Jose Olivares, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Performance Contracting, Charles Williams, and Thomas Graber, Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jose F. Olivares appeals the Hamilton Circuit Court's May 20, 2025, order denying his motions for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). He contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to recognize newly discovered evidence – a 1997 contract between SCS Group and the Lansing Board of Water and Light – that he asserts proves fraudulent concealment of his true employer and warrants setting aside the prior summary judgment in favor of Performance Contracting Inc. (“PCI”) and Thomas V. Graber (“Dr. Graber”). Because the law of the case doctrine established in this court's prior memorandum decision precludes re-litigation of the statute of limitations issue decided therein, we affirm the trial court's denial of Olivares's motions for relief from judgment. In addition, we remand for the trial court to determine the amount of appellate attorney fees to be awarded to PCI and Dr. Graber and for the trial court to determine whether to place restrictions on Olivares's ability to file additional motions or pleadings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The following background facts are drawn from this court's prior memorandum decision affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to PCI and Dr. Graber:

Oliveres is a Michigan resident and, in 1998, worked for a company called Performance Abatement Services (“PAS”) in Lansing, Michigan. Charles Williams was a Worker's Compensation Administrator for PAS at that time. On May 5, 1998, Olivares fell off of a ladder and suffered an injury to his shoulder “arising out of and in the course of [his] employment” with PAS. On June 21, Dr. Graber performed surgery on Olivares's shoulder. Thereafter, Olivares sought and received worker's compensation benefits from the State of Michigan. However, those benefits were terminated when Michigan determined that Olivares had voluntarily refused to return to work.

Dissatisfied with Michigan's limitation of the remedy for his shoulder injury to worker's compensation benefits, Olivares “has spent more than twenty years repeatedly filing actions in different forums ․ seeking additional compensation arising out of his shoulder injury.” He has repeatedly alleged various forms of conspiracy and fraud between PAS, through various employees, and Dr. Graber. He has attempted to rope into his lawsuits legal entities that are purportedly parent or sibling companies to PAS, including, as relevant here, PCI, an Indianapolis-based company that Olivares alleges to be a sibling company of PAS. Indeed, in a 2014 Michigan complaint, Olivares alleged nearly identical claims against Dr. Graber and a different purported employer at the time of his 1998 injury.

On December 10, 2022, Olivares filed the instant action against PCI, Williams, and Dr. Graber. According to Olivares's operative amended complaint, Williams as PCI's agent, and Dr. Graber committed fraud and civil conspiracy when they worked together to hide from Olivares that “his rotator cuff could not be repaired” and to provide Olivares with a “return to work letter.” Those actions compelled Olivares “to return to a job site [at] which no work was offered,” which resulted in the allegedly wrongful termination of his worker's compensation benefits for refusing to work.

PCI and Dr. Graber moved for summary judgment on several grounds, including the relevant statutes of limitations and res judicata. After a hearing at which Olivares did not appear, the trial court granted those motions for summary judgment[.]

Olivares v. Performance Contracting Inc., No. 24A-CT-2018, 255 N.E.3d 467 at ¶¶ 3-6 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2025) (mem.) (internal footnotes & record citations omitted).

[3] On February 20, 2025, our court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to PCI and Dr. Graber. We held Olivares's conspiracy claims were subject to a two-year statute of limitations, his fraud claims were subject to a six-year limitations period at most, and his awareness in April 2014 triggered those periods. Id. at ¶¶ 10-12. We further held that “any person in Olivares's position at that time, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, would have discovered who his actual employer had been within a reasonable timeframe after the 2014 X-ray, and certainly within two years of the filing of his 2014 complaint.” Id. at ¶ 12. We also observed that Olivares had engaged in repeated litigation concerning the 1998 injury, and we remanded for determination of how much Olivares should pay toward appellees’ appellate attorney fees. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.

[4] Both before and after our appellate decision was certified as final, Olivares filed several motions under Trial Rule 60(B) in the trial court seeking relief from the summary judgment. These motions invoked Trial Rule 60(B)(2) (newly discovered evidence), 60(B)(3) (fraud), and 60(B)(6) (void judgment). As newly discovered evidence, Olivares provided a 1997 contract between the SCS Group and the Lansing Board of Water and Light. He argued this contract proved that SCS Group – not PAS – was his true employer in 1998 and that PCI and others had fraudulently concealed this information from him.

[5] On May 20, 2025, the trial court denied Olivares's motions without conducting a hearing. The court's order stated that Olivares “is not entitled to the requested relief” and “has not demonstrated he is entitled to the relief requested.” (Appellees’ App. Vol. II at 96.) The trial court characterized the motions as “repetitive” and constituting “abuse of the legal process,” and it admonished Olivares “to cease filing repetitive and baseless motions.” (Id.)

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Properly Denied Olivares's Motions

[6] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) for abuse of discretion. State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016). Discretion has been abused when “the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. Where, as here, the trial court rules on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion without conducting a hearing, we review its decision de novo. Holland v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 171 N.E.3d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[7] Olivares argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Trial Rule 60(B) motions because (a) the 1997 contract constitutes newly discovered evidence about the identity of his employer in 1998 when he was injured and (b) the 1997 contract constitutes sufficient evidence of fraud to set aside the summary judgment.¹ PCI responds that the law of the case doctrine bars relief because we previously held Olivares's claims were time-barred regardless of the specific identity of his employer's. We agree with PCI.

[8] “The law of the case is a doctrine used to facilitate the finality of issues decided within the same action. The law of the case provides that an appellate court's determination of a legal issue is binding on the trial court and in any subsequent appeal in the same case and on substantially the same facts.” Lake Imaging, LLC v. Franciscan All., Inc., 225 N.E.3d 223, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal citation omitted). “[A]ll issues decided directly or by implication in a prior decision are binding in all further portions of the same case.” Id. The doctrine “expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided and is based upon the sound policy that when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter.” Id. (quoting INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 784 N.E.2d 566, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[9] In the first appeal of Lake Imaging, the Indiana Supreme Court characterized an indemnification claim as “an ordinary contract claim” subject to either a six-year or ten-year statute of limitations. Lake Imaging, LLC v. Franciscan All., Inc., 182 N.E.3d 203, 210 (Ind. 2022). On remand, the defendant nonetheless argued that a two-year statute of limitations applied, and the trial court refused to consider that argument. Lake Imaging, 225 N.E.3d at 227-28. We affirmed because the Supreme Court's characterization of the claim rejected any argument for a two-year limitations period. Id. at 231. We concluded that “[a]ny effort by the trial court to revisit the characterization of [the] claim ․ would have encroached onto an ‘issue decided directly’ by a higher court and would have invaded the law of the case doctrine.” Id. at 230.

[10] The same principle applies here. In our prior decision, we held that Olivares knew of the alleged conspiracy and fraud by April 2014 and that ordinary diligence would have revealed his employer's identity within two years thereafter. Olivares, No. 24A-CT-2018, slip op. at ¶ 12. That holding rested on the timing of when Olivares should have discovered his employer's identity through reasonable efforts, not on which specific entity that employer turned out to be. Id. The identity of Olivares's employer – whether PAS, PCI, or SCS Group – was therefore immaterial to our analysis. Even assuming arguendo that the 1997 contract proves SCS Group was his employer and that this fact was fraudulently concealed at the time of Olivares's injury in 1998, the outcome remains the same: Olivares should have discovered his employer's identity by 2016. He did not file this complaint until December 2022, which was well beyond any applicable limitations period. Because the alleged newly-discovered contract bears only on the identity of Olivares's employer and not on the timing of reasonable discovery, this appeal presents substantially the same facts on the only issue our prior decision resolved, and law of the case governs. See Pinnacle Media, L.L.C. v. Metro. Dev. Comm'n of Marion Cnty., 868 N.E.2d 894, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (law of the case bars relitigation of an issue decided directly or by implication absent new facts that materially affect the question decided), trans. denied. We accordingly see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Olivares's meritless motions.²

2. Appellate Attorney Fees and Filing Restrictions

[11] PCI and Dr. Graber request appellate attorney fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E). They also request that we impose restrictions on Olivares's access to Indiana courts as discussed in Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259 (Ind. 2014).

[12] First, Appellate Rule 66(E) authorizes an award of damages, including attorney fees, if an appeal “is frivolous or in bad faith.” Whether to impose such damages is within our discretion. App. R. 66(E). In the prior appeal of this Cause, we observed:

Olivares has repeatedly abused the judicial process to harass Dr. Graber and others over the course of decades for an injury he sustained in 1998. Insofar as Olivares had an initial entitlement to some relief from that injury, Michigan resolved that matter – whether Olivares likes it or not – many years ago. Rather than accept a final judgment, however, Olivares has repeatedly sought to relitigate the same issues over and again across different forums with no basis to do so.

Olivares, No. 24A-CT-2018, slip op. at ¶ 15. We therefore remanded for the trial court to determine an appropriate award of appellate attorney fees for PCI and Dr. Graber. Id. at ¶ 16.

[13] Despite that sanction and an admonishment to cease meritless filing by the trial court on remand, Olivares has continued his abusive litigation tactics by filing not only additional meritless motions in the trial court but also another meritless appeal. That Olivares proceeds pro se does not excuse this conduct. See Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 266 (noting self-represented litigants are held to the same standard as a licensed attorney). We accordingly remand for the trial court to enter another award of appellate attorney fees to PCI and Dr. Graber.

[14] Moreover, “[t]here is no right to engage in abusive litigation, and the state has a legitimate interest in the preservation of valuable judicial and administrative resources.” Id. at 264. Accordingly, “courts of this state, after due consideration of an abusive litigant's entire history, may fashion and impose reasonable conditions and restrictions ․ on the litigant's ability to commence or continue actions in this state that are tailored to the litigant's particular abusive practices.” Id. at 266. As the prior award of attorney fees did not curtail Olivares's harassment of the Appellees, we further direct the trial court to consider whether additional restrictions appropriate, including a requirement that Olivares obtain court approval before filing any additional documents in Trial Court Cause No. 29C01-2212-CT-9713.

Conclusion

[15] The law of the case, established in our prior decision, forecloses Olivares's claims, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying Olivares's motions for relief from judgment or by denying the motions without a hearing. We affirm and remand for another determination of appellate attorney fees and for consideration of additional restrictions on future filings.

[16] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Olivares's filings advance additional arguments, they are too poorly developed to be understood. We will not act as his advocate, and accordingly, any such arguments are waived. See Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 9845(Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (waiving arguments that were too poorly developed to be understood).

2.   Olivares also argues the trial court violated Indiana Trial Rule 60(D) by denying his motions without holding a hearing. That Rule provides a trial court “shall hear any pertinent evidence” when deciding a motion for relief from judgment. T.R. 60(D). However, a trial court cannot err by failing to hold a hearing if there is no “pertinent evidence” to be heard. Holland v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 171 N.E.3d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Given the binding effect of our prior decision, the trial court did not commit error when it ruled without holding a hearing. See id. (where motions asserted arguments already decided, trial court did not err when it denied the T.R. 60(B) motion without a hearing).

May, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.