Steven Eugene Schoffstall, Appellant v. State of Indiana, Appellee (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Steven Eugene Schoffstall appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion to Reduce Bond. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 18, 2026, the State charged Schoffstall with: Count I, child molesting of Person 1 between November 11, 2024, and January 25, 2026, as a level 1 felony; Count II, child molesting of Person 1 between November 11, 2024, and January 25, 2026, as a level 4 felony; Count III, child molesting of Person 2 between March 4, 2022, and March 4, 2024, as a level 1 felony; Count IV, child molesting of Person 2 between March 4, 2022, and March 4, 2024, as a level 4 felony; Count V, child molesting of Person 3 between July 5, 2011, and July 5, 2014, as a class C felony; and Count VI, child molesting of Person 4 between March 14, 2005, and March 14, 2013, as a class C felony.

[3] According to the probable cause affidavit, Person 1 was nine years old when interviewed in March 2026, and reported she “was touched improperly by grandpa,” she “described the touching as under and over the clothes, on the outside of the vaginal area and inside of the vagina by [Schoffstall's] hands and fingers,” “[t]hese incidents happened several times at the home of [Schoffstall],” and “one of the times of child molesting was inside of [Schoffstall's] garage.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 14-15. The affidavit indicated that Person 2 was fourteen years old when interviewed and reported “that Grandpa Steven Schoffstall, had molested [her] while inside the home of [Schoffstall's] living room area on the couch,” she described the touching as under and over the clothes, on the “outside of the vaginal area and inside of the vagina by [Schoffstall's] hands and fingers,” and “it happened 3 or 4 years ago.” Id. at 15.

[4] The affidavit indicated Person 3 was twenty-four years old when interviewed and reported Schoffstall “had molested them.” Id. at 17. “Person 3 advised that [Schoffstall] is the great uncle to Person 4.” Id. “Person 3 advised the first time they remembered was [Schoffstall] giving them baths and had Person 4 bend over at the waist and touch their toes.” Id. “Person 3 said [Schoffstall] had Person 4 spread with their hands their butt cheeks apart as if he was looking at their bottoms.” Id. “Person 3 went on to say that while staying at [Schoffstall's] home ․ [Schoffstall] would have [P]erson 3 lay face down straddled with their legs open while [Schoffstall] was sitting in the recliner chair open with Person 3's legs around [Schoffstall's] belly.” Id. “Person 3 reported [Schoffstall] would have a blanket covering over them and would reach up under the blanket rubbing on Person 3's vagina area.” Id. “Person 3 said this went on from ages 10-13 years old, on several occasions.” Id. The affidavit further stated Person 4 was twenty-five years old when interviewed. “Person 4 said that the earliest memory of [Schoffstall] touching [her] was around kindergarten age.” Id. Person 4 stated Schoffstall “had [her] take a bath and bend over at the knees spreading open their butt cheeks to see if they had gotten hurt while playing that day,” he “would ask if [she] wanted a back rub, then rub their butt and breast area,” “this went on almost every weekend while staying at [Schoffstall's] home,” and Schoffstall “would touch and rub [her] vagina area, and breast area.” Id. at 17-18.

[5] The trial court issued a warrant for Schoffstall's arrest and ordered, “bail is hereby fixed in the amount of “$75,000No10.” Id. at 19. On March 19, 2026, the court issued an order indicating it had held an initial hearing and stating, “Bond remains set in the amount of $75,000.00, 10% cash NOT PERMITTED, NO PROFESSIONAL BOND.” Id. at 20.

[6] On March 25, 2026, Schoffstall filed a Motion to Reduce Bond. On April 9, 2026, the court held a hearing. Schoffstall testified that he was seventy-one years old, had lived at his address for over fifty years, and had lived in Vigo County his entire life. He testified he lived with his wife, daughter, and his daughter's two sons who were seventeen and twenty-five years old. He indicated he is retired and worked most of his career driving trucks as a C.D.L. driver. He testified that he did not have any criminal history, and when asked if he had any juvenile delinquency, he stated, “misdemeanor stuff. Kid stuff.” Transcript Volume II at 9. He testified, “I've got heart problems,” “[b]oth my knees have been replaced,” “probably had twenty-four (24), twenty-five (25) surgeries since I hit fifty (50), [ ] most of them major surgeries,” “knee surgery; eye surgery; [ ] carotid artery surgery both sides; [ ] both my shoulders, twice; both my hands, three (3) times on one and two (2) on the other,” and “had a stent put in also.” Id. at 9-10. He indicated he took medicine for his heart and for diabetes. When asked if he was receiving his medications in jail, he stated “sometimes” and “not every time.” Id. at 11. When asked if he was “supposed to be on oxygen at night,” he replied affirmatively and indicated that he was not “getting that at the jail.” Id. When asked if he was able to afford to post bond in the amount of $75,000, he answered “[n]o way,” and when asked if he was requesting the court to “allow the posting of ten percent (10%) bond, or alternatively to [ ] place [him] on home detention if the Court felt that was necessary,” he replied “[i]f I could get it, yes sir.” Id.

[7] The prosecutor argued “bond is appropriately set in this matter,” there are level 1 felony child molesting charges pending, there are molesting charges involving four different victims, and there was a pattern of behavior spanning more than twenty years. Id. at 13. Schoffstall's counsel argued “the factors [ ] under the bond statute weigh [ ] in favor of allowing a [ ] ten percent (10%) bond,” Schoffstall was “a lifelong resident of Vigo County [ ] with a home in West Terre Haute that he's lived at for fifty (50) years,” “he had a strong employment history prior to retiring,” he was seventy-one years old, he had strong family ties, he had no criminal history, and he had never failed to appear. Id. at 14. Schoffstall's spouse indicated that her daughter and two grandsons lived with her and that they were in favor of Schoffstall being bonded out and coming home.

[8] On April 10, 2026, the court issued an order stating, “[t]he Court having heard the evidence and taking the matter under advisement now denies bond/placement modification.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 25.

Discussion

[9] Schoffstall challenges the trial court's denial of his Motion to Reduce Bond. “An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a trial court's bail determination.” DeWees v. State, 180 N.E.3d 261, 264 (Ind. 2022). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.

[10] Ind. Code § 35-33-8-4(b) provides that “[b]ail may not be set higher than that amount reasonably required to assure the defendant's appearance in court or to assure the physical safety of another person or the community if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community.” The statute also provides that, in setting bail, “the judicial officer shall consider the bail guidelines described in section 3.8 of this chapter[¹ ] and take into account all facts relevant to the risk of nonappearance,” including:

(1) the length and character of the defendant's residence in the community;

(2) the defendant's employment status and history and the defendant's ability to give bail;

(3) the defendant's family ties and relationships;

(4) the defendant's character, reputation, habits, and mental condition;

(5) the defendant's criminal or juvenile record, insofar as it demonstrates instability and a disdain for the court's authority to bring the defendant to trial;

(6) the defendant's previous record in not responding to court appearances when required or with respect to flight to avoid criminal prosecution;

(7) the nature and gravity of the offense and the potential penalty faced, insofar as these factors are relevant to the risk of nonappearance;

(8) the source of funds or property to be used to post bail or to pay a premium, insofar as it affects the risk of nonappearance;

(9) that the defendant is a foreign national who is unlawfully present in the United States under federal immigration law; and

(10) any other factors, including any evidence of instability and a disdain for authority, which might indicate that the defendant might not recognize and adhere to the authority of the court to bring the defendant to trial.

Ind. Code § 35-33-8-4(b).

[11] Ind. Code § 35-33-8-5 governs the alteration of bail and provides:

(a) Upon a showing of good cause, the state or the defendant may be granted an alteration or revocation of bail by application to the court before which the proceeding is pending. In reviewing a motion for alteration or revocation of bail, credible hearsay evidence is admissible to establish good cause.

* * * * *

(c) When the defendant presents additional evidence of substantial mitigating factors, based on the factors set forth in section 4(b) of this chapter, which reasonably suggests that the defendant recognizes the court's authority to bring the defendant to trial, the court may reduce bail. However, the court may not reduce bail if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the factors described in IC 35-40-6-6(1)(A) and IC 35-40-6-6(1)(B)[2] exist or that the defendant otherwise poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community.

[12] Schoffstall contends “[t]he only factor against a reduction of bond is factor 7, the potential penalty [he] faces if convicted” and “all of the other factors weigh strongly in [his] favor.” Appellant's Brief at 12. He argues he is seventy-one years old, lived at the same address for fifty years, is retired but spent his life driving semitrucks, has strong family ties, has no adult criminal history, has never failed to appear in court, and has significant health issues. The State argues that the court did not abuse its discretion and that Schoffstall faces a lengthy sentence if convicted.

[13] With respect to the nature and gravity of the offenses and the potential penalty faced, the probable cause affidavit alleges as set forth above that Schoffstall molested four girls over a period of many years. The State charged Schoffstall with two counts of child molesting as level 1 felonies, two counts of child molesting as level 4 felonies, and two counts of child molesting as class C felonies. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 provides that a person who commits a level 1 felony child molesting offense shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty and fifty years with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 provides that a person who commits a level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two and twelve years with the advisory sentence being six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 provides that a person who commits a class C felony, for a crime committed before July 1, 2014, shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two and eight years with the advisory sentence being four years. A potential lengthy sentence tends to increase the risk that a defendant will fail to appear for trial. See DeWees, 180 N.E.3d at 270 (noting crime defendant allegedly committed carried maximum penalty of thirty years and observing “[s]uch a potentially lengthy sentence ‘tends to increase the risk that [the defendant] will fail to appear for trial’ and this ‘cuts substantially against [the] argument that the trial court abused its discretion’ by denying a motion to reduce bail”) (quoting Sneed v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1255, 1258-1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Ind. Code § 35-33-8-4(b)(7))).

[14] Schoffstall testified as to his age, prior employment, residence, health issues, and lack of adult criminal history. The court heard the evidence and was able to consider those factors together with the nature and gravity of the charged offenses and the potential penalty he faced. In light of the gravity of the offenses, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Schoffstall's Motion to Reduce Bond. See generally id. at 271 (“To be sure, several factors—DeWees's strong family ties, her lack of criminal record, and no evidence of past bad character—certainly militate against denying DeWees's motion. But when, like here, the trial court followed the appropriate procedural safeguards and the evidence provides sufficient support for its ruling, we refrain from interfering with the trial court's discretion—even when, like here, we consider it a close call.”).³

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-33-8-3.8(a) provides that “[a] court shall consider the results of the Indiana pretrial risk assessment system (if available) before setting or modifying bail for an arrestee.”

2.   Ind. Code § 35-40-6-6(1)(A) and (B) provide:(A) that an act or threat of physical violence or intimidation has been made against the victim or the immediate family of the victim; and(B) that the act or threat described in clause (A) has been made by the defendant or at the direction of the defendant; ․

3.   Schoffstall cites Winn v. State, 973 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and Lopez v. State, 985 N.E.2d 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Winn was charged with thirteen counts of burglary, and the trial court set his bail at $25,000 cash. Winn, 973 N.E.2d at 654. On appeal from the denial of Winn's motion for bond reduction, this Court found that, “[w]hile the severity of the thirteen charges arguably supports the setting of bail in the amount of $25,000, the absence of any other factors suggesting [Winn] was a flight risk leads us to conclude the trial court should have granted Winn's request to deposit an amount not less than 10 percent of bail ․” Id. at 656 (citation and quotations omitted). Lopez was charged with numerous crimes including corrupt business influence and fraud, and the trial court set his bond at $3,000,000 surety plus $250,000 cash. Lopez, 985 N.E.2d at 360. On appeal from the denial of Lopez's motion to reduce bond, this Court found the trial court's order was “excessive and more than necessary to assure Lopez's presence in court.” Id. at 362. We find Winn and Lopez distinguishable.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur