IN RE: the Estate of Judith A. Phillips (Deceased) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In April 2025, a trial court granted Christy L. Such's petition for probate of Judith A. Phillips's will and appointed Such personal representative of Phillips's estate (the Estate).¹ In September, Such filed a verified closing statement and requested closure of the Estate in the Jasper Circuit Court. Scott D. Phillips (Scott), a beneficiary of the Estate, objected to closure and requested an accounting, which Such provided the same day. In October, the court scheduled a hearing on “all pending matters” for December 15, 2025, and ordered Scott to appear for that hearing. Appealed Order p. 1. Scott failed to appear. The court proceeded in his absence and denied “all filings by Scott D. Phillips” and ordered Such to file a supplemental accounting. Id. at 2. After Such filed the accounting, the court closed the Estate in a written order dated March 5, 2026.

[2] Scott now appeals, raising one issue: “Whether a proceeding conducted without meaningful notice, without a meaningful opportunity to respond, without safe access to participation, and with judicial action taken after recusal satisfies due process.” Appellant's Br. p. 3. Because Scott substantially failed to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure and has not articulated a cogent argument, we conclude he has waived our review.

[3] Scott, who proceeds pro se, is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and, “therefore, must be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action.” Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “While we prefer to decide cases on their merits, alleged errors are waived where an appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors.” Id. We also note that Such has not filed an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief, we may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error, which is error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 351-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[4] Indiana Appellate Rules 46(A)(4)-(6) provide that the appellant's brief shall contain the following sections under separate headings: a Statement of Issues, which “shall concisely and particularly describe each issue presented for review[;]” a Statement of the Case, which “shall briefly describe the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for review, and the disposition of these issues by the trial court or Administrative Agency[;]” and a Statement of Facts, which “shall describe the facts relevant to the issues presented for review” and shall be supported by references to the record. Scott's brief does not sufficiently meet these requirements.

[5] First, his issue appears in his statement of the case and is too imprecise to frame a question for our review. He questions whether “a proceeding” violated his due process rights but does not assert that claim with particularity. His general references to a lack of notice, lack of opportunity to be heard, and actions after recusal do not specify which part of the proceedings below he is challenging. Second, his statement of facts section reads more like a statement of the case, wherein he provides a list of about a dozen procedural acts that occurred below. To the extent that he believes these examples of procedural history are the facts needed for our review, he provides no facts supported by reference to the record demonstrating why or how those proceedings are relevant to the issues presented for review. The absence of specificity in his issue statement and of relevant facts for our review leaves us to guess or search the record to garner context for this appeal; we will do neither.

[6] Scott's argument is even more problematic. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) provides that an appellant's argument must contain, among other things, “the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” In addition, the rule requires a “concise statement of the applicable standard of review” for each issue, and “a brief statement of the procedural and substantive facts necessary for consideration of the issues presented on appeal, including a statement of how the issues relevant to the appeal were raised and resolved by ․ [the] trial court.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Scott's argument fails to satisfy these requirements.

[7] First, Scott's standard of review is deficient. He asserts that constitutional claims are reviewed de novo and procedural rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but he provides no citation to relevant authority for these propositions. And aside from baldly contending that his claim is constitutional, he provides no reference or citation to any constitutional rights that he claims were violated. In subsequent portions of his argument, he makes vague references to pieces of a due process analysis, including that due process requires “a neutral decisionmaker” and “notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 5 (capitalization omitted). Here, however, he provides an incomplete standard and incomplete citations to relevant authority.

[8] More importantly, he fails to provide sufficient procedural and substantive facts for our review, let alone describe how those facts demonstrate a due process violation. Instead, he makes vague references to actions, filings, or orders by the trial court. For example, he states generally that “continued judicial action” occurred after recusal, id.; that “the trial court continued to strike filings in grouped orders without individualized consideration,” id. at 6; that “[r]ulings were entered within days or contemporaneously with filings, eliminating meaningful response[,]” id.; that “[n]otice was inconsistent and at times issued after judicial action[,]” id.; and that “[d]ozens of filings were resolved in bulk[,]” id. These broad assertions lack the particularity necessary for us to determine whether a deficiency in notice or in a meaningful opportunity to be heard occurred, and we will not hunt the record to make such a determination on Scott's behalf. Scott has failed to present a cogent argument sufficient for our review. Accordingly, Scott has waived appellate review.

[9] Waiver notwithstanding, our review of the minimal record that Scott submitted on appeal does not reveal a prima facie error warranting reversal. See Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d at 351-52. Among other things, Scott included the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) of the underlying case in his appendix. Arrows drawn onto the CCS point to many instances of electronic notices being issued to parties, documents being filed, and orders being issued. In addition, a review of the docket reveals numerous instances of automated ENotices and paper notices sent to the parties throughout the life of the case.² See Cause No. 37C01-2509-EU-1136. Contrary to Scott's assertions, the CCS shows on its face that notice was provided regularly throughout the proceedings.

[10] Scott also includes a partial copy of the court's order awarding approximately $18,000 in attorney fees and costs to Such. App. Vol. II p. 12. He acknowledges the existence of this order in the facts section of his brief but does not appeal from this order. See Appellant's Br. p. 4. In any event, our review of the record reveals no error.³ On October 20, 2025, the court issued an order demanding Scott to appear in person on December 15, 2025, and advising him that fees and sanctions may be awarded in his absence if he fails to appear. Scott then failed to appear, and the court issued a written order on December 17 granting Such's request for fees and sanctions. Such then filed an accounting for said fees, which was served to Scott via electronic notice and first-class U.S. mail. See Cause No. 37C01-2509-EU-1136. Given all this, Scott has waived his opportunity to challenge this order, and it is affirmed.

[11] Finally, Scott included in his appendix the Lake Circuit Court judge's September 8, 2025 recusal order. In an apparent attempt to show an error, Scott also included two orders subsequently issued by that judge: one dated September 15, 2025, which simply denied a transfer request “due to mootness” and explicitly “withh[eld] ruling upon the remaining requests due to recusal[,]” App. Vol. II p. 23, and another dated September 16, 2025, which granted transfer to Jasper County but took no action on the merits of the case. Given the minimal record presented and the judge's evident restraint in acting on the merits of the case, we do not observe prima facie error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order closing the Estate.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Scott D. Phillips did not include Such's petition in his appendix. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27, the petition is part of the record on appeal, and we have taken judicial notice of this filing. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the Record on Appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27). We also note that Such's petition was originally filed in the Lake Circuit Court under Cause No. 45C01-2504-EU-162 but later transferred to the Jasper Circuit Court under Cause No. 37C01-2509-EU-1136.

2.   Scott's Appendix provides an incomplete copy of the CCS; As such, we take judicial notice of the complete CCS for Cause No. 37C01-2509-EU-1136. See Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1156.

3.   Scott does not include copies of any pleadings or orders referenced hereafter; we take judicial notice of each of them. See Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1156.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.