John C. Goetz, et al, Appellants-Defendants v. Potawatomi Zoological Society, Inc., Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] John Goetz, Maureen Goetz, Brian Masterson, and Celestina Masterson (collectively, “the appellants”), pro se, appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Potawatomi Zoological Society, Inc. (“the zoo”). The appellants argue that the trial court erred when it granted the zoo's summary judgment motion. Concluding that the trial court erred, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred when it granted the zoo's summary judgment motion.

Facts 1

[3] We begin our recitation of the facts with a brief overview of the relevant land at issue in this appeal. The zoo owns two parcels of land (collectively, “the zoo plots”), which includes the southern plot (“the southern plot”) and the northern plot (“the northern plot”). Between the southern and northern plot is a proposed alley segment (“the proposed alley segment”). The proposed alley segment starts on Ironwood Drive, travels west and bisects the two zoo plots, heads south along the western edge of the southern plot and then continues west. This proposed alley segment was never constructed but exists in the deeds and survey documents. A one-story building, formally a funeral home, sits on the southern plot and directly on the proposed alley segment between the zoo plots, blocking the majority of the proposed alley segment. Additionally, a large portion of the proposed alley segment is covered by trees and dense undergrowth. The appellants own homes near the proposed alley segment.

[4] In February 2025, the zoo filed a verified complaint ² to quiet title on the proposed alley segment. In its complaint, the zoo named the appellants and multiple defendants who also owned property along the proposed alley segment. The vast majority of the defendants either consented to the zoo's title claim or did not answer the complaint. However, in April 2025, the appellants, pro se, filed an answer to the zoo's complaint. The appellants asserted, as an affirmative defense, that there was a right of way between the southern plot and northern plot and that they possessed “an easement across and between” the zoo plots. (App. Vol. 2 at 18). The appellants did not file a counterclaim against the zoo.

[5] In September 2025, the zoo filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion, the zoo argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding their ownership of the proposed alley segment. In support of its motion, the zoo designated as evidence the following: (1) its complaint; (2) a declaration from a surveyor who surveyed the proposed alley segment and the neighboring land; (3) two warranty deeds; (4) an affidavit of publication; (5) a declaration from many defendants in which the defendants expressed no interest in the proposed alley segment; and (6) property cards and assessments for the zoo plots.³ The zoo argued, in relevant part, that “[t]here [wa]s no evidence that [the appellants] ha[d] ever used the [p]roposed [a]lley [s]egment for access to or egress from” their homes or that “they were granted an easement across” the proposed alley segment. (App. Vol. 2 at 37).

[6] In September 2025, the appellants filed a response in opposition to the zoo's motion. Along with its motion, the appellants attached numerous affidavits, in which they and their families averred that they used a portion of the zoo's land, specifically the driveway and parking lot near the formal funeral home to access their backyards. The appellants conceded that the zoo owned the proposed alley segment but argued that they possessed a prescriptive easement across the property. The appellants argued that their designated evidence established the elements of a prescriptive easement.

[7] In response, the zoo filed a reply brief, in which it argued that the appellants had failed to “precisely describe the path of the alleged prescriptive easement.” (The Zoo's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 2).⁴ The zoo argued that the proposed alley segment that it is attempting to quiet title on is blocked by a building and heavy brush and vegetation and cannot be traveled. Additionally, the zoo argued that the appellants’ affidavits address a separate issue of whether the appellants have an easement across the formal funeral home's driveway and parking lot. The zoo reiterated that the appellants’ alleged easement did not exist inside of the proposed alley segment.

[8] At an October 2025 hearing, the zoo explained that it was requesting quiet title only on the proposed alley segment that bisected the two plots and headed south along the western edge of the southern plot. The zoo presented an image of where the proposed alley segment was in relation to the other properties.⁵ When the trial court asked if it was referring to the L-shaped portion that bordered the formal funeral home, the zoo responded that it was. The zoo asserted that whatever alleged easement that the appellants were using, it was not part of the quiet title action for the proposed alley segment.

[9] The appellants argued that they did use portions of the proposed alley segment to access their backyards. Specifically, the appellants told the trial court that the zoo was “trying to focus very narrowly on that alley segment but our easement very clearly goes through the alley segment.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12). The appellants expressed concern that if the trial court granted the zoo's motion for summary judgment on the proposed alley segment, then it would “wipe away [their] easement” and they would “have no claim to pass over that alley anymore.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12).

[10] The trial court told the appellants that its understanding was “[q]uieting title to the property ․ merely means that who owns that once proposed alley is resolved but any point in time someone could claim to have an easement over the property even after the quiet title action[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 13). Additionally, the trial court noted that “even if [it] grant[ed] [the zoo's] motion[,] it [ ] [was] not necessarily cutting [the appellants] off[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 13).

[11] In November 2025, the trial court issued an order granting the zoo's motion for summary judgment and granted title for the proposed alley segment to the zoo. The trial court's order provided, in relevant part, that the proposed alley segment was “hereby quieted in the name of [the zoo], free and clear of any and all rights, claims, interests, and liens in favor of any of the defendants hereto, and any other person or entity who may claim title or an interest in the Proposed Alley Segment[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 14). The trial court also found as follows:

In their Response to [the zoo's] Motion for Summary Judgment, [the appellants] assert that they possess a prescriptive easement elsewhere across [the zoo's] real estate. As the Court observed at the hearing, this issue is separate from the [zoo's] claim to quiet title to the Proposed Alley Segment and is not properly before the Court in this lawsuit.

(App. Vol. 2 at 12).

[12] The appellants now appeal.

Decision

[13] At the outset, we note that appellants have chosen to proceed pro se. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. Thus, pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. at 983-84. “These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent arguments on appeal.” Id. at 984. “We will not become an advocate for a party, nor will we address arguments which are either inappropriate, too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.” Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[14] The appellants argue that the trial court erred when it granted the zoo's summary judgment motion. Our standard of review for summary judgment cases is well-settled. When we review a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the same as it is for the trial court. Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth., 45 N.E.3d 788, 791 (Ind. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). “A fact is material if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Chmiel v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 109 N.E.3d 398, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (cleaned up).

[15] Specifically, the appellants argue that the trial court erred because it quieted title to the proposed alley segment without considering their interest in the form of an easement that related to the proposed alley segment. Specifically, the appellants note that their alleged easement passed over the proposed alley segment at two points and that the trial court's order found that the appellants’ alleged easement was elsewhere on the zoo's property and not part of the proposed alley segment. The zoo, on the other hand, argues that the quiet title action “did not foreclose [the appellants’] alleged prescriptive easement” and that the trial court did not err when it quieted title to the zoo without addressing the appellants’ easement argument. (Appellee's Br. 8).

[16] The zoo's action against the appellants was an action to quiet title. INDIANA CODE § 32-30-2-20 provides that “An action to determine and quiet a question of title to property may be brought by a plaintiff ․ against a defendant who claims title to or an interest in the real property with a claim that is adverse to the plaintiff, even if the defendant is not in possession of the property.” Additionally, “[a]n action to quiet title brings into issue all claims regarding the property in question.” Chmiel, 109 N.E.3d at 407. “A defendant need not act affirmatively by cross-complaint but may introduce any facts through his general denial which according to principles of equity would defeat the plaintiff in obtaining a decree quieting title to the land in controversy.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Mutchman, 565 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[17] Here, our review of the record reveals that the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the zoo quieted title to the proposed alley segment “free and clear of any and all rights, claims, interests, and liens in favor of any of the defendants[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 14). The trial court issued its order without addressing the appellants’ affirmative defense and argument regarding a prescriptive easement on a portion of the proposed alley segment. However, a quiet title action should bring “into issue all claims regarding the property in question.” Chmiel, 109 N.E.3d at 407. The trial court erred by not addressing the appellants’ claim of a prescriptive easement before entering summary judgment in favor of the zoo and quieting title to the proposed alley segment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to address the appellants’ affirmative defense and arguments before quieting title to the proposed alley segment. See Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1004, 1003 (we “consciously err[ ] on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims” and preventing the “non-prevailing party from having his day in court[.]”).

[18] Reversed and remanded.⁶

FOOTNOTES

2.   The zoo did not include its complaint in its appellee's appendix.

3.   The zoo did not include its designated evidence in its appellee's appendix.

4.   The zoo's reply brief was also not included in the appendix.

5.   This image was not included for our review.

6.   The zoo argues that a quiet title judgment “is not res judicata as to unrecorded prescriptive easement claims” and that the trial court's quiet title judgment “did not foreclose their alleged prescriptive easement.” (Appellee's Br. 8). In support of that position, the zoo cites to Popp v. Hardy, 508 N.E.2d 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). But, in that case, a quiet title judgment was not res judicata only because the party who challenged the quiet title was not a party to the original quiet title case. Here, the trial court's order made clear that it was quieting title to the proposed alley segment “free and clear of any and all rights, claims, interests, and liens in favor of any of the defendants[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 14).

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.