Randy C. Boring, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Randy Boring was convicted of three counts of dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felonies. The jury also found Boring to be an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Boring to concurrent terms of ten years on each count, enhanced by fourteen years due to Boring's status as an habitual offender, for an aggregate term of twenty-four years. Boring now appeals, and we affirm.

Issues

[2] Boring raises three issues, which we restate as:

I. Whether sufficient evidence supports Boring's convictions for dealing in methamphetamine.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Boring.

III. Whether Boring's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and Boring's character.

Facts

[3] Over a period of approximately six weeks, the Wabash County Drug Task Force conducted three controlled buys of methamphetamine from Boring through a confidential informant (“CI”). The first controlled buy occurred on August 18, 2024, at Boring's residence near LaFontaine in Wabash County. Detective Devin Bechtold worked with the CI, who arranged to purchase one gram of methamphetamine from Boring for $60.

[4] Before the transaction, officers met the CI at a church. The CI did not have a working vehicle at the time, so officers provided a Drug Task Force vehicle for the CI to use. Officers searched the CI and the vehicle to ensure that neither contained additional currency or illegal drugs. Officers also provided the CI with $60 of prerecorded currency, placed concealed recording cameras in the vehicle, and equipped the CI with a cell phone containing a concealed camera, which transmitted a live audio and video feed that Detective Bechtold monitored in real time.

[5] Detective Bechtold followed the CI, parked near Boring's residence, and observed the CI enter Boring's driveway. Detective Bechtold could hear some of the conversation on the live audio and video feed and recognized Boring's voice. After the CI left, Detective Bechtold followed the CI, flashed his lights, and the CI pulled over. Detective Bechtold collected and photographed a plastic baggie containing a crystalline substance, and officers again searched the CI and the vehicle.

[6] On August 20, 2024, the Drug Task Force conducted a second controlled buy at Boring's residence. The CI had his own vehicle this time. The police followed the same procedures as the first controlled buy to search the vehicle and the CI, and, prior to the buy, set up all the cameras. Unlike the first controlled buy, no price or quantity was arranged in advance; officers knew only that Boring had methamphetamine to sell. Officers provided the CI with $300 of prerecorded currency.

[7] Through the live audio and video feed transmitted by the camera on the CI's phone, Detective Bechtold recognized Boring's voice, as well as the voice of a female, Donna Clark, whom Detective Bechtold knew to be associated with Boring. Detective Bechtold thereafter collected a second plastic baggie containing a crystalline substance and $240 in unspent currency. The CI paid $60 for the methamphetamine.

[8] On September 29, 2024, the Drug Task Force conducted the third controlled buy, again following the same procedures: officers searched the CI and the vehicle before the buy, set up the cameras, and provided the CI with $300 of prerecorded currency. The CI arranged to purchase approximately one and one-half grams of methamphetamine from Boring for $100. This transaction occurred outside Boring's residence near the garage, and Detective Bechtold observed the exchange on the live video feed. Following the exchange, Detective Bechtold collected a third plastic baggie containing a crystalline substance and $200 in unspent currency from the CI. Screenshots taken from the recording of this transaction depict a plastic baggie containing a crystalline substance in Boring's hand and depict Boring holding $100 of the prerecorded currency following the exchange.

[9] Each of the three bags collected from the controlled buys was submitted for laboratory testing, which established that each contained methamphetamine weighing 1.22 grams, 1.05 grams, and 1.31 grams, respectively.

[10] On October 21, 2024, the State charged Boring with two counts of dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felonies, and one count of dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony. On December 16, 2024, the State alleged that Boring was an habitual offender. On November 12, 2025, the trial court granted the State's motion to amend Count II from a Level 5 felony to a Level 4 felony based upon the weight of the substance.

[11] A jury trial was held on December 2 and 3, 2025. Detective Bechtold testified regarding the three controlled buys, and the trial court admitted the video with audio recordings of the three drug buys, screenshots of portions of the recordings, the substances recovered, and the laboratory reports. The jury found Boring guilty of three counts of dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felonies, and found him to be an habitual offender.

[12] On December 29, 2025, the sentencing hearing was held. Boring proffered as a mitigating circumstance his compliance with the terms of his bond and requested concurrent six-year sentences with a portion suspended and an eight-year habitual offender enhancement. The State argued that Boring was not “taking any kind of responsibility for his actions in this case” and recommended concurrent ten-year sentences with a fourteen-year habitual offender enhancement. Tr. Vol. III p. 79. In pronouncing sentence, the trial court stated: “You did refuse to accept responsibility for your crimes․ [Y]ou know you've got three prior convictions, but you're going to make the county pay for a jury trial on that. You have that right, but that's accepting zero responsibility for your prior conduct ․ I think that kind of thumbs your nose at the Court's authority and society's laws.” Id. at 81.

[13] The trial court's written sentencing order identified as aggravating circumstances that Boring “refuses to accept any responsibility for his crimes and required a jury to convict him of being [an] habitual offender,” as well as Boring's criminal history; the trial court found no mitigating circumstances. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17. Boring was sentenced ten years on each count, to be served concurrently, and enhanced the sentence by fourteen years due to the habitual offender finding, for an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). The trial court also ordered purposeful incarceration and indicated that, upon Boring's successful completion of a clinically appropriate substance abuse treatment program as determined by the DOC, it would consider a motion for modification of Boring's sentence if appropriate. Boring now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Boring's convictions.

[14] Boring argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of three counts of dealing in methamphetamine. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[15] To convict Boring of dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, the State was required to prove that Boring knowingly or intentionally delivered methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, in an amount of at least one gram but less than five grams. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a), (c).

[16] Boring argues that the State failed to prove that he was the person who delivered the methamphetamine to the CI. Specifically, Boring contends that, because the CI did not testify at trial and Detective Bechtold did not maintain constant visual observation of the CI during the transactions, the State failed to establish that the substance the CI surrendered to Detective Bechtold after each transaction had been delivered by Boring.

[17] We have described a controlled buy as follows:

A controlled buy consists of searching the person who is to act as the buyer, removing all personal effects, giving him money with which to make the purchase, and then sending him into the residence in question. Upon his return he is again searched for contraband. Except for what actually transpires within the residence, the entire transaction takes place under the direct observation of the police. They ascertain that the buyer goes directly to the residence and returns directly, and they closely watch all entrances to the residence throughout the transaction.

Vaughn v. State, 13 N.E.3d 873, 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (quoting Ross v. State, 908 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). The testimony of the confidential informant is not required to sustain a conviction based upon a controlled buy. See id. (affirming convictions based upon controlled buys even though the confidential informant did not testify).

[18] Here, each of the three controlled buys was conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Vaughn. Before each transaction, officers searched the CI and the vehicle and provided the CI with prerecorded currency. Officers followed the CI to Boring's residence, and Detective Bechtold observed the CI arrive. During each transaction, Detective Bechtold monitored a live audio and video feed, and he recognized Boring's voice during the first and second controlled buys. The recording of the third controlled buy captured the exchange, and screenshots taken from that recording depict a plastic baggie containing a crystalline substance in Boring's hand and depict Boring holding the prerecorded currency following the exchange. After each transaction, officers followed the CI from the residence, collected the suspected methamphetamine, and searched the CI and the vehicle a second time. Laboratory testing established that each substance contained methamphetamine weighing 1.22 grams, 1.05 grams, and 1.31 grams, respectively.

[19] This evidence refutes any inference that the CI obtained the methamphetamine before arriving at or after leaving Boring's residence. The jury could reasonably infer that Boring delivered the methamphetamine to the CI during each of the three controlled buys. Boring's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Substantial evidence was presented on all elements of the offense, supporting the jury's verdicts of guilty. Sufficient evidence, thus, supports Boring's convictions for three counts of dealing in methamphetamine.

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Boring.

[20] Boring argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to identify and consider certain mitigators. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007); Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1197 (Ind. 2018). “An abuse occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 904 (Ind. 2019) (citing Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. 2014)).

[21] A sentencing court abuses its discretion in a number of ways, including:

(1) “failing to enter a sentencing statement at all”; (2) entering a sentencing statement in which the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that does not include reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided in the statement are “improper as a matter of law.”

Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 193 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91).

[22] The trial court “ ‘is not obligated to accept the defendant's contentions as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance or to give the proffered mitigating circumstances the same weight the defendant does.’ ” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 9 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 690 (Ind. 2009)). “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (citing Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999)).

[23] Boring argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to identify four mitigating circumstances: (1) his age; (2) his “moderate” criminal history; (3) his history of alcohol and substance abuse; and (4) his GED. Appellant's Br. p. 19. At the sentencing hearing, however, Boring proffered only one mitigating circumstance—his compliance with the terms of his bond—which he does not renew on appeal. A defendant who fails to advance a mitigating circumstance at sentencing is precluded from advancing that circumstance for the first time on appeal, and we presume that the circumstance is not significant. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492. Because Boring did not proffer any of the four circumstances he now advances, he is precluded from raising them for the first time on appeal.

[24] Waiver notwithstanding, Boring fails to establish that any of the four circumstances are both significant and clearly supported by the record. Boring cites only the presentence investigation report for support and offers no argument demonstrating that his age, his criminal history, his history of substance abuse, or his GED are significant mitigating factors. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring contentions to be supported by cogent reasoning). We are not in a position to second-guess the trial court's decision regarding mitigating factors, particularly when nothing in the record and no cogent argument supports Boring's claim that the decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Schuler, 132 N.E.3d at 904.¹

III. Boring's sentence is not inappropriate.

[25] Next, Boring argues that his aggregate twenty-four-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[26] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[27] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025). In the case at hand, Boring was convicted of three counts of dealing in methamphetamine, Level 4 felonies, and was found to be an habitual offender. Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-5.5 provides that “[a] person who commits a Level 4 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and twelve (12) years, with the advisory sentence being six (6) years.” Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8(i) provides that the trial court “shall sentence a person found to be a habitual offender to an additional fixed term that is between ․ eight (8) years and twenty (20) years, for a person convicted of murder or a Level 1 through Level 4 felony,” and that “[a]n additional term imposed under this subsection is nonsuspendible.”

[28] The trial court here sentenced Boring to ten years on each count, to be served concurrently, and enhanced the sentence by fourteen years due to his status as an habitual offender, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years in the DOC. Boring received a sentence less than the maximum he could have received. Moreover, the trial court ordered purposeful incarceration and indicated that it would consider a motion for modification of Boring's sentence, if appropriate and agreed upon by the State, following Boring's successful completion of a clinically appropriate substance abuse treatment program as determined by the DOC.

Nature of the Offense

[29] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). We consider whether “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality)” exists. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025).

[30] Here, Boring did not commit an isolated act. Looking at the extent of Boring's criminal actions, he sold methamphetamine on three separate occasions over a period of approximately six weeks, and each sale involved more than one gram of methamphetamine. Boring's repeated sales reflect ongoing dealing rather than a single lapse in judgment, and the record contains no compelling evidence portraying the nature of the offenses in a positive light. The nature of the offenses, thus, does not indicate that Boring's sentence is inappropriate.

Character of the Offender

[31] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[32] Boring points to his GED, his prior self-employment, and his claim that he had “been out of trouble for several years” before the instant offenses. Appellant's Br. p. 22. Boring, however, obtained his GED in 1981, more than forty years before the instant offenses. Additionally, Boring's criminal history includes three prior felony convictions, three prior misdemeanor convictions, and a petition to revoke probation. Two of the felony convictions—in 2020 and 2022—were for possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felonies, and directly relate in both nature and recency to the instant offenses.

[33] Boring committed the instant offenses at the age of sixty-two, less than three years after his most recent methamphetamine conviction, and he progressed from possessing methamphetamine to dealing it. Boring's prior contacts with the criminal justice system have not deterred his criminal conduct. Under these circumstances, we find no basis to conclude that Boring's sentence is inappropriate based upon his character and his offenses.

Conclusion

[34] Sufficient evidence supports Boring's convictions for three counts of dealing in methamphetamine. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Boring, and Boring's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and Boring's character. Accordingly, we affirm.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Boring does not challenge the aggravating circumstances, we note that the trial court found as an aggravating circumstance that Boring “refuses to accept any responsibility for his crimes and required a jury to convict him of being [an] habitual offender.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 17. Even assuming the trial court could not properly rely upon this circumstance, we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence based upon Boring's criminal history alone, which is sufficient to support an enhanced sentence. See Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023); Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 487 n.1 (Ind. 2023), cert. denied.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.