Jason Lee Parker, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jason Parker, a habitual traffic violator with a permanently forfeited license, was pulled over by police while driving a vehicle. But just after the officer exited his patrol car, Parker sped away. He wove through busy traffic until the officer ended his pursuit for safety reasons. Parker was later convicted of driving with a forfeited license, resisting law enforcement, and reckless driving. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 7 years imprisonment. On appeal, Parker argues this sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). But he fails to show that he committed his offenses with restraint or regard, and he has a lengthy criminal history of similar offenses. We affirm.

Facts

[2] On the morning of June 15, 2023, Sergeant Druelinger of the Fishers Police Department received a notification from Flock, a “license plate reader camera system.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 96. The camera had detected on a road a license plate with a registered owner that was a habitual traffic violator with a license forfeited for life. Sergeant Druelinger then ran that flagged license plate through BMV records and determined that it was registered to Parker. Parker was listed in BMV records as a habitual traffic violator with a driver's license that was forfeited for life. Parker's picture and identifying information was included in the records. Additionally, the flagged license plate was listed as belonging to a Chevy Cavalier, but Sergeant Druelinger observed the plate affixed to a red Corvette convertible.

[3] Sergeant Druelinger located the Corvette and observed that Parker was the driver. Sergeant Druelinger confirmed that the Corvette's license plate was the flagged plate he had run through BMV records. He then activated his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop for a “false and fictitious license plate” because the affixed plate did not belong to the Corvette. Id. at 105. Parker soon pulled over and stopped his Corvette. But just as Sergeant Druelinger approached the Corvette on foot, it suddenly accelerated away.

[4] Sergeant Druelinger returned to his vehicle and began pursuing Parker, who was repeatedly crossing the double yellow line and driving at a high speed into oncoming traffic. A large truck had to veer off the road and into the grass to avoid a collision. Traffic was heavy, multiple neighborhoods lined the road, and Parker was headed for a blind hill. Sergeant Druelinger soon ended his pursuit due to the danger.

[5] A warrant for Parker's arrest was issued, and he was eventually located and charged with three offenses:

Count 1: Operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life, a Level 5 felony;

Count 2: Resisting law enforcement with the use of a vehicle, a Level 6 felony;

Count 3: Reckless driving, a Class C misdemeanor.

[6] After a jury trial, Parker was found guilty as charged and convicted accordingly. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court considered Parker's pre-sentence investigation report, which reflected a lengthy criminal history of at least 11 misdemeanor and 12 felony convictions since 2002. The report also contained a summary of an interview with Parker, during which he admitted that he had been driving despite forfeiting his license and did not realize he could serve years in prison for his violations. However, he denied being the driver of the Corvette or committing the instant offenses. Parker made no statement at the hearing.

[7] Parker was sentenced to 5 years on Count 1, operating a vehicle after forfeiture of license for life; 2 years on Count 2, resisting law enforcement; and 60 days on Count 3, reckless driving. Counts 1 and 2 were ordered to run consecutively and Count 3 was ordered to run concurrently with Count 2 for a 7-year total sentence. He appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] On appeal, Parker argues that his 7-year sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).¹ That rule permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B).

[9] The nature of the offense and the character of the offender are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). A defendant need not prove inappropriateness under each prong, although both prongs must be considered. See id. We give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision, attempting only “to leaven the outliers” rather than “achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (citations omitted). Parker bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 99 (Ind. 2021).

[10] Regarding the nature of the offense, we begin with the statutory range. Count 1, a Level 5 felony, carried a sentencing range of 1 to 6 years, with an advisory sentence of 3 years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. Count 2, a Level 6 felony, carried a sentencing range of 6 months to 2 1/212 years with an advisory sentence of 1 year. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 (2023). And Count 3, a Class C misdemeanor, carried a sentencing range of up to 60 days. See Ind. Code § 35-50-3-4. Parker's 5-year sentence on Count 1 and 2-year sentence on Count 2 are both above the advisory but below the maximum. His 60-day sentence on Count 3 is the maximum. The trial court ordered Count 1 and Count 2 to run consecutively and Count 3 to run concurrently with Count 2 for an aggregate sentence of 7 years. We are not persuaded that this sentence is inappropriate.

[11] In assessing the nature of the offense, we compare “the defendant's actions with the required showing to sustain a conviction under the charged offense” and identify whether there is “anything more or less egregious” about the defendant's offense that distinguishes it from the “typical offense.” McFarland v. State, 153 N.E.3d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citations omitted). Parker claims that his dangerous conduct and his status as a habitual traffic violator are already captured by the elements of his offenses. But there are other details not otherwise accounted for by these elements: Parker's plates were “false and fictitious” because they were affixed to the wrong vehicle, and the area in which his flight and reckless driving occurred was heavily trafficked and residential. Tr. Vol. II, p. 105. Moreover, Parker does not otherwise identify any evidence “portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense,” such as acting with “restraint, regard, and lack of brutality,” besides the fact that he did not harm anyone. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[12] Parker does not argue that his character warrants relief, and we find that it does not. Parker has an extensive criminal history including at least 11 misdemeanor and 12 felony convictions since 2002. See Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). He has received suspended sentences multiple times but after such leniency, continued to commit further crimes.

[13] “The significance of criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Parker's history is significant because it contains recent and related crimes. When Parker committed the instant offenses, he was on pre-trial release for a case involving the very same charge of operating a motor vehicle after forfeiting his license for life. And a few months after the instant offenses, Parker was charged again with the same three crimes: operating a vehicle after forfeiting his license for life, resisting law enforcement, and reckless driving. In fact, Parker was charged with this same operating-after-forfeiture offense a total of four times in 2023. This history shows a sustained unwillingness to comply with the law.

[14] Parker has not met his burden of proving that his sentence is inappropriate. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State argues that Parker waived his claim by failing to make a cogent argument or provide citations to authority for the propositions in his argument. Parker responds that his brief set out the applicable law, 7(B)’s two-pronged analysis with citations to authority, and the sentencing ranges with citations to statutes. He argues that the State's “alleged imperfections go to weight, not forfeiture.” Appellant's Reply Br., p. 5. This Court generally prefers to decide cases on the merits when possible, and we find that review of Parker's claim is possible here. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.