G.S. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) became involved with G.S. (Father), his wife (Mother), and their then 7-year-old child (Daughter) after Mother was hospitalized for a drug overdose. Escalating use of drugs by Father and Mother (collectively, Parents) led to the removal of Daughter from their home and a finding that Daughter was a child in need of services (CHINS). Parents’ continued drug use and failure to comply with court-ordered services ultimately prompted DCS to petition to terminate their parental rights.

[2] Father failed to attend the two termination hearings. As to the second, he stated that his absence was due to his fear that he would be arrested on an outstanding warrant issued in an unrelated criminal matter. After conclusion of the hearings, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights. Father appeals, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the second termination hearing and that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's termination of his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts

[3] In early January 2024, Mother, Father, and Daughter were living with Daughter's maternal grandmother in the grandmother's home. Mother overdosed on illegal drugs, leading emergency responders to administer Narcan and transport her to the hospital. While Mother was hospitalized, Father insisted that she leave against medical advice, and she did.

[4] Days later, a DCS family case manager (FCM), investigating a report of Mother's overdose, visited the family home. The FCM found the home well kept, though the doorway area smelled faintly of marijuana. Parents agreed to undergo drug screens, and each tested positive for illegal drugs. Father's screen was positive for morphine, fentanyl, and other substances, and he admitted to illegal drug use.

[5] Because Daughter appeared well-cared for and Parents were not observed under the influence in Daughter's presence, DCS did not immediately remove Daughter from Parents’ home. But DCS thereafter placed the family in a Program of Informal Adjustment, under which Daughter remained in Parents’ care and Parents received random drug screens, in-home family-preservation services, and substance-abuse assessments.

[6] From January through May 2024, Father consistently tested positive for illicit substances, including fentanyl. Parents became noncompliant with screens and missed service appointments. In May 2024, DCS petitioned to have Daughter adjudicated a CHINS. Daughter initially remained in Parents’ home with the court-ordered condition that Parents continue drug screens. But in June 2024, DCS removed Daughter after receiving several positive drug screens indicating ongoing fentanyl abuse by Parents. Father was incarcerated at the time after having been arrested a few days earlier. Mother entered a substance-abuse program that same month.

[7] Daughter was placed with her maternal great-aunt, with whom Daughter has remained ever since. The CHINS court ordered Parents to have supervised visitation contingent on three consecutive negative drug screens.

[8] Parents admitted to the CHINS allegations, which focused on their shared struggle with substance abuse. The court entered a dispositional decree requiring Father, among other things, to maintain weekly contact with the FCM, enroll in and complete recommended programs, refrain from illegal substances, obey the law, submit to random drug screens, attend scheduled visitation, and maintain suitable housing.

[9] Father initially participated in family therapy, individual therapy, and home-based casework. His circumstances soon changed. By October 2024, he was living in a motel. He had no visitation with Daughter, as it had been suspended earlier based on his positive drug screens. His only contact with Daughter was in family therapy. Even that was suspended in October 2024, marking his last face-to-face contact with Daughter. His last random drug screen in late November 2024 was positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC.

[10] Father was incarcerated in Starke County several times in 2024 and 2025 for drug-related offenses and battery. Upon his release in March 2025, he failed to engage in any DCS services, including drug screens, a substance-abuse evaluation, and Fatherhood Engagement services. In June 2025, the trial court entered a protective order barring Father from the home where Daughter was living after he repeatedly walked by it in an apparent effort to gain the residents’ attention. He later was arrested for domestic battery and invasion of privacy, although the record does not reveal the details of those offenses.

[11] DCS filed its petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights in October 2025. DCS served Father while he was in the Starke County Jail. Father thereafter told the FCM that he had entered an inpatient program. Because this was not a DCS referral, DCS lacked a signed release to verify Father's attendance. By December 2025, Father had informed DCS that he was no longer at the facility. He was not complying with the drug screening requirements and had not completed a substance-abuse evaluation. The CHINS court approved adoption as Daughter's permanency plan.

[12] Father did not appear at the first termination hearing in February 2026. His counsel did not know why he was absent, as Father had stopped communicating with him. Father had an outstanding warrant at the time.

[13] The first termination hearing proceeded, and a second hearing was scheduled for March 16, 2026. Four days before that second hearing, Father filed a motion for continuance that alleged only that he was “unable to attend Court that day.” App. Vol. II, pp. 30-31. The trial court denied the motion the next day.

[14] Father failed to appear on March 16. The FCM testified that Father had called her and said that he would not be attending the hearing because he had an outstanding warrant and did not wish to go to jail. He refused to disclose his location. The court concluded that Father was “fully capable of coming here” and “decided not to come.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 86-87.

[15] During the hearings, the FCM testified that Father had been in weekly contact with her during February 2026 and had begun substance-abuse treatment and parenting education. Father had “done more” in that month “than he has completed over the last year”—a change the FCM viewed as significant and positive. Id. at 94. She noted, however, that Father had never completed a substance-abuse assessment and had not visited Daughter since July 2024.

[16] The FCM recommended termination of parental rights and adoption by Daughter's great-aunt, her current caregiver. The FCM testified that this recommendation was based on Father's inconsistent compliance over the past two years and his unstable living situation. Daughter, meanwhile, remained bonded with and placed with her great-aunt and was doing well academically and emotionally. The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) likewise recommended termination of Father's rights and adoption.

[17] At the close of the hearing, the trial court terminated Father's parental rights, finding that Father “clearly cares more about himself than anyone else.” Id. at 127. The court deferred ruling on Mother's rights for 60 days but later terminated them as well. Father appeals the judgment. Mother does not participate in this appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[18] Father raises two issues on appeal. First, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the second termination hearing. Second, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights. Finding neither claim persuasive, we affirm.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Continuance

[19] “The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” In re J.E., 45 N.E.3d 1243, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “We will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court reaches a conclusion that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or the reasonable and probable deductions that may be drawn therefrom.” Id. “No abuse of discretion will be found where the moving party has not shown that he was prejudiced by the denial of his continuance motion.” Id.

[20] The circumstances before the trial court support its denial of Father's motion, which failed to offer any reason for his inability to attend. He had already missed the first day of the fact-finding hearing and had lost contact with his own counsel. See id. at 1247 (“In considering the efficacy of a continuance, the trial court could reflect on Father's patterns with respect to attendance, communication, and participation when he was not incarcerated”).

[21] Before the second hearing, however, Father told the FCM directly that he would not appear because he had an outstanding warrant and did not want to be arrested. The trial court reasonably characterized this as a voluntary choice rather than an inability to attend. A parent who deliberately absents himself from a termination hearing to evade arrest is poorly positioned to show an abuse of discretion from denial of his motion for continuance. See Ramirez v. State, 186 N.E.3d 89, 96 (Ind. 2022) (prejudice requires a specific showing of why additional time was necessary to provide an effective defense and how that time would have benefited the moving party).

[22] In any case, Father's counsel represented him at both hearings, and the evidence revealed his positive work at the beginning of the CHINS case and shortly before the termination hearings. For instance, the FCM testified at length about Father's renewed contact with her, his enrollment in substance-abuse treatment, and his parenting-education classes. Given the overwhelming evidence supporting termination of Father's parental rights, Father has failed to show how his self-created absence from the hearing prejudiced him. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Clearly Err in Terminating Father's Parental Rights

[23] To terminate the parent-child relationship, DCS must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that termination is in the child's best interests; (2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the child's care; and (3) that one or more of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) of the termination of parental rights statute exists. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 (2025); In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (noting clear and convincing evidence standard). Here, DCS alleged that four subsection (d) circumstances existed, as follows:

i. That [Daughter] has been removed from [Father] and has been under the supervision of the local office for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months and, despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the [Daughter's] family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, [Father] has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in [Daughter] being placed in care outside [Father's] home;

ii. That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Daughter's] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of [Father] will not be remedied;

iii. That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health or life of [Daughter];

iv. That [Father] failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following [Daughter's] removal from [Father's] home under IC 31-34-2 or [Daughter's] adjudication as a Child in Need of Services, whichever occurred earlier, or [Father] is unlikely or unable to substantially comply with [Daughter's] dispositional decree.

App. Vol. II, pp. 11-12. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found the first three of these circumstances existed and that the other termination elements were proven by clear and convincing evidence as well.

[24] When reviewing a termination of parental rights judgment, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143. “We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment, giving ‘due regard’ to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010) and Trial Rule 52(A)). Unchallenged findings are accepted as true, and we will affirm if those findings suffice to support the judgment. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We will reverse if the judgment is clearly erroneous—that is, the findings fail to support the conclusions or the conclusions fail to support the judgment. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009).

[25] Father claims the trial court clearly erred in determining that: (1) there was a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in removal or continued placement would not be remedied, which is one of the subsection (d) circumstances; and (2) termination of Father's parental rights was in Daughter's best interests. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3), (d)(3) (2025).

A. Remedying of Conditions

[26] Father challenges only one of the trial court's three conclusions under subsection (d) of the parental rights statute. See Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 (2025). Because subsection (d) is written in the disjunctive, DCS needed to prove only one of those circumstances. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1045. A parent who does not challenge a finding or conclusion waives any claim that the finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous. In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[27] Waiver notwithstanding, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's finding that Father challenges: “[t]hat there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” App. Vol. II, p. 48 (quoting Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)).

[28] Courts apply a two-step analysis when determining whether such a probability exists. First, the court identifies the conditions that led to removal and continued placement outside the home. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (applying previous version of termination statute). Second, the court considers whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. This includes considering a parent's habitual patterns of conduct, as well as the parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[29] The unchallenged findings support the trial court's subsection (d)(3) conclusion. Daughter was removed due to both parents’ ongoing drug abuse, which persisted despite an informal adjustment and in-home CHINS services. After Daughter's removal, Father's supervised visitation with Daughter after her removal ended in July 2024—shortly after it began—due to his positive drug screens. His engagement in court-ordered services was inconsistent and largely ended in October 2024. He last voluntarily submitted to a random drug screen on November 27, 2025, and it was positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. Father was subsequently jailed, but even after his release in March 2025, he engaged in no DCS services at all until shortly before the fact-finding hearing.

[30] Father's recent efforts—renewed contact with the FCM, enrollment in substance-abuse treatment, and one completed parenting-education session— were laudable, and the FCM agreed they reflected significant, positive change. But he had never completed a substance-abuse assessment, had taken no DCSmonitored drug screens recently, provided no verification of any screens taken elsewhere, and had not seen Daughter in the 11/212 years before the hearing. Moreover, he chose to avoid arrest on an outstanding warrant in another matter rather than appear at the termination hearings.

[31] On this record, the trial court did not clearly err in weighing Father's sustained pattern of noncompliance, continued substance abuse, and incarceration more heavily than his efforts in the weeks before the hearing. We decline Father's invitation to reweigh that evidence.¹

B. Daughter's Best Interests

[32] In assessing a child's best interests, a trial court considers the totality of the evidence and subordinates the parent's interests to the child's, with the child's need for permanency being paramount. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019). Here, the same evidence supporting the trial court's finding under subsection (d)(3) supports the best-interests determination. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[33] In addition, the FCM and CASA both recommended termination and adoption, citing Father's inconsistent compliance over the preceding two years and his unstable living situation. Such recommendations, together with evidence supporting the subsection (d) finding, are sufficient to support a best-interests conclusion. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799. Daughter also has remained bonded with, and stable in, her maternal great-aunt's home since June 2024, and is thriving academically and emotionally. The great-aunt is willing to adopt her. The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of Father's parental rights is in Daughter's best interests.

Conclusion

[34] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's motion to continue the second termination hearing. In addition, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's termination of Father's parental rights. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This result is not impacted by Shaw v. Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 584 N.E.2d 595 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), upon which Father relies. The Shaw Court ruled that “children are to be removed from the custody of their parents only where the situation while in the custody of their parents is wholly inadequate for their very survival,” although that is “a graduated yardstick against which the particular circumstances in a case must be measured.” Id. at 600. But our Supreme Court requires only clear and convincing evidence that continued custody threatens the child's emotional and physical development, not that the parent's home be wholly inadequate for survival. Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1233–34 (Ind. 1992). Here, the trial court's findings meet that standard.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.