Rex Szyper, Appellant-Respondent v. Caryn Szyper, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Divorced parents Rex Szyper (Father) and Caryn Szyper (Mother) (collectively, Parents) share joint legal and physical custody of their two young children. Due to their contentious co-parenting relationship, the trial court appointed a parenting coordinator and ordered Parents to communicate only through a monitored co-parenting platform. But Father routinely sent messages outside that platform and did not abide by the coordinator's binding recommendations. He scheduled medical appointments for the children without telling Mother, unilaterally changed their shared calendar, and enrolled one child in softball after the parties had agreed she would play different sports that season.

[2] After Parents filed a series of motions, the trial court conducted a consolidated hearing on Father's request to terminate the parenting coordinator, his objections to the coordinator's recommendations, and Mother's motion for contempt. At that hearing, the parenting coordinator denied Father's claims that she had been unfair or biased, and she opined that Parents, particularly Father, were not yet ready to manage disputes on their own.

[3] The trial court awarded Mother sole decision-making authority over the children's extracurricular activities, leaving intact Father's right to participate. The court also extended the coordinator's appointment, found Father in indirect civil contempt, and ordered him to pay $14,000 in attorney fees. Father now appeals. Finding his arguments primarily request that we reassess witness credibility and otherwise fail to demonstrate reversible error, we affirm.

Facts

[4] After Parents divorced in 2022, they entered into a settlement agreement under which they shared joint legal and physical custody of their two children, Q.S. (Daughter), born in 2017, and W.S. (Son), born in 2019 (collectively, Children). Under that agreement, Parents were to agree on a schedule for parenting time and holidays, but if they could not agree, the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (IPTG) would apply.

[5] By 2024, Parents were unable to agree on a schedule and their co-parenting relationship had grown highly contentious. As a result, Mother sought the appointment of a parenting coordinator (PC) in March 2024. She also requested that all communications between Parents occur only through a specific communication platform, Our Family Wizard (OFW). Father agreed to the appointment of PC Kimberly Mattingly and to exclusive communication through OFW, absent an emergency. The trial court approved this agreement in April 2024. Under the terms of her two-year appointment, PC Mattingly was authorized to make binding recommendations (BRs) on co-parenting issues. These BRs would be binding if no objection was raised within 10 days and would also remain binding pending review of the trial court.

[6] Over the following year, numerous disputes arose requiring PC Mattingly's intervention. Parents disagreed about their parenting time schedule, Children's participation in sports, and Parents’ participation in school activities, among other things. Throughout 2025, Father objected to many BRs on these issues, and the parties filed multiple motions in the trial court. This culminated in a consolidated hearing, conducted over the course of three sessions in mid-to-late 2025, on three issues: (1) Father's objections to the BRs; (2) Father's petition to terminate PC Mattingly; and (3) Mother's motion to hold Father in contempt.

[7] The events underlying these specific disputes began in January 2025, when Father requested a temporary restraining order to prevent Daughter from playing travel soccer. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court, in April 2025, denied Father's request and ordered Mother to decide whether Daughter would play travel soccer for the period of May 2025 to May 2026. The court's order also noted that Mother did not object to softball, which Daughter had been playing, and found that Daughter “shall be enrolled in softball.” App. Vol. II, p. 66.

[8] Around this time, Mother filed a motion for contempt. In it, she alleged that Father had unilaterally scheduled medical appointments for Children despite Parents’ joint custody order, contacted her outside OFW over 50 times despite the court's 2024 order to the contrary, and had not complied with PC Mattingly's directives. Mother alleged that Father had vindictively leveraged his joint custody and compliance with PC directives. For example, she alleged that on the eve of her vacation with Children, Father, an air traffic controller, threatened to call the airline and block them from boarding. Mother also claimed that after she requested a PC discussion of whether it was appropriate for Father to take Children to a Phish concert, resulting in a BR that Parents agree on concert attendance, Father immediately and unilaterally gave away Daughter's ticket to a Taylor Swift concert, which made Daughter extremely upset with Mother.

[9] In May 2025, PC Mattingly made a BR (the May BR) limiting Father to one message a day through OFW and reiterating a prior agreement that Father's messages first get approval from PC Mattingly. The May BR also provided other recommendations, including that Parents follow the IPTG for holidays. Father objected to the May BR, and the court set the matter for a hearing, specifying that the BR would be binding until the hearing. After a continuance, the hearing was set for mid-August 2025.

[10] But before that hearing, another significant dispute arose. Father wanted to enroll Daughter in fall softball—a sport that he coached—and interpreted the trial court's April 2025 order on travel soccer as permitting her to play softball at any time. Mother responded that the order pertained only to the spring softball season, given the context of the hearing. As a result, PC Mattingly made a BR in August 2025 (the August BR) that Daughter not play softball in the fall. The BR stated that Parents had agreed months ago that Daughter would swim in the fall, and the court gave Mother the authority to enroll Daughter in soccer that year; the addition of softball would mean three fall sports for Daughter, which was too much for her age. The August BR also modified the timing of Parents’ phone calls with Children upon Father's request.

[11] Father objected to the August BR and petitioned to terminate PC Mattingly, alleging that she favored Mother and had created “more animosity” in the admittedly “high conflict relationship” between Parents. Id. at 93. Upon Mother's request, which noted the relatedness of the issues, the trial court consolidated the upcoming August hearing to address all pending motions before the court—the PC-related issues and Mother's motion for contempt.

August 2025 Hearing

[12] At the August 2025 hearing, PC Mattingly testified that Parents were not ready to proceed without a PC, particularly Father. She explained that she does not take Father's objections personally and does not think her approach has been unfair or biased. She stated that she did not think Father's actions were ever “nefarious,” and she reported that she had recently learned strategies to improve communication with Father after speaking with his therapist. Tr. Vol. II, p. 38. PC Mattingly reported that this case “occupied the most [time] of any” of her cases. Id. at 50. She also raised concerns that Father recently unilaterally signed Daughter up for fall softball despite the August BR.

[13] Father testified that he did not feel heard by PC Mattingly, who he believed nearly always sided with Mother. He was frustrated with how long she took to address his issues, which included his concern that he had lost parenting time under the current schedule. Father stated that getting pre-approval of his messages was an “unnecessary burden,” though he recognized that it had initially “calmed the waters.” Id. at 59, 60.

[14] When the matter could not be concluded at the August hearing, the trial court scheduled a second session for October 2025. But in the meantime, more issues emerged, particularly with regard to Daughter's involvement in softball.

[15] Despite Parents’ dispute about whether it was permitted, Father had been taking Daughter to softball practice. In mid-August, Father asked Mother about Daughter's transportation to softball practice, and Mother responded: “I am following the PC's binding recommendation that [Daughter] should not be signed up for a softball team this fall. Please do not involve her in this dispute, as occurred yesterday.” Exhs. p. 163. Father responded by asking Mother to return Daughter's softball gear “for this weekend.” Id. A few weeks later, Mother wrote to Father: “I've brought this up each week in August, but I need to ask again—please stop sending [Daughter] to my home with her softball bag and instructing her to ask me if she's going to her game. I've taken her in the past to avoid putting her in the middle, but it's important that she's not involved in this issue going forward.” Id. at 169. Father responded: “I haven't told [Daughter] to ask you anything. I will continue to send the bag as she wouldn't even be able to play without gear.” Id. at 168.

[16] Then, in September 2025, the parties filed respective motions to modify custody, each seeking full legal and physical custody and each requesting the other undergo a psychological evaluation. Father also requested continuance of the upcoming October 2025 hearing—the second session on the PC issues and contempt motion—and in that filing promised to abide by the disputed BRs.

[17] The court granted the continuance over Mother's objection and rescheduled the hearing for November 2025. The same day the continuance was granted, Father unilaterally pulled Daughter from softball. There was only one game and a tournament left in the season. Father sent a message to the team's chat informing them that Daughter was no longer playing. Daughter was upset, and Mother requested that she be able to finish the season. Father initially refused, insisting that he had vowed to comply with the BRs in his motion to continue.¹

[18] Before the November hearing, PC Mattingly made two additional BRs based on new issues. First, Mother had planned to take Children to a school campout that fell on her weekend, but Father insisted that he should be allowed to attend too because it also fell on Mother's weekend last year. In the year before, Parents had a similar dispute and Mother decided not to attend after Father messaged her: “I will be in attendance and have a tent right next to yours because I have as much a right as you do to be there.” Exhs. p. 97. To resolve this dispute, PC Mattingly issued a BR (the September BR) that Father volunteer during the day shift of the campout and Mother stay overnight with Children.

[19] Second, Parents disagreed about who could volunteer at school events, as Mother felt that Children were uncomfortable when both Parents were present. PC Mattingly issued a BR (the October BR) that the parties alternate volunteering. The October BR also provided other recommendations, including: (1) that Parents first agree on scheduling Children's therapy appointments then alternate attending, in response to Father unilaterally taking Children to therapy; and (2) that Parents’ weekend rotation schedule remain the same, despite Father's unilateral change to their shared calendar in order to restore days he believed he lost in the prior year.

[20] Father objected to both the September BR and the October BR, and those objections were addressed in the November hearing.

November 2025 Hearing

[21] At the outset of the November hearing, the parties agreed to separately address their pending motions to modify custody at a later time, after completion of a custody evaluation. They therefore agreed that the instant hearing would address only the PC issues—including Father's challenges to the two new BRs—and Mother's contempt motion.

[22] PC Mattingly testified that there had been no improvement in Parents’ relationship since the last hearing. She stated that rarely could she approve a message from Father without first removing inappropriate language. She stated that Parents’ case is the matter in which she has issued the most BRs.

[23] PC Mattingly also expressed her concern about the softball situation. When asked if she still agreed with her testimony from the prior hearing that Father's actions were not nefarious, she responded: “I struggle. His behaviors aren't evil. They are often clearly retaliatory.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 107. She recounted Mother's “concern about the emotional toll” the softball situation had taken on Daughter and about “Father's reaction and how he handled it with [Daughter].” Id. at 106.

[24] Father then offered into evidence the emails between PC Mattingly and Parents’ attorneys about the softball situation, which the trial court admitted. In these messages, PC Mattingly described listening to a voicemail “that [Daughter] left for [Mother].” Exhs. p. 217. Daughter “is sniffling throughout her message” and “tells [Mother] that Dad said Mom said she can't play softball anymore and she'd really like to, so can [Mother] please call her.” Id. PC Mattingly wrote that she understood Father's intent to comply with the BRs but found Father's way of handling the situation was “another example of what concerns me about his mental health.” Id.

[25] Mother later introduced a recording of that voicemail from Daughter. Father objected on the basis of hearsay, and Mother argued it was an excited utterance given Daughter's “emotional distress.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 142. The trial court admitted the voicemail. Father then testified that he had told Daughter to blame the softball situation on him. Mother testified that she believed Father put his own interests before Children's, as she did not think it was “fair” for Daughter to “miss the tournament because [Father] wanted a continuance.” Id. at 214, 216.

[26] Mother also testified that this was not the only example of Father blaming Mother and involving Children in their disputes. She cited as an example the Taylor Swift concert and noted “other times [Father] has been on the phone telling [Daughter] to tell mom things or ask mom things.” Id. at 144.

[27] As to the BR that the current weekend rotation be maintained, Father expressed concern that PC Mattingly admitted she did not closely look at his proposal before making her recommendation. Mother testified that the parties had already spent the previous year coming to an agreement on the current schedule. She remarked: “We've had so many issues consistently that are resolved and then [Father] brings them up, he doesn't like them and it's over and over and over again.” Id. at 201.

[28] As for communication between the parties, Mother testified that Father had not complied with the court order requiring communication through OFW and PC Mattingly's limit of one message per day. Mother explained that she often received numerous messages a day from Father, many paragraphs long, along with emails, texts, and calendar notifications. She described the contact as “really disruptive.” Id. at 203. Father had acknowledged in some messages that he was deviating from the rules and “mock[ed] the fact that he's texting” Mother. Id. at 219. One of the messages from Father to Mother read: “O my god he texted me. Dude stop. It [sic] the holidays. I bet if you decided I wasn't Satan we'd have a blast.” Exhs. p. 134. Mother testified that the pre-approval rule has “made the communications more about the kids” though Father often broke that rule. Tr. Vol. II, p. 204.

[29] As for the BR on volunteering at school events, Father explained that he was very involved and did not want to be limited. He disagreed with Mother's assessment that Children are uncomfortable when Parents are together. But when asked whether he would agree not to approach Mother or make her uncomfortable at school events, Father hedged, saying he did not know what made her uncomfortable and they might need to talk.

[30] Finally, Father requested termination of PC Mattingly because “the vast majority” of her recommendations “are whatever position that Mother takes.” Id. at 173. Mother testified that she wanted PC Mattingly to remain involved because “it's difficult to function on a daily basis, on a weekly basis” and she was worried that “without the PC,” Father “just does whatever he wants and I just have to give way to that.” Id. at 217-18.

[31] Mother also testified that Father's conduct had violated their joint custody agreement and otherwise caused conflict. She explained that on numerous occasions, Father had scheduled and taken Children to medical appointments without notifying or updating her. Mother also testified about Father's threat to block Children from boarding their flight for vacation and his decision to give away Daughter's Taylor Swift ticket. Mother recounted that Father once declared that exchanges with Children would happen at the local police station, but PC Mattingly intervened and rejected that plan. Father then said Mother could not use his driveway, so Father had to drop Children off at Mother's home. When Mother once placed a Girl Scout form requested by Daughter in Father's mailbox, Father accused Mother of committing the “crime” of “mail tampering per the us [sic] code.” Exhs. p. 90.

[32] Again, the matter was not concluded during this hearing, and the court scheduled a final session in December 2025.

December 2025 Hearing

[33] At this final hearing, the parties continued to discuss the PC matters and the contempt motion. Father testified that he believed alternating school volunteer events was not practical and explained that he recently became a substitute teacher at Children's school. He admitted to calling Mother a “hypocrite” at one of Daughter's softball games and to threatening to call an airline to block Children from a flight. Tr. Vol. III, p. 54. When questioned about his text messages to Mother, Father said: “[T]here are some messages in here that I should not have sent and I'm a hundred percent in, in [sic] agreement with that.” Id. at 66.

[34] Mother also offered evidence supporting her request for attorney fees incurred during these proceedings on the PC issues and her contempt motion. Mother's counsel (Counsel) offered into evidence an affidavit she prepared, attesting that Mother had incurred $14,865 in attorney fees since retaining Counsel for these proceedings. Father objected, arguing that more supporting documents were needed, to which Counsel responded: “I am happy to provide the Court with a breakdown of all my expenses.” Id. at 6.

[35] Counsel then provided testimony that her hourly rate in this matter is $450 and she had been practicing since 2007. She testified that for three hearings and the large number of exhibits and documents involved, the fees were “very reasonable.” Id. at 44. Counsel again offered a breakdown of the fees and explained that a small portion of them may be related to the petition to modify custody, but very little work had been done on it. Father did not respond to Counsel's offer for a breakdown of fees and asked on cross-examination one question about what portion of fees pertained to contempt alone. Counsel responded that all hearings discussed the contempt, along with the other issues.

Trial Court's Order

[36] In January 2026, the trial court issued its order. It recounted the numerous conflicts between parties and found that throughout these situations, Father put his preferences before Children's, created unnecessary conflict, put his Children in the middle of disputes, misinterpreted prior court orders to fit his needs, and ignored PC Mattingly's BRs. The court determined that “Father's testimony on several material issues was not credible as it was inconsistent with documentary evidence and the PC's testimony” and that “Father's demeanor and manner of testifying further undermined his credibility.” App. Vol. II, p. 192. The court noted that “Father was evasive in his responses, minimized his conduct, and was reluctant to provide direct answers to questions on cross-examination.” Id. The court concluded: “Where the parties’ testimony conflicted, the Court found the PC's and Mother's testimony more credible and reliable.” Id.

[37] The court's order ultimately denied Father's request to terminate PC Mattingly and extended her appointment by one year, subject to further review at the subsequent hearing following the custody evaluation and mental health testing. The court also modified the appointment so that Father “bears the full cost of the PC's review of Father's messages” and so PC Mattingly has authority to further allocate fees on a specific issue when a party's non-compliance causes additional time and expense. Id. at 195. The order also denied Father's objections to the BRs and adopted them, making just a few modifications to some provisions relating to the parenting time schedule.

[38] The court also granted “Mother sole decision-making authority over the children's sports and extracurricular activities,” which it found was “necessary to reduce conflict, provide consistency and stability, protect the children from being placed in the middle of parental disputes, and promote the children's best interests.” Id. at 193, 195. The court found that joint decision-making on extracurriculars had been “unworkable and contrary to the children's best interest.” Id. at 193. However, the court ordered that Mother give reasonable advance notice to Father before enrollment and specifically noted that this allocation of authority “does not diminish Father's parenting time” or “restrict Father's ability to support and attend the children's activities.” Id. at 194.

[39] Finally, the court found Father in “indirect civil contempt of court as it relates to communication and joint legal custody.” Id. The court awarded Mother “$14,000 in attorney fees incurred to compensate Mother and coerce Father's compliance with the Court's orders.” Id. Father appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[40] Indiana courts recognize a “well-established preference” for “granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (citation omitted). “Appellate courts ‘are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

[41] Where, as here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Williams v. Williams, 266 N.E.3d 221, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Findings are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them. Id. at 227. A judgment is clearly erroneous when the findings cannot support it or when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard. Id. at 230. In our review, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. Winchester v. Winchester, 271 N.E.3d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[42] Father raises numerous issues on appeal, challenging: (1) the verbatim adoption of Mother's proposed findings and conclusions; (2) the admission of Daughter's voicemail; (3) the award of sole authority to Mother on extracurricular decisions; (4) the denial of his motion to terminate PC Mattingly; and (5) the award of attorney fees. Unpersuaded by his claims, we affirm.

I. Verbatim Adoption & Challenge to Findings

[43] Father first argues that the trial court's “wholesale adoption” of Mother's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is inappropriate. Appellant's Br., p. 21. But as Father acknowledges, the verbatim adoption of a party's findings is not per se improper. Though it is discouraged because it weakens appellate confidence that the findings reflect the trial court's independent judgment, our standard of review does not change. See City of Bloomington v. Cnty. Residents Against Annexation, Inc., 270 N.E.3d 67, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. The question on appeal remains whether the findings as adopted are clearly erroneous. In re Moeder, 27 N.E.3d 1089, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[44] Father also purports to challenge six findings as unsupported by the evidence. But for various reasons, we find no clear error.

[45] Three of the challenged findings are directly supported by the evidence, despite Father's attempts to point to alternate explanations. The finding that Father involved Children in the conflict is plainly supported by the evidence that Father called Mother a hypocrite at Daughter's softball game, sent Daughter to Mother's house with her softball bag, and called Mother a liar in front of Daughter. The finding that Father threatened to pitch a tent next to Mother at the school campout is directly supported by a message Father sent that read: “I will be in attendance and have a tent right next to yours because I have as much a right as you do to be there.” Exhs. p. 97. The finding that Father violated a court order by messaging Mother directly is supported by the various text messages in evidence and Father's own admission that there are some messages “I should not have sent.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 66. These admitted violations are not cured by Father's claim that some messages were sent with Mother's permission.

[46] Two of the other challenged findings are not really challenges to factual findings at all. Father disputes the finding that Daughter blamed Mother for not being able to play softball, claiming it was based on the allegedly inadmissible voicemail. He also disputes the finding that limiting Father's participation with the Children is equitable. These arguments are more appropriately addressed in Father's separate challenges to the admissibility of the voicemail and the court's grant of authority to Mother to make extracurricular decisions.

[47] Finally, Father challenges the finding that he violated the court order by enrolling Daughter in softball. He argues that the court's April 2025 order on travel soccer said that Daughter “shall be enrolled in softball” and did not explicitly confine that to spring softball. App. Vol. II, p. 66. However, the trial court was already presented with this interpretation of the order and rejected it, finding instead that the April 2025 hearing discussed only the spring softball season and focused on travel soccer.

[48] Father has demonstrated no clear error in the trial court's findings of fact.

II. Admissibility of Daughter's Voicemail

[49] Father next argues that the trial court erred by admitting Daughter's voicemail about softball. We review a trial court's admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Matter of K.R., 154 N.E.3d 818, 820 (Ind. 2020).

[50] Father claims the voicemail was hearsay and no exception applies. But he does not address the basis upon which it was admitted—as an excited utterance. Only in his reply brief does he argue the voicemail was not an excited utterance. “The law is well settled that grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant's initial brief and if addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived.” In re Moeder, 196 N.E.3d 691, 698 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005)).

[51] Waiver aside, and even if the court erroneously admitted Daughter's voicemail, reversal is not required because the error is harmless. An error is harmless and does not mandate reversal if its “probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)). The party seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating how “the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Id. at 492.

[52] Father argues the voicemail was not harmless because it supported the trial court's finding that Daughter blamed Mother for not being able to play softball, and it served as the basis for PC Mattingly's concern over Father's mental health and her “poor opinion” of him. Appellant's Br., p. 24. He argues that this led to the court's decision to grant Mother sole decision-making power over extracurriculars. We cannot agree.

[53] The point about Daughter blaming Mother was just one small part of the concerning narrative around softball: Father unilaterally enrolled Daughter, continued to send her to Mother's house with her softball bag despite Mother's explicit request to leave Daughter out of it, only later decided to comply with the BRs so he could get a continuance, and, finally, pulled Daughter from softball at the end of the season, sending a message to the entire team chat.

[54] This pattern of Father's conduct—not how Daughter reacted to it or who she blamed—was the focus of PC Mattingly's concern and the trial court's findings. Moreover, Daughter's emotional distress during the softball incident was independently testified to by PC Mattingly and Mother. And Father himself offered into evidence an email thread between PC Mattingly and Parents’ attorneys in which PC Mattingly described the voicemail and stated that the entire situation was just “another example of what concerns me about his mental health.” Exhs. p. 217.

[55] Therefore, the potential impact of admission of the voicemail was “sufficiently minor” and “our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492.

III. Award of Decision-Making Authority to Mother

[56] Father claims that the trial court's order granting Mother the sole authority to enroll Children in extracurricular activities constitutes a modification of custody. He argues that modifying custody without the required proceedings—and after the parties agreed to decide custody matters at a later point—deprived him of due process.

[57] Mother responds that the trial court did not modify custody because, under Indiana Code § 31-9-2-67 (2025), “joint legal custody” means shared responsibility for “the major decisions concerning the child's upbringing, including the child's education, health care, and religious training”—not extracurricular activities. In his reply brief, Father concedes this point. See Appellant's Reply Br., p. 12 (“Father agrees with Mother that decision-making regarding extracurricular activities is not necessarily a ‘legal custody’ issue.”). Father then pivots, claiming the court's order effects a change in parenting time because his ability to participate in sports will be limited. We disagree.

[58] The court's order explicitly stated that the grant of decision-making authority to Mother does not change Father's right to attend and participate in Children's extracurriculars. The order also requires Mother to give Father reasonable notice before enrolling Children in activities. Thus, Father is not excluded from participation. Moreover, this change was clearly supported by the trial court's findings that joint decision-making on this matter was unworkable, created conflict, and was not in the best interests of Children.

IV. Termination of PC Mattingly

[59] Father next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to terminate PC Mattingly. PC Mattingly's appointment order provided multiple grounds upon which she could be terminated by the court: exceeding her grant of authority; acting in a manner inconsistent with the portion of the IPTG on parenting coordinators; demonstrating bias; or other good cause.

[60] Father claims that PC Mattingly can no longer work effectively and impartially with him, and he accuses her of admitting she does not believe Father and of favoring Mother.² However, Father's argument boils down to a request to reassess witness credibility and to credit his testimony over PC Mattingly's.

[61] During the hearings, PC Mattingly testified that she was not biased and stated that she is “working for peace for those kiddos.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 21. She stated that she did not take Father's objections personally, as she had worked on other cases in which parties had objected. PC Mattingly also testified that she did not think Parents were ready to proceed on their own, as Father continued to provide messages that needed inappropriate language deleted.

[62] Though Father testified to the contrary—that he felt PC Mattingly unfairly favored Mother—the trial court explicitly chose to credit Mother and PC Mattingly over Father where their testimony conflicted. And the fact that conflict remained between Parents does not prove that PC Mattingly provided no benefit, as Father argues, but shows that her involvement is still needed.

[63] Father also appears to claim that PC Mattingly exceeded her authority by violating court orders. He cites the portion of the transcript discussing the trial court's April 2025 order on travel soccer, which also found that Daughter “shall be enrolled in softball.” App. Vol. II, p. 66. PC Mattingly interpreted the order as applying only to the spring season. Father's contrary interpretation of the April 2025 order was already presented to the trial court, which rejected it.

[64] We find no error in the denial of Father's motion to terminate PC Mattingly.

V. Attorney Fees

[65] Finally, Father appeals the trial court's award of $14,000 in attorney fees to Mother. He claims that the trial court's discretion to award such fees is limited by the dissolution statute's fee award provision, Indiana Code § 31-15-10-1. This statute provides that a trial court may award reasonable costs and attorney fees in a dissolution-related proceeding, and the caselaw applying it requires the court to consider the parties’ relative ability to pay, among other things. See generally Maxwell v. Maxwell, 850 N.E.2d 969, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[66] However, the trial court's fee award here was instead grounded in Father's contempt. Trial courts have inherent authority to fashion an appropriate sanction for contempt entirely separate from the dissolution statute's provision on fees. See In re Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The trial court's order found Father in “indirect civil contempt of court as it relates to communication and joint legal custody”—which Father does not dispute. App. Vol. II, p. 194. In the very next sentence, the order awarded Mother $14,000 in attorney fees “to compensate Mother and coerce Father's compliance with the Court's orders.” Id. “Sanctions in a civil contempt proceeding may seek both to coerce behavior and to compensate an aggrieved party.” MacIntosh v. MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Thus, it is clear that the court's fee award was grounded in contempt.³ We review contempt sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ind. 2012).

[67] Father's statutory argument mismatches the contempt-based fee award here. For instance, the ability-to-pay inquiry required under the dissolution statute's fee provision does not apply to contempt sanctions. See Pickett, 44 N.E.3d at 770-771. We nonetheless attempt to address Father's concern about the specificity of the evidence supporting the award.

[68] Father focuses on the lack of a specific breakdown in fees but cites no authority demonstrating that “itemization” is required. Appellant's Br., p. 29.⁴ Nor does he acknowledge that Mother's counsel testified that the contempt motion was discussed at all three sessions of the consolidated hearing. That hearing consolidated the contempt and PC-related issues because they were related. For instance, evidence on Father's disruptive communications and unilateral scheduling supported both the contempt and PC issues. Father raises no challenge to the intertwined nature of the proceedings.

[69] Finally, Counsel acknowledged that only a “small subset” of her fees related to the custody modification petition, which was put aside pending the custody evaluation after “very, very minimal” work. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 34, 44. Everything else pertained to the matters addressed at the hearings. The court's award of $14,000 is slightly below the $14,865 total listed in Counsel's fee affidavit. In support of that affidavit, Counsel testified to her hourly rate, her years of experience, and her belief that the fees were “very reasonable” given the number of hearings and the large volume of documents and exhibits involved in the matter. Id. at 44.

[70] Father has shown no abuse of discretion in the trial court's attorney fee award, which was supported by the evidence.

Conclusion

[71] Father has failed to demonstrate reversible error in the trial court's order. Many of his arguments constituted impermissible requests to reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility to favor his own explanation of events. We therefore affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   PC Mattingly later recalled that Daughter was eventually able to play out the rest of her season after PC Mattingly engaged in “a flurry of emails” with Parents’ respective counsel “trying to get an agreement that [Daughter] could finish her softball season.” Tr. Vol. II, pp. 106-07.

2.   Father also argues that the trial court's order contains no specific findings supporting the denial of his motion to terminate PC Mattingly. However, the order contains numerous findings about Parents’ disagreements and Father's failure to follow PC Mattingly's directives or court orders. The order also explicitly finds that PC Mattingly's testimony was more credible than Father's when the two conflicted, and it finds that Father's violation of Parents’ joint custody agreement “supports continued PC oversight and enforcement.” App. Vol. II, p. 190.

3.   Though the trial court's conclusions of law once reference the dissolution-fee statute, it arises in the context of contempt: “The Court has inherent authority to award attorney fees and costs for civil contempt. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 835 (Ind. 2016); Ind. Code § 31-15-10-1.” App. Vol. II, p. 193.

4.   Father also appears to claim that specific findings were required on the fees because the parties requested findings and conclusions under Trial Rule 52. However, he cites no portion of the record demonstrating such request. To the contrary, the record shows that the trial court sua sponte ordered the parties to prepare findings and conclusions at the end of the December 2025 hearing. In any case, the court's order provided specific findings supporting the fees. See App. Vol. II, pp. 192-94.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.