Roberto Miranda, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a domestic dispute with his girlfriend, Roberto Miranda, Jr., was arrested and later convicted of Level 4 felony criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury, Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. He now appeals, raising three issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying certain discovery requests, (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and (3) whether his felony convictions violate double jeopardy.

[2] We find no error in the trial court's discovery rulings. However, we find insufficient evidence to support his Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction and agree that some of his felony convictions violate double jeopardy. We thus affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 2, 2025, Miranda was at the home he shared with Victim and their infant child. Miranda and Victim argued, and Miranda became “angry” and began “throwing chairs and kicking them.” Tr. Vol. II p. 128. Victim was scared and left the home but quickly returned. Upon her arrival, Miranda came out with their baby, approached Victim's car, “grabbed the car keys[,]” and “told [her] to get in the house.” Id. at 130, 131. Victim and Miranda went inside, and Miranda placed the baby in a swing while Victim phoned her father. Miranda then, “[w]ithout warning[,]” “grabbed [Victim] in a choke hold” with his arm around her neck. Id. at 132. The two “ended up on the floor” with Miranda “laying on top [ ] of [Victim] while he ․ had [her in] a choke hold.” Id. Miranda “choked [her] to the point that [she was] turning purple” and then let go. Id. at 133. Victim then tried to run to the door, but Miranda “grabbed [her] and dragged [her] to the room” and “started choking” her with his hands. Id. at 134. Victim “essentially played dead” and Miranda let her go. Id. at 137. As a result of this attack, Victim suffered bruises to her neck, and her nose ring was ripped out of her nose, causing bleeding.

[4] Miranda then instructed Victim to sit in the corner of the room, which she did. Soon after, Victim's father arrived and she left the house with him. She called 911, and officers from the Hammond Police Department arrived at the home. After speaking with Victim and noting injuries to her neck and nose, officers approached the house intending to arrest Miranda. Miranda refused to come out of the house or to allow officers in, talking to officers through the windows and telling them they “need[ed] a warrant.” Id. at 180. At some point, Miranda did come out and placed the baby in a car seat on the front porch before returning inside.

[5] Because Miranda had “barricaded” himself in the house and police believed he might be armed, they set up a perimeter and SWAT responded to the scene. Id. After approximately an hour, Miranda “crawled through some type of tunnel” connecting the house to a “shed that's attached to the exterior of the home.” Tr. Vol. III p. 3. He then exited the shed and was apprehended by officers.

[6] The State charged Miranda with Level 4 felony criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury, Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

[7] On July 15, Miranda appeared at a pretrial hearing, waived his right to an attorney, waived his right to a jury trial, and requested a speedy bench trial. A bench trial was set for September 15. The court also set discovery deadlines of July 29 for the State and August 12 for Miranda. On July 31, another pretrial hearing was held. Miranda, pro se, stated he wanted to file a “motion for deposition” to depose Victim and her father. Tr. Vol. II p. 49. The State objected, noting that its discovery was complete and that trial was less than two months away. The trial court declined to set depositions, agreeing with the State that depositions were “not going to be able to get [ ] done in time.” Id. at 56. On September 2, Miranda filed a letter with the court requesting depositions, and the court subsequently ordered depositions to occur the following week. The State filed a motion to quash the depositions, arguing the discovery deadlines had passed and trial was imminent. Following a hearing on September 9, the court granted the State's motion to quash and no depositions occurred.

[8] A bench trial was held on September 15, after which the court found Miranda guilty as charged. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court did not enter judgment of conviction on the Class A misdemeanor domestic battery but entered judgment on all other charges. The court sentenced Miranda to the following: nine years for Level 4 felony criminal confinement, one and a half years for Level 6 felony strangulation, and one and a half years for each Level 6 felony domestic battery. The court ordered these sentences to be served concurrently. The court also sentenced Miranda to one year on the Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, to be served consecutively to the above sentences, for an aggregate of ten years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Miranda now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Discovery

[9] Miranda argues the trial court erred in (1) denying his July 31 request to conduct depositions and (2) granting the State's motion to quash. Trial courts have broad discretion over discovery matters, and thus “our review over these matters is typically limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind. 2022) (quotation omitted).

Due to the fact-sensitive nature of discovery matters, the trial court's ruling is cloaked in a strong presumption of correctness on appeal. We may affirm the trial court's ruling if it is sustainable on any legal basis in the record, even though this was not the reason enunciated by the trial court.

Williams v. State, 959 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). Under Indiana Code section 35-37-4-3, defendants “may take and use depositions of witnesses in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.” However, this “statutory right to take depositions in criminal cases has never been absolute.” Church, 189 N.E.3d at 586.

[10] At the July 31 hearing, Miranda verbally requested to depose Victim and her father. The State objected, arguing there was insufficient time to conduct depositions prior to trial, and the trial court agreed. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion here. Although Miranda argues his request was six weeks before trial and that was sufficient time to conduct depositions, such scheduling matters are the province of the trial court. Furthermore, Miranda failed to comply with the trial rules for conducting depositions, which require him to provide the State and deponents with “reasonable notice in writing” stating “the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined.” Ind. Trial Rule 30; see also Ind. Crim. Rule 2.5(F)(4). Miranda chose to proceed pro se, and in doing so he is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant his request to hold depositions when his request failed to comply with the relevant rules.

[11] The same can be said for the court granting the State's motion to quash. Again, Miranda's September 2 request for depositions did not comply with the trial rules. Further, it was untimely, given it was filed after the discovery deadline and only two weeks before trial. It was well within the trial court's discretion to deny such requests and grant the State's motion to quash. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Sercon Corp., 654 N.E.2d 1163, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (within trial court's discretion to quash subpoenas issued after the discovery deadline), trans. denied. Miranda has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in its discovery rulings.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

[12] Miranda next argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Our standard for reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).

[13] To convict Miranda of resisting law enforcement, the State was required to prove that he “(1) knowingly or intentionally (2) forcibly (3) resisted, obstructed, or interfered with (4) a law enforcement officer, (5) while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties.” Runnells v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1)). Miranda argues there is insufficient evidence he “forcibly” resisted. The State responds that Miranda's actions of refusing to comply with police instructions and barricading himself in the home constitute forcible resistance. We disagree.

[14] Our Supreme Court has held “the word ‘forcibly’ is an essential element of [resisting law enforcement] and modifies the entire string of verbs—resists, obstructs, or interferes—such that the State must show forcible resistance, forcible obstruction, or forcible interference.” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013).

[A] person “forcibly” resists, obstructs, or interferes with a police officer when he or she uses strong, powerful, violent means to impede an officer in the lawful execution of his or her duties. But this should not be understood as requiring an overwhelming or extreme level of force. The element may be satisfied with even a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence. Moreover, the statute does not require commission of a battery on the officer or actual physical contact—whether initiated by the officer or the defendant. It also contemplates punishment for the active threat of such strength, power, or violence when that threat impedes the officer's ability to lawfully execute his or her duties.

Id. at 727 (emphasis in original).

[15] The evidence here does not show Miranda forcibly resisted the officers. Indisputably, Miranda did not forcibly resist officers through actual physical contact. Nor do his actions of barricading himself in the house and refusing to come out show an active threat of strength, power, or violence. Although he was noncompliant with officers and resisted their attempts to arrest him, such “lack of cooperation [is] not forcible resistance.” McNary v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Indeed, “any action to resist must be done with force in order to violate th[e] statute. It is error as a matter of law to conclude that ‘forcibly resists’ includes all actions that are not passive.” Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind. 1993).

[16] The State argues Miranda used force when he “held the door closed when S.B. tried to allow” officers inside the home. Appellee's Br. p. 22. But we note there is no evidence Miranda forcibly held the door closed; rather, S.B. and the officer merely testified they were unable to open the door. See Tr. Vol. II p. 181 (officer testifying S.B. tried to open the door and Miranda “kept it closed”); id. at 141 (S.B. testifying she tried to let officers in with her key and “[it] wasn't opening”). Simply barring the door or otherwise not allowing officers in is not forcible resistance. See White v. State, 545 N.E.2d 1124 (defendant's actions of using his body to block police from his driveway did not constitute forcible resistance).

[17] Ultimately, Miranda did not direct any “strength, power, or violence” toward the officers nor did he make “movement or threatening gesture[s]” toward them. Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 724; see also McNary, 269 N.E.3d at 1249 (defendant did not forcibly resist officers by walking into another room and refusing to comply with officer's commands). For these reasons, we conclude there is insufficient evidence Miranda committed Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate that conviction and its accompanying sentence.

III. Double Jeopardy

[18] Miranda next argues his convictions for Level 4 felony criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury, Level 6 felony strangulation, and Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.¹

[19] As an initial matter, we note the State argues Miranda waived this claim because he did not assert this specific argument to the trial court. However, because “questions of double jeopardy implicate fundamental rights, we routinely address specific double jeopardy violations even when the parties have not begun the conversation.” Morales v. State, 165 N.E.3d 1002, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (collecting cases involving sua sponte discussions), trans. denied. As such, we will address Miranda's argument on the merits.

[20] We review double jeopardy claims de novo. McGuire v. State, 263 N.E.3d 745, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Where, as here, the claim involves a single criminal transaction that violates multiple statutes with common elements, we apply the analysis laid out in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020). First, we determine whether “the language of either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, either expressly or by unmistakable implication[.]” Id. at 248. If so, the inquiry is at an end and there is no double jeopardy violation. Id. But here, none of the statutes permits multiple punishment. As such, we turn to Wadle’s next step.

[21] Second, we determine whether the offenses are included “either inherently or as charged.” Id. If neither offense is included in the other, again the inquiry ends and there is no double jeopardy violation. Id.

Included offenses come in two forms: inherently included offenses and offenses that are included as charged. An offense is inherently included if it meets the definition of “included offense” in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-168. An offense is included as charged (or “factually included”) if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense. In determining whether offenses are included as charged, we examine only the facts as presented on the face of the charging information.

McGuire, 263 N.E.3d at 749-50 (quotations omitted). Miranda acknowledges the offenses here do not meet the statutory definition of an “included offense” under Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-168. However, he argues that his convictions for Level 6 felony strangulation and Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury are factually included in his conviction for Level 4 felony criminal confinement.

[22] “[W]hen assessing whether an offense is factually included, a court may examine only the facts as presented on the face of the charging instrument.” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (Ind. 2024) (emphasis in original). “This includes examining the ‘means used to commit the crime charged,’ which must ‘include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.’ ” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251). Where ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another, courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant's favor and find a presumptive double jeopardy violation, although the State can later rebut this presumption. Id. at 1069.

[23] The charging information here provided as follows:

COUNT I

[CRIMINAL CONFINEMENT (a Level 4 Felony)]

Jeffery Miller, upon oath, says that on or about July 2, 2025, in the County of Lake, State of Indiana, Roberto Miranda Jr. did knowingly or intentionally confine [Victim] without the consent of [Victim], said act resulting in moderate bodily injury to [Victim], contrary to I.C. 35-42-3-3(a) and I.C. 35-42-3-3(b)(2) and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

COUNT II

[STRANGULATION (a Level 6 Felony)]

Jeffery Miller, upon oath, says that on or about July 2, 2025, in the County of Lake, State of Indiana, Roberto Miranda Jr. in a rude, insolent or angry manner, did knowingly or intentionally apply pressure to the throat or neck of [Victim] in a manner that impeded normal breathing or blood circulation of [Victim], contrary to I.C. 35-42-2-9(c) and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

COUNT III

[DOMESTIC BATTERY RESULTING IN MODERATE BODILY INJURY (a Level 6 Felony)]

Jeffery Miller, upon oath, says that on or about July 2, 2025, in the County of Lake, State of Indiana, Roberto Miranda Jr. did knowingly or intentionally touch [Victim], a family or household member, in a rude insolent or angry manner, resulting in moderate bodily injury, contrary to I.C. 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) and I.C. 35-42-2-1.3(b)(3) and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.

App. Vol. II p. 16.

[24] The charging information for each of these offenses tracks the statutory language and lacks specific facts to make clear whether the means to commit the confinement was something other than the strangulation or battery. That is to say, it is conceivable on the face of this charging information that the means used by Miranda to confine Victim could have included all of the elements of strangulation or domestic battery. See Easter v. State, 281 N.E.3d 896, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (charging information was ambiguous as to whether criminal confinement count was factually included in rape count, as we could “easily conceive of facts under which [criminal confinement] may or may not be factually included in [rape]”); see also Denny v. State, 272 N.E.3d 210, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“Because of the way the information was drafted, specifically the lack of factual detail, one cannot necessarily tell whether the means used to commit the confinement was something other than aggravated battery.”). This ambiguity creates a rebuttable presumption of a substantive double jeopardy violation. See A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1070.

[25] Thus, we proceed to the final step and give the State the opportunity to rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation. To do so, “the State must demonstrate that it made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses.” Eversole v. State, 251 N.E.3d 604, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. To make this determination, we look to whether the defendant's actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249.

[26] To accomplish this step, “we must first identify which of the defendant's actions to analyze.” Afolabi v. State, 279 N.E.3d 939, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. denied. “This is not a call for post hoc explanations of how the evidence could have been allocated between the offenses to avoid substantive double jeopardy.” Id. Rather, “we must be convinced that the factfinder could have— and did—credit distinct actions by the defendant as supporting each of the challenged offenses.” Easter, 281 N.E.3d at 911.

[27] The State attempts to rebut the double jeopardy presumption by claiming Miranda committed confinement when he “took [Victim's] car keys from her and marched her back into the house[,]” Appellee's Br. p. 37, and that this is a separate act from his later strangulation and battery. But this conduct cannot satisfy the elements of Level 4 felony criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury. Nor was this the conduct the State relied upon at trial.² At closing, the State characterized the confinement as follows:

We heard [Victim] testify earlier that when she tried to leave, the defendant grabbed her and dragged her into another room where she didn't want to be against her will and she did not consent to that. She tried to escape and she was dragged back into another room earlier. We also heard her testify that during the initial strangle, the first time that he strangled her nearly to unconsciousness when she turned purple that when she -- her last recollection is that he was on top of her, holding her down, confining her to the ground, restraining any freedom of movement on her part.

Tr. Vol. III p. 74. When asked by the trial court what constituted the moderate bodily injury element of the Level 4 criminal confinement charge, the State replied:

[The] [p]hysical condition that was impaired was her ability to breathe, her ability to move about freely, her ability to swallow. She testified earlier that because of the attack and the strangulation and the pressure to her neck that she was not able to swallow. In addition to that, other than just a complaint of pain, which would [be] more [a]kin to just bodily injury, she sustained her nose ring being ripped out of her face and caused it to bleed.

Id. at 75-76.

[28] Thus, as argued by the prosecutor, Miranda committed criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury when he grabbed Victim, dragged her, and strangled her, causing pain and injury. The State then used these same facts when asking the court to find Miranda guilty of Level 6 felony strangulation and Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury. The State argued:

Count 2, strangulation ․ [Victim] testified the defendant grabbed her initially in a choke hold, cutting off the air flow and the blood circulation of her neck ․

***

Count 3, domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, we've discussed at length․ We discussed the moderate bodily injury. Some of those things are the same.

Id. at 79, 81. Thus, the prosecutor did not sufficiently distinguish the conduct supporting each count. See Fleener v. State, -- N.E.3d --, 2026 WL 2036365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (finding a substantive double jeopardy violation where the State's closing argument cited defendant's actions of “pushing, pulling and dragging” the victim as establishing both the confinement and the battery).

[29] Our review of the record further reveals that the evidence adduced at trial did not otherwise make clear to the finder of fact that the confinement, strangulation, and domestic batteries were based on distinct actions. Victim testified that upon entering the house with Miranda, he “grabbed [her] in a choke hold” so that she could not breathe and they “ended up on the floor” with him “laying on top of [her.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 132. Miranda then let her go, and she tried to run toward the door. At that point, he “grabbed [her] and dragged [her]” and started “choking” her until she “played dead” and he stopped. Id. at 133-34. She testified as a result of these actions she sustained injuries to her neck and her nose ring was ripped out of her face. This testimony does not support the State's argument on appeal that the criminal confinement charge is based on actions separate from the strangulation and battery. Rather, Miranda's actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 253.

[30] Given the evidence and argument above, the State has failed to rebut the presumption of double jeopardy. The proper remedy here is to vacate the convictions with the lesser penalties – here Level 6 strangulation and Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury. See Eversole, 251 N.E.3d at 609.

IV. Conclusion

[31] We affirm Miranda's conviction for Level 4 felony criminal confinement and Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child. For the reasons provided above, we reverse his convictions for Level 6 felony strangulation and Level 6 felony domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, as well as his conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. We remand for the trial court to vacate these convictions and the accompanying sentences.

[32] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Miranda also argues his convictions for Level 4 felony criminal confinement resulting in moderate bodily injury and Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child violate double jeopardy. But we note that Miranda conceded to the trial court that these convictions did not violate double jeopardy. See Tr. Vol. III pp. 143-44. As such, he has invited any alleged error, and we may not address that issue on appeal. See Bush v. State, 208 N.E.3d 605, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

2.   The State argues we cannot consider its closing argument in determining whether it has rebutted the presumption of double jeopardy. We disagree. Step 3 of the Wadle analysis requires us to determine whether the State “made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence[.]” Eversole, 251 N.E.3d at 608. We have routinely made this determination by looking to the State's closing argument. See Afolabi, 279 N.E.3d at 956; Easter, 281 N.E.3d at 911. Furthermore, we note our Supreme Court in Wadle specifically cited to the prosecutor's closing argument when conducting Step 3 of the analysis. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 254.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.