Andrew D.M. Rodgers, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Andrew D.M. Rodgers was convicted of Level 6 felony stalking and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery under cause number 20D01-2308-F6-1006 (F6-1006) and Level 5 felony strangulation and Level 6 felony residential entry under cause number 20D01-2503-F5-71 (F5-71). Rodgers presents the following restated issues for appeal:

1. Was Rodgers denied a fair trial when police reports were not disclosed to him until the second day of trial, after opening statements but before the presentation of evidence?

2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to establish the convictions for stalking, domestic battery, and residential entry?

3. Is an aggregate sentence of eight and one-half years inappropriate in light of the nature of Rodgers's offenses and his character?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In February 2023, nineteen-year-old L.P. met thirty-year-old Rodgers through work. She was a manager at a KFC restaurant in Elkhart, and he drove for Uber Eats. Rodgers was also a professional boxer. Within a few months they began an on-and-off relationship, and in early July 2023, L.P. learned that she was pregnant with his child. This led to tension between L.P. and Rodgers.

[4] On August 3, 2023, L.P. and Rodgers were not on good terms. Rodgers made several angry phone calls to L.P. before she left for work that evening. He told her that she had “messed up,” was “playing with the wrong dude,” and “don't know what I'm capable of.” Transcript Vol. 5 at 44-45. These communications scared L.P.

[5] Rodgers believed L.P. was romantically involved with a coworker, Mandrell Mcluen, who was working with L.P. that night. The restaurant closed at 11:00 p.m., and shortly thereafter, Rodgers entered through the back door. The first person he encountered inside was Mcluen. Rodgers began to “rough him up” and go through Mcluen's pockets. Id. at 49. L.P. tried to get between the men to break up the altercation, but Rodgers angrily pushed her out of the way. Rodgers left through the back door when Mcluen called the police. L.P. was crying and scared, and she informed the responding officer that she wanted a trespass warning issued on Rodgers for the KFC.

[6] On her drive home from work around 1:30 a.m., L.P. learned from her mother and sister, who lived at the same apartment complex, that Rodgers was outside her apartment looking for her. He had been “prowling around the halls” and “knocking on their doors and asking them where [L.P.] was, when she was going to be home, and why she wasn't here yet.” Transcript Vol. 4 at 71.

[7] Elkhart County Sheriff's Officer Chance Wilson, along with Officer Alex Ryall, met L.P. near the business office of the Overlook Apartments, and she informed them of the events that had occurred at the KFC. She identified Rodgers and pointed to where he was standing outside her apartment building. Officer Wilson contacted Elkhart City Police regarding the KFC incident and to initiate a battery report. Officer Wilson also spoke with L.P. about the process of obtaining an order of protection.

[8] Meanwhile, Elkhart County Sheriff's Sergeant Adam Leeper arrived on the scene and encountered Rodgers, who was standing alone outside and in front of L.P.’s apartment. Rodgers was defensive and “very animated” when Sergeant Leeper approached. Id. at 99. Rodgers also refused to identify himself.

[9] Officer Wilson eventually instructed L.P. to drive over to her apartment, where he and the other officers would help her get inside. Officers Wilson and Ryall walled off Rodgers from L.P. as she unloaded her car and went in. Rodgers tried to talk to L.P., but the officers stopped him. During this time, Officer Wilson also observed that the conversation between Sergeant Leeper and Rodgers was not going well. Rodgers was providing evasive answers, continuing to elevate his voice, and circling around. Based on his training and experience, Officer Wilson believed Rodgers was exhibiting “fight or flight” behavior, so Rodgers was placed in handcuffs. Id. at 81.

[10] Thereafter, Officer Wilson spoke further with L.P. inside her apartment. She described the earlier threatening phone calls from Rodgers and expressed fear about what he might do based on his showing up at her work and home. Officer Wilson then arrested Rodgers for stalking.

[11] On August 7, 2023, under F6-1006, the State charged Rodgers with Level 6 felony stalking and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery of L.P.¹ As a condition of pretrial release, Rodgers was ordered to have no contact with L.P.

[12] Despite the no contact order, Rodgers and L.P. began seeing each other within a few months of his arrest. He started pressuring L.P. to have the charges against him dropped, and after their son was born in April 2024, the no contact order was vacated by the trial court upon L.P.’s request. She wanted to give their relationship another chance for their son, but Rodgers remained jealous of other men, and he attempted to isolate L.P. from her family, particularly her sister. By November 2024, L.P. was pregnant with their second child.

[13] Although Rodgers lived with L.P. off and on, he did not have a key to her apartment and was not on the lease. On March 17, 2025, they had an argument while running errands, resulting in L.P. requesting to be dropped off at a friend's home with their son. The argument continued outside the friend's home, until L.P.’s friend told Rodgers to leave, or she would call the police. Rodgers left, but continued to call L.P. He wanted to gather his belongings from L.P.’s apartment. She told him he would have to wait.

[14] Instead of waiting, Rodgers climbed onto L.P.’s third-floor balcony and entered through her sliding glass door, which was kept open for her dog. L.P.’s neighbor, Rachelle Johnson, who lived directly below L.P., observed Rodgers climbing from her balcony to L.P.’s. Rodgers told Johnson that he locked himself out, but Johnson knew such was impossible because the apartment doors required a key to be locked from the outside.

[15] When L.P. arrived home, she found Rodgers and demanded to know how he had gotten into her apartment. He refused to answer, and an argument ensued. Rodgers then instigated a physical altercation to retrieve his phone from L.P., and the two eventually fell to the floor. While L.P. was on her hands and knees, Rodgers, from above, placed three fingers on one side of her neck and pressed hard enough that L.P. could not breathe. While doing this, he kept saying, “I'll snap your neck right here.” Id. at 200. L.P. struggled with Rodgers, but he was much stronger. After L.P. continued to plead with him, Rodgers eventually let go and let her breathe. He then picked up his things and left.

[16] L.P. waited a few days, until March 21, to report the incident to police. She had two small abrasions on her neck, and some of her acrylic nails were missing from the struggle. That same day, L.P. was examined by a forensic nurse, during which L.P. described the choking incident and the history of her relationship with Rodgers. In providing care, the nurse also utilized the Domestic Violence Safety Assessment Tool, which indicated that L.P. was at a serious threat level.

[17] On March 28, 2025, under F5-71, the State charged Rodgers with Level 5 felony strangulation and Level 6 felony residential entry. It later added a charge of Level 5 felony domestic battery. As a result of the events of March 21, Rodgers's bond was revoked under F6-1006, and the no contact order was reinstated.

[18] Against the repeated warnings of the trial court, Rodgers opted to proceed pro se in both criminal cases, which were joined for trial. The State provided Rodgers with discovery, including detailed summaries of the anticipated testimony of the witnesses (the Discovery Summaries) and the opportunity to view police body cam footage, but it refused to provide him with the actual police reports before trial. The State took the position that the Indiana Access to Public Records Act (APRA) gives prosecutors discretion to deny discovery of police reports in criminal cases.

[19] The two-day jury trial commenced on July 15, 2025, with jury selection, instructions, and opening statements. At the start of the second day, and before any witnesses had been called, the State noted that Sanchez v. State, 264 N.E.3d 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), issued the prior day, rejected the Elkhart County Prosecuting Attorney's Office's practice of withholding from discovery police reports based on APRA. See id. at 1230-31 (holding that APRA does not apply and that police reports are generally discoverable in a criminal proceeding unless the State establishes that a privilege applies). In light of Sanchez, the State provided Rodgers with the police reports before court commenced that morning. For purposes of the record, the State submitted Exhibits 100 and 101, which were, respectively, the Discovery Summaries and the police reports that had been provided. Rodgers objected, arguing that his substantial rights had been prejudiced because he should have been provided with the police reports “months ago” when he asked for them. Transcript Vol. 4 at 60. Rodgers did not identify any specific prejudice or request a continuance.

[20] After the presentation of the evidence on the second day of trial, the jury found Rodgers guilty as charged. The trial court did not enter a judgment of conviction on the domestic battery verdict in F5-71 due to double jeopardy concerns. The court, however, entered convictions on the other charges – the stalking and domestic battery in F6-1006 and the strangulation and residential entry in F5-71.

[21] At the sentencing hearing on August 15, 2025, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of two and one-half years for stalking and one year for domestic battery in F6-1006. And it imposed concurrent sentences of six years for strangulation and two years for residential entry in F5-71. The court ordered the sentences under each cause to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of eight and one-half years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC).

[22] Rodgers now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

1. Discolsure of Police Reports

[23] Rodgers initially argues that he did not receive a fair trial because he did not receive the police reports until after the jury was already seated and opening statements were made. He asserts that the police reports contained exculpatory evidence and thus the State had a duty to disclose them under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused ․ violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”). See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (citing Brady and stating that the prosecution has an “affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant”).

[24] As the State properly observes, this is a case of late disclosure of evidence, not suppression. It is well established that to prevail on a Brady claim, “a defendant must establish: (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.” Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 755 (Ind. 1998). Here, even assuming the police reports were favorable to the defense and material, which the State disputes, Brady is inapplicable because the police reports were provided to Rodgers during trial and before the State presented its evidence. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind. 1999) (“If the favorable evidence becomes known to the defendant before or during the course of a trial, Brady is not implicated.”).

[25] Absent a Brady violation, the late disclosure was at most a discovery violation.

Trial courts have broad latitude with respect to matters of this sort and their rulings receive great deference on appeal. The primary factors that a trial court should consider when addressing a discovery violation are whether the breach was intentional or in bad faith and whether substantial prejudice has resulted. We will affirm a trial court's rulings absent clear error and resulting prejudice.

Cain v. State, 955 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Ind. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted). The “preferred remedy” for a discovery violation is a continuance, and “[i]f a continuance would have cured the harm that arose by the discovery violation, failure to request one results in waiver.” Id.; Alcantar v. State, 70 N.E.3d 353, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[26] Because Rodgers did not request a continuance, we find that he has waived appellate review of this issue. See Alcantar, 70 N.E.3d at 356. Waiver notwithstanding, we observe that the State immediately disclosed the police reports upon learning of this court's decision in Sanchez, which negated the APRA basis for withholding police reports. The police reports were not lengthy, and they were generally consistent with the Discovery Summaries provided to Rodgers earlier in the case. This was not, as Rodgers suggests, “trial by ambush,” and a continuance would have cured any potential harm in the delayed disclosure of the police reports. Appellant's Brief at 23.

2. Sufficiency

[27] Rodgers next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions for stalking, domestic battery, and residential entry.² When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, instead leaving those matters to the province of the jury. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024); see also Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022) (“When there are conflicts in the evidence, the jury must resolve them.”). With this deferential review in mind, we will consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction. Sorgdrager v. State, 208 N.E.3d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. And we will affirm “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022) (Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016)). In sum, the evidence does not need to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from the evidence to support the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).

2.1 Stalking

[28] To establish that Rodgers committed stalking, as a Level 6 felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) engaged in a course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of L.P. (3) that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and (4) that actually caused L.P. to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened. See Ind. Code §§ 35-45-10-1 and -5(a); see also Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[29] For purposes of stalking, harassment means “conduct directed toward a victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” I.C. § 35-45-10-2. And impermissible contact includes, among other things, following or pursuing the victim or communicating with the victim. I.C. § 35-45-10-3.

[30] Here, the evidence shows that Rodgers made several angry and threatening phone calls to L.P. before going to her place of employment, after business hours, and entering through the back door to confront L.P. and/or Mcluen out of jealousy. After the altercation at the KFC, during which Mcluen called the police, Rodgers went to L.P.’s apartment complex and waited for her, lurking in the halls and outside until after 1:30 a.m. Then he even tried to communicate with her while police officers were blocking him so that she could safely enter her apartment. Rodgers's repeated impermissible contact frightened L.P., and reasonably so. The State presented sufficient evidence to establish stalking, and we reject Rodgers's suggestion that L.P. had to make a “clean break” and directly ask him to stay away from her before his contacts could be considered impermissible. Appellant's Brief at 24.

2.2 Domestic Battery

[31] With respect to the domestic battery conviction, Rodgers's sole argument is that L.P.’s testimony did not establish that he was the one who pushed her when she intervened during the altercation with Mcluen. That is, Rodgers contends that L.P.’s testimony was ambiguous because there were two men present and she simply stated that “he” pushed her. Transcript Vol. 5 at 49.

[32] We reject this invitation to reweigh the evidence. When considered in context, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that L.P. was talking about Rodgers when she said “he” pushed her. Further, Officer Wilson testified that L.P. reported to him that Rodgers “basically assaulted her by shoving her into the equipment at work.” Transcript Vol. 4 at 73.

2.3 Residential Entry

[33] For the residential entry conviction, the State had to prove that Rodgers knowingly or intentionally broke and entered the dwelling of another person. See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5.

[34] Rodgers does not dispute that he climbed the balcony to gain access to the apartment because he did not have a key to the front door. He claims, however, that because he was living with L.P. off and on up until this time and entered the apartment to retrieve his belongings, “the element of ‘dwelling of another person’ was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant's Brief at 26.

[35] Again, we will not reweigh the evidence. L.P. clearly testified that the apartment was in her name alone and that Rodgers did not have a key. When Rodgers repeatedly expressed a desire to remove his belongings that day, after an argument, L.P. informed him that he would have to wait until she came back to her apartment. Instead of waiting as L.P. had requested, Rodgers climbed the outside of the building and onto L.P.’s third-floor balcony to enter the apartment through the sliding glass door. Along the way, he lied to the shocked neighbor in the apartment below, saying that he had locked himself out. The evidence amply supports the finding that Rodgers entered the dwelling of another person, which is the only element challenged on appeal.

3. Inappropriate Sentence

[36] Rodgers's final argument is that his aggregate sentence of eight and one-half years in the DOC is inappropriate and should be revised. Under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence if “after due consideration of the trial court's decision” we find that “the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Id.; see also Hoak v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1209, 1209 (Ind. 2019) (“Even when a trial court imposes a sentence within its discretion, the Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of this sentencing decision.”).

[37] Our principal task in this regard is “ ‘to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ not to achieve a ‘correct’ result in every case.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1248 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). “And we generally defer to the sentence imposed unless a defendant presents ‘compelling evidence’ portraying the nature of the offense and their character in a positive light.” Id. (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). Thus, Rodgers bears the responsibility of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. See Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018).

[38] Rodgers was convicted of Level 5 felony strangulation, for which he received the maximum sentence of six years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Concurrent to that sentence, under F5-71, the court imposed an enhanced sentence of two years for residential entry, a Level 6 felony. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) (providing for a sentencing range of range of six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year, for a Level 6 felony). Then under F6-1006, the trial court imposed maximum sentences of two and one-half years for Level 6 felony stalking and one year for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, but the court ran those sentences currently. See id.; I.C. § 35-50-3-2. Finally, as required by law, the trial court ordered the aggregate sentences imposed in the two causes to run consecutively, as Rodgers committed the F5-71 crimes while released on bond in F6-1006. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(e). In sum, Rodgers faced up to twelve years but was only sentenced to eight and one-half years in the DOC for his two separate crime sprees against L.P., who on each occasion was pregnant with his child.

[39] The nature of Rodgers's offenses against L.P. shows a concerning escalation of domestic violence. In August 2023, early in their relationship and during a period when they were not on good terms, though L.P. was pregnant, Rodgers came to L.P.’s place of employment in a jealous rage and angrily pushed her out of the way when she tried to stop him from assaulting Mcluen. This battery was bracketed by a course of harassing conduct that included angry and threatening phone calls to L.P., sneaking into her place of work after hours, and then lurking around her apartment complex so that he could continue to harass her when she arrived home from work, even while she was escorted by police. The charges and no contact order issued in F6-1006 did not stop Rodgers from pursuing and manipulating L.P. They were back together, off and on, after his arrest, and the domestic violence continued.

[40] Then in March 2025, when L.P. was pregnant with their second child, and after a heated argument, Rodgers scaled the outside of the apartment complex to gain unauthorized access to L.P.’s apartment. When L.P. came home to find him inside, she demanded to know how he gained access, but Rodgers ignored her, going about his business of collecting his belongings. He then began a physical confrontation with L.P. when she refused to hand over his phone.³ This ended in Rodgers, a professional boxer, strangling L.P. as she was on her hands and knees pleading with him that she could not breathe. All the while, Rodgers repeatedly threatened to snap her neck.

[41] Like the nature of the offenses, Rodgers's character does not suggest that he deserves a reduced sentence. To overcome the deference due the trial court's sentencing decision, a defendant may present evidence of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character.” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[42] The State argues in part:

[B]oth the evidence presented at trial and Defendant's behavior during the course of the legal proceedings show [ ] that [he] is a controlling bully who traffics in violence and threats and does not accept responsibility for his own conduct and poor choices. [His] character flaws do not cease to be flaws merely because he proclaims them to be virtues or because L.P. was unable to break free from the cycle of domestic violence for several years. A loving father does not assault his children's mother, and jealousy does not excuse or mitigate Defendant's violent attempts to control L.P.’s life.

Appellee's Brief at 30. These observations are apt, especially given Rodgers's arguments on appeal that he is a loving father and that L.P. repeatedly sought to have the no contact order lifted.

[43] We find particularly telling of Rodgers's character that he has an extensive criminal and delinquent history. He has juvenile delinquency adjudications for intimidation, battery (multiple times), resisting law enforcement, and dangerous possession of a firearm. He has adult convictions for pointing a firearm, possession of marijuana (multiple times), resisting law enforcement (multiple times), criminal mischief, and maintaining a common nuisance. He also violated probation on numerous occasions (with probation being revoked as recently as 2021),⁴ and he repeatedly violated the no contact order in this case. It is clear that Rodgers does not believe the rules apply to him. And unsurprisingly, he refused to cooperate with the preparation of the presentence investigation report, in which he was rated through the Indiana Risk Assessment System to be in the “HIGH risk category to reoffend.” Supplemental Appendix at 16.

[44] Rodgers has not met his burden of persuading us that his aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Accordingly, we decline the invitation to revise it.

[45] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Rodgers with Class B misdemeanor battery of Mcluen, but that count was later dropped.

2.   He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his strangulation conviction.

3.   Rodgers's suggestion that L.P. instigated the argument ignores the fact that he broke into her apartment and refused to tell her how he got in. Regardless, his physical attack on L.P. was not proportional to any of her actions.

4.   Rodgers's claim that “he had been out of trouble since 2017” is not supported by the record given the multiple probation violations that followed his 2017 felony offense, resulting in his unsatisfactory discharge from probation in November 2021. Appellant's Brief at 28. Further, at the time of sentencing in this case, Rodgers had a criminal charge pending in another county for an offense that occurred in February 2023, for which he had entered a pretrial diversion agreement in 2024 but was redocketed in February 2025.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.