MOORE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Richard Moore appeals from his convictions of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. He claims that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence and that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After reviewing the issues presented, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that there is sufficient evidence to support his convictions. Thus, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2025, D.C. was dating Moore and living in his house in Indianapolis. After midnight on January 10, 2025, the two had an argument. During the argument, D.C. became upset, threw some pictures of Moore's ex-girlfriend, and asked him why he did not treat her the same way he had treated his ex-girlfriend.

[3] At some point, D.C. was inside the garage, wearing shorts and a sports bra. The verbal argument turned physical, with Moore pushing D.C. to the concrete floor and slamming or pushing on her while she was down. During the altercation, Moore threw D.C. out of the garage and into the snow. D.C. sustained bruises and scratches on her arm, hand, and the side of her face. The bruising from those injuries intensified with time.

[4] Law enforcement officers responded to a report about the disturbance and arrived at Moore's house at around 1:00 a.m. They observed that D.C. was distraught and crying, and Moore was irate and upset. The officers noted D.C.’s injuries and took photographs of them.

[5] The State charged Moore with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. The case proceeded to a bench trial at which both D.C. and Moore testified. D.C. testified that Moore was arrested on January 10, 2025, and she moved out of his house before he was released from jail two days later because she was afraid of him.

[6] However, D.C. also testified that she contacted Moore a few weeks or months after the incident and had sex with him at some point. During cross-examination, D.C. answered questions about her contact with Moore after the crimes. D.C. admitted that she had contact with Moore after the incident and that in response to Moore's request, she contacted Moore's parents about making the charges go away.¹

[7] Moore's counsel offered Defense Exhibit B, a document that appeared to be a Facebook Messenger conversation, for admission into evidence. The State objected to the admission of the exhibit as irrelevant, and the trial court sustained the objection. Moore's counsel argued that the exhibit was relevant to show that D.C. would change her story in exchange for money. The trial court stated that “[t]he questions and answers would suffice to[o] for that point to be made on.” Id. at 39. During cross-examination, D.C. had already acknowledged that she sent the Facebook Messenger message to Moore's father and acknowledged her willingness to exonerate Moore in exchange for money. In other words, the trial court found that the exhibit was cumulative of D.C.’s admissions.

[8] On redirect examination, D.C. testified that Moore asked her to write a letter in his presence that he could keep. He asked her to state that he had not done anything wrong and that she wanted the charges dismissed. She testified that he told her he wanted to stay in a relationship with her and asked her a few times to write a letter in which she exonerated him that he could give to his lawyer.

[9] Moore testified that D.C. was the initial aggressor and started the fight by trying to scratch, kick, and bite him. He claimed he defended himself by grabbing her arms and then trying to escort her out of the garage toward the snow. He said that while he was attempting to move D.C. outside, she slipped and fell resulting in her injuries.

[10] The court found Moore guilty as charged imposed a 360-day aggregate sentence. The court said,

[Q]uite honestly, Mr. Moore, I didn't find your testimony as credible and believable as I did the alleged victim. So even reviewing the audio recordings and the video recordings, although there were some conflicting testimony and discrepancies in both of your testimonies, I am still very comfortable in finding that the State met its burden of proof as to both counts.

Id. at 108. Moore now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Exclusion of Evidence

[11] Moore challenges the trial court's decision to exclude evidence bearing on D.C.’s credibility. He claims prejudice from the court's exclusion of the evidence that he says was relevant to D.C.’s credibility, contending that the court's finding of guilt was based on incomplete evidence of D.C.’s credibility. Moore argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding two exhibits: (1) a printout of D.C.’s GPS tracking on November 9-10, 2025 (Defense Exhibit A); and (2) a message D.C. sent to Moore's father through Facebook Messenger, offering to write an exculpatory letter to the prosecutor about the case in exchange for money (Defense Exhibit B). Appellant's Br. p. 12. He offers that the evidence would bear on D.C.’s credibility because she testified that she was afraid of Moore, but she acted contrary to the behavior of a person who feared Moore after the battery.

[12] “Generally, we review the trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Brummett v. State, 230 N.E.3d 968, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. “We reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id. “We may affirm a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record.” Id.

[13] Moore claims that the court abused its discretion by excluding Defense Exhibits A and B. Moore contends that the admission of Defense Exhibits A and B was necessary to show that D.C. contacted both Moore and his parents and that she had discussions about helping him to obtain the dismissal of the charges. He asserts that this shows that D.C. did not fear him and that she was motivated to drop the charges for monetary gain. He says his defense was prejudiced because the court's finding of guilt was based on a determination of D.C.’s credibility.

[14] We note first that just because the trial court found D.C.’s testimony to be more credible than Moore's does not mean that D.C.’s credibility was without discrepancies or inconsistencies. In fact, the court observed that “it wasn't an easy decision” and noted the “conflicting testimony and discrepancies in both” witnesses’ testimony. Tr. Vol. II, p. 108. And finding one witness’ testimony to be more credible does not mean that the court did not consider the other witness’ testimony.

[15] Nevertheless, the record shows that Defense Exhibit A, a certified copy of D.C.’s GPS records, was admitted over objection. Id. at 95. This exhibit showed D.C.’s movements on November 9, 2025. And Moore was able to introduce evidence through cross-examination of D.C. and his own direct examination testimony that D.C. had contact with Moore after the January 10, 2025 incident. Moore testified that subsequent to the incident D.C. came to his home and also went to his parents’ home on November 9 or 10, 2025.

[16] Defense Exhibit C, a screen shot of a number Moore had blocked, was admitted in evidence and was used by Moore to discredit D.C.’s testimony that she had talked with Moore after January 10. Id. at 84. Defense Exhibit C, coupled with Moore's testimony identifying one of D.C.’s phone numbers, supported Moore's testimony that he had blocked D.C.’s phone number on his phone. Thus, he had tried to prevent D.C.’s attempts to contact him after the incident.

[17] As for the Facebook Messenger message, Defense Exhibit B, which was excluded, the substance of the message was already admitted through D.C.’s testimony. D.C. acknowledged that she did reach out to Moore's parents about “making the charges go away[.]” Id. at 33. And on cross-examination, D.C. testified that she sent the message to Moore's father requesting money for her bond in exchange for writing a letter exonerating Moore. Therefore, although the physical copy of the message itself was not admitted, the substance of the message, that D.C. was reaching out to Moore's parents about dismissal of the charges in exchange for money was admitted. Thus, Defense Exhibit B was cumulative of the testimony already received in evidence, and its exclusion was not reversible error. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1268 (Ind. 2015) (“Where the wrongfully excluded testimony is merely cumulative of other evidence presented, its exclusion is harmless error.”); Ind. Trial Rule 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

[18] Here, Moore's substantial rights were not affected. He was able to introduce the substance of all of the evidence he wanted to use to discredit D.C.’s testimony. And as we have detailed above, Moore was able to thoroughly cross examine D.C. and challenge her credibility. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Defense Exhibit B, the substance of which was acknowledged by D.C. And Moore's other exhibits were admitted.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[19] Moore also argues that his convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence. “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims ․ warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020). “Rather, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” Id. “[A court on review] will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 263.

[20] To support Moore's conviction of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: “Moore did knowingly touch [D.C.], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 12; also see, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) (2021). A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) (1977). “ ‘Because knowledge is the mental state of the actor, the trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences of its existence.’ ” Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 883 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Young v. State, 761 N.E.2d. 387, 389 (Ind. 2002)). “Any touching, however slight, may constitute battery.” Impson v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1275, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). And to establish that Moore committed Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: “Moore did knowingly touch [D.C.] in a rude, insolent, or angry manner resulting in bodily injury that is: pain and/or scratch mark(s) and/or redness[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 12.

[21] D.C.’s testimony was sufficient to evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore committed both offenses. She testified that she lived with Moore in his house, they had an argument, the argument escalated into a physical altercation, Moore shoved her onto the garage floor and pushed her while she was down, and he threw her out of the garage into the snow. D.C. described the injuries to her arm, hand, and head that resulted from the battery. The uncorroborated testimony of a victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction. Smith v. State, 163 N.E.3d 925, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[22] Here, however, there is more than just the testimony of the victim. The responding officers observed D.C.’s injuries. And they photographed those injuries. They also observed D.C.’s and Moore's demeanor. D.C. was described as distraught and crying, while Moore was described as being irate. And an officer testified that D.C.’s injuries were consistent with D.C.’s description of what happened. Further, there was no testimony that Moore sustained any injuries that were consistent with his testimony that D.C. bit, kicked, and scratched him. The court, as the fact finder, was free to disbelieve Moore's self-serving testimony. See Randolph v. State, 755 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ind. 2001) (“The [fact-finder] was free to disbelieve Randolph's self-serving testimony, which it apparently did.”).

[23] Additionally, the inconsistencies in D.C.’s testimony go to the weight of the evidence. And our standard of review prohibits us from reweighing the evidence. Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 262. The fact that D.C. continued to contact Moore and had sex with him after the incident does not preclude a finding that the batteries occurred.

[24] We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support both of Moore's battery convictions.

Conclusion

[25] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that was cumulative of the victim's own testimony. And there was no prejudice to Moore from the exclusion because the substance of the excluded evidence was presented to the trier of fact. Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence to support Moore's convictions both from the victim's testimony and corroborating evidence. Additionally, discrepancies in the victim's testimony go to the weight of the evidence. Moore was allowed to thoroughly challenge D.C.’s credibility. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Tr. Vol. II, pp. 30-37.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Bradford, J., concur.