Eric R. Creekmore, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Eric R. Creekmore (“Creekmore”) appeals his conviction of Level 5 felony intimidation,¹ challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 2024, Creekmore and Thomas Gibson (“Gibson”) had been arguing over the sale of a truck. On the evening of August 24, 2024, as Gibson drove home, he saw a blue, four-door truck with blue rims following him. Creekmore was in the passenger seat of the truck and Danielle Norris (“Norris”) was driving. When Gibson arrived at his residence, Creekmore got out of the truck holding “a big[,] long pipe with a little slight curve to the top of it” at his side and told Gibson that he would kill Gibson, his mother, and his grandmother. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 131. Creekmore then chased Gibson. Gibson eventually ran to his garage and looked for a weapon to defend himself. Creekmore did not follow Gibson into the garage, but returned to the truck and left.

[3] Gibson spoke to his mother and grandmother about what to do and then called the police non-emergency line at 8:13 p.m. and reported the incident. Officer Clayton Elston of the Hartford City Police Department (“Officer Elston”) investigated and met with Gibson at his residence. When Gibson recounted the events, he estimated that he had called the non-emergency line about fifteen minutes after the incident with Creekmore. Officer Elston spoke with Gibson's neighbor, Bobbi Wyatt (“Wyatt”), who witnessed the incident. Wyatt saw a man in a “neon green work shirt with reflectors on it” get out of the passenger side of the truck and chase Gibson with a “club,” which he threw into the back of the truck before leaving. Id. at 118–19. She noticed that the truck had a blue license plate with white lettering, and she gave Officer Elston a photograph she had taken of the truck.

[4] The next day, officers located a blue truck at a trailer park. The truck was registered to Norris, had blue rims and an out-of-state plate, and a crowbar was located in the bed of the truck. Officers asked Kurtis Fields, a resident at the park, if Creekmore was present, and Fields told them that he was not. Fields let the officers search a garage on the property but initially refused to allow officers in a second garage. After being advised that officers would need to secure the premises in order to obtain a search warrant for the second garage, Fields reconsidered and allowed officers into the garage. Inside, officers found Creekmore seated in an armchair in the dark. He was arrested.

[5] On August 27, 2024, the State charged Creekmore with Level 5 felony intimidation. Creekmore filed a notice of alibi on September 24, 2024, and the State responded two days later, indicating that the crime occurred on “the evening of August 24, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 39, 43. The case proceeded to a jury trial on September 23, 2025.

[6] At trial, the State's presentation included testimony from Wyatt, Gibson, and Officer Elston. Gibson was unsure of the precise time the incident occurred, stating that he first spoke with his mother and grandmother and waited “probably about 45 minutes to an hour” after the crime before calling the police. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 133. On the day of the incident, he had told Officer Elston that the confrontation occurred about fifteen minutes before his call. However, in his pre-trial deposition, Gibson estimated that he waited fifteen to thirty minutes before calling police. At trial, Gibson acknowledged that he was “not really 100 percent for sure if it was 15 minutes or 45 minutes” and that he “do[esn't] pay attention to the time ever,” adding: “just by the feel of the time to me[,] [it] was probably approximately 15 minutes. Maybe I could be wrong.” Id. at 141.

[7] Creekmore presented his alibi defense through John Whitmire (“Whitmire”). Whitmire testified that on the evening of August 24, 2024, Creekmore came to his home in Muncie, which is roughly a forty-five-minute drive from Hartford City, and stayed about thirty minutes. Whitmire provided home security footage, time-stamped at 7:52 p.m., showing Creekmore walking up to the residence in a high-visibility shirt and approaching from the passenger side of a truck.

[8] The jury found Creekmore guilty. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to six years, with five years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction and one year suspended to supervised probation. Creekmore now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Creekmore challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, claiming the evidence established an alibi. Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review. Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses; those tasks belong to the jury. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022) (citing Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244 (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).

[10] To convict Creekmore of Level 5 felony intimidation, the State had to prove that he communicated a threat to Gibson with the intent that Gibson be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act, and that he drew or used a deadly weapon in doing so. Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2), (b)(2)(A). Creekmore only challenges the identity element. He contends that the evidence conclusively established an alibi placing him at Whitmire's home in Muncie when the crime occurred.

[11] Alibi evidence “may be relevant although it does not absolutely preclude the possibility of the defendant's presence at the alleged time and place of the criminal act.” Lane v. State, 175 Ind. App. 543, 545, 372 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1978). Where the precise time of the offense is uncertain, the jury may infer that the offense occurred within a timeframe consistent with the defendant's guilt. See Webster v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1295, 1297 (Ind. 1981); see also Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that where time is not an element of the offense, the State need not prove the precise date alleged and its evidence is not limited to that date). Here, the State alleged, in response to Creekmore's notice of alibi, that the crime occurred sometime on “the evening of August 24, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43.

[12] First, there was ample evidence that Creekmore was the person who threatened Gibson and chased him with a weapon. Gibson knew Creekmore from their dispute over the truck and identified him by name as the man who threatened and chased him. Wyatt, Gibson's neighbor, saw a man in a neon green work shirt get out of the passenger side of a blue truck—with blue rims and an out-of-state plate—and chase Gibson with a club; that description matched both the truck owned by Norris, and the high-visibility shirt Creekmore wore in his own alibi video. In addition, police found a crowbar in the bed of the truck that was consistent with Wyatt's description of a “club.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 118.

[13] Creekmore briefly argues that the evidence of the time of the crime presented at trial varied from the time set forth in the State's response to the alibi notice, such that he was misled in preparing his defense. See Quillen v. State, 271 Ind. 251, 253, 391 N.E.2d 817, 819 (1979). Time does become of the essence where a defendant raises an alibi defense; however, here, the alibi response stated the crime occurred “on the evening of August 24, 2024,” which was within the scope of the evidence presented at trial. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 43. Creekmore otherwise fails to develop this argument and we find no error.

[14] Next, we consider Creekmore's alibi evidence. The timeline relevant to Creekmore's alibi defense is as follows: (1) Whitmire's video of Creekmore arriving at his residence is time stamped at 7:52 p.m.; (2) Gibson called the police to report the incident at 8:13 p.m.; and (3) it takes approximately forty-five minutes to drive from Gibson's residence to Whitmire's residence. Creekmore relies solely on Gibson's initial statement to police that the incident occurred about 15 minutes prior to his call to conclude that the uncontroverted evidence establishes that he could not have committed the crime. However, Gibson's testimony about how much time passed between the incident and his call to the police was equivocal and unsure. At trial Gibson testified that he had waited “45 minutes to an hour” while he spoke with his mother and grandmother, and he acknowledged that he was “not really 100 percent for sure” and did not pay attention to the time. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 133, 138, 141. An hour between the incident and Gibson's call to police would have provided Creekmore sufficient time to leave Gibson's residence and arrive at Whitmire's residence. Creekmore's contrary reading of the timeline is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1245.

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction of intimidation.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4).

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.