Russell Finnegan, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In 2021, Russell Finnegan, who was involved in a protective-order case, sent the presiding judge multiple letters full of vulgarity. That judge then issued a rule to show cause and appointed a special judge, who later found Finnegan in indirect contempt and sentenced him to thirty days in jail. Finnegan filed a notice of appeal, but it was dismissed after he failed to file a brief. In 2025, Finnegan filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging the finding of contempt. The post-conviction court summarily denied his petition.

[2] Finnegan now appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition, raising a variety of claims. But the State argues we should not address these claims, contending “[c]ontempt findings are not criminal and cannot be challenged through post-conviction proceedings.” Appellee's Br. p. 17. We agree.

[3] In support of its argument, the State cites Finnegan v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1265 (Ind. 2024).¹ There, our Supreme Court addressed whether the statutory procedures for asserting an insanity defense in a criminal proceeding applied to an indirect contempt proceeding. First, the Court noted the insanity defense statutes apply only to criminal cases. The Court then went on to determine whether, for purposes of the insanity defense statutes, indirect contempt was a criminal case. The Court determined it was not, based on the “distinct statutes on contempt and the content and structure of the criminal code as a whole[.]” Finnegan, 240 N.E.3d at 1272. Ultimately, the Court held “[i]ndirect contempt of court is neither criminal nor civil, but sui generis” and thus the insanity defense statutes did not apply to such proceedings.² Id.

[4] The same can be said here. Similar to the insanity defense statutes, the post-conviction rules are limited to “[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime[.]” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a) (emphasis added). And as the Court explained in Finnegan, “indirect contempt is neither a ‘crime’ nor a ‘criminal offense’ as defined by the [Indiana] Code.” 240 N.E.3d at 1271. Thus, the Post-Conviction Rules do not provide relief to a person found in indirect contempt.

[5] The State then argues this means the post-conviction court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition and it should have been dismissed, and thus this appeal should be dismissed. However, as our Supreme Court reiterated twenty years ago, not all legal errors are jurisdictional, and we must resist the urge “to convert a legal issue into one of jurisdiction[.]” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ind. 2006) (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Sandefur, 197 N.E.2d 519, 521 (Ind. 1964)) (internal quote from J.I. Case omitted). “Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding belongs.” Id. at 540. When the facts are not in dispute, the question is one of law that we review de novo. Monroe Cnty. v. Boathouse Apts., LLC, 150 N.E.3d 1045, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[6] Finnegan filed his petition for post-conviction relief in the Pulaski Circuit Court, which sits as Indiana's fifty-ninth judicial circuit. Ind. Code § 33-33-66-1 (2004). “All circuit courts have ․ original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases[.]” Ind. Code § 33-28-1-2(a)(1) (2019). None of the other statutes organizing the Pulaski County courts limits that general grant of jurisdiction. See Ind. Code ch. 33-33-66. Accordingly, we presume Pulaski Circuit Court has subject matter jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases, see Monroe Cnty., 150 N.E.3d at 1047 (“Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have subject matter jurisdiction.”) (quoting Lakes & Rivers Trans., a Div. of Jack Gray v. Randolph Robinson Steel Co., 736 N.E.2d 285, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), which includes Finnegan's civil petition for post-conviction relief.

[7] Whether a contempt finding is a “crime” to which the Post-Conviction Rules apply, see P-C.R. 1(1)(a) (indicating remedy available to any person “convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime”) – is a legal question about whether Finnegan can obtain post-conviction relief from a finding of indirect contempt. Although we conclude our Supreme Court's decision in Finnegan forecloses relief for an indirect contemnor under the Post-Conviction Rules, this does not mean that the Pulaski Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Finnegan's post-conviction petition. See Monroe Cnty., 150 N.E.3d at 1050 (holding party's argument asserted legal error, rather than jurisdictional inadequacy, such that trial court erroneously granted dismissal for lack of jurisdiction).

[8] As such, we decline to dismiss Finnegan's appeal. But because Finnegan is not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Rules, we affirm the denial of his petition.³

[9] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The contemnor in Finnegan is the same litigant as in the present case.

2.   The Finnegan Court left open the possibility that its holding “might offend due process” but stated that determination “must wait for a case where it is raised.” Finnegan, 240 N.E.3d at 1272. We similarly do not determine whether there is a due process issue here, as Finnegan did not make a due process argument on this issue.

3.   Citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the State moved to dismiss Finnegan's appeal before filing its Appellee's Brief. The motion was held in abeyance, and the State timely filed its brief. Given our holding here, we deny the State's motion by separate order.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.