Susan M. Burrows, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After accepting a plea of guilty to Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine,¹ the trial court sentenced Susan M. Burrows to an aggregate term of fifteen years, with twelve years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) and three years suspended to probation. The sole issue Burrows presents for our review is whether her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character. She asks this Court to revise her sentence to time served, with the balance to be served through community corrections and a term of probation. Finding that Burrows's sentence is not inappropriate, we decline to revise her sentence and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 2

[2] In the afternoon of June 16, 2024, Putnam County Sheriff's deputies were dispatched to a residence in Cloverdale, Indiana, on a report of a possible cardiac arrest. Upon arrival, the deputies found three unresponsive adults – Steven Drengacs, Nicholas Boswell, and Burrows – on the ground outside of a camper that was parked on Drengacs's parents’ property. The deputies and emergency personnel administered Narcan; however, Drengacs was pronounced dead at the scene after lifesaving efforts failed. Burrows and Boswell were both revived and transported to a local hospital. A forensic pathologist later determined that Drengacs died of methamphetamine and fentanyl toxicity.

[3] During an interview at the hospital, and after being Mirandized, Burrows told a Putnam County Sheriff's detective that, the day before, she found a baggie of powder at her late brother's home that she believed contained cocaine. The next day, she had carried the substance to Drengacs's camper, divided the powder into three lines, and then she, Drengacs, and Boswell each snorted a line using a rolled-up dollar bill.

[4] Four days later, Burrows telephoned the detective and repeated the same account of the incident, adding that she was the one who asked Drengacs and Boswell if they wanted to ingest the substance and that all three had been negatively affected within moments of using the substance. A few days later, Boswell provided investigators with a similar account of the incident.

[5] On January 24, 2025, the State charged Burrows with Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death.³ Nearly a year later, on December 4, 2025, the State added a count of Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine. One week later, Burrows pled guilty to the Level 3 felony under a plea agreement that dismissed the Level 1 felony and left her sentence to the trial court's discretion. When Burrows set out the factual basis during her guilty plea hearing, she admitted that she had “knowingly or intentionally delivered Methamphetamine[,] pure or adulterated[,] weighing at least five grams but less than ten grams.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 41.) The trial court took the guilty plea under advisement, ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”), and set the matter for sentencing.

[6] In January 2026, Putnam County Community Corrections provided the trial court with a screening letter that indicated that Burrows was ineligible for home detention or electronic monitoring because she “reside[d] in Clay County” and “Clay County Community Corrections [wa]s not willing to accept supervision.” (App. Vol. 2 p. 45.) The PSI was filed January 20, 2026.

[7] Burrows's sentencing hearing was held on February 12, 2026. Preliminarily, defense counsel requested a continuance to allow Burrows to be re-screened for community corrections. Counsel informed the trial court that he believed the earlier ineligibility determination rested on unpaid fees and that he had learned that morning that those fees had been paid. The State objected, arguing that the screening letter had been on file for some time and Burrows “had plenty of time to ․ cure that issue[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 p. 46.) The trial court denied the continuance and proceeded to sentencing.

[8] The probation officer who had prepared the PSI testified that Burrows had seven prior convictions and that the Indiana Risk Assessment System (“IRAS”) score placed her in the high-risk category to reoffend. The officer recommended a sixteen-year sentence with thirteen years executed and three years suspended to formal probation. Drengacs's sisters read statements describing the effects of Drengacs's death on their family.

[9] Burrows testified that she was forty-four years old and had been continuously incarcerated since her January 2025 arrest. She acknowledged a longstanding struggle with methamphetamine abuse. She testified that she believed the substance she gave to Drengacs and Boswell was cocaine; she had attempted to help Drengacs when he had collapsed; and she had not intended for anyone to be harmed. She also testified that she had completed addiction recovery programming while incarcerated and wished to continue with treatment. She told the trial court that, if released to home detention, she would live with family in Clay County. She testified that she hoped to obtain employment and that the outstanding fees that had made her ineligible for community-corrections placement had recently been paid. On cross-examination, Burrows agreed that her conduct regarding the dealing incident was reckless; that she had found a bag of drugs without knowing its source or contents and shared it with her friends; that one of her friends had died; and that she was remorseful and thought about the incident every day.

[10] The State asked the trial court to impose a sixteen-year sentence with thirteen years executed in the DOC. Defense counsel requested imposition of the advisory sentence of nine years – with three years executed in the DOC and the balance suspended to probation – and asked the court to consider purposeful incarceration and entertain the “type of sentence that might allow for modification to home detention after a certain period of time is served[.]” (Id. at 68.)

[11] The trial court first convicted Burrows of Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine. Turning to sentencing, the court found as an aggravating factor Burrows's criminal history, noting Burrows's “pattern of criminal behavior[,]” which included six prior misdemeanor convictions and one prior felony conviction. (Id. at 69.) The court also noted as aggravating factors Burrows's failed attempts at probation that had occurred “pretty much every, every time that [she was] placed on probation[,]” and the harm resulting from the dealing offense, including Drengacs's death and the near-fatal overdoses suffered by Boswell and by Burrows herself. (Id. at 70.) The court told Burrows that she was “not being found legally responsible for [Drengacs's] death[,]” but that it was “hard to ignore that [it] happened as a result of actions that [she] put in motion.” (Id.)

[12] As mitigating factors, the trial court found that Burrows had accepted responsibility by pleading guilty, was “sincerely” remorseful, and had voluntarily participated in “rehabilitation efforts” while incarcerated. (Id. at 70.) The trial court noted, however, that by pleading guilty, Burrows had received the benefit of being convicted of a lower-level felony. Finding the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the trial court sentenced Burrows to an aggregate term of fifteen years, with twelve years executed in the DOC and three years suspended to probation, and the court recommended she receive substance-abuse treatment while incarcerated.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Burrows contends her sentence is inappropriate given the nature of her offense and her character.⁴ We may revise a sentence when we find, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision ․ that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. App. R. 7(B). Because sentencing is a function of the trial court, its judgment should receive “ ‘considerable deference.’ ” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). This deference can only be “ ‘overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense’ and ‘the defendant's character.’ ” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1267). Appellate review of a sentence is “ ‘to leaven outliers, ․ but not to achieve the perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.’ ” Nicholson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 680, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225), trans. denied. The burden of proving a sentence is inappropriate falls to the defendant. Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[14] Our review is “holistic” and takes into consideration “the whole picture before us.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127. Appellants need not prove their sentence is inappropriate for both their character and offense, but “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. Our determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.

[O]ur goal is to determine whether the appellant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record.

George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[15] “When we evaluate whether a sentence is inappropriate given the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence.” Zamilpa v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1079, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). A Level 3 felony is punishable by a term of imprisonment of between three and sixteen years, with nine years being the advisory term. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). Here, the trial court imposed a cumulative fifteen-year sentence, six years above the advisory sentence and one year below the maximum sentence allowed by statute, with twelve of those years ordered executed in the DOC and three years suspended to probation.

The Nature of Burrows's Offense

[16] Regarding the nature of her offense, Burrows acknowledges that it “is serious.” (Appellant's Br. at 13.) Still, she identifies several factors that she contends place the offense in a less egregious light: the delivery of the methamphetamine to both Drengacs and Boswell did not stem from a “commercial dealing enterprise[,]” and it involved no profit motive, packaging for resale, repeated sales, threats, weapons, or efforts to conceal the crime; Burrows, Drengacs, and Boswell all believed the substance they were ingesting was cocaine; Burrows ingested the same substance and nearly died too; Burrows attempted to assist Drengacs after he collapsed; and Burrows reported her actions to law enforcement immediately after the incident occurred and again a few days later. (Id. at 15.) Burrows also contends that because the State characterized her conduct as “reckless[,]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 63), the sentence the trial court imposed “exceeded what was necessary for conduct” that Burrows argues “occurred in the context of consensual, shared drug use, and was never intended to cause death or serious harm.” (Appellant's Br. at 16.)

[17] Here, there is nothing about the nature of Burrows's offense that renders her sentence inappropriate. Burrows found an unidentified bag of powder in her late brother's bedroom that she then brought to her friends, divided into lines, and shared, with no concern as to the true nature of the substance. The substance – later determined to be methamphetamine, apparently mixed with fentanyl – killed Drengacs, nearly killed Burrows, and necessitated that Burrows and Boswell receive Narcan, hospitalization, and medical treatment. As the trial court noted, it was “hard to ignore that [the incident] happened as a result of actions that [Burrows] put in motion.” (Tr. Vol. II at 70.) Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Burrows's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.

Burrows's Character

[18] Turning to assessment of a defendant's character, we have described that character is found in what we learn of the offender's life and conduct. Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Regarding her character, Burrows points to the fact that by pleading guilty, she accepted responsibility for her actions; she expressed remorse; while incarcerated awaiting sentencing, she had completed addiction recovery programming; she had a “concrete release plan” that included housing, employment prospects, transportation support, and continuing recovery support, had the trial court considered releasing her to home detention; “community corrections placement was a realistic sentencing option”; and she testified at sentencing that she believed she could be successful on home detention. (Appellant's Br. at 18.) Also, according to Burrows, “her criminal history did not justify a near-maximum executed sentence” because her criminal history consisted of “primarily low-level” and misdemeanor offenses. (Id. at 19.)

[19] While these statements may be true, we note that “[w]hen considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant's criminal history. The significance of criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citation omitted). Burrows's criminal history, consisting of one felony and six misdemeanor convictions, is not insignificant. Between 2009 and 2019, Burrows was convicted of possession of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, visiting a common nuisance, false informing, driving while suspended, battery resulting in bodily injury, and possession of marijuana. While the trial court observed that Burrows's criminal history was “not the worst[,]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 69), “[e]ven a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character and shows that she was not deterred by previous contacts with the criminal justice system from committing the current offense.” Harris v. State, 163 N.E.3d 938, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. In addition, Burrows has violated her placements on probation numerous times, which also reflects poorly on her character and indicates that previous attempts at leniency have failed. Thus, we cannot say Burrows's sentence is inappropriate given her character.

Burrows's Placement

[20] Finally, Burrows argues her sentence is inappropriate because it should be limited to the time she has already served, with the balance served through community corrections. Burrows also appears to argue that the trial court's denial of her request to continue the sentencing hearing “materially affected” the trial court's “sentencing structure” because the “court imposed a sentence that sent [Burrows to the DOC] for twelve years without first allowing the record to be developed on whether she should be placed in community corrections under strict supervision.” (Appellant's Br. at 19.) We note, however, that “it is quite difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim that h[er] placement is inappropriate.” Moon v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1156, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation omitted).

[21] Here, the trial court clearly stated why imprisonment was necessary in Burrows's case, telling Burrows that she had exhibited a “pattern of criminal behavior pretty much all [her] lifetime[,]” and she had “failed probation[ ] ․ pretty much ․ every time that [she had been] placed on probation.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 69-70.) Regarding Burrows's drug use, the trial court noted that Burrows had shown a desire to “abstain from drugs[,]” which was “the first step” toward recovery, but the court recognized that having that desire was “not enough[.]” (Id. at 70.) The court “encourage[d]” Burrows to “continue on that path” to recovery and indicated it would recommend that she receive substance abuse treatment while incarcerated in the DOC. (Id. at 71.) Based on the foregoing, we are unpersuaded that Burrows's executed twelve-year sentence is inappropriate and should be limited to some combination of time served and placement in community corrections.⁵

Conclusion

[22] Burrows has not demonstrated that her aggregate fifteen-year sentence for Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine, with twelve years executed in the DOC and three years suspended to probation, is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character. We accordingly affirm the trial court.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1) & (d)(1).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5(a).

4.   Burrows acknowledges that, in her Appellant's Brief, she had “stated that the [trial] court did not give adequate mitigating effect to [her] guilty plea, remorse, and treatment progress.” (Appellant's Reply Br. at 5.) In her Reply Brief, Burrows clarified that “[t]hat language should not be read as a freestanding request to reweigh mitigators under” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). (Id.) Indeed, a request to reweigh mitigators is not a cognizable argument because when trial courts find aggravating and mitigating factors, they cannot be said to have abused their “discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (quoting Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147, 155 (Ind. 2000)). Therefore, we address only Burrows's inappropriate-sentence claim.

5.   To the extent Burrows argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for a continuance, we are not persuaded.Rulings on non-statutory motions for continuance are within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion and resultant prejudice. An abuse occurs only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. There is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Burrows sought a last-minute continuance on grounds that her counsel had just learned that she might be eligible for placement in community corrections – a matter the State argued could have been resolved before the sentencing hearing took place. Under these circumstances, we decline to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Burrows's request to continue the sentencing hearing.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.