Bobbie N. Muse, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Bobbie Muse appeals her conviction for resisting law enforcement, arguing it was not supported by sufficient evidence. Finding that it was, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 6, 2025, Avon police detective Aaron Stobaugh was working at Walmart as an off-duty loss prevention officer. He “was wearing a full police uniform.” Transcript at 7. That afternoon, Walmart security suspected Muse's husband of shoplifting after he failed to scan two items at the self-checkout. Detective Stobaugh and a Walmart employee stopped Muse, her husband, and their two young children as they tried to leave the store, and the employee asked if they had failed to scan certain items in their cart. Muse's husband answered that he “scanned everything.” State's Exhibit 1 at 00:36-00:37. The employee then asked the family to “follow [him] real quick,” and the Muses walked with the employee and Stobaugh to the loss prevention office. Id. at 00:42-00:45.

[3] When they arrived at the office, the employee asked Muse's husband to follow him inside and told Muse to wait outside in the vestibule. Muse replied, “No, we're all going to go in,” to which Stobaugh said, “That's not how this works, ma'am.” Id. at 02:11-02:14. When Muse inquired further, Stobaugh explained that he did not want to discuss the alleged shoplifting in front of her children, and Muse said she would be willing to wait outside the office if the door was cracked open. Stobaugh replied, “No, ․ you can leave,” and instructed her to “give ․ the stolen stuff back” to the Walmart employee. Id. at 02:27-02:30. Stobaugh then went inside the loss prevention office and spoke with Muse's husband for a few moments while Muse remained outside with the employee.

[4] After Muse gave the employee the two unscanned items, Stobaugh walked back outside the office and told her, “You need to go out to the car. I'm going to trespass you from the store. Go.” Id. at 03:09-03:12. Muse explained that she wanted to wait for her husband, who had the keys to their car. Stobaugh grabbed the keys to give to her, but she said, “I'm going to wait right here until this is taken care of.” Id. at 03:29-03:31. Stobaugh asked Muse to leave several more times and, when she became increasingly combative, he threatened to take her to jail if she did not do so. She took the keys from him but said, “I'm gonna be right here,” and stood next to the cart with her back turned away from the officer. Id. at 04:05-04:06.

[5] Stobaugh walked up behind Muse, told her to “give [him her] hands,” and pulled both of her arms behind her back. Id. at 04:14-04:15. As he did, Muse said, “Listen, listen,” and slipped her left arm from his grasp. Id. at 4:15-4:17. Stobaugh was quickly able to reestablish control of Muse's arms, and once he had, he walked her a few steps forward, pressed her against an ATM, and put her in handcuffs. He then instructed her to go inside the loss prevention office. She refused, demanding several times that Stobaugh “let [her] go.” Id. at 04:44-00:45. When Stobaugh walked her to the office door, she said, “I'm not going up in there.” Id. at 05:16-05:17. Stobaugh had to drag Muse into the office, after which she twisted and wrenched her body out of his grasp as he led her to a row of chairs. After the detective sat her down in one, Muse ignored repeated instructions to stay seated, and at one point had to be pushed back down into the chair.

[6] The State charged Muse with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement ¹ and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.² At a bench trial, the State called Detective Stobaugh as its sole witness. Through his testimony, the State introduced into evidence body camera footage of his interaction with Muse. Stobaugh explained that he had asked Muse to leave the store “so that we could handle the shoplifting complaint and move on about the day” and that her refusal to do so “impact[ed] ․ [his] ability to perform [his] responsibilities as a law enforcement officer[.]” Tr. at 10-11.

[7] The State did not elicit any testimony during direct examination about whether Muse exerted force against Stobaugh during or after her arrest. But when Muse's attorney asked Stobaugh about the initial handcuffing on cross-examination, he testified that she “pull[ed] away from [him]” but did not try to push him with her body or kick him. Id. at 17. On redirect, the State asked Stobaugh to clarify how many times he “use[d] some kind of physical force to get ․ Muse to comply with what [he was] requesting of her[.]” Id. at 19. He answered, “It was the application of handcuffs and pulling away. I had to forcefully pull her into the [loss prevention] office. I had to push her into her seat at least twice. So at least four times.” Id.

[8] After a brief re-cross, the State tried to rest its case-in-chief, but the trial judge indicated that he had a few questions. The court asked Stobaugh to “take [it] through ․ how much force or how much pressure or resistance [he was] getting with regard to each of those four inciden[ts] ․” Id. at 21. Stobaugh answered,

So incident one I'll call the application of handcuffs. She, as I was trying to get her hands behind her back and I had one hand on her arms and one hand going for my cuffs, she pulled away from me and I had to like re-grab her, put her against the ATM ․ in order to control her to get the handcuffs on.

THE COURT: And so when you're saying she pulled away from you explain what you mean by that.

[STOBAUGH]: Her arms are behind her back and she like pulled them forward.

THE COURT: And what did that force you to do? Did that force your body to do anything?

[STOBAUGH]: I mean it probably caused me to go off balance as I'm trying to hold on to her as she pulls forward.

THE COURT: And so she was pulling you toward her?

[STOBAUGH]: Yes, ․ I'm facing her back and as she pulls forward I would like go with her a little bit.

Id. at 21-22.

[9] After Stobaugh testified, the defense indicated it had no evidence and the parties presented their closing arguments. After listening to those arguments, the trial court ruled from the bench that the State had failed to prove that Muse committed disorderly conduct, but that she was guilty of resisting law enforcement. In rendering its verdict, the court explained,

[T]he officer testified that not once but four different times he had to use some level of strength in order ․ to get compliance from [Muse][,] especially with regard to the second incident where the officer said he had to pull her ․ into the room after asking her multiple times to come in[,] and the video even showed that she didn't merely just turn her hand away from the cuffs, she yanked her hand away and the officer ․ said that he stumbled toward her[.] ․ I think that those two actions together, the pulling and pulling the officer's hand is enough to establish resisting law enforcement ․

Id. at 28. At a sentencing hearing, the court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Muse accordingly. She now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Muse contends “[t]he State failed to present sufficient evidence that [she] forcibly resisted” Detective Stobaugh. Appellant's Brief at 8. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that it is the fact-finder's role, not ours, “to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). Additionally, “[w]e consider only the evidence most favorable to” the conviction. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could have found “the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[11] To convict Muse of resisting law enforcement, the State was required to prove that she “(1) knowingly or intentionally (2) forcibly (3) resisted, obstructed, or interfered with (4) a law enforcement officer, (5) while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties.” Runnells v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1)). On appeal, Muse contends that the State failed to prove that she exerted any force against Stobaugh, so we focus our analysis there. In Spangler v. State, our Supreme Court held that a person “ ‘forcibly resists’ ․ when strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement official's rightful exercise of his or her duties.” 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993). Cases considering whether a person forcibly resisted are “necessarily fact-sensitive” with different cases often presenting “facts varying only by slight degrees.” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 727 (Ind. 2013). While “the statute does not demand complete passivity,” the “force involved need not rise to the level of mayhem” and even a “modest level of resistance” might support the offense. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013); Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965, 966 (Ind. 2009).

[12] The State takes us through several actions by Muse that it claims amount to forcible resistance, but we've identified one that is sufficient to support her conviction. That is, “[w]hen Detective Stobaugh tried to handcuff [Muse], she pulled her arms away[.]” Appellee's Br. at 10. Though “simply refusing to present arms for handcuffing is not forcible resistance[,]” refusing to submit to handcuffing in a way that exerts strength, power, or violence against the arresting officer can be. McNary v. State, 269 N.E.3d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Graham, 903 N.E.2d at 966), trans. denied. For example, in Jordan v. State, a panel of this Court found sufficient evidence of forcible resistance when the defendant tried to run away from the officer and, after the officer was able to catch up to her, “yanked her shoulder away, twisted and turned, and started firing her arms and pulling her body away from [him] so that [he] could not get control of her.” 37 N.E.3d 525, 528-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, in Johnson v. State, the panel affirmed when, among other things, the defendant turned away from an officer who was attempting to search him “and pushed away [from the officer] with his shoulders while cursing and yelling.” 833 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[13] Like the forcible actions exerted by the defendants in Jordan and Johnson, Muse pulled her arms away from Stobaugh with enough strength that she knocked him off balance and caused him to “go with her a little bit.” Tr. at 22. Nonetheless, Muse contends her actions are comparable to McNary, where, in relevant part, the defendant refused to place her hands behind her back for handcuffing. 269 N.E.3d at 1250. The McNary panel reasoned that while the defendant's actions “may have been resistance, this lack of cooperation was not forcible resistance” because unlike Jordan and Johnson, there was no evidence of strength, power, or violence directed at the officer. Id. In contrast, Muse's act of pulling against Detective Stobaugh was an active attempt to avoid being placed in handcuffs, and one that exerted at least a modest level of strength against him.

[14] Furthermore, the McNary panel underscored “that cases involving resisting arrest ‘are necessarily fact-sensitive’ and exist ‘along of spectrum of force, ․ with the facts varying only by slight degrees.’ ” Id. at 1251 n.7 (quoting Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727). To be sure, Detective Stobaugh's body camera shows that Muse did not exert an overwhelming amount of force against him as he tried to put her in handcuffs—but that does not mean it was unreasonable for the trial court to credit Stobaugh's testimony that she exerted at least a modest amount of strength against him. See Shepard v. State, 205 N.E.3d 1051, 1053-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“The [forcible] element may be satisfied with even a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence.” (quoting Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727)). Thus, while reasonable minds could arguably differ about whether Muse forcibly resisted, our standard of review requires that we defer to the trial court's determination in this case.

Conclusion

[15] For these reasons, we affirm Muse's conviction.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a)(1).

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.