Joseph Martin Jones, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joseph Martin Jones appeals his convictions for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine and Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, arguing (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to establish venue in Madison County, and (2) the trial court erred in refusing his proposed jury instruction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November 2017 and January 2018, the Madison County Drug Task Force (DTF) received multiple tips about Jones dealing drugs from a residence in Anderson, Madison County. DTF officers surveilled the home and observed high foot traffic coming into and out of the residence. DTF investigators believed the high foot traffic corroborated reports that Jones was dealing drugs out of the residence. On one occasion, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of someone who had just left the residence and discovered methamphetamine on his person.

[3] In February 2018, a confidential informant began cooperating with DTF. DTF officers arranged for the confidential informant to conduct a controlled buy from Jones on February 7. The confidential informant purchased approximately three and a half grams of methamphetamine from Jones and turned it over to DTF. DTF conducted another controlled buy from Jones on February 8.

[4] DTF officers placed a GPS tracker on a vehicle Jones used and followed him as he traveled from Anderson to Indianapolis and back “[s]everal” times. Am. Tr. Vol. III p. 236. They learned through this surveillance and a tip that Jones was traveling to Indianapolis to resupply his drugs. They also received information that Jones would drive a Chevrolet Traverse on another supply run to Indianapolis on April 9. On that day, DTF officers observed Jones enter a Chevrolet Traverse while carrying a small black bag with yellow print on the side. Jones drove the vehicle and a woman rode in the passenger seat. DTF investigators followed Jones from Anderson to a gas station in Indianapolis in unmarked vehicles. Jones was at the gas station for approximately thirty minutes before he returned to the vehicle and resumed driving. Based on his prior trips, DTF investigators believed Jones had acquired the drugs and was en route back to Madison County. Anderson Police Department Sergeant Keith Gaskill contacted the Fishers Police Department to request that an officer conduct a traffic stop of Jones's vehicle.

[5] Fishers Police Department Officer Austin Arndt responded to DTF's request. Officer Arndt observed Jones traveling northbound on I-69 and speeding. He initiated a traffic stop of Jones's vehicle in Hamilton County. Jones and the female passenger exited the vehicle, and a K9 officer conducted a free-air sniff around the vehicle. After the dog alerted to the odor of narcotics, Officer Arndt searched the vehicle. He found a black and yellow DeWalt bag on the driver's side floorboard. The bag contained a large plastic bag with several smaller bags of methamphetamine inside, heroin packaged in one-gram quantities, unused syringes, a digital scale, a gun, a plastic container with large shards of crystal methamphetamine, and several unused smaller baggies.

[6] On August 4, 2021, the State charged Jones with two counts arising from the controlled buys and eight counts arising from the traffic stop. On November 18, 2024, Jones moved to dismiss the counts pertaining to the traffic stop, arguing that Madison County was not the proper venue for these charges. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss and his subsequent request to certify the denial order for interlocutory appeal.

[7] On June 16, 2025, the State amended the charging information to dismiss and amend several counts. The State's amended charging information contained the following charges: Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, and Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine. The Level 2 felony charges pertained to the traffic stop in April 2018, whereas the Level 4 felony charge related to the controlled buy on February 7, 2018.

[8] A three-day jury trial began on July 14. The State presented evidence of the facts outlined above. Sergeant Gaskill testified that the contents of Jones's bag—a large quantity of drugs, individual baggies, a digital scale, and a firearm—were commonly seen in street-level drug dealing. He believed that Jones was actively dealing drugs in Madison County. The State introduced video footage of Jones discussing his drug-dealing operations with other inmates. In one video, Jones admitted that he “got caught ․ coming back from Indianapolis with two pounds of meth and fifty-four grams of heroin.” State's Ex. 1 00:03-00:12. Jones stated in another video that he “sure had a lot of fun selling drugs out there.” State's Ex. 19 00:06-00:11.

[9] After the State rested, Jones moved for a directed verdict on the Level 2 felony charges, arguing that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that venue was proper in Madison County. The trial court denied his motion. Jones then tendered proposed jury instructions on venue and the preponderance of the evidence standard. The trial court rejected Jones's venue instruction, and he subsequently withdrew the preponderance of the evidence instruction. The jury found Jones guilty on all three counts. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-eight years executed in the Department of Correction. Jones now appeals.¹

Discussion and Decision

I. Venue

[10] Jones argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish that venue in Madison County was proper for his Level 2 felony convictions.² Defendants have a constitutional and statutory right to be tried in the county where the offense was allegedly committed.³ Ind. Const. Art. I, § 13; Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1(a) (2005). When venue is not an element of the offense, the State need only demonstrate proper venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Baugh v. State, 801 N.E.2d 629, 631 (Ind. 2004). “The standard of review for a claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove venue is the same as for other claims of insufficient evidence.” Eberle v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. In conducting this review, we “neither weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility, but look to the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the conclusion of requisite venue.” Id.

[11] Jones argues the State “presented no evidence that [he] ever possessed or dealt an illegal substance in Madison County on April 9.” Appellant's Br. p. 21. Instead, he contends that the appropriate venue for these offenses was Hamilton County, where the traffic stop occurred, or Marion County, where he obtained the drugs. However, more than one county may have concurrent jurisdiction to try a crime. Henke v. State, 801 N.E.2d 633, 634 (Ind. 2004). Venue is proper in any county where the defendant directs criminal activity. Baugh, 801 N.E.2d at 632. Where “a crime commences in one county and is continued into adjoining counties, then the charge may be filed in any of the involved counties.” Davis v. State, 520 N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (Ind. 1988).

[12] Here, the State presented sufficient evidence that Jones directed his criminal activity towards Madison County. He ran a drug-dealing operation in Madison County and regularly traveled to Indianapolis to resupply and maintain this operation. On April 9, Jones embarked on another supply run, and he was stopped while returning to Madison County. The contents of Jones's bag—large amounts of methamphetamine and heroin, unused syringes, single-use baggies, a digital scale, and a handgun—indicate that he successfully acquired more product to continue dealing drugs in Madison County. This evidence, taken together with Jones's own statement that he “got caught ․ coming back from Indianapolis[,]” demonstrates that he intended to deliver these drugs to members of Madison County's community. State's Ex. 1 00:03-00:10 (emphasis added). The State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Jones directed his criminal activity towards Madison County. See Chavez v. State, 722 N.E.2d 885, 895-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding sufficient evidence of venue in Tippecanoe County where defendant and accomplice broke down marijuana for distribution in neighboring county to sell to customers in Tippecanoe County), reh'g denied. Accordingly, venue was proper in Madison County.⁴

II. Jury Instruction

[13] Jones argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give his proposed instruction on venue to the jury. We review a trial court's decisions on jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Eberle, 942 N.E.2d at 861. We will reverse a conviction for an instructional error only if the defendant demonstrates that the error prejudiced his substantial rights. Id.

[14] Jones tendered the following jury instruction:

Although venue is not an element of a crime, the State must prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence. It is the State's burden to prove that the offenses charged occurred in the county identified in the charging information.

App. Vol. III p. 37.

[15] Venue is generally an issue to be determined by the jury because it turns on an issue of fact. See Eberle, 942 N.E.2d at 855. “Even when venue turns on issues of fact, however, a trial judge may refuse to instruct the jury on venue if it presents no genuine issue.” Cutter v. State, 725 N.E.2d 401, 409 (Ind. 2000) (citing United States v. Massa, 686 F.2d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1982)), reh'g denied. Here, the underlying facts that determine venue are not, themselves, in dispute. Jones does not dispute that, on April 9, he drove from Anderson to Indianapolis or that the drugs were discovered in his car when he got stopped while coming back. Because these underlying facts—which establish venue in Madison County as a matter of law—are not in dispute, there is no genuine issue as to venue for the jury. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to give the proposed jury instruction. Eberle, 942 N.E.2d at 861.⁵ We affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jones does not challenge his Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine conviction on appeal.

2.   Jones also argues the court “erred by denying [his] pretrial motion to transfer [the] counts to a county of proper venue[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 14. But Jones did not file a pretrial motion to transfer. While he did file a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, the only requested relief was for the charges to be dismissed. He did not request a transfer in his motion, the accompanying memorandum, or during the hearing on his motion. Jones has waived this issue for our review by failing to request transfer of venue. See Smith v. State, 809 N.E.2d 938, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding defendant waived argument on venue by failing to make a timely objection), trans. denied.

3.   The State argues that Jones waived any constitutional challenge by “not rais[ing] an argument under the Indiana Constitution when the matter was discussed in the trial court[.]” Appellee's Br. p. 17 n.5. We disagree. Jones relied on case law analyzing venue under Article 1, Section 13, and he repeatedly discussed his constitutional right to be tried in the county where the offenses occurred.

4.   The parties also dispute whether venue is proper under Indiana Code section 35-32-2-1(d), which provides that “[i]f an offense is committed in Indiana and it cannot readily be determined in which county the offense was committed, trial may be in any county in which an act was committed in furtherance of the offense.” We have already determined that venue was proper under subsection (a); thus, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding subsection (d).

5.   Jones contends the court should have accepted both his venue and preponderance of the evidence instructions. While the trial court rejected his venue instruction, Jones voluntarily withdrew the instruction on preponderance of the evidence. An instruction on preponderance of the evidence would have been necessary only if the court instructed the jury on venue. See Baugh, 801 N.E.2d at 631 (stating the State's evidentiary burden for proving venue is preponderance of the evidence). Here, the court did not need to instruct the jury on preponderance of the evidence because a venue instruction was not warranted. Accordingly, we need not address this issue.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.