Isam R. Clark, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Isam Clark fatally shot Dalton Collins during a drug-deal robbery setup. Clark was convicted of murder and attempted robbery. Clark appeals and raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence Clark's statements from his interview with law enforcement; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other evidence at trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On March 22, 2025, 16-year-olds Clark and Derrick Brifil arranged to meet at Clark's house in Evansville, Indiana, to “trade magazines” for their Taurus G3C handguns, Tr. Vol. III at 67. Later that day, Clark and Brifil joined a video call with Brifil's friend, 17-year-old Ethan Baughn. Baughn offered Brifil and Clark a “lick”—meaning a robbery—involving “some weed and a gun.” Id. at 32.

[4] The target victim was Dalton Collins. The plan was to stage a marijuana sale in a parking lot near Clark's house. Baughn, who was staying at a hotel out of town, would arrange the sale, and Brifil would approach Collins's vehicle while Clark hid behind a dumpster. When Brifil examined the marijuana and said the codeword “damn,” Tr. Vol. III at 33, Clark would emerge and “draw his gun on the car,” id. at 34. From the robbery, Clark would keep Collins's firearm, Baughn would take Clark's firearm, and Brifil would keep the marijuana.

[5] Baughn sent the parking lot address to Collins, who drove there with his friend Zachary Kiper. Both were equipped with firearms—Collins with a Taurus G3 9mm and Kiper with a SAR Arms 9mm. As Collins neared the parking lot, Baughn called to “distract” him. Tr. Vol. II at 250. Baughn and Collins remained on the phone as Collins entered the parking lot and Brifil approached the driver's side door. Brifil examined the marijuana and said, “[D]amn it smell[s] good,” but Clark did not emerge from behind the dumpster. Tr. Vol. III at 38. Brifil then pointed his firearm into the vehicle and reached for Collins's firearm. Brifil heard a “pop” followed by “more pops,” felt he had been shot, and “turned around to see [Clark] shooting into the car.” Id. at 39.

[6] Kiper returned fire toward Clark; Brifil and Clark ran away. Kiper drove to the hospital when he saw that Collins was “[s]lumped over” and appeared to be “sleeping in his seat.” Tr. Vol. II at 216. On the way, Kiper realized he had also been shot. Collins later succumbed to his injuries—gunshot wounds to the top of his head and his face.

[7] After the shooting, Clark twice called Baughn. In the first call, Clark stated, “I had to jump out[,] and I got to shooting at him.” Tr. Vol. III at 5. Clark said he fired “[a]bout ten” shots. Id. In the second call, Clark asked Baughn what he should do, and Baughn told him, “[Y]ou're going to have to get rid of your gun, you're going to have to run.” Id.

[8] Later that night, as the investigation into the shooting unfolded, law enforcement officers discovered a wounded Brifil outside a residence near the parking lot. Brifil's firearm—with a “magazine that was almost completely full”—was found discarded in a yard nearby. Tr. Vol. III at 108. Law enforcement believed the firearm had not been fired that night. Seven shell casings were recovered from the parking lot, and testing revealed that they were all fired from a single source, which was not Kiper's firearm. Clark's firearm was never located.

[9] Information from Kiper, his family, and Collins's family led law enforcement to speak with Baughn the next morning. Baughn told the officers that Clark was involved in the affairs the previous evening. Law enforcement surveilled Clark's residence and observed him bring a white plastic bag—later found to contain washed clothing, loose ammunition, and $11.83—from his house to a different residence and deposit the bag in a backyard trashcan. A search of Clark's bedroom revealed more loose ammunition along with marijuana.¹

[10] Clark was taken for an interview, during which his grandmother and legal guardian was present. Clark was aware that the interview concerned a “shooting,” State's Ex. 1 at 0:25–0:28, and Evansville Police Department (“EPD”) Detective Jonathan Helm gave Clark's grandmother the same “lowdown,” id. at 0:28–0:32. Before any questioning began, Detective Helm read aloud the first portion of the waiver of rights form and gave Clark and his grandmother time to confer in private. When Detective Helm returned, he read aloud the remainder of the form, and the following exchange occurred:

Det. Helm: So if that's an accurate statement and you're willing to, you know, talk—

Clark: Can I have a lawyer with me during the questioning?

Det. Helm: Yes, but that obviously can't happen, like, now.

Clark: Like now (nodding).

Det. Helm: Yeah. Because I know that's, it's always funny because no one's ever, at least as far as I've been involved in, you know, they'll say I want a lawyer, but then that means we really can't because they don't have one on hand. You know what I'm saying.

Clark: Right, yeah.

Det. Helm: So it's like, if this was more of a prearranged to where you had a lawyer and you wanted to bring him. I have had that.

Clark: Right.

Det. Helm: You know, we've done that. So yeah, if you want a lawyer, we couldn't do any questioning now, you'd have to get one. Is that something you want?

Clark: What?

Det. Helm: A lawyer?

Clark: Um, I mean, we can have this conversation right now.

State's Ex. 2 at 5:06–5:54. Detective Helm also advised Clark that if he “decide[d] to answer questions now without a lawyer present,” he still had “the right to stop answering anytime.” Id. at 5:57–6:05. Clark and his grandmother then signed the waiver of rights form, which stated, “I understand what my rights are․ I am willing to make a statement and answer some questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time.” Id. at 4:48–4:57.

[11] Shortly thereafter, when EPD Detective Michael Beitler entered the room, Detective Helm explained that Clark had “asked if ․ he could have a lawyer during questioning,” and Detective Helm had explained, “that's part of the rights” but “without one being here, it would have ․ to ․ be a later prearranged” interview. State's Ex. 15 at 0:09–0:20. Detective Helm again pointed out that Clark could “answer now” and “still have the right to stop answering” thereafter. Id. at 0:25–0:28.

[12] Clark then asked, “Can we like, let a public defender know so, like, whenever they are free, they can come in?” State's Ex. 15 at 0:48–0:51. The detectives explained that public defenders are not “on standby” and “that's not necessarily how that works,” id. at 0:54–0:58, but if Clark were charged with a crime, a public defender would be appointed. Clark was curious about the potential charges he faced and “how [his] name got brought up,” so he agreed to proceed with the interview. Id. at 1:09–1:12. Clark denied involvement in the shooting and claimed he was at home that evening. Clark also stated his DNA “shouldn't be” in Brifil's vehicle.² State's Ex. 15 at 16:18–16:25.

[13] An examination of Clark's, Brifil's, and Baughn's cell phones revealed that Brifil was on a video call with Clark as he walked up to Collins's car “so [Clark] could hear the code word.” Tr. Vol. IV at 92. The phone records also corroborated Baughn's account that Clark called him after the shooting.

[14] The State charged Clark as an adult with murder and two counts of attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury as Level 2 felonies.³ While Clark was in jail awaiting trial, he stated to a friend on a phone call that “for the robbery,” he would “probably try to cop out for like four” and “do like 10.” State's Ex. 16 at 0:19–0:27. Clark also stated, “I'll do two years for a gun charge, I don't give no f[*]ck.” Id. at 1:17–1:22.

[15] Before the jury trial, Clark filed a motion to suppress his statements from the interview on the grounds that his Miranda rights waiver was invalid. During the ensuing suppression hearing, Detective Helm testified that he interpreted Clark's references to an attorney as “asking for clarification on what his rights are,” Tr. Vol. II at 45, not that Clark “wanted a lawyer before questioning,” id. at 49. Clark's response—“[W]e can have this conversation right now,” State's Ex. 2 at 5:50–5:53—assured Detective Helm that Clark “understood and wished to continue” the interview without an attorney present, Tr. Vol. II at 50. Detective Helm also testified regarding a previous interaction involving a different incident with Clark in which Clark “didn't speak” with Detective Helm because Clark “invoked ․ Miranda.” Id.

[16] The trial court concluded that “when [Clark] requested if a lawyer was present to sit in,” the request was “more inquiry than invocation of [Clark's] rights” and “f[e]ll well short of the unequivocal nature of invoking his rights required by Indiana courts.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 117. The trial court also noted that “[o]n both occasions [Clark] brought up a lawyer, Det. Helm clearly and calmly, without any discouragement, informed [Clark] he was entitled to a lawyer and that Det. Helm would stop the interview if [Clark] wanted to obtain a lawyer”; “[e]ach time, [Clark] unequivocally responded that he wished to speak with detectives and proceed with the current interview.” Id. The trial court granted Clark's motion to suppress as to statements made before Clark and his grandmother signed the waiver of rights form but denied the motion as to the statements made thereafter.

[17] During the jury trial, Clark renewed his objection to the statements from his interview, which the trial court overruled. The trial court subsequently admitted a redacted portion of Clark's interview. Clark also objected to the admission of the jail phone call on the grounds that his contemplation of taking a plea deal was not relevant and was prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection. Baughn and Brifil were given “use immunity” and testified regarding Clark's involvement in the shooting. Tr. Vol. III at 6, 24. Clark did not testify; his defense was that he “was never there” and “did not participate in the shooting.” Tr. Vol. IV at 202.

[18] The jury found Clark guilty as charged. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered judgments of conviction on only the murder charge and the attempted robbery charge involving Kiper. Clark was sentenced to 56 years in prison. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[19] Clark argues that the trial court erred by admitting (1) his statements from the law enforcement interview and (2) his jail phone call. We generally review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 424 (2024). However, “we engage in de novo review when an alleged ‘constitutional violation has resulted from the admission of evidence.’ ” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 2013)).

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Admitting Clark's Statements from the Law Enforcement Interview

[20] Clark first argues that the trial court erred by admitting his statements from the interview in violation of his rights under the United States Constitution and the Juvenile Waiver Statute, Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1. The United States Constitution “protect[s] an individual's privilege against self-incrimination and ensure[s] that only their voluntary statements can be used against them in a criminal prosecution.” J.Q.R. v. State, 252 N.E.3d 919, 924 (Ind. 2025) (citing U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV, § 1; Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 14; D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 332–33 (Ind. 2011)). “These protections extend to situations when law enforcement questions a juvenile ‘who is in custody—i.e., custodial interrogation.’ ” Id. (quoting D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 333).

[21] Indiana's Juvenile Waiver Statute “ ‘affords juveniles with greater rights than the Constitution requires.’ ” T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 725 (Ind. 2023) (quoting R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037, 1043 (Ind. 2018)). Under this statute, “an unemancipated child cannot unilaterally waive their Miranda rights.” J.Q.R., 252 N.E.3d at 925 (citing Ind. Code § 31-32-5-1). When such a child is not represented by counsel, the child can only waive his or her rights “through a ‘custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem’ ” and only then if the requirements of the Juvenile Waiver Statute are satisfied. Id. (quoting I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2)). One such requirement is that “the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver.” I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2)(D).

[22] Clark argues that the trial court should have excluded his statements from the interview for three reasons: (a) the officers questioned him despite his invocation of his right to an attorney; (b) his waiver of rights was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and (c) the errors were not harmless. We address each argument in turn.

a. Clark did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to an attorney

[23] Clark first argues that the trial court should not have admitted his statements from the interview because the detectives questioned him despite his invocation of his right to counsel. “Once the accused requests counsel, ‘the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’ ” Schuler v. State, 112 N.E.3d 180, 186 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ind. 2010)). “This request, however, must be ‘unambiguous and unequivocal.’ ” Id. (quoting Carr, 934 N.E.2d at 1102). “A defendant's statement is either ‘an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not.’ ” Id. at 188 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).⁴

[24] We determine whether a “reference to an attorney” constitutes an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel based on “a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances.” Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 186 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). If such an officer “would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,” the officer is “not required to stop questioning.” Id. (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459) (emphasis in original). Moreover, “[i]f a defendant's statements are unclear,” the officer “may ask clarifying questions to determine whether the accused has actually requested counsel.” Id. at 186–87 (citing Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (Ind. 2002)). But once an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to an attorney has been made, an officer cannot badger the suspect with “repeated rounds of questioning” so as to “undermine the will of the person being questioned.” Carr, 934 N.E.2d at 1107 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).

[25] Turning to the instant case, a suspect's mere reference to an attorney coupled with a present willingness to answer questions without an attorney present generally does not suffice as an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. For example, in Schuler v. State, the defendant stated, “I want my attorney, but I'll answer, you can ask me questions however.” 112 N.E.3d at 185. The questioning detective sought clarification regarding whether the defendant wished to speak with an attorney before continuing the interaction, stating, “if you're telling me you want an attorney, I cannot talk to you any[ ]more.” Id. The defendant reiterated, “you can go ahead and talk to me, that's fine.” Id. at 186. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the detective was not required to cease questioning the defendant because his reference to an attorney was not “an outlier or even on the bleeding edge of Miranda’s jurisprudence” and he gave “permission to continue questioning.” Id. at 187. The defendant thus did not “unambiguous[ly]” request counsel, and the detective's questioning did not run afoul of Miranda. Id. at 188.

[26] Here, the facts align with Schuler. Having reviewed the video, a reasonable officer could construe Clark's first reference to an attorney—his question, “[C]an I have a lawyer with me during the questioning,” State's Ex. 2 at 5:10–5:12—as a question about whether an attorney could be present for the ensuing interview, not a demand to suspend the interaction until an attorney was present. In fact, Clark's phrasing was even less clear than the “I want my attorney” statement in Schuler, where ambiguity was found, 112 N.E.3d at 185; see also Powell v. State, 898 N.E.2d 328, 337 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding suspect's question—“Could I see about getting a lawyer or something man?”—was “ambiguous and not sufficiently clear as to constitute a request for an attorney”), trans. denied.

[27] Detective Helm was thus permitted to seek clarification regarding whether Clark wished to speak with an attorney before any questioning took place or was merely inquiring about his rights. See Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 186 (citing Bailey, 763 N.E.2d at 1003). Clark clarified that he and Detective Helm could “have this conversation right now,” State's Ex. 2 at 5:50–5:52, and he signed the waiver of rights form, which stated that he “d[id] not want a lawyer at this time,” id. at 4:55–4:57. This permitted Detective Helm to proceed with questioning. See Schuler, 112 N.E.3d at 187.

[28] Clark's second reference to an attorney occurred after he signed the waiver of rights form. Clark asked, “Can we, like, let a public defender know so, like, whenever they are free, they can come in?” State's Ex. 15 at 0:48–0:51. This was clearly not an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel at that moment before questioning took place, so the detectives were not required to terminate the interaction.

[29] Clark relies on Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, which is distinguishable. In Carr, the defendant four times clearly indicated that he wished to speak with a lawyer, stating throughout the interview (1) “I'm in a situation where I feel like ․ I really need an attorney to ․ talk with,” id. at 1105; (2) “I need to have an attorney to deal with because this is a serious thing,” id. at 1106; (3) “I just feel like, in this situation as serious as it is, that I need to consult an attorney before I say anything more,” id.; and (4) “Do you have any idea how long it will be before I can see an attorney?,” id. Each time, the questioning detective responded by “acknowledg[ing] the request but then ․ keep[ing] the conversation going.” Id. at 1105. For example, after the defendant first requested an attorney, the detective stated, “[Y]ou're absolutely entitled to that sir․ I'm not going to violate your rights (inaudible) that way,” but then “continued by inviting the defendant to talk more, adding, ‘The only reason I was in here, we know what happened․ I just wanted to know why. It might not be as bad as it appears, but only you know those circumstances.’ ” Id.

[30] Though the defendant eventually agreed to the questioning, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that this “would not have occurred had the detective scrupulously honored the defendant's unequivocal and unambiguous invocations of the right to counsel” instead of “prolong[ing] the conversation and thus instigat[ing] the subsequent dialogue.” Carr, 934 N.E.2d at 1107. The defendant's statements were therefore inadmissible. Id.

[31] Clark argues that, as in Carr, the detectives here merely “explain[ed] the process” instead of honoring Clark's request for an attorney. Appellant's Am. Br. at 17. Clark's references to an attorney, however, were not unambiguous and unequivocal invocations of his right thereto. The detectives were permitted to seek clarification regarding whether Clark wished to suspend the interview until he could speak with an attorney; Clark instead indicated he wanted to speak with the detectives “right now,” State's Ex. 2 at 5:50–5:53. The ensuing interview did not run afoul of Clark's constitutional rights.

b. Clark's waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

[32] Next, Clark argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda and juvenile rights before speaking with the detectives. Under the Juvenile Waiver Statute, the State “bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile received all of the protections” guaranteed by the statute. D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 334 (citing I.C. § 31-32-5-1; Brown v. State, 751 N.E.2d 664, 670 (Ind. 2001)). This includes proving that the juvenile's waiver was “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” made. Id. at 334–35 (citing Stewart v. State, 754 N.E.2d 492, 494–95 (Ind. 2001); Douglas v. State, 481 N.E.2d 107, 111–12 (Ind. 1985)).

[33] Clark argues that his waiver of rights was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because (1) “Detective Helm misrepresented or misunderstood the law and intentionally downplayed the importance of the acknowledgment and waiver ․ by portraying it as a formality,” and (2) when Clark asked about the potential charges he faced, “the detectives decline[d] to tell him and instead beg[a]n their questioning.”⁵ Appellant's Am. Br. at 19.

[34] As an initial matter, we agree with the State that these arguments are waived because Clark did not make them before the trial court and instead raises them for the first time on appeal. See Alexander v. State, 275 N.E.3d 521, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (citing Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied) (noting the “well[-]established” principle that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal), trans. not sought. During the suppression hearing, Clark argued that his statements from the interview should be excluded for failure to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute because Clark did not have the opportunity for a “meaningful consultation” with his grandmother. Tr. Vol. II at 52; see I.C. § 31-32-5-1(2)(C). Clark objected at trial based on the same grounds. Tr. Vol. IV at 40. The argument Clark now raises under the Juvenile Waiver Statute is different and is therefore waived.

[35] Waiver notwithstanding, we address Clark's arguments on the merits. When determining whether a juvenile's waiver of rights is knowing and voluntary, we examine “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” to determine whether the waiver “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 339 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); citing Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind. 2000); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979)). “Relevant considerations include the juvenile's physical, mental, and emotional maturity; whether the juvenile or his or her parent understood the consequences of the juvenile's statements; whether the juvenile and his or her parent were informed of the delinquent act for which the juvenile was suspected; the length of time the juvenile was held in custody before consulting with his or her parent; whether there was any force, coercion, or inducement; and whether the juvenile and his or her parent had been advised of the juvenile's Miranda rights.” Id. at 339–40 (citing I.C. § 31-32-5-4; Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725–27). Although a written waiver is not “necessary nor sufficient to establish that a person voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights,” a written waiver “is certainly strong proof that a valid waiver occurred.” Id. at 339 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).

[36] Here, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Clark's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Clark was sixteen years old at the time of the interview and had invoked his right not to speak with detectives in a previous custodial interaction. This suggests Clark had the “physical, mental, and emotional maturity” to understand his rights and make an informed decision regarding whether to speak with law enforcement. D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 340. Additionally, Clark was aware that the “delinquent act for which [he] was suspected” concerned a shooting. D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 339–40 (citing I.C. § 31-32-5-4; Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725–27).

[37] Detective Helm explained that obtaining Clark's and his grandmother's signature on the waiver of rights form was required before they could proceed with the interview, and he read the form aloud. Clark appeared to be familiar with the advisements listed on the form, nodding his head, State's Ex. 1 at 1:14–1:21, and joining Detective Helm in reciting a portion of the well-known Miranda rights language, id. at 1:39–1:41. As Detective Helm left the room so that Clark and his grandmother could consult privately, Clark stated, “We ain't got nothing to talk about.” Id. at 2:28–2:30.

[38] When Detective Helm returned, he read a second portion of the form, which stated,

I understand what my rights are․ I am willing to make a statement and answer some questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. Neither promises nor threats have been made to me. No pressure or force of any kind has been used against me.

State's Ex. 2 at 4:48–5:05. Clark and his grandmother then signed the waiver of rights form. This is “strong” evidence that Clark's waiver was valid. D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 339 (citing Butler, 441 U.S. at 373).

[39] Nothing suggests that Detective Helm downplayed the importance of the waiver of rights form, as Clark contends. Detective Helm took care to go over the form in detail and repeatedly reminded Clark of his rights and that he could stop the questioning at any point. We cannot say that the State failed to prove Clark's waiver of rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary or that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Clark's subsequent statements.

c. Any error in the admission of Clark's statements was harmless

[40] Even if the admission of Clark's statements was erroneous, any error would be harmless. Errors of constitutional dimensions “require reversal unless ‘the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.’ ” Taylor v. State, 271 N.E.3d 559, 563 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ind. 2010)). In conducting our harmless error analysis, factors we consider are “the presence or absence of other, corroborating evidence on material points; whether the impermissibly admitted evidence was cumulative; the overall strength of the prosecution's case; the importance of the impermissible evidence in the prosecution's case; and the extent of cross-examination or questioning on the impermissibly admitted evidence.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1197 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736, 745–46 (Ind. 2019)).

[41] Here, Clark's statements were of minimal evidentiary value and not incriminating; he claimed he was at home during the shooting and did not admit to any involvement in the robbery. This is not a case where the defendant's statements formed a critical component of the State's evidence, such as in Carr, where the defendant's improperly obtained statements “contained considerable details regarding his state of mind during the killing—details not provided by other evidence.” 934 N.E.2d at 1107–09. In fact, the State barely touched on Clark's statements during the trial.

[42] Meanwhile, the remaining evidence against Clark was substantial. Though Clark argued he was not involved in the robbery, Brifil's and Baughn's testimony placed him at the scene and detailed his role in planning the affair. The phone records between the three corroborate Brifil's and Baughn's account of the events leading up thereto. The evidence also clearly placed the responsibility for the shooting on Clark. Brifil provided an eye-witness account of Clark “shooting into” Collins's vehicle, Tr. Vol. III at 39, and Baughn testified that Clark told him after the shooting that he fired “[a]bout ten” shots, id. at 5. Law enforcement recovered seven shell casings from the scene and determined they were fired from a single firearm. Kiper's firearm was excluded as a source,⁶ and Brifil's magazine was found “almost completely full,” Tr. Vol. III at 108; law enforcement did not believe Brifil's firearm was fired that night. The day after the shooting, law enforcement observed Clark discreetly disposing of wet, potentially washed clothing and loose ammunition in the backyard trashcan of a friend's residence.

[43] Given the weight of the evidence against Clark, his statements from the interview did not meaningfully “contribute to the verdict” against him. Taylor, 271 N.E.3d at 563 (quoting Koenig, 933 N.E.2d at 1273). Clark's rights were not violated by the admission of these statements, and any error in the admission thereof would be harmless. The trial court thus did not err by admitting Clark's statements.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Admitting the Jail Call

[44] Clark next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the jail call, during which Clark stated he would consider “cop[ping] out” to the robbery charge, State's Ex. 16 at 0:19–0:27, or agreeing to a lesser sentence for “a gun charge,” id. at 1:17–1:22. Clark argues this evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.⁷

[45] Under Indiana Evidence Rule 401, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” A trial court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice,” among other things. Ind. Evidence Rule 403. “Unfair prejudice ․ looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1193 (quoting D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 224 (Ind. 2009)).

[46] Our research reveals no Indiana appellate precedent that directly addresses the relevance, probity, and prejudice of evidence regarding a defendant's willingness to plead guilty to certain charges before any such plea agreement is offered. We need not confront that issue in this opinion because any error in admitting Clark's jail call is harmless.

[47] This evidentiary issue is not of constitutional dimensions, so we determine whether the alleged error resulted in “prejudice” to Clark's “substantial rights.” Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1197 (quoting Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)). “The harmless-error analysis is a practical one, embodying ‘the principle that courts should exercise judgment in preference to the automatic reversal for error and ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial.’ ” Id. (quoting Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652). As explained in Part 1.c. supra, ample evidence supports Clark's convictions. Any error in admitting the jail call did not prejudice Clark's substantial rights. We therefore cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this evidence.

Conclusion

[48] The trial court did not err by admitting Clark's statements to law enforcement, and any error therein would be harmless. Similarly, any error in the admission of Clark's jail call was likewise harmless, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it. We affirm the trial court's rulings on all issues raised and affirm Clark's convictions.

[49] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The shell casings found in the parking lot and the ammunition found in the trashcan and Clark's bedroom were each a mixture of the same three “common” bullet brands, which one of the detectives described as “worthwhile as far as evidence.” Tr. Vol. IV at 169.

2.   On appeal, Clark contends that in the interview, he “state[d] that he will not consent to a DNA sample.” Appellant's Am. Br. at 20. Clark cites “14:33:31,” a citation apparently to State's Exhibit 15, which is the redacted video of Clark's interview admitted at trial. See id. However, there is no such discussion of DNA testing at this timestamp in State's Exhibit 15.Clark's refusal to consent to DNA testing instead appears at State's Exhibit 2 14:05–14:22, which was admitted during the suppression hearing but not at trial. From comparing State's Exhibit 2 with State's Exhibit 15, Clark's refusal appears to have been redacted in Exhibit 15, as it is muted. See State's Ex. 15 at 7:11–7:35. All that is not muted on this matter is Detective Helm's question, “So we either get ․ a volunteer swab or get a search warrant,” and Clark's answer, “Search warrant”; that the swab was of Clark's DNA is not mentioned. Id. at 7:35–7:41.

3.   In Cause 82C01-2504-MR-002299, the State charged Brifil with two counts of murder and one count each of robbery resulting in serious bodily injury as Level 2 felony and dangerous possession of a firearm as a Class A misdemeanor. Brifil pled guilty to assisting a robbery resulting in serious bodily injury and dangerous possession of a firearm, and the two murder charges were dismissed.

4.   Clark argues that the trial court “applied the wrong standard” when it determined that Clark's references to an attorney were not unambiguous and unequivocal invocations of his right to thereto because the references occurred “after [Clark] signed the waiver but before questioning began.” Appellant's Am. Br. at 12. Clark, however, claims this “timing makes the proper analytical framework unclear” and does not identify the standard he believes the trial court should have employed. Id. Clark's argument is not cogent and is therefore waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring arguments be supported with “cogent reasoning”); Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)) (“We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ”).

5.   Clark also argues his waiver was invalid because he invoked his right to an attorney, but the detectives “redirected him and continued on.” Appellant's Am. Br. at 19. We have already concluded in Part 1.a. supra that Clark did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to an attorney.

6.   Clark does not suggest that Kiper could have shot Collins. Moreover, the bullet that caused Collins's head wound was fired “downward and from the left side to the right side,” Tr. Vol. II at 90, which was the opposite side of where Kiper was seated in the passenger seat.

7.   The parties agree that because no formal plea agreement on these terms was offered to Clark, Indiana Evidence Rule 410(a)—which generally bars admission of guilty plea agreements and statements made in connection therewith—is not applicable.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.