Courtney Demer Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Courtney Demer Johnson appeals his convictions, following a jury trial during which he represented himself, for dealing in methamphetamine as a level 2 felony, dealing in a narcotic drug as a level 2 felony, criminal recklessness as a level 6 felony, resisting law enforcement using a vehicle as a level 6 felony, driving while suspended as a class A misdemeanor, and reckless driving as a class C misdemeanor. He asserts that his waiver of his right to counsel was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. He also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a continuance, instructed the jury, and limited his closing argument. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 6, 2024, Marion Police Officer Chris McAninch was on routine patrol when he observed a white Cadillac Escalade that appeared to be speeding. Officer McAninch pulled behind the Escalade and used his in-car radar to determine that the vehicle was traveling forty-three miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone. Officer McAninch activated his emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop, with Officer Gage Kelly in a separate police vehicle assisting.

[3] The driver of the Escalade pulled the vehicle to the side of the road “like it was gonna stop and then eventually just [took] off.” Transcript Volume I at 72. Both officers pursued the vehicle as it traveled at speeds in excess of ninety miles per hour in the thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone. The vehicle “blew through” stop signs and red lights, weaved in and out of its lane of travel, and almost struck “a civilian riding a moped.” Id. at 91. The vehicle ultimately crashed into a tree.

[4] When officers approached the crashed Escalade, the driver's door was open, and the driver had fled on foot. Officer Kelly and Officer McAninch searched the nearby area for over an hour but were unable to locate the driver. Sergeant Jared Shrontz joined the search with his canine partner, Arlo. At one point, Arlo, who was trained “to aggress human odor” was “staring down into brush” that appeared to have “been disturbed.” Id. at 116. Sergeant Shrontz loudly announced that he was with “the Grant County Sheriff's office and had a canine” that he intended to deploy unless the individual showed himself. Id. at 117. Johnson stated, “I'm coming out” as he emerged from the brush. Id. Officer Kelly took Johnson into custody. A search of Johnson's person revealed $2,520 in his pocket. Inside the Escalade, officers located 462.70 grams of methamphetamine, 102.44 grams of fentanyl, and 2.43 grams of a heroin and fentanyl mixture in the center console.

[5] On July 9, 2024, the State charged Johnson with dealing in methamphetamine as a level 2 felony, dealing in a narcotic drug as a level 2 felony, criminal recklessness as a level 6 felony, resisting law enforcement using a vehicle as a level 6 felony, driving while suspended as a class A misdemeanor, possession of marijuana as a class A misdemeanor, and reckless driving as a class C misdemeanor. The State also alleged that Johnson was an habitual offender. The State subsequently dismissed the possession of marijuana charge.

[6] The court held a hearing on June 4, 2025. During the hearing, the court addressed Johnson stating, “counsel has withdrawn and ․ you are asking to represent yourself. Is that correct?” Id. at 4. Johnson responded, “Yes. Self representation by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. The court advised Johnson that the court could appoint a different public defender to represent him because self-representation is “generally not a good idea.” Id. Johnson rejected the court's offer stating, “I would like to take that constitutional right.” Id. The court advised Johnson of all the trial tasks, such as selecting a jury, subpoenaing witnesses, and making legal arguments, he would be required to do on his own without the court's “help” and when asked, “understanding all of that, are you still ․ comfortable to represent yourself,” Johnson responded, “Yes.” Id. at 5. The court again advised that self-representation is “typically not a good idea and doesn't typically end well ․ and so I want to make sure that you're going into this with open eyes.” Id. Johnson responded, “Yes.” Id. The court further warned, “I don't want to get to the eve of trial and then you say oh no I want a lawyer now. Okay. We're not gonna do that?” Id. Johnson agreed by responding, “No.” Id. Johnson requested the court to ensure that the record reflected that he “fired” his previous court-appointed attorney a “while back” and would have filed a motion with the court requiring him to withdraw and requesting self-representation earlier if he had known how to do so. Id. at 7.

[7] The court held a pretrial conference hearing on June 18, 2025. Johnson requested to depose a witness, and the parties and the court spent the remainder of the hearing discussing scheduling the deposition. The court held a final pretrial conference and motions hearing on July 18, 2025. Johnson made several motions, most of which were denied. At the conclusion of the hearing Johnson stated, “I would like to put a continuance in on the fast and speedy, take it off the board. I think I'm just gonna hire an attorney.” Id. at 40. The State objected to a continuance noting that, “based on the position he's put us in with his fast and speedy,” witnesses were subpoenaed, the lab was subpoenaed, and everyone was “ready to go.” Id. The court stated, “I'm not gonna grant your continuance at this point. So we're gonna go to trial a week from Monday ․ you can always hire an attorney and an attorney can always represent you ․ I'm just not going to continue the trial, but you can ․ yes, you can hire an attorney to represent you.” Id. Johnson twice indicated that he understood the court's ruling and he offered no further comment on his request for continuance.

[8] A jury trial began on July 28, 2025. Johnson appeared pro se. The jury found him guilty as charged. The jury also found Johnson to be an habitual offender. The court sentenced him to twenty-five years with twenty years executed and five years suspended to probation.

Discussion

A. Waiver of Right to Counsel

[9] Johnson first asserts that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself at trial because his “waiver of his right to counsel was not done knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily; the trial court failed to properly advise [him] regarding same.” Appellant's Brief at 18 (capitalization omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to self-representation is a “ ‘fundamental’ right, implicit in the structure of the Sixth Amendment and supported by a long history of customary practice and legal protections.” Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 256 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 817, 818, 831-832, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975)). “But, while deeply rooted in our legal culture, the right to self-representation is not absolute.” Id.

[10] “[B]efore a defendant waives his right to counsel and proceeds pro se, the trial court must determine that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Jackson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Specifically, the court must “ ‘acquaint the defendant with the advantages to attorney representation’ and the disadvantages and the dangers of self-representation.” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003)); see Marshall v. State, 180 N.E.3d 411, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“The defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”). There is no script a court must follow in fulfilling this duty, but it must come to a “considered determination” that the defendant understands and intends to waive his right to counsel. Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001). “This determination must be made with the awareness that the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Because a trial court is uniquely situated to assess whether a defendant has waived the right to counsel, we will most likely uphold the trial court's decision “to honor or deny the defendant's request to represent himself.” Wright, 168 N.E.3d at 255.

[11] Here, the record reveals that the trial court thoroughly advised Johnson of the perils of self-representation. The court stated that it would appoint a public defender to replace his previous court-appointed attorney, an offer which Johnson adamantly rejected. The court listed several preparation and trial tasks Johnson would be responsible for completing without the aid of the court, and Johnson stated that he understood. Johnson's prior criminal history indicates that he was no stranger to the criminal justice system, and he assured the court multiple times that he was comfortable with trial procedure, that he knew how to conduct his “own research,” Transcript Volume I at 4, and that he was steadfast in his desire to exercise his constitutional right to proceed pro se. Under the circumstances presented, we conclude the court conducted an adequate inquiry and properly determined that Johnson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.¹

B. Denial of Continuance

[12] In a related argument, Johnson asserts the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance made approximately ten days before trial. In Washington v. State, 902 N.E.2d 280, 285-286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, this Court observed that “continuances are not favored and as a general rule should be granted only when the continuance is necessary in the furtherance of justice on the showing of good cause.” Unless otherwise provided by statute (which Johnson does not argue), the decision to grant or deny a request for a continuance falls within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Olson v. State, 563 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Ind. 1990). An abuse of discretion occurs only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Jackson v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. A defendant cannot establish an abuse of discretion without showing that he was prejudiced by the court's ruling. Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d 522, 527 (Ind. 1995). A defendant must make a “specific showing” as to how additional time would have aided his defense or how he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of a continuance. Jones v. State, 701 N.E.2d 863, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

[13] In his brief, Johnson simply states that it “was an abuse of discretion not to continue the case and give him time to either hire an attorney or have a public defender appointed.” Appellant's Brief at 20. Johnson specifies, for the first time on appeal, that he moved for a continuance because he realized he was “in over his head” and needed an attorney. Id. at 33. However, Johnson did not make this argument to the trial court. We observe that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived. Stewart v. State, 945 N.E.2d 1277, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[14] Waiver notwithstanding, although he alluded to perhaps hiring an attorney if a continuance were granted, Johnson never requested that the court appoint an attorney or definitively stated he no longer wished to proceed pro se. Notably, Johnson fired his previous public defender and specifically rejected the court's second offer of a court-appointed attorney. Johnson has not explained exactly why he could not have moved for a continuance for the purposes of hiring an attorney during the prior pretrial conference, which occurred more than a month before trial, as opposed to waiting until only ten days before trial. Indeed, the court expressly warned Johnson that it did not intend to entertain a continuance on the “eve of trial” in the event he ended up regretting his decision to represent himself. Transcript Volume II at 5. In its objection to Johnson's continuance request, the State noted that its witnesses had already been subpoenaed and were ready for trial. As a general matter, continuances sought shortly before trial to hire new counsel “are disfavored because they cause substantial loss of time for jurors, lawyers, and the court.” Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind. 1994). Under the circumstances presented, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Johnson's motion.

C. Jury Instruction

[15] Johnson next contends the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. Instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and we review its decision only for an abuse of discretion. Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. 2013). “The purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’ ” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when the instruction is erroneous, and the instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484-485 (Ind. 2015).

[16] Relevant here, Johnson was charged with dealing in methamphetamine and dealing in a narcotic drug as level 2 felonies. Specifically, the State alleged that Johnson possessed “with intent to deliver” both methamphetamine and fentanyl. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 24-25. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2) provides: “A person who ․ possesses, with intent to ․ deliver ․ methamphetamine, pure or adulterated; commits dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony.” The offense is a level 2 felony if: “the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) grams[.]” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(e). “A person may be convicted of an offense under subsection (a)(2) only if: (1) there is evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that the person intended to deliver or finance the delivery of the drug; or (2) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams.” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(b).

[17] Similarly, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2) provides: “A person who ․ possesses, with intent to: ․ deliver ․ a narcotic drug, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule I or II; commits dealing in ․ a narcotic drug, a Level 5 felony.” The offense is a level 2 felony if “the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) grams[.]” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(e). “A person may be convicted of an offense under subsection (a)(2) only if: (1) there is evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that the person intended to manufacture, finance the manufacture of, deliver, or finance the delivery of the drug; or (2) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams.” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(b).

[18] Johnson observes that the court's preliminary jury instructions regarding the two dealing charges did not include the language that a person may be convicted of these offenses only if: “(1) there is evidence in addition to the weight of the drug that the person intended to manufacture, finance the manufacture of, deliver, or finance the delivery of the drug; or (2) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams,” while the court's final jury instructions regarding these two charges included such language. He asserts that the “preliminary instructions said one thing, then in the final instructions it changed the theory on how [he] could be convicted.” Appellant's Brief at 39.

[19] When discussing final instructions with the parties, the trial court informed them that language had been added to the two dealing instructions by stating that the “elements of the dealing in a methamphetamine and dealing in a narcotic drug, um, were, uh, changed to address how they were filed[.]” Transcript Volume II at 14. Johnson questioned “why has it been changed if it was already correct.” Id. The court explained, “there's two different ways that you can, uh, charge a dealing case. You can charge it with delivery or possession with intent to deliver. I hadn't heard the evidence before, uh, I prepared the final instructions, obviously, and so when you prepare the final instructions, you do it to make it consistent with the evidence and the way it was charged.” Id. Johnson responded, “I would object to the instructions ․ both the dealings.” Id. at 15. The court overruled Johnson's objection.

[20] Johnson now claims on appeal that the trial court “abused its discretion by modifying the final instruction[s]” because such modification created “a material variance from the original charge” which made it “easier to prove [him] guilty.” Appellant's Brief at 22. However, “[w]hen objecting to an instruction, the objection at trial must be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the trial court of the claimed error, identifying both the claimed objectionable matter and the grounds for the objection.” Childers v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (Ind. 1999). “Thus, to preserve error for appeal, a defendant must specifically state the grounds for his objection, or the claim is forfeited.” Id. Johnson's objection to the final instructions was not sufficiently specific and he has therefore waived appellate review of this claim.

D. Closing Argument

[21] Finally, Johnson asserts that the trial court “erred in ruling that [he] could not cite and argue case law in his closing argument” as this denied him “the opportunity to argue his own case in a manner he saw fit consistent with the law.” Appellant's Brief at 40, 43. The opportunity to make a closing argument is a basic element of the criminal process. Nickels v. State, 81 N.E.3d 1092, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “It is well settled that the proper scope of final argument is within the trial court's sound discretion.” Nelson v. State, 792 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. “[A] conviction will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused.” Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1195 (Ind. 2021) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

[22] Indiana courts have long held that counsel may argue both the law and the facts in a criminal case. Horn v. State, 176 Ind. App. 527, 535, 376 N.E.2d 512, 517 (1978) (citing Kilgore v. State, 170 Ind. App. 569, 572, 354 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1976)). As for closing argument, in Lax v. State, 275 Ind. 34, 38, 414 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ind. 1981), the Indiana Supreme Court held that “the reading of law” to the jury is permissible. Further, in Hernandez v. State, 439 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ind. 1982), the Court confirmed that “reading from decisions to the jury is proper in final argument so long as it is clear” that counsel “is reading from or referring to a separate case, so as to not mislead or confuse the jury.”² See also Thevenot v. State, 121 N.E.3d 679, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding no abuse of discretion in allowing prosecutor to cite to and read from caselaw during closing argument); accord Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) trans. denied.

[23] Here, the record reveals that at the outset of his closing argument, Johnson argued, “[t]he State has asked you to convict me based on a foundation of circumstan[tial] evidence so weak that it cannot support the weight of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Even more importantly, the Indiana Supreme Court in Hampton versus State has made it clear ․” Transcript Volume II at 32. The prosecutor interrupted stating, “Judge, I'm going to object.” Id. The prosecutor argued, “You can't start arguing caselaw to the jury ․ This isn't ․ one, I don't think permissible or two, appropriate in closing argument.” Id. at 33. The court sustained the objection instructing Johnson to “argue about the facts and the instructions.” Id. We agree with Johnson that the blanket prohibition on his ability to cite and argue caselaw during closing argument was error. See Nelson, 792 N.E.2d at 593 (concluding that “because the trial court's stated basis for limiting Nelson's closing argument is erroneous as a matter of law, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion”).

[24] Nevertheless, Johnson has not shown prejudice and we find the court's error harmless. See id. (applying harmless error analysis to restriction on closing argument). Even though the court limited his ability to argue caselaw, our review of Johnson's closing argument reveals that he presented extensive argument that the case against him, specifically that he was the driver of the Escalade in which the drugs were found, was entirely circumstantial and based solely on “indirect proof.” Transcript Volume II at 33. But, given the ample evidence presented against him, we cannot say that the jury would have been persuaded by his closing argument even if supported by caselaw.³ In short, Johnson has not demonstrated that reversal of his convictions is warranted.

[25] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Johnson's convictions.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although a defendant who proceeds pro se has no right to the appointment of standby counsel for assistance, Kindred v. State, 521 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 1988), we think best practice is for the court to appoint standby counsel in cases such as the current one when a defendant is proceeding to a jury trial on multiple felony charges. See Wilson v. State, 94 N.E.3d 312, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (observing that appointment of standby counsel can be an appropriate prophylactic device when a defendant assumes burden of conducting his own defense).

2.   Although both Lax and Hernandez arose in the context of the prosecution's closing argument, the principle applies equally to defense counsel.

3.   The State presented evidence that Johnson was found hiding in close proximity to where the Escalade had been crashed into a tree and he was the only person found in the area. The State also presented evidence linking the Escalade to Johnson, including that the Escalade was registered to Johnson's girlfriend and she spoke with him on a jail phone call about how it took hours for her to get “the truck that he wrecked” out of impound and what it might cost to fix the damage he caused. Transcript Volume I at 139. He also spoke with his girlfriend about another woman's fingernail she found in the Escalade when she picked it up from the impound lot and began “trying to explain” to her how the fingernail came to be in the car on the night in question. Id. at 140. The State presented further evidence that Johnson admitted to his girlfriend in the same jail phone call that he was dealing drugs.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.