Mishael Johnson, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Mishael Johnson, pro se, appeals the trial court's order granting the State's motion to correct error, which followed the trial court's order vacating Johnson's requirement to register for life under Indiana's Sex Offender Registration Act, Ind. Code §§ 11-8-8-0.1 to -23 (2024). Johnson raises three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it granted the State's motion to correct error.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Between June 2010 and April 2012, Johnson molested a child who was between six and seven years old. There is no question that, at the time, Johnson was at least eighteen years old. For his offenses, he was convicted of two counts of Class C felony child molesting. The Marion Superior Court then imposed a sentence of eight years with four years suspended for each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.

[4] In May 2025, Johnson, now a resident of Lake County, filed an apparent petition to “vacate” his “classification ․ as a ‘Sexually Violent Predator’ (SVP).” Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 2. In support of his request, Johnson stated that he was never adjudicated an SVP following his conviction. Yet, Johnson continued, he has been required to maintain a lifetime registration on Indiana's Sex Offender Registry. According to Johnson, because he was never adjudicated an SVP, any such apparent finding should be vacated and his registration requirement should be terminated.

[5] Although Johnson lived in Lake County and thus presumably maintained his registration with authorities there, Johnson filed his request in the Marion Superior Court ¹ and served his request only on the Marion County Prosecutor's Office. The Marion Superior Court, in turn, did not give notice of Johnson's request to the Indiana Department of Correction, the Attorney General, the Lake County Prosecutor, or the Lake County Sheriff, which it was required to do under Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22(e)(2).

[6] The trial court held a hearing on Johnson's motion, and a local deputy prosecutor appeared at the hearing. At that hearing, Johnson argued that he was never adjudicated an SVP and therefore his registration requirements should be terminated. The deputy prosecutor conceded that there was no record of Johnson having been adjudicated an SVP. The court then ordered Johnson's registration to be terminated and sent its order in relevant part to the Department of Correction.

[7] Upon receiving the order, the Department moved to intervene, which the trial court granted, and then filed a motion to correct error. In its motion, the Department noted that it had not been properly served with Johnson's request. The Department then argued that Johnson was not an SVP because, at the time he committed his offenses, Indiana law did not apply that designation to Class C felony convictions. According to the Department, Johnson's lifetime registration arose by operation of law based on other statutory sources in accordance with the nature of the offenses and the age of his victim, namely, Indiana Code section 11-8-8-19(c).²

[8] The trial court granted the Department's motion to correct error and vacated its prior order. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Johnson appeals the trial court order granting the Department's motion to correct error. We typically review rulings on motions to correct error for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Wilson v. State, 280 N.E.3d 1280, 1284 (Ind. 2026). However, where the issues presented are questions of law, our review is de novo. Id.

[10] We briefly note that Johnson proceeds pro se in this appeal. We thus reiterate Indiana's long-standing recognition that pro se litigants are “held to the same standards as a trained attorney.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). As our Supreme Court has made clear:

[pro se litigants are] “afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, a party proceeding pro se must “be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action.” McCullough v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 820, 825 (Ind. 2017) (quotation omitted). While trial courts may facilitate a fair hearing for pro se litigants by explaining “legal concepts in everyday language” and informing litigants “what is expected of them,” they must enforce the law. Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2 & cmt. 5.

Id. at 410-11.

[11] Johnson's essential argument on appeal is that the local deputy prosecutor's failure to make the correct legal argument during the initial hearing before the trial court precluded the Department from intervening and making that argument by way of a motion to correct error. But Johnson is mistaken. Johnson's request to terminate his registration requirements went to the administration of the Indiana's Sex Offender Registry, which is principally done by the Department. See I.C. ch. 11-8-8. The local deputy prosecutor did not represent the Department with respect to Johnson's request. See Ind. Dep't of Corr. v. Haley, 928 N.E.2d 840, 846-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Thus, Indiana law required that notice of Johnson's request be served independently on the Department before the trial court could hold a hearing on it. I.C. § 11-8-8-22(e)(2).

[12] However, the Department was not given that notice. No one at the initial hearing had the authority to make an argument on the Department's behalf, and, once the Department learned of Johnson's request, it promptly intervened and represented itself for the first time. Thus, Johnson's arguments on appeal, which go not to the correctness of the Department's legal position or the trial court's reliance on it but instead challenge only the timing of the Department's arguments, fail as a matter of law.

[13] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's order granting the Department's motion to correct error.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22(d) required Johnson's request to be filed in the county of his residence.

2.   This statute provides:A sex or violent offender who is convicted of at least one (1) offense under section 5(a) of this chapter[, which includes child molesting offenses,] that the sex or violent offender committed:(1) when the person was at least eighteen (18) years of age; and(2) against a victim who was less than twelve (12) years of age at the time of the crime; is required to register for life.I.C. § 11-8-8-19(c).

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.