IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.M. (Minor Child) and C.M. (Mother) and A.N. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.M. (“Mother”) and A.N. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights to their daughter, A.M. (“Child”), on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). The parties each present several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting eviden of Mother's drug screen results which predated Child's removal?

2. Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother has a history of DCS involvement due to housing instability and illegal substance use. In fall 2021, about two years before Child was born, DCS removed Child's half-sister, A.C., from Mother's care due to Mother's lack of stable and permanent housing, methamphetamine use, and inability to provide A.C. with appropriate care and supervision. A.C. was adjudicated a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).¹ As part of A.C.’s case, DCS put in place substance use treatment, case management, and parenting education services to assist Mother with obtaining employment and housing and addressing her illegal drug use. Mother made progress but never successfully completed services.

[4] In October 2023, while A.C.’s case was pending, Mother gave birth to Child. No father was listed on the birth certificate. At the time, Mother was living with a friend and participating in medication management, drug screens, and overnight visitation with A.C. Things were going well, and DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Tamra DeGroat initially had no concerns about Child being in Mother's care. But in February 2024, Mother tested positive for illegal drug use on a drug screen. Mother told the FCM this occurred after she recently spent time with Child's alleged father. Shortly thereafter, Mother had a disagreement with her friend and moved out, leaving her unhoused and unemployed.

[5] In April 2024, DCS alleged Child was a CHINS because Mother lacked housing, was already receiving services through a pending CHINS case, and had a recent positive drug screen. DCS detained Child and placed her in foster care. In the CHINS petition, DCS identified Father as Child's alleged father and attempted to locate him.

[6] On Mother's admission, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS. After a dispositional hearing, the trial court ordered Mother to, among other things: maintain housing with adequate bedding, functioning utilities, and a way to safely store and prepare food; maintain a legal and stable source of income adequate to support the household; complete a substance use assessment and participate in any recommended services; submit to random drug screens as requested by DCS or service providers; refrain from illegal drug use; attend all scheduled medical and mental health appointments and take prescribed medications; attend all scheduled parenting time sessions; and participate in case management services with the goal of obtaining and maintaining long-term housing, income, and transportation. See Ex. Vol. 1 at 85–86. DCS referred Mother for services consistent with the dispositional order.

[7] Mother minimally engaged in services in fall 2024. She completed a substance use assessment, interview, and evaluation. She attended two therapy and life skills training sessions, although they were scheduled for twice per month. She also participated in a few case management sessions. Mother submitted to four drug screens, three of which were negative for illegal substances. She visited with Child inconsistently. For a time, Mother moved in with a boyfriend; but when that relationship ended, her housing again became unstable. She stopped taking her mental health medication in December.

[8] Meanwhile, DCS located Father, and he appeared at Mother's factfinding hearing and submitted to a DNA test to establish paternity. Father admitted to an extensive history of illegal drug use, and FCM DeGroat referred Father to services, including a substance use assessment, father engagement services, drug screens, and supervised visitation. After paternity was established, DCS attempted to assess Father as a placement. But Father was living in a “trap house” and did not want FCM DeGroat to see it because “it wasn't a very good place[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 196. At Father's request, DCS assessed some of Father's family members for relative placement but was unable to place Child in those homes due to pending DCS cases or past DCS history. Father participated in four supervised visits with Child that fall. He tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine on October 20 and December 5.

[9] Father failed to appear at his December factfinding and dispositional hearings. In the dispositional order, the trial court ordered Father to, among other things: contact the FCM at least once per week; allow the FCM to visit his home; keep all scheduled appointments with DCS, CASA, or service providers; maintain housing; maintain a legal and stable source of income; complete a substance use assessment and participate in any recommended services; submit to random drug screens; refrain from illegal controlled substance use; not allow anyone to possess, use, or consume illegal drugs in his home; attend all scheduled parenting time sessions; and participate in father engagement and parenting services with the goal of obtaining and maintaining long-term housing, income, and transportation. See Ex. Vol. 1 at 106–07. DCS referred him to the appropriate services.

[10] By January 2025, neither parent was compliant with the case plan or visiting Child. FCM DeGroat went on medical leave in February, at which time FCM Karen Tomlin took over the case and attempted to reestablish contact and services with Parents. Mother met with FCM Tomlin and informed the caseworker she had engaged with DCS in the past but “slipped back into” active addiction. Tr. Vol. 2 at 81. FCM Tomlin re-referred Mother to services, and Mother visited with Child once in March. Mother was initially “very cooperative” with FCM Tomlin and completed some random drug screens. Id. Three drug screens between February and April 2025 were negative for illicit drug use, but Mother did not show for at least four other requested screens. After a few weeks of meeting with FCM Tomlin, Mother's participation “kind of declined” and her communication with DCS thereafter was “very sporadic.” Id. at 81, 85.

[11] As for Father in this same timeframe, he tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC in February. Father did an intake session with a father engagement provider but said “he didn't think that he needed those services.” Id. at 196.

[12] Parents did not appear at the April 2025 permanency review hearing. That same month, Mother moved to Ohio to live with a boyfriend and largely stopped communicating with DCS. Several service providers attempted to engage with her over the summer, but either she was non-responsive or the provider was unable to deliver services while Mother was out of state. In July, Father was incarcerated on felony charges of dealing in methamphetamine, unlawful carrying of a handgun, and pointing a firearm at another. Although his service referrals remained open, DCS was unable to provide him with services while incarcerated.

[13] In September 2025, Mother refused to submit to a random drug screen. FCM DeGroat, who had since returned from medical leave, was concerned Mother was using illicit substances again based on her behavior and appearance, although no drug screen confirmed those suspicions. As of the October permanency and review hearing, neither parent was compliant with the case plan, engaging in services, or visiting with Child. DCS moved to modify the permanency plan to adoption only. Mother objected, but Father supported the motion.

[14] DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ rights to Child in August 2025, alleging DCS had a satisfactory plan for Child's care (adoption) and termination was in Child's best interests. DCS also alleged that despite its reasonable efforts to reunify the family, Parents were unable to remedy the conditions resulting in Child's removal; there was a reasonable probability Parents would not remedy the conditions resulting in Child's removal; and there was a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's wellbeing. See Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. 2 at 14–15. As to Mother only, DCS also alleged she had a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance which rendered her incapable of caring for Child, and she refused or failed to complete treatment during the two-year period immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition. See id. at 14.

[15] The trial court held a factfinding hearing in October. Numerous service providers testified about Parents’ participation in services. Through the testimony of the scientific director at Cordant Health Solutions, DCS offered the test results of some of Parents’ drug screens. Of the ten test results DCS offered pertaining to Mother, eight were collected in 2022 and 2023 during half-sibling A.C.’s case and before Child's birth. Over Mother's objection for relevancy, the trial court admitted the test results.

[16] Both parents appeared at the hearing and testified. Mother had recently returned to Indiana from Ohio, having left that state after her boyfriend became abusive. After living in her car for three weeks, she was now staying with another friend and working part time as a food delivery driver. She had been looking for work but was having a harder time finding a job than she had in the past. She denied actively using drugs but admitted she had a “pretty extensive” substance use problem. Tr. Vol. 2 at 214. She had not completed treatment. As to her current circumstances, Mother testified frankly: “I can't say that I'm in the best position right now to take care of [Child], but I'm trying.” Id. at 217. She did not have stable housing or sufficient income to support Child.

[17] Father was incarcerated and expected to be so for at least twenty-seven more months. Father, too, was frank about his circumstances, describing his living situation for the last five years as being “in and out of jail” and admitting to having used methamphetamine “[f]or years.” Id. at 226, 228. He stated he once tried going to a substance use treatment program called Recovery Works but left because he “didn't like it.” Id. at 231. Although both FCM DeGroat and his attorney had encouraged him to engage in treatment services, he explained that he was facing a Level 2 felony charge and “just didn't think [he'd] be around” to care for Child. Id. at 232. For this reason, Father declined the substance use treatment and father engagement services offered to him.

[18] At the time of the hearing, Child was two years old and placed in a pre-adoptive home where she was “doing well.” Id. at 194. Child's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) MacKenzie Dunckel stated Child “fit[ ] right in” and was “very comfortable” in the home. Id. at 115. According to Child's foster mother, Child had her own room, attended daycare, and received therapy through First Steps for a mild speech delay.

[19] FCM DeGroat believed termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests because the “reasons for the detention have not be[en] alleviated. [Mother] is still homeless and unemployed. [Father] is going to be incarcerated, he said, for approximately three (3) years[.]” Id. at 199. Similarly, CASA Dunckel recommended termination because “[t]hings have not changed, since we've been involved with [Mother].” Id. at 113. As the CASA explained, Mother

can go through periods of time where she has many, many months of sobriety. But she is still homeless, living out of her car. To my knowledge, she's unemployed. She has not visited with [Child] since March 28th of 2025. And prior to that visit, it was December of 2024. She goes on these bouts where you cannot find her, you cannot get in contact with her. And I don't believe that the reasons for removal have been remedied.

Id.

[20] On January 15, 2026, the trial court found DCS had proven the allegations in the petition by clear and convincing evidence. The court entered its findings and conclusions, stating in relevant part:

B. The DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal or the reasons for the placement outside the parents’ home will not be remedied.

Mother and Father were both offered services to remedy the removal of Child. Parents did not successfully complete their services. Parents were discharged from their services for noncompliance. There is nothing to show that the parents will now cooperate with DCS to remedy the reason Child was removed.

Father had and has criminal charges. Father thought that he was going to be incarcerated for a while so he never participated. Father now is incarcerated and will be for another twenty seven (27) months.

Though Child was not removed from Father, Father could not have Child live with him because he was living in a “trap house” and was currently using drugs․

Unfortunately, Mother cannot remedy the removal of Child. Mother has been inconsistent in her services throughout her CHINS case. Mother was recently homeless and now is living with a friend. Her sole employment is door-dashing. Mother has not presented or shown any consistency as to residency, employment, her services, and more importantly, visitation with Child. Mother last visited with Child on March 28, 2025 – [177] days since the factfinding hearing.

* * *

F. That as to Mother, DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that Mother has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of alcohol or a controlled substance that renders the parent incapable of caring for the child; and has refused or failed to complete available treatment for the alcohol or controlled substance use during the two (2) year period immediately preceding the filing date of this petition.

Mother, through her own admissions, and the evidence presented shows her struggle with substance [use] that makes her incapable of caring for Child. Mother has not completed treatment for her ongoing drug issues during the two (2) year period immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition on August 7, 2025.

Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. 2 at 104–05. Regarding best interests, the trial court concluded:

The DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence termination is in the best interest of the child in that ․ children need permanency.

CASA and DCS agree that termination is in the best interest [of] Child. Child has found permanency with placement. Child is getting her needs met there. DCS has presented evidence and testimony that parent[s] simply are not able to care for Child. Neither parent has been compliant with services, neither parent has seen Child in a long time, and neither parent has made a substantial effort to show otherwise that termination is not in Child's best interest. Child has been removed from Mother for [547] days. Child needs permanency.

Id. at 105. The trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Child.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Mother's drug screen results.

[21] Mother first challenges the admission of eight drug screens (three of them positive for illegal drugs) dated between October 2022 and July 2023, arguing they were irrelevant and prejudicial because they predated the CHINS filing in this case.

The admission of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. An abuse of discretion only occurs where the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. The fact that evidence was erroneously admitted does not automatically require reversal, and we will reverse only if we conclude the admission affected a party's substantial rights. In general, the admission of evidence that is merely cumulative of other evidence amounts to harmless error as such admission does not affect a party's substantial rights.

In re D.B.M., 20 N.E.3d 174, 178–79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), trans. denied.

[22] Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Ind. Evidence Rule 402. But a trial court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. See Evid. R. 403.

[23] In support of the petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, DCS alleged under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(9) that Mother had a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of a controlled substance which rendered her incapable of caring for Child. See Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. 2 at 14. To carry its burden, DCS was required to produce clear and convincing evidence of Mother's history of methamphetamine use. As such, the results of the drug screens administered during A.C.’s CHINS case in the years immediately preceding Child's removal were directly relevant to the current termination proceedings. Further, as DCS points out on appeal, Indiana appellate courts have long recognized that a trial court may consider a parent's historical pattern of conduct, including drug use, when terminating parental rights. See Appellee's Br. at 16 (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013); A.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 61 N.E.3d 1182, 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Even outside the context of a Subsection (d)(9) allegation, such evidence would be relevant to Mother's habitual pattern of conduct which led to Child's removal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the drug screens.

[24] Moreover, even if the trial court erroneously admitted such evidence, the error would not be grounds for reversal in this case. The three positive drug screens were merely cumulative of other unchallenged evidence, including CASA Dunckel's testimony that Mother “had a very bad drug addiction” and Mother's acknowledgment she had a “pretty extensive” substance use problem. Tr. Vol. 2 at 112, 214. Even if erroneous, the trial court's admission of cumulative evidence was harmless as it did not affect Mother's substantial rights.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[25] Parents next argue the trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous. Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230. But “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[26] A decision to terminate parental rights is among the most difficult a trial court is called upon to make. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). These decisions are “among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.” Id. We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We do not reweigh the evidence but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). And we do not judge witness credibility for ourselves, instead giving due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses firsthand. Id. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts supporting them either directly or by inference. In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Trial court findings not challenged on appeal are accepted as true. See In re A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

Statutory Requirements

[27] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2025) (“termination statute”). The State bears the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997).

[28] As to Subsection (d), DCS alleged (and the trial court found) the following subsection (d) circumstances existed as to both Parents:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent [for the requisite time]; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)–(4). Only as to Mother, DCS also alleged the circumstances described in Subsection (d)(9):

(9) That the parent:

(A) has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of alcohol or a controlled substance that renders the parent incapable of caring for the child; and

(B) ․ (i) has refused or failed to complete available treatment for the alcohol or controlled substance use during the two (2) year period immediately preceding the filing date of the petition ․

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(9). If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship and shall enter findings of fact supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c)(1) (2012).

Reasonable Efforts as to Father

[29] First, Father argues DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with Child, “thereby depriving [him] of a meaningful opportunity to remedy the conditions that led to Child's removal and to eliminate any possible threat that [he] posed to Child's well-being.” Appellant Father's Br. at 4. Father describes DCS's efforts as a “nearly complete failure to arrange services” for him. Id. at 12 (formatting removed).

[30] DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families during CHINS proceedings. See I.C. § 31-34-21-5.5 (2025). But the record does not support Father's assertions that DCS failed to arrange services for him. As the trial court found, DCS referred Father to the services required by the dispositional order. At the factfinding hearing, several service providers testified to their attempts to connect with and provide services to him. When Father met with a provider, Father chose not to participate in services. For example, after he met once with the father engagement services provider, “he didn't think that he needed those services” and the provider closed the referral. Tr. Vol. 2 at 196. Although Father admitted to an extensive history of drug use, he did not want to engage with substance use treatment, having tried before but found he “didn't like it.” Id. at 231. The thrust of Father's own testimony was that DCS offered him services, but he declined to participate because he “just didn't think [he'd] be around” to care for Child due to the seriousness of his pending criminal charges. Id. at 232. The trial court credited Father's testimony, finding “Father thought that he was going to be incarcerated for a while so he never participated.” Appellants’ Joint App. Vol. 2 at 104.

[31] Regarding visitation, both FCMs who worked on the case were available to supervise Father's visits with Child. Yet Father visited with Child only four times; his last visit was in December 2024, even though he was not incarcerated until July 2025. Father did not stay in touch with the FCMs and did not attend Child and Family Team Meetings before his incarceration.

[32] As to Father's argument that DCS failed to provide services during his incarceration, FCM DeGroat testified services were not available in the jail. As this Court has previously found, the inability to provide reunification services to a parent while he is incarcerated does not amount to a denial of due process. See In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). And as our Supreme Court has observed, parents who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop or maintain positive and meaningful relationships with their children. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235–36. Further, given Father's overall lack of engagement with services and ambivalence about reunification while he was not in jail, there is no indication in the record that Father would be able to remedy the reasons for Child's removal while he was incarcerated for at least the next twenty-seven months, even if the provision of services were possible. A “parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.” In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citation omitted), trans. denied. Overall, the record is clear that Father, not DCS, failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify with Child.

Mother's Subsection (d) Challenges

[33] Next, Mother argues DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to prove two of the four Subsection (d) circumstances alleged in the termination petition. See Appellant Mother's Br. at 18 (challenging sufficiency of the evidence as to Subsections (d)(3) and (4)). The State responds that Mother has waived any challenge under Subsection (d) because she does not challenge all the trial court's Subsection (d) conclusions.

[34] We agree with the State. Here, the State alleged as to Mother the circumstances under Subsection (d)(2), (3), (4), and (9), and the trial court concluded DCS met its burden on all four. Because subsection (d) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489. As Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusions as to Subsections (d)(2) and (9), her argument under Subsection (d) is waived.

[35] Waiver notwithstanding, we briefly review the trial court's conclusion that DCS established, by clear and convincing evidence, the circumstances alleged under Subsection (d)(3): that there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and placement outside the home will not be remedied. When proving this element, the evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[36] Child was removed from Mother's care due to Mother's housing instability and illicit drug use. Two years later, Mother was in no better position to care for Child than when she was first removed. Although Mother denied active drug use at the time of the factfinding, she had recently refused a random drug screen in September 2025 (after the termination petition was filed). She had not completed services or substance use treatment. She lacked stable housing or sufficient income to support Child. And although she notes her interactions with Child were always appropriate, she had not visited with Child since March 2025. The trial court's conclusion that the conditions that led to Child's placement outside the home were unlikely to be remedied was not clearly erroneous.

Best Interests

[37] Finally, both Parents challenge the trial court's finding that termination was in Child's best interests. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. A child's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[38] FCM DeGroat and CASA Dunckel stated it was in Child's best interests to terminate the parent-child relationship. “Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Considering this evidence and Child's legitimate need for permanency, the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Child's best interests was not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[39] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Mother's drug screens. Clear and convincing evidence supports the court's termination decision.

[40] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Mother's DCS history is relevant here, A.C. is not part of this case. Her CHINS matter closed in April 2025 when the trial court appointed her paternal uncle to be her guardian. In addition, Mother has two other children who are no longer in her care after DCS involvement.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.