Carlisha Davis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Carlisha Davis was convicted of neglect of a dependent after her four-month-old son's right arm was broken from non-accidental trauma. The trial court sentenced Davis to four years with three years suspended to probation and assessed probation fees. Davis appeals and raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support her conviction; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by assessing probation fees.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On May 13, 2024, Davis brought her four-month-old son B.A. (“Child”) to a childcare center where Davis worked. Child was “smiling and playing” during the day. Tr. Vol. II at 15. When Davis's shift ended at approximately 3:50 p.m., the childcare center director Sierra Resnover picked up Child out of a crib and handed him to Davis so they could go home. Child was moving normally, and there did not appear to be anything wrong with him. A video from the childcare center showed Child flexing his right arm without signs of pain or discomfort as Davis was leaving the daycare.

[4] At approximately 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., Resnover texted Davis to inform her that she did not need to come in for the night shift, and Davis said she would stay home. Approximately one hour later, Davis texted Resnover asking her to “check the camera” at the childcare center because she thought Child's arm was broken. Ex. Vol. 1 at 7. Davis stated that Child had been asleep since she took him home, and she wanted to “make sure it didn't happen[ ]” at the childcare center. Id. Davis also “wonder[ed] if [Child's arm] got caught in the bed” at her home. Id. at 10.

[5] After Child was taken to the hospital, child abuse pediatrician Dr. Leah Garvin determined Child had an “acute right humerus fracture,” Tr. Vol. II at 52, with the two ends “displaced,” id. at 53. Child also had bruising on both shoulders. Dr. Garvin believed the injury was the result of “a considerable amount of force,” such as a “direct impact with some rotation,” a “pulling or a jerking” of the arm, Tr. Vol. II at 54, or a “significant high fall,” id. at 58. Dr. Garvin further opined the injury was “non-accidental,” id. at 54, and could not have been caused by Child himself.

[6] Additionally, after reviewing video from the childcare center, Dr. Garvin determined that Child had not been injured there because he was moving his arm normally when he left. If Child were injured at the time, he would not be able to move his arm, it would appear “deformed,” and it would likely “dangle in place by his s[ide].” Tr. Vol. II at 53. Child would also be in considerable pain, exhibit “forceful crying,” and would “likely not be able to eat well or sleep well.” Id.

[7] The State charged Davis with neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury as a Level 5 felony.¹ After a bench trial, the trial court found Davis guilty as charged and commented on Child's injuries.

[I]t is hard to figure out what happened but what is clear to the Court is that someone injured this baby and someone fractured this baby's arm and [Davis] knew that his arm was broken before EMS even got there․ This was no accident. This is somebody shaking, twisting[.] [T]he child was able to move his arms at the daycare․ So, the Court does believe that this injury and this break of the child's arm occurred at [Davis's] residence, ․ and the Court finds that she failed to prevent the injury.

Tr. Vol. II at 81.

[8] Davis was sentenced to four years with three years suspended to probation. The trial court determined Davis was “indigent to fines and costs” and assessed a $50.00 probation administration fee along with $20.00 monthly for probation user fees. Tr. Vol. II at 95. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Davis's Conviction

[9] Davis argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support her conviction for neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury as a Level 5 felony. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[10] In order to convict Davis of neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury as a Level 5 felony under Indiana Code sections 35-46-1-4(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (effective April 29, 2021, to June 30, 2026), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that while Davis had Child in her care, she knowingly or intentionally placed him in a situation that endangered his life or health and that resulted in bodily injury. The only element Davis challenges is the one requiring that she knowingly placed Child in danger. A “knowing” mens rea under the neglect of a dependent statute means “the accused must have been subjectively aware of a high probability that [s]he placed the dependent in a dangerous situation.” Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985); see also Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b).

[11] Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Child was not injured while he was at the childcare center. Child was moving his arm normally and did not show the signs of pain and immobility that would have accompanied such an injury. After daycare, Child was in Davis's exclusive care until he was taken to the hospital. The fact that a child sustains an injury while in the exclusive care of another person is evidence that the person neglected the child. See Lindhorst v. State, 90 N.E.3d 695, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). When Davis first texted Resnover that night, she claimed Child had been asleep since he got home. Davis only mentioned that she thought Child's arm was broken one hour later when she “wonder[ed]” if Child's arm “got caught in the bed” at her house. Ex. Vol. I at 10. Child's injuries were found to be non-accidental and not ones he could cause by himself. The trial court could reasonably infer that Child was injured based on a situation in which Davis knowingly placed him because he was in Davis's exclusive care at the time of his injuries.²

2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Assessing Probation Fees

[12] Davis also challenges the trial court's assessment of probation fees. We review a trial court's sentencing decisions, including “the imposition of costs and fees” under the abuse of discretion standard. Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision “is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. (quoting Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1083 (Ind. 2022)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “But a ‘statute's meaning and scope are legal questions we review de novo.’ ” Id. (quoting Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1094 (Ind. 2018)).

[13] Davis argues that the trial court abused its discretion by “assessing” probation fees, Appellant's Br. at 13, because it either (1) failed to make an “adequate inquiry into her ability to pay,” id. at 14; or (2) “ordered her to pay them despite her being indigent as to the fees,” id. Probation fees are governed, in part, by Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1(d), which provides that “[i]n addition to any other conditions of probation, the court shall order each person convicted of a felony to pay” (1) “not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) as an initial probation user's fee”; (2) “a monthly probation user's fee of not less than fifteen dollars ($15) nor more than thirty dollars ($30) for each month that the person remains on probation”; (3) the costs of certain laboratory testing, if required; (4) fees for alcohol abuse deterrence, if applicable; and (5) “an administrative fee of one hundred dollars ($100).”³

[14] Probation fees are thus “statutorily[ ]mandated” for felony convictions, and the trial court must assess them notwithstanding a defendant's indigency. Polk v. State, 88 N.E.3d 226, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). An indigency determination “merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for [her] inability to pay,” Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Henderson v. State, 44 N.E.3d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied; Berry v. State, 950 N.E.2d 798, 803 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)); see Berry, 950 N.E.2d at 803 n.6 (explaining that the assessment (or “imposition”) of fees “is a separate issue from sanctions imposed for nonpayment”). And although the trial court must hold an indigency hearing at some point when probation fees are assessed, Negash v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1281, 1293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)), there is no strict requirement “as to when the indigency hearing must be held,” id. at 1294 (citing Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 795).  ⁴

[15] Davis appears to rely on Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, for her position that the indigency determination precluded the assessment of probation fees, but Spells is distinguishable. At issue in Spells was whether certain fees imposed constituted “costs.” 225 N.E.3d at 775. Costs “usually” cannot be assessed if the defendant is indigent. Id. (citing I.C. § 33-37-2-3(a)). The court in Spells explained that because “costs” are defined to “include the ‘fees prescribed by IC 33-37-4-1,’ ” such fees constitute costs that indigency precludes. Id. (citing I.C. § 33-37-2-5). Other fees not prescribed by that section are not “costs.” Id. at 776 (discussing the jury fee prescribed by Indiana Code section 33-37-5-19).

[16] Probation fees are not prescribed by Indiana Code section 33-37-4-1, but rather Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1, so they are not “costs” for which indigency precludes assessment. Because Davis was sentenced to probation for a felony conviction, assessment of probation fees was mandatory. I.C. § 35-38-2-1(d).⁵ And because indigency does not preclude assessment of probation fees, we need not delve into the trial court's “inquiry into [Davis's] ability to pay,” Appellant's Br. at 14.

Conclusion

[17] Sufficient evidence supports Davis's conviction, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by assessing probation fees. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (effective April 29, 2021, to June 30, 2026).

2.   Davis argues that the trial court “applied the incorrect legal standard” because it commented that Davis “failed to prevent” Child's injury. Appellant's Br. at 12 (citing Tr. Vol. II at 81). The trial court's “failure to prevent” language was not a statement of the evidentiary standard but rather an evidentiary finding, which the probative evidence and reasonable inferences support.

3.   The administrative fee assessed here was $50.00. This is less than the $100.00 probation administration fee required by Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1(d)(5). The $50.00 amount reflects the administrative fee permitted for misdemeanor offenders under Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1(e)(4). The State, however, does not argue error in this regard.

4.   A trial court may “choose[ ] to wait and see if a defendant can pay probation fees before” it holds a hearing to determine indigency. Negash, 113 N.E.3d at 1294 (quoting Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 795). “At the latest, an indigency hearing for probation fees should be held at the time a defendant completes his sentence.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 795).

5.   We note that in Spells, the trial court found the defendant “indigent as to probation fees,” 225 N.E.3d at 771, but the appropriateness of this finding was not an issue discussed by the court on appeal.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.