Jennifer Ibarra, Appellant-Defendant v. Jacob Garcia, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jacob Garcia filed an eviction action against his tenant, Jennifer Ibarra. Ibarra failed to appear at the possession hearing, and the trial court entered a default order and granted Garcia possession of the premises. Ibarra also failed to appear at the subsequent damages hearing, and the trial court entered judgment in Garcia's favor in the amount of $8,180, plus court costs and post-judgment interest.¹ Ibarra now appeals. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Ibarra raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether Ibarra may challenge the validity of the pre-suit statutory notice and the timeliness of the complaint for the first time on appeal from a default judgment.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with the damages hearing in Ibarra's absence.

III. Whether alleged irregularities in the docketing of Ibarra's filings require reversal.

Facts

[3] Ibarra occupied a property owned by Garcia under a lease agreement for rent of $196 per week. After sending notice to Ibarra on November 5, 2025, regarding the non-payment of rents and late fees, Garcia filed a small claims notice of claim for eviction on November 14, 2025.

[4] On November 26, 2025, Ibarra filed a pro se appearance and a verified motion for continuance supported by medical documentation, claiming anxiety and panic attacks. On December 4, 2025, the trial court granted the motion and continued the eviction hearing to December 29, 2025. On December 23, 2025, Ibarra filed a second motion for continuance, which the trial court denied on December 29, 2025.

[5] On December 29, 2025, the trial court held the possession hearing. Garcia appeared in person; Ibarra failed to appear. Garcia moved for default judgment based upon Ibarra's failure to appear, answer, or otherwise defend the complaint.² The trial court granted the motion and entered default judgment against Ibarra. The trial court found Garcia was entitled to possession of the premises, ordered Ibarra to vacate the premises on or before January 5, 2026, and scheduled a hearing on the issue of damages for January 23, 2026.

[6] Between December 30, 2025, and January 23, 2026, Ibarra filed numerous motions and notices, including a verified motion to set aside the default judgment, several motions to stay, a motion to correct error, a motion for a transcript at public expense, and filings regarding disability accommodations. The trial court granted Ibarra leave to file a written request to appear remotely at the January 23, 2026 hearing. The trial court denied the motion to set aside, the emergency motion to stay, the motion to correct error, and the related motions to stay. On January 21, 2026, the trial court advised that Ibarra had leave to file a written request to attend remotely and that she should contact the clerk's office regarding electronic filing issues.³ On January 22, 2026, the trial court further advised Ibarra that this matter could be heard in her absence if she did not participate. Ibarra did not file a request to attend the hearing remotely.

[7] On January 23, 2026, the trial court held the damages hearing. Ibarra again failed to appear. The trial court denied Ibarra's pending request for a continuance and request for a transcript at public expense, noting that, given her absence, no evidence or argument was presented in support of them. Garcia testified and presented exhibits regarding unpaid rent and damages. The trial court entered judgment in Garcia's favor in the amount of $8,180, plus court costs and post-judgment interest.⁴

[8] Ibarra filed additional post-judgment motions, including a motion to vacate the judgment, which the trial court denied. Ibarra now appeals.⁵

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[9] Ibarra proceeds pro se, and we, therefore, reiterate that “a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Picket Fence Prop. Co. v. Davis, 109 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Although we prefer to decide cases on their merits, arguments are waived where an appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial that it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors. Id.

[10] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that the argument section of a brief “contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․” We will not consider an assertion on appeal when there is no cogent argument supported by authority and there are no references to the record as required by the rules. Id. “ ‘We will not become an advocate for a party or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’ ” Picket Fence, 109 N.E.3d at 1029 (quoting Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984).

[11] We also note that Garcia has not filed an appellee's brief. In such cases:

the appellate court need not develop an argument for the appellees but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. This less stringent standard of review relieves [us] of the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee. We are obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required.

Hahn-Weisz v. Johnson, 189 N.E.3d 1136, 1140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

I. Defective Statutory Notice

[12] Ibarra first argues that the eviction action proceeded on a defective statutory notice under Indiana Code Section 32-31-1-6. Specifically, Ibarra claims that (1) the notice was addressed to individuals other than Ibarra; (2) the notice of claim was filed before the ten-day period required by the statute had run; and (3) the notice asserted an arrearage inconsistent with the lease. See Appellant's Br. pp. 20-21.

[13] Ibarra, however, did not appear at the eviction hearing and did not present these arguments to the trial court. “As a general rule, a party may not present an argument or issue to an appellate court unless the party raised that argument or issue to the trial court.” Pearman v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 108 N.E.3d 342, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting GKC Indiana Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Investors, LLC, 764 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). Moreover, because the possession order was entered on default, Ibarra was required to challenge it by a motion under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B), and our review is limited to the grounds presented in that motion. See Expert Pool Builders, LLC v. Vangundy, 224 N.E.3d 309, 314 (Ind. 2024); Ind. Trial Rule 55(C). Additionally, Ibarra's post-judgment motions did not raise the statutory notice issue. This argument, thus, is waived. Evergreen Shipping Agency Corp. v. Djuric Trucking, Inc., 996 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); see Mid-States Gen. & Mech. Contracting Corp. v. Town of Goodland, 811 N.E.2d 425, 438 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“An appellant who presents an issue for the first time on appeal waives the issue for purposes of appellate review.”).⁶

II. The Damages Hearing

[14] Ibarra next argues that the trial court erred by proceeding with the January 23, 2026 damages hearing without resolving her disability-accommodation requests. Although styled as a motion for disability accommodation, Ibarra's motion requested that the hearing be continued.⁷

[15] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion. McClendon v. Triplett, 184 N.E.3d 1202, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-44 (Ind. 2014)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Gunashekar v. Grose, 915 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind. 2009). When a trial court denies a party's motion for a continuance, there is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. In re N.K., 249 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[16] Here, the record does not support Ibarra's contention that her accommodation requests went unaddressed. The trial court granted Ibarra leave to file a written request to appear remotely, set her requests for hearing on January 23, 2026, and advised her that the matter could be heard in her absence if she did not participate. The trial court further advised Ibarra that she could contact the court's staff regarding any specific accommodation needs. Ibarra, however, did not file a request to appear remotely and did not appear at the hearing. The trial court, thus, proceeded with the hearing and entered judgment in Garcia's favor. Ibarra, thus, has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with the damages hearing.

III. Docketing Irregularities

[17] Finally, Ibarra argues that the record is materially unreliable because her filings were repeatedly misclassified on the CCS as correspondence, rejected for technical errors, or resolved through administrative entries and blanket denials rather than individualized rulings.

[18] “[I]t is well settled that the trial court speaks through its CCS or docket, and this court is limited in its authority to look behind the CCS to examine whether an event recorded therein actually occurred.” City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. Here, the CCS reflects that the trial court received, considered, and responded to Ibarra's numerous filings. Ibarra's filings were docketed as correspondence because she submitted them to the clerk by e-mail, and the trial court advised Ibarra that she could avoid that designation by filing via U.S. Mail or in person at the clerk's desk. The trial court explained that it took no action on certain filings because they lacked a completed caption, a signature, or a certificate of service. The trial court subsequently ruled on the merits on some of those motions. The trial court, moreover, expressly confirmed that Ibarra's prior filings “have, in fact, been received by the Judge of this Court and that requests made therein have been set for hearing.” CCS entry of January 22, 2026. When Ibarra sought correction of the CCS, the trial court reviewed the challenged entries, found them accurate, and denied her requests.

[19] Ibarra identifies no judicial ruling inaccurately recorded on the CCS; her complaints concern the classification and processing of her filings. The classification of a filing on the CCS, however, did not prevent the trial court from considering its substance, and the trial court's entries and orders show that it received and disposed of Ibarra's requests. Ibarra does not explain how any docketing irregularity affected the disposition of her case. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (no error “in anything done or omitted by the trial court” warrants reversal where its probable impact “is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties”). Ibarra, thus, has not established prima facie error, and her challenge to the reliability of the record fails.

Conclusion

[20] Ibarra waived her challenge to the statutory notice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding with the damages hearing, and Ibarra has not established that any docketing irregularity affected the disposition of her case. Accordingly, we affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Trial Court's Damages Order dated January 23, 2026 (the “Damages Order”).

2.   See Trial Court's Possession Order dated December 29, 2025 (the “Possession Order”).

3.   See Trial Court's chronological case summary (“CCS”).

4.   See the Damages Order; Indiana Appellate Rule 31(D) Affidavit Regarding January 23, 2026 Damages Hearing (filed March 12, 2026).

5.   Ibarra tendered a defective appendix and failed to cure the defects. We cite instead to the trial court's record and CCS. The residential lease agreement was attached to the notice of claim for eviction filed on November 14, 2025. Ibarra also did not provide a transcript of the hearings due to the cost. See Campbell v. Criterion Group, 605 N.E.2d 150, 160-61 (Ind. 1992) (holding that a transcript is unavailable when an indigent appellant is unable to bear the costs of its preparation, and that the appellant may then present a statement of the evidence under the predecessor to Appellate Rule 31); Ind. Appellate Rule 31(D) (providing that, where the trial court judge does not certify the moving party's statement of the evidence, the judge shall file an affidavit setting forth the judge's recollection of the disputed statements or conduct). On March 6, 2026, we directed the trial court judge to file verified affidavits regarding the evidence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 31(D); the trial court judge timely filed the affidavits on March 12, 2026, and they are part of the record on appeal.

6.   The written notice Ibarra describes does not appear in the trial court's record, and her contentions that the notice was addressed to persons other than herself and asserted an arrearage inconsistent with the lease find no support in the record before us. Ibarra, moreover, mischaracterizes Indiana Code Section 32-31-1-6, which addresses a landlord's termination of the lease rather than the filing of an action. Here, the lease expressly required Ibarra to pay rent in advance, and the notice of claim alleged that she had refused or neglected to do so; notice, therefore, was not necessary to terminate the lease. See I.C. § 32-31-1-8(5); Walking With Jesus Ministries v. Alexander, 240 N.E.3d 183, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (holding the ten-day notice requirement inapplicable where the face of the lease provided that rent was payable in advance).

7.   Ibarra's motion, docketed as a Motion for Disability Accommodation and Temporary Suspension of Proceedings, requested that the bench trial be continued and that Ibarra be given additional time to remove her personal property.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.