Donnyha Tyler, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Donnyha Tyler appeals her conviction for Level 5 felony intimidation.¹ Tyler raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Tyler sold drugs to a homeless person in Indianapolis known as “KD.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 225-27. On October 19, 2023, KD owed Tyler $40 for drugs, and Tyler sought to collect on the amount owed. When Tyler located KD, KD said she was not going to pay Tyler because KD “was getting sober.” Id. at 228. Tyler “didn't want to hear that” and “pulled out a gun on [KD].” Id. Tyler pointed the gun “[a]t [KD's] face” and said, “I got something for you.” Id. at 228-29. KD was “intimidated,” but she responded by trying to “fight.” Id. at 228.

[3] Tyler then “back[ed] up” and returned to her vehicle without the money. Tyler then “almost” ran over KD with Tyler's vehicle. Id. at 299. Although KD “jump[ed] out [of] the way,” Tyler struck, dragged, and killed Tommy Brock, with whom KD had a relationship. Id. Tyler fled from the scene but was eventually apprehended.

[4] As relevant to this appeal, the State charged Tyler with Level 5 felony intimidation for pulling the gun on KD. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 31-32. On the first day of Tyler's ensuing jury trial, the State called KD to testify. However, almost immediately after KD took the stand, the court called a brief recess to discuss, among other things, KD's apparent demeanor. Counsel for the State and for Tyler agreed that KD appeared to be “intoxicated” and “high.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 165. The court then dismissed KD and instructed her to return to testify the next day “completely alert” and “not impaired.” Id. at 168.

[5] On day two, the State called KD back to the witness stand, and KD testified to Tyler's actions on the evening of October 19, 2023. No other witnesses provided relevant testimony on the State's intimidation charge.

[6] Thereafter, the jury found Tyler guilty. The trial court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Tyler accordingly. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, Tyler asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her conviction for Level 5 felony intimidation. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[8] To show that Tyler committed Level 5 felony intimidation as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tyler communicated a threat to KD “by drawing a deadly weapon” with the intent that KD would be placed in fear that the threat would be carried out. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 31-32; see Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2)(A) (2023). However, Tyler's sufficiency argument on appeal is premised not on the elements of the charged offense but on Indiana's incredible-dubiosity rule. Under that rule,

[a]ppellate courts may impinge upon a jury's function to judge the credibility of a witness ․ Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremely hesitant to invade the province of the jury. We recently summarized that, to warrant application of the incredible dubiosity rule, there must be: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). In applying this summary in Moore, this Court found the first factor not met because “there were multiple testifying witnesses that the jury could have relied upon in reaching its verdict.” Id. at 757-58. In discussing inherent probability as the second factor, we found in Moore that it was satisfied only when the witness's trial testimony was inconsistent within itself, not that it was inconsistent with other evidence or prior testimony. Id. at 758-59. Finally, in applying the third factor, absence of circumstantial evidence, we evaluated whether there existed circumstantial evidence of guilt, but did not require such circumstantial evidence to independently establish guilt. Id. at 759-60.

Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015) (emphasis added).

[9] Applying that test here turns on the second component of the incredible-dubiosity rule, namely, whether KD's testimony “was inconsistent within itself.” Id. While KD certainly had her credibility issues, her testimony was not inherently inconsistent. Tyler asserts otherwise, noting that KD said Tyler had pulled a gun on KD, but KD could not describe that gun. That is not inherently inconsistent testimony. Tyler also asserts that KD said that, when Tyler was “backing up” toward her vehicle, Tyler was “running towards her car like this, but walking obviously.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 229. That isolated statement may lack perfect clarity, but it also demonstrates that KD was making some kind of physical gesture to the jury, and in any event it is not inherently inconsistent within the meaning of the incredible-dubiosity rule.

[10] Tyler further asserts that KD said she was intimidated by Tyler pulling the gun out, yet KD also wanted to fight Tyler. We discern no inconsistency in that testimony. Tyler contends that KD at one point stated that she turned her back to Tyler; again, nothing in that statement is inherently inconsistent such that KD's testimony is on its face unbelievable. And Tyler of course points out issues with KD's credibility, but those issues were for the jury.

[11] Accordingly, Tyler is unable to demonstrate that KD's testimony was inconsistent with itself. Thus, her claim that the evidence to support her conviction is insufficient under the incredible-dubiosity rule fails, and we affirm her conviction for Level 5 felony intimidation.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Tyler does not appeal her conviction for Level 5 felony reckless homicide.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.