Dejwane Patrick Kayira Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Dejwane Patrick Kayira Smith (“Smith”) was convicted of Level 4 felony possession of a narcotic drug ¹ and Level 5 felony dealing in a narcotic drug.² Smith appeals his convictions, challenging the admission of evidence obtained from the search incident to his warrantless arrest. Smith argues that the warrantless arrest leading to the search was not supported by probable cause, contrary to both the state and federal constitutions. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the afternoon of April 30, 2025, Officer Zachary Turpin (“Officer Turpin”) of the Evansville Police Department (“EPD”) stopped a vehicle for speeding. The driver and sole occupant of the vehicle was Breanna Compton (“Compton”). When Officer Turpin approached the vehicle, Compton said she was on her way to file a restraining order against Smith, who lived with her.

[3] Compton became tearful and visibly distressed while speaking about Smith. When Officer Turpin asked what was going on, Compton showed him bruises developing on her arms and a welt on her forehead. She explained that Smith had thrown her against a wall earlier that day, causing the arm bruising, and had struck her forehead three days prior. Compton said she did not contact law enforcement about the violence because Smith had been threatening her. She recounted that, the previous night, Smith had taken her phone and car keys to prevent her from leaving and physically blocked her from leaving for work the next morning. Smith told Compton she was not leaving the house without him.

[4] After speaking with Compton, Officer Turpin prepared a probable cause affidavit in support of an arrest warrant for felony criminal confinement and felony domestic battery. He also communicated the substance of Compton's report to a superior officer, who relayed the information via e-mail to all EPD officers. No warrant had yet issued when, around 2:00 p.m. the next day, EPD Detective Phillip Goodman (“Detective Goodman”) observed Smith leave his residence and drive away. After noticing that Smith failed to signal a turn, Detective Goodman coordinated with nearby officers to initiate a traffic stop.

[5] One responding officer was Detective Neal Luecke (“Detective Luecke”) of the Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Office. He was joined by two EPD detectives, Detective Dylan Barnes (“Detective Barnes”) and Detective Quinton Keil. The three detectives converged on Smith's vehicle and worked together to conduct a high-risk traffic stop. Smith was arrested, at which point Detective Barnes conducted a search incident to arrest. Concealed beneath the waistband of Smith's underwear, Detective Barnes found a plastic bag containing multiple white pills. Subsequent testing disclosed that the pills contained hydrocodone and acetaminophen and weighed 10.17 grams total. Detective Luecke seized Smith's cellphone and law enforcement later obtained a search warrant for its contents. The search disclosed text messages indicative of dealing in narcotics.

[6] The State charged Smith with Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, Level 4 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 6 felony domestic battery, and Level 6 felony criminal confinement. Smith moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the search, arguing that law enforcement lacked probable cause to arrest him without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court held a hearing and denied Smith's motion to suppress the evidence.

[7] The matter progressed to a jury trial, where the trial court dismissed the counts of domestic battery and criminal confinement at the State's request. At trial, Smith renewed his motion to suppress and asked the trial court to recognize a continuing objection to the admission of evidence from the search incident to his arrest. The trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible but agreed to recognize a continuing objection. The jury later found Smith guilty of Level 4 felony possession of a narcotic drug and Level 5 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, which was a lesser-included offense of the Level 2 felony charge. The trial court held the sentencing hearing on August 12, 2025, and ordered Smith to serve an aggregate term of nine years executed. Smith now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Smith challenges the admission of evidence obtained from the search incident to his warrantless arrest. Smith claims the arrest was unconstitutional, and therefore, evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible. “Generally speaking, evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful seizure must be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 266 (Ind. 2013). As a general matter, we review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). When the ruling turns on a predicate question of law—such as the constitutionality of a search or seizure—we review that question de novo. Id. When evaluating the trial court's ruling on the validity of a warrantless arrest, “we will consider the foundational evidence from the trial as well as the evidence from the motion to suppress hearing which is not in direct conflict with the trial testimony.” Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (synthesizing Indiana Supreme Court caselaw).

I. Fourth Amendment

[9] Smith claims his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which “regulates all nonconsensual encounters between citizens and law enforcement officials.” Thomas, 81 N.E.3d at 625. “In general, police must have a warrant to make an arrest.” Id. An exception exists, however, when an officer “has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a felony.” Id.

[10] “Probable cause to arrest arises when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances ․ which would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the defendant committed the criminal act in question.” Id. at 626. Probable cause does not require that the arresting officer observe the facts and circumstances on which the probable cause determination rests. See Row v. Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011, 1019 (Ind. 2007). Rather, “[a]n officer may, in good faith, rely on information communicated by another officer to establish probable cause.” Id. And even if the arresting officer lacked “the specific information to form the basis for probable cause,” the arrest is constitutional if “sufficient information to justify the arrest ․ was known by other law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the investigation.” State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting U.S. v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)), trans. denied.

[11] Smith devotes most of his argument to attacking the probable cause affidavit that Officer Turpin prepared in anticipation of an arrest warrant—specifically, a sentence that mistakenly attributed to Smith a statement that Compton had made, and Officer Turpin's asserted failure to disclose his pre-existing interest in investigating Smith. Neither line of attack is persuasive. That warrant was never issued, so the pertinent inquiry is not what Officer Turpin wrote in anticipation of an arrest warrant, but what the officers collectively knew at the moment of the arrest—and whether that knowledge established probable cause to believe Smith had committed a felony. In other words, an error in the affidavit does not infect the required analysis: the basis for probable cause was Compton's account and her visible injuries, not anything Smith said, and those facts were communicated to the arresting officers regardless of the content of the affidavit.

[12] Here, the collective knowledge of the police officers at the time of the arrest would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that Smith committed a felony against Compton. Officer Turpin encountered Compton in visible distress with a welt on her forehead and bruises developing on her arms. Those injuries, she explained, were caused by Smith—the arm bruising from being thrown against the wall that day and the forehead welt from a blow three days earlier. She had not called law enforcement, she said, because Smith had been threatening her. The night before, he took her phone and car keys to prevent her from leaving, and he later physically blocked her from leaving for work. This information was relayed to the officers who participated in Smith's arrest.

[13] Smith argues that Compton was not credible. We note, however, that Officer Turpin not only heard Compton's personal account of the events, but also saw injuries on her body that were consistent with the violence she described. Based on Officer Turpin's interactions with Compton and his observations of the injuries apparent on her body, a person of reasonable caution would believe that Smith committed felony-level criminal confinement and domestic battery. See Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1.3(b)(3) (specifying that a person commits Level 6 felony domestic battery by knowingly or intentionally touching a household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner that results in moderate bodily injury); 35-42-3-3(a) (specifying that a person commits Level 6 felony criminal confinement by knowingly or intentionally confining another person without the other person's consent). We, therefore, conclude that the warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause and thus consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

II. Article 1, Section 11

[14] Smith also challenges his warrantless arrest under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Unlike the Fourth Amendment's focus on probable cause, Indiana's Article 1, Section 11 requires the government to establish that the intrusion into a person's liberty was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. That reasonableness turns on a balancing of (1) “the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred,” (2) “the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities,” and (3) “the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).

[15] For the reasons earlier discussed, law enforcement had a high degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that Smith committed felony-level offenses against Compton—specifically, criminal confinement and domestic battery. In addition to the detailed report from Compton, Officer Turpin witnessed a welt on her forehead and bruises developing on her arms. These injuries were consistent with Compton's report of the violence. Smith argues that the police harbored improper motives to arrest him. However, an officer's subjective motives do not bear on the degree of concern that a person committed a felony.

[16] As for the degree of intrusion, the arrest constituted a restraint of Smith's physical liberty—a high degree of intrusion by any measure.

[17] Turning to the extent of law enforcement needs, it is undisputed that the EPD applied for an arrest warrant that, at the time of the arrest, had not yet issued. Given the pending application for the warrant, it was not strictly necessary that the police conduct a warrantless arrest before a decision on the warrant. The question under Litchfield and its progeny, however, is not whether exigent circumstances made a warrant impracticable, but “whether on the totality of the facts [law enforcement's] decision ․ was reasonable under Litchfield’s three factors.” Washburn v. State, 121 N.E.3d 657, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Here, Smith was mobile—observed leaving his residence in a vehicle—and a warrant had not yet issued. At the time, the responding officers knew about the violence Compton reported and that she recently expressed her intent to seek a restraining order against Smith. Those circumstances supported acting while the opportunity to arrest was available, before Smith could leave the area.

[18] On balance, we conclude that the arrest was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Although the degree of intrusion was high, law enforcement had an especially high degree of suspicion that Smith committed felony offenses against Compton. And although it was not strictly necessary to arrest Smith while the warrant application was pending, it was reasonable for officers to arrest Smith while they had the opportunity to do so, before he might have fled.

[19] Because the warrantless arrest was lawful under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11, Smith has not identified grounds to exclude evidence obtained from the search incident to his arrest. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a), (c).

2.   I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(2)(C).

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.