Whitney R. Greathouse, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Whitney Greathouse appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to continue the evidentiary hearing and the sanction imposed by the trial court when it revoked her probation. Finding no error, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Greathouse presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Greathouse's motion to continue the evidentiary hearing.

II. Whether the trial court erred when it imposed the remainder of Greathouse's suspended sentence as the sanction for her probation violation.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In June 2023, Greathouse pleaded guilty to escape, a Level 5 felony, in the cause underlying this appeal, and to possession of methamphetamine and theft with a prior conviction, both Level 6 felonies, in two other cases. She was sentenced to four years for escape, with two years executed and two years suspended to probation. For Greathouse's convictions of possession of methamphetamine and theft, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 365 days, to be served consecutively to her sentence for escape.

[4] Greathouse began serving her probationary sentence on July 16, 2024. On November 5, 2025, the State filed a petition to revoke her probation and impose her suspended sentence. The State alleged that Greathouse had failed a drug screen, failed to complete substance abuse evaluation and treatment as ordered, and failed to report to probation. After the State filed its petition but before the evidentiary hearing, Greathouse failed a second drug screen.

[5] Following the evidentiary hearing, the court determined that Greathouse had violated her probation in all three instances, ordered revocation of her probation, and imposed the entirety of her previously suspended sentence. Greathouse now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Denial of Request for Continuance

[6] Greathouse contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying her motion to continue the evidentiary hearing. She claims that “[t]he circumstances dictated that a continuance be granted.” Appellant's Br. p. 12.

[7] Rulings on non-statutory motions for continuance are within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion and resulting prejudice.¹ Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. We begin with the presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Id.

[8] Here, the trial court granted Greathouse's first motion when she called in to the court the day of the hearing requesting a continuance because of car trouble. See Appellant's App. Vol. Two, p. 170 (Order on Evidentiary Hrg.). The court rescheduled the hearing, and Greathouse filed another motion to continue five days prior to that hearing for the reason that “she was compelled to seek treatment in an emergency room in the week of January 1l and, at that time, she was given a medical appointment on January 20, which prevents her from appearing in Court on that date.” Id. at 174 (Motion to Continue). The court denied this motion.

[9] At the beginning of the hearing on January 20, 2026, Greathouse again asked for a continuance, this time based on a lack of communication with her appointed counsel. When the court asked counsel about the communication issue, he indicated that he was appointed a few weeks prior to the hearing date, and that although Greathouse had his contact information, he did not have hers. He was first contacted by Greathouse the week prior to the hearing when she left a message asking to continue the hearing due to several serious medical conditions and appointments. Counsel contacted her and informed her that “if there was a conflict that prevented her from being in court because of a prior medical appointment, I needed to know specifics about that appointment.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 53. Greathouse provided information, which was later revealed to be inaccurate. Counsel further informed the court that the State had objected to the request. The court advised Greathouse that while it did consider the State's objection, it probably would have denied the motion anyway because it did not consider her reason to be a valid excuse for missing a court hearing. Id. at 54.

[10] Counsel notified the court that the State had made an offer that morning and asked for a continuance so Greathouse could consider it. Id. at 54. The court, noting that counsel had not had time to discuss the offer with Greathouse because she had appeared late to the hearing, denied the motion to continue but permitted a short recess so that Greathouse and her counsel could review the State's offer. Id. at 55.

[11] Greathouse asserts that the trial court erred by not granting a continuance so that her counsel could review her medical and probation records, which she argues would either constitute a defense to the allegations or have a mitigating effect. We disagree.

[12] The court granted Greathouse's first motion to continue, which was a last minute request, and the court was informed that Greathouse had supplied incorrect information as the basis for her second motion. Although the court denied the motion at issue, it nevertheless allowed a recess to permit Greathouse to confer with counsel prior to holding the hearing. Greathouse's argument that counsel should have been permitted time to develop a defense is of no moment. As we discuss below, Greathouse admitted to the allegation that she used methamphetamine and that she had no excuse for doing so. Moreover, Greathouse failed to show any resulting prejudice from the denial. Thus, considering these facts and circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying Greathouse's eleventh-hour motion to continue the evidentiary hearing.

II. Sanction

[13] Greathouse next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve the entirety of her previously suspended sentence. “ ‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.’ ” Clemons v. State, 260 N.E.3d 1010, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). Accordingly, we reverse a trial court's revocation of probation and its resulting sanction for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Clemons, 260 N.E.3d at 1015.

[14] Upon finding a probation violation, the trial court may: (1) continue the probation with or without modifying the conditions; (2) extend the probationary period for up to one year; or (3) order all or part of a previously suspended sentence to be executed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). To determine whether the sanction issued by the trial court is appropriate, we consider the severity of the violation. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013). Additional considerations include the defendant's criminal history, her past violations, and her unwillingness or inability to complete ordered programs. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge has considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed when conditions are violated. Id.

[15] Greathouse gave dubious testimony regarding her missed probation appointments and her substance abuse treatment. And the court stated that it did not find her to be a credible witness. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 88. In addition, Greathouse admitted to failing the drug screens, which were after she had completed a substance abuse treatment program while incarcerated and requested a modification of her sentence for doing so. Id. at 74; see Appellant's App. Vol. Two, pp. 150-53. She testified that she had no excuse for the positive drug screens other than that she “just kind of gave up” when her health issues resurfaced. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 73.

[16] Given Greathouse's inability to schedule and attend probation appointments, and her unwillingness or inability to complete ordered programs and remain drug free after attending treatment, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her entire suspended sentence.

Conclusion

[17] We therefore conclude that neither the trial court's denial of Greathouse's motion to continue nor the court's imposition of her entire suspended sentence resulted in error.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-36-7-1 governs motions to continue by a defendant due to the absence of evidence or a witness, or based on the illness of the defendant or a witness. Greathouse's motion was not based on any of these factors.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Altice, J., and Scheele, J., concur.