George Matthew Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In April 2024, George Smith pled guilty to Level 5 felony reckless homicide for accidentally shooting his friend, and the trial court imposed a six-year sentence suspended to probation, with the first three years to be served on community corrections. On January 1, 2026, Smith had a physical altercation with another individual in the community corrections facility. As a result, the State charged Smith with Class A misdemeanor battery and filed petitions to revoke Smith's probation and community corrections placement. After a hearing, the trial court found Smith had violated the rules of his placement, revoked his suspended sentence, and ordered him to execute the remaining time in the Department of Correction (DOC). Smith appeals, arguing the court (1) violated his due process rights, and (2) abused its discretion by revoking his suspended sentence and ordering him to execute the remainder in the DOC. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the evening of March 31, 2023, when Smith was eighteen years old, he and a few of his friends were hanging out at his house when H.R. drove up. Both he and Smith had guns with them. Smith came out of the house, and H.R. pointed his gun at him from inside his car and said “bang.” Transcript at 13. Smith pulled out his own gun, approached H.R., said “bang,” and the gun fired—hitting H.R. and wounding him. Id. Smith called 911 and after passing the phone to one of his friends, performed CPR on H.R. until authorities arrived. H.R. ultimately died from his injury.

[3] Initially, the young men at the scene were not forthcoming with the officers about what happened. But the next morning, Smith went to the police station and told them he had accidentally shot H.R. The State charged Smith with Level 5 felony reckless homicide,¹ to which he ultimate pled guilty. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence suspended to supervised probation, with the first three years to be served on community corrections. As a special condition of his probation, the court ordered Smith to speak at a different Knox County school each month about what had happened with H.R.

[4] On January 1, 2026, Smith asked the other men in the community corrections facility if they could be quieter during the day since his work schedule differed from theirs and required him to sleep while they were up. One of the men, Christopher Fox, began insulting and threatening Smith. Even though Smith reached out to the correctional officers for help and told them that Fox was upset, the officers did not assist him. Smith left the area to find a correctional officer. While he was gone, Fox removed everything from Smith's bunk and tossed it onto the floor. When Smith returned and saw what Fox had done to his bunk, he went upstairs and did the same to Fox's bunk. The pair continued to exchange words as they descended the stairs. Back downstairs, Smith turned and punched Fox's shoulder. Fox pushed Smith, tackled him, and punched and kicked him in the face.

[5] The week after the incident, the State charged Smith with Class A misdemeanor battery and filed notices that Smith had violated his community corrections placement and probation. The community corrections notice alleged that Smith had violated the rules by “remov[ing] the bedding from another offender's bunk” and “swing[ing]” at Fox. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 24. The Wabash Valley Regional Community Corrections Conduct Adjustment Board determined that Smith was “NO LONGER an acceptable Client for [its] program and should be removed and sent to a secure facility.” Id. at 25. The probation violation notice alleged that, in addition to breaking community corrections rules,² Smith had violated the conditions of his probation by “being charged with a new offense.”³ Id. at 30.

[6] At the fact-finding hearing for his revocations, several probation and community corrections officers testified about the incident. The State also admitted video clips showing the altercation between Smith and Fox. See State's Exhibit 3. Smith also testified, and he admitted it was wrong to remove the items from Fox's bunk but “felt like it was the only thing [he] could do because the [correctional officers] weren't going to do anything ․” Tr. at 93. He also testified that he pushed Fox because he “felt threatened.” Id. at 94.

[7] The State requested Smith's entire suspended sentence be revoked, noting that “[h]e was granted an extraordinary act of mercy being placed” on probation and community corrections, and he was required to follow the rules regardless of Fox's actions toward him. Id. at 99. Additionally, the State argued that the “director of the facility ha[d] indicated to the Court that [Smith was] not suitable for their program any more [sic] and this violation [was] sufficient to have him removed.” Id. The defense admitted that Smith “[s]hould [not] have done it[,]” but argued “when a bully starts to bully you, you've got to at least stand up for yourself to a point.” Id. at 100-01. Noting that Smith was only eighteen years old when he entered the program, only twenty at the time of the altercation, and he was acting in self-defense, defense counsel asked the court to place Smith on house arrest for the remainder of his sentence in lieu of revoking his probation.

[8] The trial court found Smith violated two probation conditions—breaking community corrections rules and being charged with a new offense. As a result, it revoked Smith's suspended sentence, reasoning,

It was a gift for you to go to work release. Because you were eighteen years old and you came in here and you acted like you had some remorse and you acted like you were going to learn from this. And I see that you have learned absolutely nothing ․ If you can't behave when you are handed that gift, then I don't know what else could be done for you.

Id. at 102. The court also noted that almost two years into his sentence, Smith had failed to comply with his requirement to speak at any of the Knox County schools. The trial court ordered Smith to serve his suspended sentence in the DOC and credited him with 665 days of accrued time and 222 days for good time. Smith now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Placement on probation and community corrections are alternatives to incarceration through the DOC. Ewing v. State, 273 N.E.3d 1107, 1111 (Ind. 2026). “Each is a ‘matter of grace,’ a ‘conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.’ ” Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied). That liberty is dependent upon a defendant's compliance with the rules of probation and/or the community corrections program, and violating those rules permits the trial court to “remove them from the program and/or order that their previously suspended sentence be executed instead.” Id. (citing Ind. Code §§ 35-38-2.6-5(a)-(b) (2020) (community corrections), 35-38-2-3(h)(3) (2015) (probation)).

[10] First, Smith argues he was denied due process when “the trial court improperly revoked [his] probation ․ without first determining that revocation was appropriate and warranted under the circumstances.” Appellant's Brief at 7. “Whether a given procedure satisfies the requirements of due process is a question of law[,]” which we review de novo. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 857 (Ind. 2024), cert. denied. Although a petition to revoke does not “trigger[ ] the ‘full array of constitutional rights afforded defendants at trial[,]’ ” certain due process requirements still must be met. Ewing, 273 N.E.3d at 1111 (quoting Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549). Those requirements are:

(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [work release or] probation; (b) disclosure to the [program participant or] probationer of the evidence against him or her; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses ․ ; (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [work release or] probation.

Id. at 1111-12 (alterations in original) (quoting Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

[11] Smith does not delineate which of these requirements he believes he was denied. Rather, Smith cites Woods v. State, in which our Supreme Court explained that “[p]robation revocation is a two-step process[,]” requiring the trial court to determine whether there has been a probation violation and then, if there was, “determine if the violation warrants revocation of the probation.” 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). He contends the court bypassed the second step when it “immediately moved to sentencing [him] ․ without even allowing [him] to offer evidence of his character and other conditions which may have informed whether revocation and execution of his entire sentence [was] appropriate.” Appellant's Br. at 9. Preliminarily, we note that although the trial court said at the hearing that it was “revoking his entire sentence[,]” it nonetheless gave him credit for the time he'd already served on community corrections as well as good time credit, reducing his original six-year sentence by 887 days. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 47. Thus, Smith is incorrect that he was ordered to serve his entire suspended sentence.

[12] Turning to Smith's primary argument, we disagree with Smith's contention that the trial court failed to adhere to the two-step process laid out by our Supreme Court in Woods. InWoods, after the State presented evidence at the fact-finding hearing that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation by missing a drug test, the defendant asked, “Can I explain why I missed sir?” 892 N.E.2d at 639. The trial court said, “No because it doesn't matter, because you're on strict compliance[,] you weren't allowed to miss remember?” Id. The court then revoked his probation. Id. Our Supreme Court concluded that the court's failure to provide the defendant “the opportunity to explain why” his probation should not have been revoked violated his due process rights. Id. at 641.

[13] The same cannot be said here. Smith was afforded a full fact-finding hearing in which he offered evidence, confronted and cross-examined the State's witnesses, and presented argument to the court. Specifically, Smith explained to the court that he was merely defending himself, he was only twenty years old, and even younger when he entered the program. Unlike the defendant in Woods, Smith was able to explain his behavior to the trial court. And, in response, the court explained to Smith why it disagreed and found that revocation and execution of the remainder of his sentence was the appropriate sanction. Moreover, Smith specifically argued that the circumstances warranted that he be put on house arrest, and the trial court gave him credit for time he'd already served. Thus, his assertion that “[t]he court clearly never even considered, or perhaps realized it was even possible, that some sanction or sentence short of revocation and execution of the entire sentence was a possibility” is not well taken. Appellant's Br. at 9; see also Laughlin v. State, 101 N.E.3d 827, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“In bench trials, we assume the judge knows and follows the applicable law.”).⁴

[14] Smith contends he “is entitled to an opportunity to be heard ․ as to whether there may be some future course of action that serves the interests of all parties and is more appropriate than immediate revocation and placement in [the] DOC.” Appellant's Br. at 10. But he was provided and indeed availed himself of that very opportunity.⁵ Smith has therefore failed to show the trial court violated his right to due process. See Vernon v. State, 903 N.E.2d 533, 537-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding the trial court did not improperly “skip[ ] the second step of the process” where the defendant “was afforded an evidentiary hearing” and “point[ed] to no authority showing that he [was] entitled to another one”), trans. denied.

[15] Next, Smith argues the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his suspended sentence and ordering him to execute it in the DOC.

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the probation period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one or more sanctions, including ordering execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Castillo v. State, 67 N.E.3d 661, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added) (citing Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015)), trans. denied. We review a trial court's probation revocation and sanction for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (internal citations omitted). In our review, we only consider evidence favorable to the judgment, and we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Vernon v. State, 903 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. “Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation.” DePalma v. State, 258 N.E.3d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied, trans. denied).

[16] Smith acknowledges that he “all but admitted that he violated his probation.” Appellant's Br. at 11. But he nonetheless argues that “[t]his Court ․ sees far more egregious, dangerous, and concerning exhibitions of behavior that form the basis for probation violations.” Id. He contends that his “youthful age” and the circumstances of the incident “do[ ] not warrant revocation” or him “serving his entire suspended sentence.” Id. at 11-12. Again, Smith is mistaken as to what the trial court ordered him to serve here; it was not his entire sentence but rather what remained of it after factoring in his credit for accrued and good time. Moreover, his assertions amount to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The evidence presented at the fact-finding showed that Smith violated two conditions of his probation, including committing the crime of battery against Fox. Given the seriousness of Smith's underlying crime and his resort to violence in violation of his probation and community corrections rules, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Smith to execute the remainder of his suspended sentence in the DOC.

Conclusion

[17] Finding the trial court did not violate Smith's due process rights or abuse its discretion by ordering him to execute the remainder of his suspended sentence, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5 (2014).

2.   Probation Rule #14 provided that Smith would “serve [three] years in the Wabash Valley Regional Community Corrections Work Release Program and comply with all the rules and regulations of the program[.]” Exhibits at 12.

3.   Probation Rule #3 provided that Smith must “obey all town, city, county, state and federal laws and ordinances” and that “any arrest or citation for a violation of the law ․ will be considered evidence of a violation of [his] probation ․” Ex. at 12.

4.   We also note that in Woods, our Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the probation revocation despite the trial court's error in denying the defendant an opportunity to present mitigating evidence. The court reasoned that “[n]either on direct appeal nor on transfer ․ d[id] [the defendant] make any attempt to explain why he violated the terms of his probation[,]” and, “[m]ore importantly, [he] did not make an offer of proof to the trial court” after it prevented him from giving an explanation. 892 N.E.2d at 642. Similarly, here, Smith provides no indication as to what additional evidence he would have offered regarding “his character and other conditions” to show revocation was not warranted. Appellant's Br. at 9. He also did not object to the trial court's procedure at the hearing, request to make a statement of allocution, or otherwise seek an opportunity to present evidence specific to the matter of sanctions. Thus, even if we were to find the court erred, Smith has failed to show he is entitled to relief.

5.   Smith also cites Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) to support his argument that he was denied due process. However, as our Supreme Court observed in Woods, “Indiana has codified the due process requirements of Morrissey in Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3 by requiring that an evidentiary hearing be held on the revocation and providing for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses by the probationer.” 892 N.E.2d at 640. As discussed above, Smith was afforded a full fact-finding hearing during which he confronted and cross-examined witnesses. Smith's reliance on Morrissey is therefore unpersuasive.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J. and Kenworthy, J., concur.