D.J. (Father) Appellant-Respondent v. Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.J. (Father) appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to Br.P. and Ba.P. (collectively, Children). Father challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of Children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and D.P. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) are the biological parents of Br.P., born in October 2014, and Ba.P., born in February 2023.¹ Ba.P. was born exposed to marijuana, fentanyl, and morphine. Hospital staff reported to DCS that Parents appeared to be under the influence. Mother submitted to a drug screen and tested positive for fentanyl and norfentanyl. She also admitted to taking Roxicodone without a prescription while pregnant. Father refused to submit to a drug screen but admitted to using marijuana.

[3] On March 1, DCS filed a petition alleging Ba.P. and Br.P. were children in need of services (CHINS). DCS alleged that Ba.P. was born drug-exposed and Parents were unable to provide a safe and stable home free of substance abuse. Children were removed from Parents’ care and placed with their maternal grandmother (Grandmother).

[4] Because DCS could not locate Father, DCS served him by publication. Father did not appear for a default hearing held on June 30, 2023. The court took the issue of Father's default “under advisement pending the outcome of Mother's fac[t] finding” hearing. Ex. Vol. I p. 54. A contested factfinding hearing was held for Mother on June 26 and July 13. On August 21, 2023, the trial court issued a written order adjudicating Children CHINS. That order was later file-stamped on January 5, 2024. Then, on January 26, Father's default order was signed. That same day, the court held a dispositional hearing, but Father did not appear. Because Father did not appear, the court proceeded without entering a dispositional order as to him.

[5] Father first contacted DCS through Family Case Manager (FCM) Anthony Turay “sometime between November of 2023 and January of 2024[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 11. FCM Turay informed Father that DCS submitted referrals for him to begin participating in services. FCM Turay was unable to confirm if Father had stable housing or if he was employed. Father did not initiate services or maintain regular contact with FCM Turay. However, Father reported that he completed a residential drug treatment program in August 2024 as a condition of a criminal case.

[6] In August 2024, Father appeared for the first time at a CHINS hearing on Children's permanency plan. Following that hearing, the trial court approved adoption as a permanency plan for Children.

[7] In September, Father also appeared for a dispositional hearing, and the court issued a written order for his disposition on October 16. The court ordered Father to complete substance abuse and parenting education assessments, submit to random drug screens, participate in home-based therapy and a fatherhood engagement program, follow all recommendations, and attend therapeutic visitation with Children. Father failed to submit to random drug screens, complete the required assessments, or participate in home-based therapy. Although he participated in a fatherhood engagement program for “about two months[,]” he was ultimately discharged without successful completion. Id. at 13. As to visitation, Father visited Children twice in October and once in November, then stopped engaging in visits altogether.

[8] On November 8, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ relationships with Children. DCS alleged that Father had not remedied the conditions that resulted in Children's removal and that continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to Children's well-being. On October 15, 2025, the trial court held a termination hearing. Father did not appear at the hearing. DCS presented evidence about Father's lack of participation and progress in the underlying CHINS case. FCM Turay testified that he last spoke to Father in November 2024, so he did not know whether Father had obtained safe and stable housing or employment. Since removal, Father had not completed any services or demonstrated that he could provide a safe and stable home free of substance abuse.

[9] Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) Jessica Garza and Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) Elizabeth Deboor testified that Grandmother was meeting Children's needs and that Children were happy in her care. Eleven-year-old Br.P. was on her school's honor roll, and two-year-old Ba.P. continued to meet her developmental milestones. GAL Garza did not believe that Father could be a stable and sober caregiver for Children. She noted that Children “have waited almost three years for permanency[.]” Id. at 28. GAL Garza believed termination to be in Children's best interests because Grandmother could adopt Children and provide them with stability and permanency. CASA Deboor also opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interests. CASA Deboor and FCM Turay agreed that Father had not shown an ability to parent Children or remedied the conditions resulting in Children's removal. FCM Turay also recommended that Father's relationship with Children be terminated and that Grandmother adopt Children.

[10] On January 14, 2026, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and terminated Parents’ relationships with Children. The trial court found Parents had not addressed their substance abuse disorders or displayed an ability or willingness to parent Children and provide permanency. The court concluded that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal will not be remedied, that continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to Children's well-being, and that termination of the parent-child relationships is in Children's best interests. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[11] We recognize “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “[t]ermination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1151-52 (Ind. 2016) (quotation omitted).

[12] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted).

[13] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege, in relevant part, the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4) (2024).² In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Id. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3).

[14] DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).³

II. Best Interests

[15] Father's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in concluding that termination was in Children's best interests.⁴ In determining whether termination is in the best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 2835 (2020), reh'g denied. “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency[,]” as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. (citations and quotation omitted). We have previously held that “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[16] Father contends the evidence is insufficient to support the court's best interests determination. We disagree. Father concedes that GAL Garza and CASA Deboor testified that termination was in Children's best interests. In addition, FCM Turay recommended termination of Father's relationship with Children because he “ha[d] not demonstrated his ability to parent both [Children].” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. And Father does not challenge the court's finding that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (unchallenged findings are accepted as true). Indeed, the evidence showed that Father has not “addressed [his] substance use disorder or expressed any interest whatsoever in parenting the children.” App. Vol. II p. 119. This evidence is sufficient on its own to support the trial court's best interests conclusion.

[17] Still, a child's permanency is central to the court's best interests analysis. Children were ordered removed from Parents’ care in March 2023. Since then, Children have been placed with one stable caregiver—their maternal grandmother—who wishes to adopt them. In that time, Father has been noncompliant with services and has failed to regularly visit with Children. Father's failure to consistently visit Children or cultivate a bond with them demonstrates a lack of commitment to preserving the parent-child relationship. See Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to exercise visits shows a lack of commitment to the relationship), trans. denied. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interests. We affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025. The relevant portions of the statute remain unchanged.

3.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-8 was amended effective March 5, 2026. Subsection (a) remains unchanged.

4.   Father also asserts that he “challenges” findings 17, 18, and 25 of the court's termination order. Appellant's Br. p. 11. But he does not challenge the factual accuracy of those findings and fails to assert how they are unsupported by the record. Instead, he argues that those findings are insufficient to support the court's best interests determination. As such, his challenge to the findings is waived. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to develop a cogent argument results in waiver).

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.