COLEMAN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Lloyd C. Coleman appeals the trial court's sanction following the revocation of his placement on probation. Coleman raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve a portion of his previously suspended sentence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 20, 2018, Coleman pleaded guilty to dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 4 felony. The court accepted Coleman's plea and sentenced him to twelve years, with eleven years and one hundred seven days suspended to probation. On July 16, 2024, the court revoked Coleman's placement on probation and ordered him to serve his previously suspended sentence on work release. The court thereafter modified his sentence and placed Coleman back on probation for ten years.

[3] On June 19, 2025, the State filed a motion to revoke Coleman's placement on probation, alleging that he had violated the terms of his placement when he “tested positive for an illegal substance (methamphetamine) while on Probation[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 35. On October 17, officers executed a search warrant on Coleman's home and found numerous firearms and methamphetamine. As a result, on October 20, the State filed its second motion to revoke Coleman's probation. In that motion, the State alleged that Coleman had failed to report to probation “for a mandatory appointment” on October 17 and that he had “allegedly committed a new offense” by possessing the firearms and methamphetamine. Id. at 66.

[4] The court held a hearing on the State's motions on December 2. Coleman's probation officer, Chris Yon, testified that Coleman had tested positive for methamphetamine on June 19, however the court sustained Coleman's objection to that testimony on the ground that the State had not laid a proper foundation. Yon then testified that he had contacted Coleman on October 16 and told him to come to the office, but Coleman responded that he was “out of town[.]” Dec. Tr. at 12. Yon then directed Coleman to appear “first thing” the next day, but Coleman “never showed up[,]” and he did not “try to call or reschedule[.]” Id. at 12, 16. Detective Scott Arnold with the Pike County Sheriff's Office then testified that he had obtained a warrant to search Coleman's house and that officers had found methamphetamine and “a number of firearms” in the home. Id. at 27.

[5] Following the hearing, the court found that the State had not met its burden regarding the June 19 motion. As for the State's second motion, the court found that the State had met its burden to show that Coleman had failed to report to probation on October 17 but that the State did not meet its burden to demonstrate that Coleman committed a new offense. Accordingly, the court found that Coleman had violated the terms of his probation.

[6] The court then held a hearing regarding Coleman's sanction. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court noted that Coleman has a “significant” criminal history that began in 1987 and includes five prior misdemeanors and nine prior felonies. Jan Tr. at 12. The court also noted that Coleman had “recently violated conditions” of pretrial release and that “prior lenient treatment has been unsuccessful.” Id. The court then ordered Coleman to serve six years of his previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Coleman contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve six years of his previously suspended sentence. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated. Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a). Indeed, violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[8] Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. We review a trial court's decision to revoke probation and a trial court's sentencing decision in a probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[9] On appeal, Coleman argues that, while the court was able to “technically act as it did when it ordered that [he] serve six years in the DOC for failing to attend a meeting with probation, that outcome is excessive.” Appellant's Br. at 8. Coleman maintains that he “had already served 8 years of probation” for which he received “very little benefit” given the sanction because the violation of probation was simply “the failure to come to a meeting with probation[.]” Id. at 9.

[10] We acknowledge that the only violation that the court found was a failure to meet with probation. Nonetheless, the court was well within its discretion to order Coleman to serve six years of his previously suspended sentence. As the court found, Coleman has an extensive criminal history that includes eight placements on probation. Of those eight terms, one was closed out unsatisfactorily and one was revoked. In addition, Coleman previously violated the terms of his current placement on probation in 2024, for which his placement on probation was revoked and for which he was ordered to serve his sentence on work release. However, his placement was modified to return him to probation for ten years. Thus, this was not Coleman's first violation of his current term on probation.

[11] Stated differently, despite prior attempts at leniency, Coleman continues to violate the terms of his probation. Given Coleman's history of unsuccessfully completing probation and of violating the terms of his probation, including a prior violation of the current term on probation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked six years of his previously suspended sentence. We therefore affirm the trial court.¹

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Coleman contends that the court based its sanction on the State's allegations that he had failed a drug test and committed a new crime, we cannot agree. At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the court specifically found that the State had not met its burden with regard to those two allegations. Then, at the beginning of the hearing to determine Coleman's sanction, the court reiterated that the parties were present following the court's finding that the State met its burden with regard to “one allegation that he did in fact violate” the terms of his probation. Jan. Tr. at 4. Thus, it is clear that the court limited its consideration to the fact that Coleman was found to have violated his probation only one time.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.