to credit Elliott's self-serving testimony. See Weaver v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1048, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“The jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, was entitled to determine which witnesses’ testimony to believe and which to disbelieve.”), trans. denied. We reiterate that we will not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the jury's determination of Elliott's credibility, or lack thereof. As such, we affirm Elliott's conviction for possession of methamphetamine.

2. Appellate Rule 7(B)

[26] Next, Elliott asks us to revise his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Under that rule, we may revise a defendant's sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). We grant considerable deference to the trial court's sentencing decision. Wilson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 667, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Absent “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character)[,]” we will affirm the sentence. Id. (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). It is the defendant's burden to prove his sentence is inappropriate. Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[27] We begin by looking at the advisory sentence for the relevant offenses. Id. If a defendant's “sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, ‘we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.’ ” Id. (quoting Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). In so doing, “we ‘focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.’ ” Norton v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014)). And we are guided by the primary goal of Appellate Rule 7(B) review, which is to “ ‘leaven the outliers’ rather than necessarily achieve what is perceived as the ‘correct’ result.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)), reh'g denied.

[28] Here, Elliott was convicted of three offenses: Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine; Level 6 felony intimidation; and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is three to sixteen years, and the advisory sentence is nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2014). A Level 6 felony carries a possible sentence between six months and two-and-a-half years, with a one-year advisory sentence. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (2025) (amended July 1, 2026). And the maximum allowable sentence for a Class A misdemeanor is one year.⁸ Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2 (1977).

[29] Elliott therefore faced a maximum allowable sentence of nineteen-and-a-half years. Yet he received a fourteen-year sentence, five-and-a-half years less than the maximum. Moreover, Elliott's sentence is just three years longer than it would have been had the trial court imposed consecutive advisory sentences for the two felony convictions and a consecutive one-year sentence for the misdemeanor conviction. The harshness of the slight deviation above the advisory sentence is lessened by the fact that Elliott will only have to execute ten years in the DOC before serving the rest of his sentence on community corrections. As this Court has long recognized, “less executed time means less punishment.” Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“[I]t is simply not realistic to consider a year of probation, a year in community corrections, and a year in prison as equivalent.”), trans. denied. And after considering the nature of Elliott's offense and his character, he has not convinced us that his relatively lenient sentence is an outlier in need of revision.

[30] Starting with the nature of Elliott's offense, in addition to whether the crime differed from what was accounted for by the advisory sentence, “[w]e also consider whether the offense was ‘accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.’ ” Burkhart v. State, 259 N.E.3d 347, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122), trans. denied. In asserting that his offenses were “not at all particularly egregious,” Elliott entirely ignores the senseless acts of violence he committed against his sister. Appellant's Br. at 18. Not only did he verbally accost and physically attack C.C. without provocation, but the perceived insult that triggered his violent outburst was C.C.’s reminder for him to attend to his medical needs by checking his blood sugar. Elliott then threatened to slit C.C.’s throat if she reported him to authorities. We also note that the evidence suggests Elliott battered C.C. after spending the night under the influence of methamphetamine, all while possessing over ten grams of the substance—which Jeffries testified was over 100 doses. Simply put, we find the nature of Elliott's crimes to be beyond the pale.

[31] Because Elliott made a weak showing on the nature-of-the-offense prong of Rule 7(B), he must make a strong showing of good character to justify a modification of his sentence. See Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (“[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.”). He has fallen far short of carrying that burden.

[32] When evaluating Elliott's character, we must “engage in a broad consideration of [his] qualities[.]” Burkhart, 259 N.E.3d at 355 (quoting T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). This includes “whether [he] has ‘substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122). We find nothing in the record which demonstrates that Elliott possesses virtuous traits or has exhibited examples of his good character. He has an extensive criminal history, which reflects extremely poorly on him. See Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” (quoting Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020))). He has repeatedly been convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (among other offenses) and has made a habit of violating the terms of probation and pre-trial release—all of which shows his continued failure to abide by our laws. See Kayser v. State, 131 N.E.3d 717, 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding the defendant's poor character was evidenced “by an extensive criminal history that span[ned] decades and include[d] a probation revocation”).

[33] Elliott committed new offenses while this case was pending, including Level 6 felony failure to appear when he absconded to Washington state, apparently to avoid the criminal proceedings here. That Elliott fled the jurisdiction—and then resisted efforts to return him to Indiana—rather than face the consequences of his actions did not exemplify good character. Indeed, Elliott has abjectly refused to accept responsibility for his actions or express remorse, instead calling himself a victim and disparaging C.C. during the pre-sentence investigation. We also note that despite possessing a significant quantity of methamphetamine, Elliott refused to acknowledge that he is a substance abuser. Elliott also committed further violent actions and disrespect for the law while in pre-trial custody, as he physically attacked another inmate and was disciplined for insolence toward jail staff.

[34] The record is replete with example after example of Elliott's poor character. Elliott's argument to the contrary is simply unpersuasive. He claims his good character is demonstrated by the fact that his medical issues contributed to his violent actions. That finds no support in the record, and in fact C.C. testified Elliott's inability to control his blood sugar had not, at any point in his life, caused him to engage in violent outbursts. Those began about a year before Elliott attacked his sister, around the same time he seems to have started using methamphetamine.

[35] Elliott further claims that he has an exemplary work history, has earned numerous college degrees, and is married. But “many people are gainfully employed[,]” Holmes v. State, 86 N.E.3d 394, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied, a large swath of the population has received college degrees, and marriage is exceedingly common in our society. We're at a loss for how those factors show Elliott's good character, particularly against the backdrop of his repeated criminal behavior, failure to accept responsibility for his reprehensible actions, and disregard for the rule of law.

[36] In sum, Elliott has not met his burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We therefore affirm his sentence.

Conclusion

[37] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[38] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d)(2) (2014).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2), (b)(1)(A) (2022) (amended July 1, 2026).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) (2021).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2021) (amended July 1, 2024).

5.   Elliott's sentence in this cause is consecutive to a two-year sentence he received after pleading guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated in 2024.

6.   Elliott does not challenge his convictions for intimidation and domestic battery.

7.   The “enhancing circumstance” alleged here was that Elliott committed his crime “on the property of a ․ penal facility[.]” Ind. Code § 35-48-1-16.5(7)(A) (2020) (current version at Ind. Code § 35-48-1.1-18(7)(A) (2026)).

8.   Our legislature has not provided an advisory sentence for a Class A misdemeanor.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., concurs. Kenworthy, J., concurs in result.