JOHNSON v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Nichale Johnson appeals his conviction and sentence for murder, a felony. Johnson raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted certain evidence.

2. Whether his sixty-five-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In May 2020, Johnson and Rashaad Germany, Jr., attended Ben Davis High School in Indianapolis. Johnson was seventeen years old, and Germany was eighteen years old, though his “mentality was like a 12-year-old.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 140. At some point during that month, Johnson and Germany got into an argument during a class.

[4] On October 26, Johnson sent an Instagram message to someone asking about “buying a gun.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 56. Two days later, Johnson asked a friend if he could use the friend's Instagram account to get someone's address, but the friend refused. That same day, Johnson asked multiple people if he could use their guns. On October 29, Johnson asked Sariah Person, another classmate from Ben Davis, if he could borrow her Instagram account. Person agreed and gave Johnson her login information.

[5] That evening, Germany was staying at the home of his grandmother, Lisa Gilbert. Beginning at 10:53 p.m., Johnson, acting as Person, used Person's Instagram account to contact Germany. Johnson asked Germany if he was “seeing someone,” and tried to get Germany to meet up. Tr. Vol. 2 at 151. Germany initially responded that he was “going to sleep,” but he ultimately agreed to meet “Person” and shared his location. Id. at 152. At around 1:52 a.m. the next morning, Johnson, still pretending to be Person, sent Germany a picture showing that he was in Germany's neighborhood.

[6] At around 2:00 a.m., Gilbert heard gunshots. Officers and medical personnel responded to a 9-1-1 call and found Germany unresponsive on the ground by a neighbor's porch. The medics declared Germany deceased at the scene as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. Germany's aunt showed officers screenshots of the Instagram conversation between Germany and Johnson acting as Person.

[7] Later that morning, Person and her mother went to the police station to provide officers with information. Person told officers that she had provided someone with the nickname “Krayze” the login information to her Instagram account. Tr. Vol. 2 at 178. She further reported that any of the messages that came from her account after 10:00 p.m. on October 29 were not sent by her. And she stated that “Krayze” wanted to use her account “to set[ ] someone up.” Id. at 181. Person was later able to identify “Krayze” as Johnson through a yearbook photo. After that disclosure by Person, officers obtained Johnson's Instagram records.

[8] On November 26, 2020, the State applied for a search warrant. In support of that request, Detective Stephen Smalley submitted an affidavit. Detective Smalley alleged that Germany had informed his grandmother that he was going outside to meet someone and that Germany had spoken with Person via Instagram prior to his death. Detective Smalley further affirmed that Person informed him that “a male she knows as ‘Crazy’ ” asked to use her Instagram account to “look for someone” for a “ ‘Setup’ ” and that Person gave “Crazy” her password. Ex. Vol. 1 at 12. And Detective Smalley stated that Person had identified “Crazy” as Johnson through a yearbook photo. Detective Smalley then requested a warrant for a buccal swab, gallery photo, and fingerprints of Johnson. The trial court granted the search warrant the same day. Officers then attempted to find Johnson but were unsuccessful.

[9] Johnson was ultimately arrested on February 22, 2024. The State resubmitted the same application for a search warrant, which the court again granted. While Johnson was in custody, Detective Smalley read him his Miranda rights and then questioned him about Germany's death. Johnson denied knowing Germany, using Person's Instagram account to send messages, and killing Germany. But in a follow-up interview, Johnson admitted that he knew Germany and Person from school. He also admitted that he went to Germany's house to fight him but that he never got into a fight because “[s]omebody else was there.” Ex. Vol. 2 at 44. Johnson further stated that Germany came out of his house and that Johnson heard “gunshots,” so he left. Id. And he admitted that he had used Person's account to send a message because he “wanted to fight” Germany. Id. at 45.

[10] The State charged Johnson with murder, a felony. The State also filed an enhancement alleging that he had used a firearm in the commission of the offense. Johnson filed a motion to suppress the statements he had made to officers following the execution of the warrant. Johnson alleged that the search warrant “was [not] supported by probable cause” and that it “was requested as part of a fishing expedition.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 84-85. And Johnson alleged that, following the seizure, he made “incriminating statements.” Id. at 85. Thus, Johnson maintained that the search warrant violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The court denied Johnson's motion after a hearing.

[11] The court held a multi-day, bifurcated jury trial beginning on November 17, 2025. During the trial, the State presented the testimony of several witnesses, including officers, Person, and various experts. In addition, the State presented as evidence several of Johnson's Instagram conversations.

[12] Johnson testified in his defense and admitted that he and Germany had previously had some “friction” and had exchanged “words.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 68. But he testified that he did not shoot Germany. He further testified that, despite his earlier statements that he had gone to Germany's house alone, he had actually gone with a friend, R.J. And he testified that R.J. “wanted to fight” Germany. Id. at 72. In addition, Johnson admitted that he had used Person's Instagram account to locate Germany's address, that he and R.J. went to that address, and that he used the Instagram account to get Germany to leave the house. He then testified that, as Germany approached the car, R.J. “started shooting.” Id. at 77.

[13] At the conclusion of the first phase of the trial, the jury found Johnson guilty of murder. Johnson then admitted to having used a firearm in the commission of the offense. Following a sentencing hearing, the court identified as aggravating the nature and circumstances of the crime in that it “appear[ed] to be a murder that stem[med] from some beef that happened quite earlier.” Id. at 168. As mitigators, the court identified that Johnson was seventeen years old at the time of the offense, that he had no criminal history, and that he admitted to the enhancement. The court then found that the mitigators and aggravator “are of the same weight” and imposed the advisory sentence of fifty-five years on the murder conviction, enhanced by ten years for his use of a firearm, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-five years in the Department of Correction. Id. at 169. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Admission of Evidence

[14] Johnson first contends that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the statements he made to police. Generally, the trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admission of evidence. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). We review the court's ruling for abuse of that discretion, and we will reverse only when the admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. (citation omitted). When an appellant's challenge to the court's ruling is predicated on an argument that the search or seizure of the evidence was unconstitutional, it raises a question of law, and we consider that question de novo. Id. at 40-41.

[15] On appeal, Johnson asserts that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 when they seized him pursuant to an invalid warrant and that any statements he made following that seizure were “evidence obtained from an illegal search.” Appellant's Br. at 14.

[16] However, we need not address whether the court erred when it admitted that evidence because any error was harmless. As our Supreme Court has stated:

an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Put another way, the question is, “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that ․ the jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?”

Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736, 743 (Ind. 2019). Further, whether

an error in admitting evidence was harmless in a particular case depends on a host of factors. They include the presence or absence of other, corroborating evidence on material points; whether the impermissibly admitted evidence was cumulative; the overall strength of the prosecution's case; the importance of the impermissible evidence in the prosecution's case; and the extent of cross-examination or questioning on the impermissibly admitted evidence.

Id. at 745.

[17] Here, in his statements to police that Johnson challenges, Johnson initially denied knowing Germany, using Person's Instagram account to send messages, and killing Germany. But in a follow-up interview, Johnson admitted that he knew Germany and Person from school, that he went to Germany's house to fight him but that he never got into a fight because someone else was there, and that someone else shot Germany when he exited the house. And he admitted that he had used Person's account to send a message because he wanted to fight Germany.

[18] However, those statements are merely cumulative to Johnson's own trial testimony. During his testimony, Johnson admitted that he and Germany had previously gotten into a verbal altercation and that he had used Person's Instagram account to contact Germany, get Germany's location, and persuade Germany to exit the house. In addition, Johnson testified that a friend had gone with him to Germany's house and that the friend is the person who shot Germany.

[19] In addition, beyond Johnson's statements to police, the State had admitted as evidence the Instagram conversations Johnson had with several people asking to buy or borrow a firearm or to use their Instagram accounts, Person's testimony that Johnson had used her Instagram account on the night of the offense, and the Instagram conversation between Johnson using Person's account and Germany during which Johnson pretended to be Person to lure Germany out of his home.

[20] In light of all of the evidence before the court, we can say with confidence that the probable impact of Johnson's statements to police was sufficiently minor so as to not affect Johnson's substantial rights. Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the court's admission of that testimony was harmless. We therefore affirm Johnson's conviction for murder.

Issue Two: Appropriateness of Sentence

[21] Johnson next argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has recently held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has recently explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[22] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[23] The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. And Johnson faced a possible additional fixed term of between five years and twenty years for using a firearm in the commission of the offense. I.C. § 35-50-2-11(g). Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Johnson to the advisory term of fifty-five years for the murder charge and imposed an additional fixed term of ten years for the enhancement, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-five years executed in the Department of Correction.

[24] On appeal, Johnson contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense because his “offense is not more egregious than the ‘typical’ offense of murder” and that the “record does not indicate that [he] engaged in any act of torture, nor did he threaten or physically injure any person other than the victim.” Appellant's Br. at 22. And he asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because his “friends and family delivered numerous letters of support to the trial court,” he “plead[ed] guilty to the firearm enhancement,” and he is “quite young” with “a good employment history.” Id. at 23-24.

[25] However, Johnson has not met his burden to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offense, Johnson, over the course of several days, contacted various individuals via Instagram in an attempt to buy or borrow a firearm, and he asked several people to use their Instagram accounts to find Germany's address. Once a friend gave Johnson access to her Instagram account, Johnson messaged Germany, who had the mental abilities of a twelve-year-old, lied to him by pretending to be Person, and lured him out of his house under the guise that he was meeting Person. After Germany exited the house, Johnson shot him multiple times, apparently in retaliation for a verbal altercation that had occurred between them months prior. Stated differently, Johnson planned the murder in advance and then ambushed Germany after repeatedly lying to him. Johnson has not presented compelling evidence of restraint, regard, or lack of brutality to warrant a revised sentence. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[26] As for his character, we acknowledge that Johnson was only seventeen years old at the time of the offense and that he did not have any criminal history. However, the trial court took both of those facts into consideration when it sentenced him to the advisory sentence for murder and for only ten years on the enhancement, which was ten years below the maximum additional term it could have imposed. Further, and again, Johnson planned the murder of a classmate who had the mental capacity of a child and lied repeatedly to Germany prior to shooting him, which reflects poorly on his character. Johnson has not demonstrated that his character warrants a revision of his sentence.

Conclusion

[27] Any error in the court's admission of Johnson's statements to police was harmless in light of the other evidence before the jury. And Johnson's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.

[28] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.