Zachary Boler, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Zachary Boler appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and imposing as a sanction the execution of the entirety of his previously-suspended sentence. Boler argues that his due process rights were violated because “he did not have a neutral and detached hearing officer and didn't have the opportunity to be heard in person or present evidence before the trial court rejected a proposed agreement.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. Concluding that Boler has not demonstrated error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Boler pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony causing death while operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood in Cause Number 49D20-2211-F4-29804 (F4-29804). The terms of the plea agreement provided that Boler's total sentence would be capped at eight years, with the sentence being otherwise left to the court's discretion. The court's September 29, 2023 sentencing order imposed a four-year sentence executed in the Department of Correction (DOC) with four years suspended and two years served on probation.

[3] Boler was released from the DOC in 2025. At first, Boler was compliant with the terms of his probation. However, on January 8, 2026, the State filed a notice of probation violation, which was amended the next day. The amended notice alleged that Boler failed to: (1) comply with the recommendations of a substance abuse evaluation; (2) submit to drug screenings as directed on December 5 and 27, 2025; (3) refrain from the use of illegal drugs, yet tested positive for controlled substances on December 9 and 17, 2025, and January 1, 2026; (4) pay court ordered fines, costs, fees, and restitution; and (5) refrain from committing new criminal offenses by committing Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, filed under Cause Number 49D35-2601-F6-823 (F6-823). Boler pleaded guilty to the charge in F6-823.

[4] A probation revocation hearing was held on March 19, 2026, at the beginning of which Boler's counsel informed the court that he had reached an agreement with the probation department. After hearing counsel's summary of the proposed agreement, which called for revocation of probation and two years of home detention to be served consecutively to his sentence in his new case, F6-823, the court rejected the recommendation. Next, the court asked if the matter should be set for a contested hearing. Boler's counsel responded that they would “go open to the Court, and have the Court determine [Boler's] sentence.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 36.

[5] Boler admitted to violating the terms of his probation without the agreement. He testified that he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and sentenced to 300 days executed and 245 days home detention in F6-823. He also stated that he had completed a few classes on substance abuse. He was discharged from his referral to Aspire for substance abuse treatment because of his relapse. In support of his request for a sentence without executed time, Boler stated that he had been accepted into the Turning Point Recovery Center through Volunteers of America. Boler's counsel also reiterated the benefits of the proposed agreement he had reached with the probation department and argued that it was an appropriate sanction option.

[6] The trial court revoked the remainder of Boler's four-year suspended sentence and ordered his sentence executed in the DOC. The court also recommended Boler for the Recovery While Incarcerated program. Boler now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Boler requests that we reverse the trial court and remand the matter for a new probation revocation hearing. He argues that due process entitled him to a neutral and detached hearing officer. More specifically, he argues that he did not have the opportunity to be heard or to present evidence before the trial court rejected the proposed agreement he had reached with the probation department. He contends that the trial court's outright rejection of the proposed agreement is evidence that the court was neither neutral nor detached in violation of his due process rights.

[8] “A probation revocation proceeding is civil in nature and a probationer is not entitled to all of the rights afforded to a criminal defendant.” Moore v. State, 102 N.E.3d 304, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “The due process requirements for probation revocation hearings are more flexible than in a criminal prosecution.” Id. “This flexibility allows courts to enforce lawful orders, address an offender's personal circumstances, and protect public safety.” Id. “The specific rights required in revocation proceedings are: (1) written notice of the violation alleged; (2) disclosure of the State's evidence; (3) opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (4) confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses; (5) a “neutral and detached” factfinder; and (6) a written statement of the reason probation is revoked.” Id. at 307-08 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). These requirements are codified in Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3 (2015).

[9] The following standards of review are implicated here. “ ‘Whether a party was denied due process is a question of law that we review de novo.’ ” Moore, 102 N.E.3d at 308 (quoting Hilligoss v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1228, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)). Further, Boler proposed a plea agreement in which he would admit to the violation and the probation department recommended an agreed sanction, very much like a plea agreement to a criminal offense. In that situation, “[o]ffer and acceptance of an agreement by the parties do not alone compel acceptance of the agreement by the trial court.” Roeder v. State, 696 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). “[W]hen reviewing a trial court's decision to accept or reject a plea agreement, we use an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. Thus, reversal is appropriate only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. Furthermore, “[w]e review a trial court's decision to revoke probation and a trial court's sentencing decision in a probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion.” Abernathy v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[10] Here, it is undisputed that Boler intended to admit he had committed probation violations, especially in light of his guilty plea in F6-823. What was at issue was the sanction for his violation. The trial court was well within its discretion to reject the proposed agreement until it heard evidence regarding the facts and circumstances of the violations and any mitigating evidence pertinent to the court's sanction decision. Once the trial court accepts a plea agreement, it is bound by its terms. Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e) (2017).

[11] Boler's argument that the court was not neutral and detached presumes that the court's rejection of the proposed agreement meant that it was predisposed to impose a harsher sanction. And Boler points to the sanction the court ultimately imposed, which is more stringent than the sanction in the proposed agreement, as evidence in support of his argument. Because this situation is akin to a court's acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement to a criminal offense, Boler must show actual bias or predetermination. To do so, he must overcome the strong presumption that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced in matters that come before the judge. See Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (Ind. 2000) (“The law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced in the matters that come before the judge.”), abrogated on other grounds by Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1081-82 (Ind. 2025). Here, the court's rejection of the proposed agreement did not affirmatively demonstrate an actual bias or predetermination. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 904 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (court advised probationer that he bore burden of showing crime was not committed; court expressed bias against allegedly “self-serving” testimony probationer might offer). Instead, here, by rejecting the proposed agreement, the court retained the discretion to fashion a sanction upon a showing that a probation violation had occurred.

[12] Additionally, the court offered to hold a contested hearing. Boler declined and admitted he violated the conditions of his probation without the benefit of a proposed agreement regarding a sanction. The court then heard Boler's testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding his violation, including that he had relapsed and that his relapse had caused his termination from his substance abuse treatment, his screening failures, and his new criminal charge in F6-823 for possession of methamphetamine to which he pleaded guilty. Boler offered that his relapse was triggered by the death of a family member. Additionally, the court heard Boler's counsel's continued argument in favor of the proposed agreement as a sanction. And his counsel disclosed Boler's sentence in F6-823.

[13] We conclude that Boler's due process rights have not been violated here. He was able to present his testimony to the court and was given the opportunity to argue in favor of the proposed agreement that he had reached with the probation department. We further conclude that the court's rejection of the proposed agreement before hearing sworn testimony involving the circumstances of and admission to the probation violations does not amount to a due process violation. In addition, after hearing Boler's testimony, the court could always impose the same or similar sanction as called for in the agreement. “[T]he act of rejecting a plea bargain is not sufficient of itself to establish the bias and prejudice of the trial court.” Clemons v. State, 424 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ind. 1981).

[14] As for the trial court's choice of sanction, we likewise find no abuse of discretion here. The trial court was allowed by statute to impose the execution of the remainder of Boler's previously-suspended sentence as a sanction. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (2015). Boler admitted that he failed drug screens, was terminated from his substance abuse program, and had accumulated a new criminal conviction. The court was well within its discretion to impose the sanction it chose.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not violate Boler's due process rights by rejecting a proposed agreement as to his sanction for his probation violation before hearing evidence. Boler was afforded the opportunity to present the same proposed sanction and to explain the circumstances of his probation violations to the trial court. Boler has failed to show that the court was neither neutral nor detached. And the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanction it was allowed by statute to impose. Consequently, we affirm the court in all respects.

[16] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.