Sierra Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. Jamie Franklin, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Sierra Johnson leased a house from Jamie Franklin and agreed to make various cosmetic improvements to the home in exchange for a reduced monthly rent payment. When Johnson failed to make certain rent payments, Franklin sued her in small claims court for eviction and unpaid rent. Johnson counterclaimed for reimbursement for repairs and other improvements she made to the home. The trial court ordered Johnson's eviction, and after a damages hearing, entered judgment against her for $3,000 in unpaid rent.

[2] Johnson appeals pro se, without providing a transcript. She first argues that the trial court erred by declining to certify her Statement of the Evidence under Indiana Appellate Rule 31. Because that Statement was not verified, as required by the rule, we find no error in the decision not to certify it. Johnson also raises a variety of issues related to the money judgment entered against her. But a lack of cogency, among other violations of Appellate Rule 46(A), impedes our ability to consider these issues. Finding them waived, we affirm.

1Facts

[3] Johnson leased a house from Franklin in late 2023 and quickly fell behind on her rent payments. In early 2024, Franklin sued Johnson in small claims court, seeking her eviction as well as money damages for unpaid rent and property damage. Johnson filed a counterclaim against Franklin, seeking reimbursement for certain repairs and improvements she made to the home during her brief tenancy. After an eviction hearing, the trial court ordered Johnson to vacate the premises. And after a damages hearing, the court issued a Judgment Order with the following findings and conclusions:

[Johnson] rented a 1970s era manufactured home from [Franklin] under a somewhat unusual lease arrangement whereby [Johnson] was to pay $1,000.00 per month as a “reduced rental value” in recognition of work which was required for the property which [Johnson] was to perform. Under the lease, [Franklin] was responsible for unspecified work for the roof and electrical system while [Johnson] was responsible for removing wallpaper, painting the interior of the property a uniform color, removing old flooring materials and replacing them[,] and an option for unspecified improvements to cabinetry.

[Johnson] lived in the property from September, 2023, until early February, 2024. The parties disagree as to the total amount [Franklin] received from [Johnson]. [Franklin] asserts she received only $1,600.00. [Johnson] claims she paid $3,000.00. [Franklin] was uncertain in her testimony as to whether a security deposit was paid[, a]t one point stating there was and at another that there was not. In addition, [Franklin] testified that there were different versions of the lease that were prepared by her. The lease that was submitted by [Franklin] into evidence, signed by [Johnson], indicates that there was no security deposit. The court mentions this mostly because the court has question[s] as to the reliability of some components of [Franklin's] testimony.

[Franklin] claims she is owed $6,000.00 in rent. However, that amount does not square with the $1,000.00 monthly rent for the time in question (September, 2023, to February, 2024) given [Franklin's] acknowledgement of $1,600.00 in payments. Further, [Franklin] testified that there was nothing wrong with the roof as it was only ten years old. Yet, she was looking at replacing the roof. That makes no sense.

The photos of the property ․ show a property that is in poor condition. The degree to which the property could have gone from needing work but being “habitable” as [Franklin] described, to the condition displayed in the photos in the limited time [Johnson] was in possession is a quandary. The property condition is also remarkable for the poor condition of the front and back porches and steps which likely give insight as to the overall property condition.

The repair work that [was] ․ commissioned for the property after she had recovered possession was undoubtedly more in line with improvement than repairs that are attributable to [Johnson's] actions. The court views [Franklin's] complaints of [Johnson's] alleged damage and/or improperly completed work as having left [Franklin] in no worse condition than she was in prior to the tenancy and appears to the court to have not caused any increase in cost of the work [Franklin] wanted to have done. The court finds that [Johnson] owed total rent of $6,000.00 and paid $3,000.00. Judgment is entered in favor of [Franklin] and against [Johnson] in the amount of $3,000.00 together with the costs of this action. The court awards nothing for physical damages.

App. Vol. II, pp. 13-14.

[4] Johnson promptly filed a notice of appeal, in which she asked the trial court's court reporter to prepare a transcript of the damages hearing. A month later, the court reporter notified this Court that Johnson had yet to pay for the transcript's preparation. This Court, in turn, issued an order requiring Johnson to make payment arrangements within 10 days. Johnson responded by asking the trial court to find her indigent and to waive her obligation to pay for the transcript. The trial court denied this request, after which this Court again ordered Johnson to make payment arrangements within 10 days. In response to this order, Johnson filed with the trial court a Statement of the Evidence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 31. Franklin objected to Johnson's proposed Statement on various grounds, and the trial court declined to certify it. Johnson thereafter asked for and was granted permission from this Court to proceed with her appeal without a transcript.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Johnson appeals pro se, challenging the trial court's decision not to certify her Statement of the Evidence and raising a variety of issues relating to the $3,000 money judgment entered against her. We note that Franklin did not file an appellee's brief. In such cases, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on [the appellee's] behalf.” Howard v. Daugherty, 915 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Rather, we will reverse if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. “Prima facie error in this context is error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. at 1000 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If an appellant does not meet this burden, we will affirm.” Id.

[6] Because Johnson's Statement of the Evidence was unverified, we do not find prima facie error in the trial court's decision not to certify it. And by failing to comply with our Appellate Rules, Johnson has waived the issues she raises with the trial court's money judgment. We therefore affirm.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Declining to Certify Johnson's Statement of the Evidence

[7] Appellate Rule 31 provides: “If no Transcript of all or part of the evidence is available, a party ․ may prepare a verified statement of the evidence from the best available sources, which may include the party's ․ recollection.” App. R. 31(A) (emphasis added).¹ The rule allows other parties to then “file a verified response to the proposed statement of evidence.” App. R. 31(B). And subject to one exception, not applicable here, the rule further provides: “[T]he trial court ․ shall, after a hearing, if necessary, certify a statement of the evidence, making any necessary modifications to statements proposed by the parties.” App. R. 31(C).

[8] We understand Johnson to claim that a trial court may not decline to certify a Statement of the Evidence under Appellate Rule 31; rather, the court “shall” certify it, either as submitted or as modified by the court. Id. This may be true, generally. But Johnson's Statement was defective because it was not verified, as required by the rule. It included only the following “Certification”:

This Statement of Evidence accurately reflects the proceedings to the best of Appellant's ability and is submitted for settlement and approval pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 31.

Respectfully submitted,

[Sierra Johnson]

Appellant, Pro Se

App. Vol. II, pp. 111-12 (brackets in original).

[9] Indiana Trial Rule 11(D) provides the default rule for verifying documents in civil proceedings:

[I]t is sufficient if the subscriber simply affirms the truth of the matter to be verified by an affirmation or representation in substantially the following language: “I (we) affirm, under the penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representation(s) is (are) true. (Signed)____________”

Trial Rule 87(G)(1) further provides: “All documents electronically filed that require a signature must include a person's signature using one of the following methods: (a) a graphic image of a handwritten signature, including an actual signature on a scanned document; or (b) the indicator ‘/s/’ followed by the person's name.”

[10] Johnson's “Certification” does not substantially follow the verification language in Trial Rule 11(D) because it does not invoke the penalties for perjury. See generally Austin v. Sanders, 492 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Ind. 1986) (“The essential purpose of a verification is that the statements be made under penalty [f]or perjury.”). Moreover, because Johnson's typewritten name is not preceded by the indicator “/s/,” as required by Trial Rule 87(G)(1), the certification is unsigned.

[11] For these reasons, Johnson has not met her burden of establishing prima facie error in the trial court's decision not to certify her Statement of the Evidence.

II. Johnson Has Waived the Issues She Raises with the Trial Court's Judgment Order

[12] “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This means they are “bound to follow” the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure and “must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983-84. “[W]e prefer to decide issues on the merits,” but where a litigant's noncompliance with our Appellate Rules is “so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived.” Id. at 984.

[13] Johnson has failed to comply with our Appellate Rules in several respects. As a starting point, we look to the Statement of the Issues section of Johnson's Appellant's Brief, which lists the following nine issues for appellate review:

1. Whether the judgment entered is supported by the CCS and the official record where filing, evidence, and procedural steps reflected in the CCS do not align with the trial court's findings.

2. Whether the trial court failed to consider the unlivable condition of the rental property ․ when determining liability[.]

3. Whether the trial court erred by failing to address or rule on [Johnson's] properly filed counterclaim[.]

4. Whether [Franklin] materially breached the lease by cutting the locks off [Johnson's] doors[.]

5. Whether the trial court erred by disregarding the police report regarding the lock cutting incident that directly contradicted [Franklin's] testimony[.]

6. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that [Johnson] owed six months of unpaid rent[.]

7. Whether [Johnson] was denied a fair hearing where the trial court permitted opposing counsel to interrupt and intimidate [Johnson] during her testimony without corrective action[.]

8. Whether the trial court violated [Johnson's] due-process rights by refusing to consider [Johnson's] documentary evidence at the final hearing[.]

9. Whether the trial court violated [Johnson's] due-process rights by failing to schedule trial for over a year[.]

(hereinafter, “Issue 1,” “Issue 2,” “Issue 3,” etc.). Appellant's Br., pp. 6-8.

A. Waiver of Issues 3, 6, 7, and 8

[14] Appellate Rule 46(A) requires the appellant's brief to include a “Statement of the Issues” section that “concisely and particularly describe[s] each issue presented for review,” which Johnson's brief does. App. R. 46(A)(4). But the rule also requires the brief to include an “Argument” section that “contain[s] the appellant's contentions [as to] why the trial court ․ committed reversible error.” App. R. 46(A)(8). Of the nine issues listed above, only Issues 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9 are discussed in the Argument section of Johnson's brief. Because Johnson made no attempt to develop arguments for Issues 3, 6, 7, and 8, she has waived those issues for appellate review. See K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“A party waives any issue for which it fails to develop a cogent argument or support with adequate citation to authority.”).

B. Waiver of Remaining Issues

[15] Appellate Rule 46 further provides that the “Argument” section “must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning,” and that “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.” App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). “We demand cogent argument supported with adequate citation to authority because it promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Id. Therefore, “[w]e will not ․ address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984. Such arguments are waived. Id.

[16] Although Johnson's brief includes arguments for Issues 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9, as well as an unlisted issue, those arguments are not supported by cogent reasoning or citation to legal authority, as delineated below.² Most also concern allegations we cannot review because Johnson did not provide us with a transcript of the damages hearing or a verified statement of the evidence. See Fields v. Conforti, 868 N.E.2d 507, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding appellant waived claims by not providing transcript on which claims depended).

Issue 1

[17] On Issue 1, Johnson argues: “The judgment is not supported by the CCS or the official record, where filings and procedural steps do not align with the trial court's findings.” Appellant's Br., p. 19. In support of this argument, Johnson asserts, without citation to authority, that “[a] judgment must be supported by the CCS and the evidence admitted at trial.” Id. Without further explanation, she then claims that “[t]he CCS reflects filings, dates, and procedural steps that do not match the trial court's findings,” and that “[d]ocuments referenced in the judgment do not appear in the CCS, and communications occurred outside official channels.” Id. at 20.

Issue 2

[18] On Issue 2, Johnson argues: “The trial court failed to consider the unlivable condition of the rental property—including mold, structural decay, and unsafe condition—despite evidence showing the parties’ agreement that [Johnson's] labor would satisfy the deposit requirement.” Id. at 17. In support of this argument, Johnson asserts that “Indiana Code § 32-31-8-5 requires landlords to deliver a dwelling that is safe, clean, structurally sound, and free from conditions that materially affect health and safety.” Id. She also asserts, without citation to authority, that “[a] tenant cannot be required to accept an uninhabitable property unless the agreement is explicit and supported by evidence.” Id. Without further explanation, she then claims:

The parties agreed the home would be fully livable, with [Johnson] performing only minor cosmetic work—painting and flooring—in exchange for the deposit. Instead, the home contained mold, structural decay, and unsafe conditions from the outset. These defects were central to the dispute, yet the trial court made no findings regarding habitability or the parties’ agreement.

Id.

Issue 4

[19] On Issue 4, Johnson argues: “[Franklin] materially breached the lease by cutting the locks off [Johnson's] doors, intimidating [Johnson's] children, and damaging the only means of securing the home, thereby excusing [Johnson's] performance and barring [Franklin's] claim.” Id. at 18. In support of this argument, Johnson asserts, without citation to authority, that “[a] party who materially breaches a contract first cannot enforce the contract against the other party,” and that “[c]utting locks and compromising safety violates the covenant of quiet enjoyment.” Id. at 19. Without further explanation, she then claims that “[Franklin] cut the locks, frightened [Johnson's] children, and damaged the only means of securing the home while rent was current,” and that “[t]his conduct materially breached the lease and excused [Johnson's] performance.” Id.

Issue 5

[20] On Issue 5, Johnson argues: “The trial court erred by disregarding the police report that directly contradicted [Franklin's] testimony and supported [Johnson's] account of the events leading to the dispute.” Id. at 17. In support of this argument, Johnson asserts, without citation to authority, that “[c]ourts must consider relevant, properly submitted evidence,” and that “[a] judgment cannot rest on testimony contradicted by objective documentation.” Id. at 18. Without further explanation, she then claims:

The police report documented the lock-cutting incident and contradicted [Franklin's] testimony. It confirmed [Franklin's] presence, her knowledge that [Johnson] was inside, and the damage to the only means of securing the home. The trial court did not reference or weigh this evidence.

Id.

Issue 9

[21] On Issue 9, Johnson argues: “The trial court violated [Johnson's] due-process rights by delaying trial for over a year without [Johnson's] request while granting continuances to [Franklin].” Id. at 21. In support of this argument, Johnson asserts, without citation to authority, that “[p]arties are entitled to a fair and timely hearing,” and that “[u]nexplained delays and unequal treatment violate due process.” Id. Without further explanation, she then claims that “[t]he trial court delayed trial for more than a year without any request from [Johnson], while granting continuances to [Franklin],” and that “[t]hese delays prejudiced [Johnson] and affected the outcome.” Id.

Unlisted Issue

[22] In the Argument section of her brief, Johnson also raises an issue not listed in her Statement of the Issues. She argues: “[Franklin's] undisclosed communication with the court reporter through the reporter's personal email account compromised the neutrality of the record.” Id. at 22. In support of this argument, Johnson asserts, without citation to authority, that “[c]ourt personnel must maintain neutrality” and that “[o]ff-record communications create an appearance of partiality and undermine confidence in the record.” Id. Without further explanation, she then claims that “[Franklin] communicated with the court reporter through a personal Gmail account outside the CCS and official filing system,” and that “[t]hese communications do not appear in the record and raise concerns about preferential access.” Id.

[23] Because Johnson's arguments for Issues 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9, as well as the unlisted issue, are not supported by cogent reasoning or citation to legal authority, she has waived those issues for appellate review.

Conclusion

[24] Johnson has not met her burden of showing prima facie error in the trial court's decision not to certify her Statement of the Evidence, and she has waived the issues she raises relating to the $3,000 money judgment entered against her. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Under a substantively similar predecessor to Appellate Rule 31, our Supreme Court determined that a transcript is “unavailable” when “an indigent is unable to bear the costs of its preparation.” Campbell v. Criterion Grp., 605 N.E.2d 150, 160 (Ind. 1992).

2.   We note that the numbering used in Johnson's Statement of the Issues does not match the numbering used in the Argument section of her brief. Issue 1 corresponds to argument number 4, Issue 2 corresponds with argument 1, Issue 5 corresponds with argument 2, Issue 4 corresponds with argument 3, and Issue 9 corresponds with argument 6.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.