Aaron J. Woolston, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Aaron J. Woolston appeals from the sentence imposed after his conviction of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated in Cause Number 16D01-2508-F6-637 (Cause 637) and the imposition of a portion of his previously suspended sentence in Cause Number 16D01-2311-F6-1113 (Cause 1113). He contends that his sentence in Cause 637 is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Woolston also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking a portion of his previously suspended sentence and imposing a 450-day sentence as a sanction for his probation violation in Cause 1113. After reviewing the issues presented, we conclude that Woolston's sentence in Cause 637 is not inappropriate. And we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to impose a portion of Woolston's previously suspended sentence as a sanction for his probation violation in Cause 1113. Therefore, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts from Cause 1113 and Cause 637 come from the probable cause affidavits in both cases. Those facts are available for our consideration because the plea agreement in Cause 1113 did not limit the facts available for consideration, and Woolston did not enter into a plea agreement in Cause 637. See Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1146 (Ind. 2013) (“Unless the evidence is forbidden by the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court judge may consider all evidence properly before him.”); Forshee v. State, 56 N.E.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (no abuse of discretion to consider facts not forbidden by plea agreement that support elements of dismissed charge).

[3] On November 11, 2023, the Greensburg Police Department received a report of a potentially intoxicated driver. The caller observed a male, later identified as Woolston, stumble and fall as he left a liquor store. Woolston entered a white Ford pickup truck and drove away. The caller followed Woolston and relayed the location to police dispatch. The caller also saw Woolston “almost hit poles on the side of the road.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 17 (probable cause affidavit).

[4] Sergeant Eric Lusk responded to the dispatch at around 5:30 p.m. During the traffic stop Sergeant Lusk smelled the strong odor of alcohol emanating from inside the vehicle. When Woolston exited the vehicle, the officer observed that Woolston had an extremely unsteady balance and had urinated on himself. Limited field tests were conducted because of Woolston's unsteady balance, and the tests that were conducted confirmed that Woolston was impaired. Woolston's portable breath test results showed that he had a blood alcohol count of 0.350. Woolston was arrested and taken to the hospital for a blood draw. The blood draw results revealed that his blood alcohol level was 0.39.

[5] Woolston pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated under Cause 1113. The fixed-term plea agreement specified that he would be sentenced to 910 days with 905 days suspended to probation. The trial court accepted the agreement and imposed that sentence. As a condition of probation in Cause 1113, Woolston was prohibited from committing any criminal act or violating any traffic law. He was also prohibited from possessing or consuming alcohol.

[6] On May 31, 2025, at around 4:50 p.m., the Greensburg Police Department received a report of a possibly intoxicated driver operating a white Honda Civic. Officer Keaton Atchley observed the vehicle remain stopped at a stop light for an entire cycle before turning at the intersection. Officer Allison Reismiller observed the vehicle swerve into the opposite lane of travel and abruptly swerve back into the proper driving lane. She observed the driver of the car, a male driver later identified as Woolston, with his head slumped down and his eyes closed several times.

[7] Officer Reismiller initiated a traffic stop and approached the vehicle. The officer explained the reason for the stop, and Woolston denied having swerved into the opposite lane of traffic. After Woolston stepped out of the vehicle, the officer observed several empty mini Fireball shooters open and in plain view. She also smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from Woolston, observed that his speech was slow and slurred, and saw that his movements were slow and unbalanced. Woolston leaned against the front end of the police vehicle. And he admitted that he had one drink that day.

[8] The officer informed Woolston that she wanted to complete field sobriety testing. Woolston became visibly upset and once again denied any wrongdoing. No field sobriety testing was conducted because Woolston indicated that he would submit to it but he did not want to do so. He was then placed under arrest. He repeatedly asked what he had done and each time was told the reason for the traffic stop.

[9] Eventually, Woolston consented to a portable breath test which showed that his blood alcohol level was 0.340. Woolston was searched, and the officer found two mini Fireball shot bottles. A search of Woolston's vehicle led to the discovery of several more empty and full mini Fireball shots in the center console of the vehicle. Woolston was transported to the hospital for a blood draw. The toxicology report showed that his blood alcohol level was 0.351.

[10] The State charged Woolston with Level 5 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated in Cause 637 and petitioned to revoke Woolston's probation in Cause 1113. The State alleged that Woolston had violated his probation in Cause 1113 by committing a new criminal offense in Cause 637. Woolston admitted to committing Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated under Cause 637 and to violating the terms and conditions of his probation in Cause 1113.

[11] Woolston presented the testimony of David Bilodeau, the house manager at The Ark of Decatur County, a sober living facility, prior to sentencing and the imposition of the probation violation sanction. Bilodeau had known Woolston as a client of The Ark since his admission to the program on January 19, 2026. Bilodeau testified to the program requirements and treatment plan. Woolston also testified and admitted that he had not searched for treatment options until he was charged in Cause 637. He claimed to have previously completed intensive outpatient treatment. And he admitted that Cause 637 was his third conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and that his blood alcohol levels had been high in all three cases.

[12] In Cause 637, the trial court identified aggravating and mitigating circumstances. As aggravating circumstances, the trial court found that (1) Woolston was on probation when he committed the new offense, (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense were aggravating, and (3) he had two prior convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. As mitigating circumstances, the trial court identified Woolston's guilty plea and that he had sought treatment. The trial court rejected Woolston's offered mitigating circumstance that incarceration would be an undue hardship on Woolston's dependents.

[13] The trial court sentenced Woolston to 370 days in the Department of Correction under Cause 637. For his probation violation, the court sanctioned Woolston in Cause 1113 by revoking 450 of the 905 days suspended to probation, to be executed in the Department of Correction, and terminated his probation as unsuccessful. Woolston now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Inappropriate Sentence—Cause 637

[14] Woolston contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. He maintains that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his “lack of conduct harming others and his need for substance abuse assessment and treatment.” Appellant's Br. p. 4.

[15] Our standard of review for such claims is well settled. We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Our role in reviewing a sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B) “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for the trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “The defendant bears the burden of persuading this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.” Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). And “[w]hether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[16] “ ‘[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.’ ” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[17] “When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence for the crime.” McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, “we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is from six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (2019). Woolston argues that his two-year sentence is inappropriate. Appellant's Br. p. 8. However, our review of the record reveals that Woolston received a 370-day sentence, or just five days more than the one-year advisory sentence for the offense. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 85 (Abstract of Judgment Cause 637). Thus, Woolston received a near-advisory sentence for the offense.

[18] As for the nature of the offense, we observe that Woolston was on probation for the same offense at the time he committed the offense in Cause 637. Woolston was intoxicated to the point that his unsafe driving was reported to law enforcement. He was impaired such that his vehicle remained stopped at a traffic light for a full cycle before proceeding. He also swerved into the opposite lane of travel. An officer observed Woolston falling asleep at the wheel, his head slumped down and his eyes closed several times. This conduct endangered not only Woolston but other members of the traveling public. And his blood alcohol content was more than four times the legal limit. Woolston had multiple containers of Fireball whiskey in his car and on his person, smelled of alcohol, and had slow and slurred speech and slow and unbalanced movements. We find nothing in the nature of the offense that warrants a downward revision from this near-advisory sentence.

[19] As for the character of the offender, we conclude that his sentence is not inappropriate. Woolston was on probation for the same offense when he committed the offense charged in Cause 637. This was Woolston's third conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, with a high blood alcohol content, and this habitual pattern of criminal conduct is a poor reflection on his character. See Heyen v. State, 936 N.E.2d 294, 305-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (bad reflection on character where defendant was unable to obey law and continued to repeatedly commit same crimes), trans. denied.

[20] Moreover, Woolston did not seek treatment until the charges were filed in Cause 637. Despite his two previous convictions for operating while intoxicated with high blood alcohol levels, he had not properly addressed his substance abuse problem. While we commend his recent efforts at seeking treatment, his prior behavior reflects a disregard for the law, which placed himself and others in danger. The fact that he drank alcohol to excess was harmful enough to himself. The fact that he chose to drive while intoxicated extended the risk of that harmful behavior and imperiled others.

[21] We conclude that Woolston has not demonstrated that his slightly enhanced sentence is in need of revision. We find that his sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

II. Sanction For Probation Violation—Cause 1113

[22] Woolston next argues that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum possible sanction for [his] probation violation, the execution of his entire 905-day suspended sentence.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. The record reflects, however, that the trial court revoked Woolston's probation based on the commission of the new criminal offense in Cause 637 and imposed 450 days of the 905 previously suspended days as a sanction for Woolston's violation. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 80.

[23] Woolston admitted that he committed the probation violation alleged in Cause 1113. Following a finding that a defendant violated probation, a trial court has several options: (1) continue the defendant on probation; (2) extend the probationary period by up to one year; or (3) order execution of all or part of the suspended sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015). While a single violation may support revocation, “the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ind. 2013).

[24] The trial court has “considerable leeway” in determining sanctions for probation violations. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). But it abuses its discretion when imposing a sanction for a probation violation decision when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. We have repeatedly ruled that it is not an abuse of discretion to order execution of the entire suspended sentence when a defendant commits a new criminal offense while on probation. Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied; Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[25] Here, Woolston committed the same offense for which he was on probation. The trial court could have ordered execution of the entire suspended sentence. However, the court imposed the execution of a portion—450 days—of Woolston's previously suspended sentence as a sanction for the violation. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's choice of this sanction. Thus, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Conclusion

[26] Woolston's slightly enhanced sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by choosing to revoke Woolston's probation and impose the execution of about half of his previously suspended sentence as a sanction for the probation violation. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

[27] Affirmed.

Najam, Senior Judge.

Matthias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.