Mmoja Ajabu, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Eli Lilly and Company, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Mmoja Ajabu's father Paul West died on November 22, 1964, at Methodist Hospital. In December 2011, Ajabu—acting individually and on behalf of his father's estate—filed a complaint against Eli Lilly alleging claims for negligence and wrongful death.¹ Ajabu was initially represented by counsel. After counsel withdrew, Ajabu attempted to proceed pro se. The trial court ordered Ajabu to get counsel pursuant to a local rule prohibiting a personal representative of an estate from proceeding without counsel. When Ajabu did not obtain counsel within the time allowed by the trial court, the trial court granted Lilly's motion to dismiss the action with prejudice on March 27, 2012.

[2] In December 2025—over thirteen years after the case was dismissed—Ajabu attempted to revive the case by filing a pro se Trial Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. Lilly responded on January 20, 2026, alleging (1) Ajabu was still prohibited from proceeding without counsel on behalf of West's estate and (2) the motion was untimely and without merit. The trial court denied Ajabu's motion the next day. The trial court also denied Ajabu's subsequent motion to correct error.

[3] As explained by our Supreme Court:

In rendering final judgment, our trial courts put an end to the controversy before them. Accordingly, entering final judgment deprives a court of its inherent power to reconsider, vacate, or modify any previous order. Indeed, a final judgment can be modified only so far as the judgment itself, a statute, or court rules permit. This presumption of finality provides certainty and stability, allowing parties to rely on decisions as conclusive.

Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Trial Rule 60(B) is one of the tools a party can use to set aside a final judgment. Id. We review a trial court's decision under Trial Rule 60(B) for an abuse of discretion. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 72 (Ind. 2006).

[4] Trial Rule 60(B) enumerates grounds on which a party may obtain relief from judgment if the party can satisfy the procedural and substantive requirements. Liu, 250 N.E.3d at 410. Here, Ajabu alleged three grounds for relief: newly discovered evidence (subsection (2)); fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct (subsection (3)); and subsection (8), which is a catch-all provision for any other reason justifying relief. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9–10.

[5] A motion seeking relief under subsections (2) and (3) must be filed “not more than one year after the judgment” is entered. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B). Ajabu's motion is clearly untimely on these two grounds, as it was filed more than thirteen years after the judgment Ajabu seeks to set aside.

[6] Trial Rule 60(B)(8) provides relief from judgment for any reason other than those set forth in subsections (1), (2), (3), or (4). Subsection (8) “may only be invoked upon a showing of exceptional circumstances justifying extraordinary relief” and a motion seeking such relief must be filed within a reasonable time. Baker & Daniels, LLP v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 924 N.E.2d 130, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. What constitutes a reasonable time varies with the circumstances of each case. State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016). “Relevant to the question of timeliness is prejudice to the party opposing the motion and the basis for the moving party's delay.” Gipson v. Gipson, 644 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Ind. 1994). Here, as Lilly points out regarding prejudice, it has “relied on the judgment for over a decade.” Appellee's Br. at 12. And Ajabu offers no explanation for his lengthy delay in seeking relief. To the extent his list of “extraordinary circumstances justify[ing] relief” is meant to offer an explanation, they are circumstances that could fall under subsections (2) or (3) and are therefore not appropriate for relief under subsection (8).² Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 10. Ajabu did not file his motion within a reasonable time. See Gipson, 644 N.E.2d at 877 (affirming trial court's denial of a motion for relief filed six years after the judgment).

[7] We also review a ruling on a motion to correct error for abuse of discretion. EdgeRock Dev., LLC v. C.H. Garmong & Son, Inc., 261 N.E.3d 192, 202 (Ind. 2025). Ajabu claimed in his motion to correct error that the trial court violated his due process right to be heard by ruling on the Trial Rule 60(B) motion without allowing him an opportunity to reply to Lilly's response. Specifically, he claimed Lilly raised “new and complex legal arguments, including Workers’ Compensation exclusivity” in its response and “[d]ue process requires an opportunity to respond where dispositive legal issues are raised.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 24; Appellant's Br. at 5. But Lilly did not argue Ajabu's motion for relief from judgment should be denied because of the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.³ And the case Ajabu cited as establishing his due process right to reply to “dispositive legal issues” says no such thing. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 24 (citing Munster Cmty. Hosp. v. Bernacke, 874 N.E.2d 611, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). Further, Ajabu did not point to a state or local rule that expressly provides a right to reply. Ajabu has not met his burden of proving the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to correct error. See Matter of Est. of Peters, 206 N.E.3d 434, 445–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (stating a trial court's decision on a motion to correct error is “cloaked with a presumption of correctness,” and the appellant has the burden to show it was an abuse of discretion).⁴

[8] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ajabu's motion for relief from judgment or his motion to correct error.

[9] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   It appears West was employed by Lilly. In Ajabu's pleadings in this case, he references “[e]mploymentrelated laboratory exposure and institutional conduct” as apparent bases for his claims. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9.

2.   For instance, Ajabu lists “[i]nstitutional concealment of critical facts[,]” which would fall under subsection (3) for fraud, and “[a] death now shown to be medically preventable under accepted 1964 standards[,]” which would fall under subsection (2) as newly discovered evidence. Id. The other circumstances—“[a]ttorney incapacity at the time of dismissal” and “[a]bsence of competent medical causation review”—were known at the time judgment was entered.

3.   In 2012, Lilly did file a motion to dismiss Ajabu's complaint based on this provision but this was not the basis for the judgment from which Ajabu seeks relief. Lilly made a single reference to the Workers’ Compensation Act in its response to Ajabu's motion for relief from judgment when explaining the procedural background of this case. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 13.

4.   After this case was fully briefed, Ajabu filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority and Motion to Supplement the Record, citing Appellate Rule 48 as authority to do so. Rule 48 allows a party to “promptly file with the Clerk a notice” of “pertinent and significant authorities” that have come to the party's attention after the party's brief has been filed, setting forth the citations and a “parenthetical or a single sentence explaining the authority.” Ajabu's notice sets forth additional facts not legal authorities and is therefore inappropriate.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.