IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.P. (Minor Child); (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] J.P. (“Father”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with his ten-year-old son, J.P. (“J.P.”). He argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance; and (2) the trial court's order terminating his parental relationship with J.P. is clearly erroneous. Concluding that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion for a continuance; and (2) the trial court's order terminating Father's parental relationship with J.P. is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Father's motion for a continuance.

2. Whether the trial court's order terminating Father's parental relationship with J.P. is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[2] Mother and Father are the parents of J.P., who was born in June 2015. In December 2023, Mother and Father were both incarcerated, and eight-year-old J.P. lived with a legal guardian (“the legal guardian”) in Jackson County. In mid-December 2023, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that J.P. was the victim of neglect because the legal guardian was using alcohol and illegal substances while caring for J.P.

[3] A DCS family case manager (“the FCM”) contacted the legal guardian, and the legal guardian told the FCM that she did not know if she wanted to continue caring for J.P. because of his bad behavior. At the end of December 2023, the legal guardian told the FCM that she could no longer manage J.P. and that he was ready for a new home.²

[4] DCS removed J.P. from the legal guardian and placed him in kinship care with a family friend (“the family friend”). Also, at the end of December 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging that J.P. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”).

[5] In June 2024, the trial court adjudicated J.P. to be a CHINS. One month later, in July 2024, the trial court issued a dispositional order that required Father to:

(1) abstain from the use of illegal drugs; (2) complete a substance abuse assessment; (3) submit to random urine drug screens; (4) attend supervised visits with J.P.; and (5) participate in all DCS-recommended programs.

[6] Father, who was still incarcerated in the county jail (“the jail”), began participating in a Fatherhood Engagement program. Because service providers were not able to provide the other court-ordered services at the jail, DCS planned to schedule those services for Father when he was released from incarceration.

[7] Forty-six-year-old Father was released from the jail in January 2025, more than one year after J.P. had been placed with the family friend. Following his release from incarceration, Father moved in with his mother in Freetown and began participating in weekly one-hour supervised visits with J.P. Father continued to participate in the Fatherhood Engagement Program, and DCS referred Father to the previously court-ordered services, including a substance abuse assessment and random urine drug screens.

[8] One month later, in February 2025, Father stopped participating in the Fatherhood Engagement program. In addition, Father told the visitation supervisor that he would no longer be participating in supervised visits with J.P. because J.P. did not want to participate in visits with him. At that time, Father had not completed the court-ordered substance abuse assessment or participated in the court-ordered urine drug screens.

[9] In June 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental relationship with J.P. One month later, in July 2025, Father attended the initial hearing on the termination petition and asked the trial court to appoint him an attorney. The trial court determined that Father was indigent and appointed him an attorney (“the appointed attorney”) from the county public defender agency (“the public defender agency”). In addition, the trial court scheduled the termination hearing for August 20, 2025.

[10] One week later, the appointed attorney filed a motion to withdraw his appearance. The appointed attorney explained in his motion that Father, who was “engaged in adversarial proceedings against” the public defender agency, had stated that he had no confidence in representation by any attorney associated with that agency. (App. Vol. 2 at 36). According to the appointed attorney, Father had further stated that he would include the appointed attorney in any action that Father had taken against the public defender agency if the appointed attorney did not withdraw his representation.

[11] The trial court granted the appointed attorney's motion to withdraw his appearance and appointed Father an attorney (“Father's attorney”) who was not associated with the public defender agency. Father's attorney then filed a motion to continue the termination hearing because he had a previously scheduled jury trial that conflicted with the hearing. The trial court granted the motion to continue and scheduled the termination hearing for November 19, 2025. DCS sent Father notice of the date of the rescheduled hearing.

[12] At the beginning of the November 2025 termination hearing, Father's attorney told the trial court that Father had called his office about fifteen minutes before the hearing was scheduled to begin and stated that “he was stuck in Freetown without a ride.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 4). Father's attorney asked the trial court to continue the hearing, and the trial court denied his oral motion.

[13] At the hearing, DCS family case manager Autumn Gellhouse (“FCM Gellhouse”) testified that, during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Father “ha[d] denied most of his random drug screens except for two that were positive” for methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 8). According to FCM Gellhouse, the most recent methamphetamine-positive test result had been in October 2025, which was four months after DCS had filed the termination petition and one month before the termination hearing.

[14] Further, according to FCM Gellhouse, Father had returned to the Fatherhood Engagement program but had not completed any other services. In addition, FCM Gellhouse testified that Father had not visited J.P. since February 2025. Moreover, according to FCM Gellhouse, J.P. had been placed with the family friend for more than two years and was “thriving.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 7). FCM Gellhouse testified that termination of the parent-child relationship was in J.P.’s best interests and that the plan for J.P. was adoption by the family friend.

[15] In addition, FCM Gellhouse testified that she no longer met with Father by herself because he had “threatened to take out DCS[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 8). FCM Gellhouse further testified that she had concerns about Father's mental health issues.

[16] The Fatherhood Engagement program provider (“the FE provider”) also testified that he had concerns about Father's mental health issues because Father “ha[d] various beliefs including that he [wa]s God and father of creation and he[ ] [was] owed by the world for stretching himself thin and getting rid of his powers.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 19). According to the FE provider, the day before the hearing, Father had stated that “he [had] invented a cell phone and [had given] it to everyone on the world for them to, it's various things.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). The FE provider also testified that he had discussed with Father the possibility of participating in mental health services. However, Father had told the FE provider that he did not need those services.

[17] Lastly, CASA Karen Davis (“CASA Davis”) testified that J.P. felt safe with the family friend and that he was happy that the family friend wanted to adopt him. In addition, CASA Davis testified that J.P. no longer wanted to participate in visits with Father. According to CASA Davis, termination of the parent-child relationship was in J.P.’s best interests.

[18] In January 2026, the trial court issued a detailed order terminating Father's parental relationship with J.P. Specifically, the trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in J.P.’s removal or the reasons for J.P.’s placement outside Father's home would not be remedied and that the termination of Father's parental rights was in J.P.’s best interests.

[19] Father now appeals.

Decision

[20] Father argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance; and (2) the trial court's order terminating his parental relationship with J.P. is clearly erroneous. We address each of his contentions in turn.

1. Motion for a Continuance

[21] Father first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance. We disagree.

[22] We review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. Matter of C.J.B., 281 N.E.3d 615, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). When the trial court denies a party's motion for a continuance, there is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Id.

[23] In support of his argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a continuance, Father relies on Indiana Trial Rule 53.5. However, as DCS points out, effective January 1, 2025, Trial Rule 53.5 was repealed, and motions to continue became governed by Trial Rule 7(D). See C.J.B., 281 N.E.3d at 620. Because the termination hearing in this case was held in November 2025, Father's motion to continue is governed by Trial Rule 7(D).

[24] Trial Rule 7(D) provides as follows:

(1) A party must file a motion for continuance as soon after the cause for continuance or delay is discovered by the party seeking the same.

(2) Any written motion to continue a matter must be filed pursuant to subdivision (B) and must include:

(a) A statement that the opposing party has no objection;

(b) A statement that the opposing party objects; or

(c) A statement that the opposing party's position is unknown, and the date, time, and method by which the moving party filing the motion attempted to obtain agreement and the result, or why such outreach was not possible.

(3) If a party did not comply with subdivision (D)(2), a court may grant a motion for continuance only if the moving party certifies to the court, in writing, the efforts made to give notice and the reasons supporting the moving party's claim that actual notice should not be required.

(4) A party's motion must include:

(a) the approximate amount of time needed to elapse before the matter can be heard, and,

(b) a good faith estimate of the time needed for the rescheduled hearing or trial.

Trial Rule 7(D). We have explained that this new rule “appears to leave continuances to the discretion of the trial court, so long as the procedural requirements of the rule are met.” C.J.B., 281 N.E.3d at 621.

[25] Here, Father's last minute oral motion for a continuance, which was made on the morning of the hearing, met none of these requirements. Specifically, Father's motion was not written, did not identify DCS's position on the continuance, and did not indicate when Father would be available. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's motion to continue. See id. (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the father's oral motion to continue where the father's motion met none of the Trial Rule 7(D) requirements).³

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[26] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[27] Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege in its termination petition as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.⁴ DCS must prove these alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[28] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[29] Father argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of his parental relationship with J.P. Specifically, his sole contention is that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the termination was in J.P.’s best interests.

[30] In determining whether a termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235.

[31] A child's need for permanency is a central consideration in determining the child's best interests. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009), reh'g denied. Moreover, this Court has previously explained that “the recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[32] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Father did not successfully complete any of the court-ordered services and twice tested positive for methamphetamine. One of those methamphetamine-positive tests occurred four months after DCS had filed the termination petition and just one month before the termination hearing. Further, both FCM Gellhouse and the FE provider testified that they were concerned about Father's mental health issues. However, when the FE provider discussed mental health services with Father, Father responded that he did not need them.

[33] Moreover, FCM Gellhouse and CASA Davis both testified that termination of the parent-child relationship was in J.P.’s best interests. Further, the trial court concluded that DCS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in J.P.’s removal would not be remedied, and Father does not challenge this conclusion. In addition, we note that at the time of the termination hearing, ten-year-old J.P. had been placed with the family friend for nearly two years and was thriving. Further, J.P. had not seen Father in nine months and no longer wanted to participate in visits with him. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the termination of the parent-child relationship was in J.P.’s best interests.

[34] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.P.’s mother (“Mother”) voluntarily relinquished her parental rights and is not participating in this appeal.

2.   The trial court issued an order terminating the guardianship in April 2024.

3.   We further note that Father's reliance on the eleven-factor test set forth in In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241 (Ind. 2014) is misplaced. In K.W., our Indiana Supreme Court explained that the eleven-factor test applies to the consideration of a motion to transport an incarcerated parent to a termination hearing and not to a motion to continue the termination hearing. Id. at 244. Thus, application of this test is not compelled here as Father requested a continuance of the hearing, not a motion to transport. See C.J.B., 281 N.E.3d at 622, n. 4 (declining to apply the eleven-factor test where the father had requested a continuance of the termination hearing, not a motion to transport).Father also appears to argue that the trial court violated his due process rights when it denied his motion for a continuance. However, Father did not raise a due process argument at the trial court level and makes no fundamental error argument on appeal. He has, therefore, waived appellate review of this issue. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (explaining that “a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.”).

4.   The General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed the termination petition in this case in June 2025, the amended version of the statute applies here. Additionally, we note that the General Assembly further amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025. The 2025 amendment does not apply to this case.

Pyle, Judge.

May, J., and Scheele, J., concur.