IN RE: IN RE: a Child in Need of Services: B.G. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After being adjudicated a child in need of services (CHINS), the trial court ordered B.G's (Child) continued placement in a secure residential facility. Child now appeals the trial court's denial of her pre-adjudication motions to reconsider her placement in a secure residential facility, arguing that the trial court violated her due process rights by ordering her placement in such a facility without a hearing and that the length of such placement exceeded statutory limitations. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) argues that Child's challenges to her pre-adjudication placement in a secure residential facility are moot.

[2] We dismiss.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On March 23, 2025, DCS filed a verified petition alleging Child, then thirteen years old, was a CHINS due to her parents’ failure to provide her “with a safe, stable, appropriate living environment and necessary education.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 20. Child had not been to school in over two months. At a detention hearing on March 24, 2025, the court placed Child under the wardship of DCS and approved Child's placement in relative care, foster care, kinship care, or emergency shelter care. Child was initially placed in foster care, but she ran away from her foster placement. Child was located a week later and placed at Lutherwood as an emergency shelter placement because DCS could not find another foster home in which to place her. On April 23, 2025, the court appointed counsel for Child pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-32-4-2(b).

[4] Child underwent a Maximus Qualified Residential Treatment Program (QRTP) Individual Assessment and the results recommended residential treatment. Based on Child's behaviors, including running away and failing to attend school, the evaluator concluded that Child would benefit from “receiving treatment in a safe and supervised environment provided by a QRTP level of care.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 40. Additionally, the evaluator concluded that Child would benefit from a structured clinical program to treat behavioral and emotional needs, and that Child should receive comprehensive diagnostic evaluations to clarify her diagnosis and better direct treatment. Although Child's mother preferred that Child be placed with her and Child's father wanted Child to be placed with him “when the time is right,” Child's family case manager, therapist, and Guardian ad Litem (GAL) all stated a preference for Child to be placed in a residential treatment program. Id. at 40. This report was filed with the court and sent to all parties, including Child, on May 29, 2025.

[5] On June 5, 2026, DCS filed a motion requesting a change of placement for Child from Lutherwood's emergency shelter to Lutherwood's IMPACT program,¹ which is a secure residential facility with therapeutic aspects. DCS attached an affidavit to the motion emphasizing Child's risk of elopement and human trafficking and stating that Child's therapist and GAL were in agreement with the placement. The court granted the request the same day.

[6] The following day, Child filed a motion to reconsider placement, explaining that “Lutherwood's IMPACT program is conducted in a secure or locked facility, that has many features similar to a detention facility.” Id. at 57-58. She asserted that “because this case is pre-adjudication, placement in the IMPACT Program should not be permitted.” Id. at 59. Child further contended that while I.C. § 31-32-12-1 allows for pre-adjudication mental or physical examination or treatment, such confinement is limited under I.C. § 31-32-12-2 to not more than fourteen days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. Child also contended that authorizing pre-adjudication/pre-disposition confinement for evaluation or treatment for a period of more than fourteen days without the protective features that attach to dispositional hearings was a denial of due process and related protections under the United States and Indiana Constitutions.

[7] On June 9, 2025, Child was moved from emergency shelter care at Lutherwood to the IMPACT program. Child began undergoing a diagnostic and evaluation (D & E) assessment to provide guidance as to what the best setting would be for Child, including whether to continue with the IMPACT program or be moved to a different setting. This assessment was to take between thirty and forty-five days.

[8] At a hearing on July 1, 2025, the trial court addressed Child's motion to reconsider placement, asking Child to give a “two minute thumbnail” of the basis for her motion for reconsideration. Transcript Vol. 2 at 4. Child, by counsel, summarized her arguments and informed the court that Child was willing to do therapeutic services but did not want to be confined in a secure setting such as Lutherwood, which, she noted, is a locked facility that prevented her from leaving. Child requested placement in a foster home or, at a minimum, a less restrictive residential type setting. DCS argued Lutherwood's IMPACT program was the safest place for Child as it reduced her risk of elopement. Child's GAL agreed that placement in the IMPACT program was where Child needed to be given her behavioral issues and risk of elopement. The court denied Child's motion to reconsider placement, expressing concern about Child's behaviors or that Child would suffer “some collateral consequences” from a less restrictive environment. Transcript Vol. 2 at 8.

[9] At the conclusion of the July 1 hearing, DCS noted that if Lutherwood's recommendation following the D & E assessment was that it could not continue to accept Child into their IMPACT program, DCS would determine a different placement. In the meantime, the court ordered DCS to arrange for visitation between Child and her mother.

[10] On July 21, 2025, the court notified the parties that the judicial officer who had reviewed evidence and heard testimony regarding the CHINS matter was unavailable going forward.² At an attorney's conference on August 8, 2025, the parties agreed that the fact-finding process would need to be started anew. The first available date on the court's calendar was December 10, 2025. Child expressed concern over the delay, citing the impact it would have on her ability to timely challenge her placement in the IMPACT program, and objected to the rescheduled hearing as being untimely. The court found that the delay was necessitated by the circumstances as the judge had inherited all of the previous judge's cases.

[11] On August 19, 2025, Child filed a second motion to reconsider placement, primarily stating the same arguments as set out in her first motion. DCS responded, arguing that Child needed the treatment offered by the IMPACT program given her history of elopement, substance abuse, and communications with boys and men she met online. Additionally, DCS acknowledged that Child could not be held in a secure detention facility but argued that Lutherwood did not qualify as such.

[12] The court held a hearing on Child's second motion to reconsider on September 12, 2025. At the outset of the hearing, the court refused Child the opportunity to call Morgan Squyres, a care coordinator at Lutherwood, to testify about the “level of confinement at the Impact program.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 73. Child argued that I.C. §§ 31-32-12-1 and -2 did not allow pre-adjudication confinement lasting longer than fourteen days, but that she had already been confined for nearly ninety days. Child objected to staying in the “confined setting” and asked to be released to either the emergency shelter care part of Lutherwood, or one of the other placements previously authorized by the court. Transcript Vol. 2 at 75. DCS countered that Lutherwood did not fall under the definition of secure detention facility and that there is no statute preventing Child's placement in the IMPACT program. DCS further argued that Child's needs were best met by Lutherwood's IMPACT program because the structured environment ensured her safety and reduced her risk of elopement compared to less restrictive settings.

[13] Child's GAL stated that DCS did not have alternative placement for Child based on safety concerns and her eloping from her former foster home. She was of the opinion that “a less restrictive placement would put [Child's] safety at jeopardy.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 78. She also noted the results of the D & E assessment, which recommended residential treatment at Lutherwood or elsewhere.

[14] Following the September 12 hearing, the court submitted an entry on the chronological case summary stating that Child's second motion to reconsider placement was denied and that the court would issue a formal order. On October 10, 2025, Child filed a motion requesting that the denial of her second motion to reconsider be certified for interlocutory appeal, noting that by rule, the CCS entry denying such triggered her deadline to seek such an appeal. On October 14, 2025, the court denied the motion for certification, stating that such was premature as no formal order had yet been issued.

[15] On December 3, 2025, the court issued a formal order that included findings in support of the denial. A week later, December 10, 2025, the CHINS matter proceeded to a fact-finding hearing during which child's mother admitted Child is a CHINS. The court held a dispositional hearing on January 9, 2026. By that time, Child was making “good progress at Lutherwood” and had requested the court to allow Child's father to have unsupervised visitation with Child upon Lutherwood's recommendation. Transcript Vol. 2 at 86. The court granted Child's request in this regard. While Child acknowledged that she was doing well at Lutherwood, she expressly did not waive her arguments regarding her pre-disposition placement hearings to preserve such issues for appeal. The trial court issued a dispositional order on January 21, 2026, maintaining Child in her current placement in Lutherwood's IMPACT program.

[16] Child now appeals. Additional information will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

[17] Child challenges her pre-adjudication placement in Lutherwood's IMPACT program for a period exceeding fourteen days without a hearing or supporting evidence. She claims the placement was contrary to statute and in violation of her due process rights under the United States and Indiana constitutions. Acknowledging that her challenge is “technically moot,” Child argues that the public-interest exception applies, allowing us to review her claim. Appellant's Brief at 29. DCS requests that Child's appeal be dismissed.

[18] “A case is moot when the controversy at issue has been ended, settled, or otherwise disposed of so that the court can give the parties no effective relief.” E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (citing T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied); see also J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 256 N.E.3d 1260, 1264 (Ind. 2025) (holding an appeal is moot “when the appellate court cannot provide either party with effective relief”). We generally dismiss moot cases. T.W., 121 N.E.3d at 1042 (citing In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991)).

[19] However, a moot case may be decided on its merits when it involves questions of great public interest or when leaving the judgment undisturbed might lead to negative collateral consequences. Matter of A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “Cases falling within the public interest exception [to the mootness doctrine] typically contain issues likely to recur.” Id. “When appellate courts invoke this exception, it results in decisions which are, for all practical purposes, advisory opinions.” I.J. v. State, 178 N.E.3d 798 (Ind. 2022) (cleaned up). Thus, it should be used sparingly. See Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 786 (Ind. 2011) (holding that courts should avoid issuing advisory opinions); but see E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 465 (finding that appellate courts can choose to take moot cases for the public interest exception, but “are not required to issue an opinion in every moot case”).

[20] Here, Child's placement prior to disposition is a moot issue because no effective relief can be rendered to Child. Child's pre-adjudication placement did not change at disposition even after Child had a full evidentiary hearing.³

[21] In Matter of A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, parents challenged the court's probable cause determination that Child was a CHINS and that removal was necessary to protect Child's health. This court found that no relief for child's detention was available from the initial/detention order after child's detention was affirmed by the dispositional order. Id. This court noted that the reason that the public interest exception is often addressed by appellate courts for CHINS adjudications—“the harmful collateral consequences that a CHINS adjudication carries”—does not apply to an initial CHINS probable cause determination. Id.

[22] Here, Child challenges her pre-dispositional placement but she does not challenge the court's order at disposition that Child remain in the IMPACT program. The same analysis as in A.C. applies here because there are no harmful collateral consequences of Child's placement now that she does not object to the same placement after disposition. Even if Child's pre-dispositional rights were infringed, the infringement was harmless because once she had the ability to present her full case and cross-examine witnesses, the placement decision remained unchanged. Because Child does not challenge her current placement, there is nothing for this Court to remedy for Child.

[23] We also find that the circumstances of this case are not likely to recur. Child's age and behavior (especially the fact that she eloped from her first foster placement) made placement in a foster home difficult. Further, the unfortunate timing of a change in judge followed by the fact that Child desired to have the entirety of the evidence heard anew, resulted in a delay of the CHINS fact-finding and subsequent disposition that would seem to be uncharacteristic of CHINS proceedings.

[24] For these reasons, we are unpersuaded that Child's pre-adjudication placement falls within the public interest exception. We therefore dismiss Child's appeal as moot.

[25] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Per an email from a Referral Relations Specialist at Lutherwood, the IMPACT program is located in a “Secure Unit” and is “for victims of Human Trafficking or Child Sexual Exploitation.” Id. at 83.

2.   CHINS fact-finding hearings were held on May 22 and July 1, 2025. Because evidence was not concluded, a third fact-finding hearing was set for July 17, 2025. This third date, however, was cancelled.

3.   On appeal, Child has not provided a transcript of the December 10, 2025, CHINS fact-finding hearing.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.