V.E., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] V.E. appeals the juvenile court's order committing him to the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). V.E. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by making him a ward of the DOC because that disposition does not serve the goal of rehabilitation, is not the least restrictive alternative, is not in his best interest, and is not necessary for community safety.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On December 10, 2024, at approximately 10:30 p.m., D.G. reported to the Anderson Police Department (APD) that her fourteen-year-old son, V.E., ran away from home after he made suicidal statements. Although responding officers could not locate V.E. as they searched the vicinity, D.G. contacted APD again around 12:45 a.m. and informed dispatch that she had tracked V.E.’s phone to a nearby gas station.

[4] An APD officer went to that location, saw V.E., and identified himself as a police officer. D.G. arrived shortly thereafter and V.E. refused several verbal commands from her and the police officer directing him to return home with D.G. V.E. was then taken into custody and was alleged to have committed the offenses of resisting law enforcement and leaving home without permission of his parent (Cause 324). V.E. was subsequently released to the custody of D.G.

[5] On December 29, 2024, at approximately 11:00 p.m., an APD officer responded to a vehicle crash with unknown injuries. The caller reported seeing two black male teenagers wearing sweatpants and hoodies exit the vehicle and run from the crash site. When the responding officers arrived, they saw three black juvenile males (the Suspects) flee the scene. Although the officers identified themselves as police officers and ordered the Suspects to stop, they continued to run. While searching the area, one of the officers found V.E. lying in some bushes. V.E. was taken into custody for resisting law enforcement.

[6] At a detention hearing on January 3, 2025, the juvenile court noted that D.G. was not in town. Thus, V.E. was ordered to remain in secure detention at the Madison County Youth Center (Youth Center) until D.G. returned and funds became available for electronic monitoring.

[7] On January 8, 2025, the State filed three petitions alleging that V.E. was a delinquent child under Cause 324, Cause 336 (violating the terms of his release), and Cause 341 (resisting law enforcement on December 29, 2024) (collectively, the Offenses). V.E.’s initial hearing on the Offenses took place on January 14, 2025, at which time the juvenile court released V.E. to D.G.’s custody and placed him on home detention.

[8] On March 22, 2025, D.G. filed a missing person's report with APD, alleging that V.E. had left her residence three days earlier. The juvenile court issued a bench warrant for V.E. for violating his conditional release. V.E. was subsequently apprehended, and the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing on March 28, 2025. A probation officer reported that V.E. had tested positive for marijuana at the Youth Center. Thus, the juvenile court ordered V.E. to remain there, determining that it was unlikely that V.E. would appear for subsequent hearings and that detention was essential “to protect [V.E.]” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 46-47.

[9] On April 11, 2025, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on the Offenses. At that hearing, V.E. entered into a plea agreement with the State, where he admitted committing most of the Offenses. In turn, the State dismissed one count of resisting law enforcement and violating conditional release under Cause 336. The juvenile court ordered V.E. to remain in detention until the next court date and to undergo a mental health evaluation.

[10] At a dispositional hearing on May 20, 2025, the juvenile court ordered V.E. to supervised probation that required his participation in home-based case management services, a substance abuse assessment, GPS electronic monitoring for ninety days, and family therapy. Following a review hearing on August 15, 2025, V.E. was removed from GPS electronic monitoring and placed on home detention. The juvenile court also ordered placement of V.E. with his aunt, C.G.

[11] On August 22, 2025, a social worker at Anderson High School informed the APD school resource officer of an incident where a female student told the social worker that a video of her masturbating was being shown to other students at the school. The female student described the video as a “screen recording of a FaceTime taken without her permission,” and she identified V.E. as the individual who had shown it to at least ten other students. Id. at 98.

[12] When V.E. was questioned about the incident, he voluntarily gave his phone to the school social worker and stated that he had received the video from another student. V.E. was taken into custody and transported to the Youth Center. That same day, V.E. admitted to possessing child pornography, and the juvenile court ordered V.E. detained. The probation department then filed a petition for modification of the dispositional decree.

[13] On August 26, 2025, the juvenile court held an initial hearing for violation of probation and a detention hearing. V.E. denied any responsibility for the August 22 incident, and the juvenile court ordered V.E. to have no access to electronic devices including cell phones and computers. V.E. was released to home detention with C.G., and the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing.

[14] On September 28, 2025, an APD officer investigated an allegation that V.E. sexually assaulted a teenage girl a week earlier at a party. The victim reported to police that on the evening of September 20, 2025, she saw V.E. walking through a crowd lifting his shirt and displaying a firearm during a party in a local park. The victim stated that V.E. approached and ordered her to “[c]ome here” while displaying the firearm under his shirt. Id. at 131. V.E. then began touching the victim's vagina and breasts through her clothing. Although the victim told V.E. to stop, he told her to “shut up” and groped her without her consent. Id. A few days later, the victim reported the incident to the school secretary, and she identified V.E. as the perpetrator.

[15] The APD officer who was investigating the matter discovered V.E.’s Instagram account—“Balin4vdoe”—on October 2, 2025. The officer knew that “Vdoe” was V.E.’s “street name.” Id. at 132. The officer saw a “story” posted to the account where V.E. was talking about having a “blicky”—the street term for a gun—and “something” could be seen in his waistband. Id. There were also photos of V.E. vaping with text that read, “[g]ood Za[¹ ] tap in.” Id. This language led the officer to believe that V.E. was selling marijuana, and he reported his findings to V.E.’s probation officer. When V.E.’s probation officer contacted C.G. on October 2, she advised that V.E. ran away because of the ongoing investigation.

[16] The next day, the investigating APD officer noticed that V.E. posted a new photo on social media of himself standing in front of a mirror in C.G.’s living room. Although V.E. had attempted to cover something in his hand, “[y]ou could still see the bottom of the grip of a [gun] with the magazine sticking out.” Id. The juvenile court issued a warrant for V.E.’s detention on October 2, 2025. V.E. was apprehended and detained, and on October 7, the probation department filed an amended petition for modification, alleging that

1. The victim of a sexual battery identified V.E. as the perpetrator.

2. V.E.’s social media showed a photo of him with a firearm, drug paraphernalia, and vapes.

3. C.G. reported V.E. as a runaway.

4. V.E. was verbally offensive and disrespectful to detention center staff and the arresting officer when he was detained on October 6.

5. V.E. tampered with his intake drug screen by adding water to the sample.

6. V.E. tested presumptively positive for marijuana on October 7 when they readministered the test.

Id. at 128-29.

[17] V.E. denied the allegations and the juvenile court set an evidentiary hearing for October 24, 2025. V.E. was also ordered to remain in secure detention until the evidentiary hearing, because it was “in the best interest of [V.E.] to be removed from the home environment and remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of [V.E.]” Id. at 135.

[18] On October 14, 2025, a supervisor at the Youth Center responded to “aggressive behavior” coming from V.E.’s cell. Transcript Vol. II at 148. V.E. threatened to kill the supervisor as other personnel tried to deescalate V.E.’s behavior. V.E. then began to kick his cell door, yell profanities, and made further threats that he was going to kill the supervisor and other detention staff. V.E. was subdued after officers pepper sprayed him.

[19] A week later, V.E. attempted to cover a surveillance camera in his cell with wet toilet paper. After V.E. refused orders to remove the toilet paper, several officers entered his cell. V.E. threw his “hard plastic” lunch tray at the supervisor, striking him in the face. Id. at 137-38. Officers then pepper sprayed V.E, which allowed them to cuff V.E.’s hands and feet. V.E. again threatened the supervisor, stating that he was going to kill him and his family.

[20] At the October 24 modification hearing on the probation violations, V.E., pursuant to an agreement with the State, admitted the allegations in the amended petition for modification except for the allegation involving sexual battery and possession of child pornography, which the State dismissed. Four days later, the State filed two new delinquency petitions against V.E. (Cause 281 and Cause 283) regarding the Youth Center incidents. Cause 283 alleged one count of battery against a public safety officer, a Level 6 felony, and intimidation, a Level 6 felony. Cause 281 alleged that V.E. committed three separate counts of intimidation, all Level 6 felonies.

[21] The juvenile court held an initial hearing on Cause 283 and Cause 281 on November 18, 2025. At that hearing, the probation department noted that V.E.’s mental health assessment concluded that V.E. “is capable of controlling his behavior and is aware of the effects his behavior has on others.” Id. at 117-18. The probation department also informed the juvenile court that it had contacted five potential secure residential treatment facilities for V.E., but they all refused to accept V.E. because of his physical aggression and the risk of safety to staff and other residents. V.E. denied the allegations and the juvenile court stayed the modification hearing until the Cause 281 and Cause 283 petitions were adjudicated.

[22] The juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing on the Cause 281 and Cause 283 petitions on December 5, 2025, at which time the State presented evidence of V.E.’s delinquent behavior at the detention center in October. After hearing the evidence, the juvenile court entered judgments of delinquency on both petitions.

[23] Although the juvenile court expressed a desire to place V.E. in a residential facility, it noted that no facility would accept V.E. because of his violent behavior and the risks that he would pose to staff and other residents. The juvenile court told V.E. that “you know right from wrong,” and noted that he continued to threaten others and violate probation despite knowing it was wrong. Id. at 185-86. The juvenile court observed that while V.E. was provided with “multiple breaks,” he continued to violate the court's orders. Id. at 186. It further noted that the Youth Center could not provide V.E. with the required psychological help but that the DOC was equipped to do so. Thus, the juvenile court determined that the sole option it had was to declare V.E. a ward of the DOC.

[24] V.E. now appeals. Additional information will be provided as needed.

Discussion and Decision

[25] V.E. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in making him a ward of the DOC. A juvenile court generally enjoys “wide latitude and great flexibility” in juvenile matters, and its placement decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. K.S. v. State, 114 N.E.3d 849, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the decision reflects a misapplication of the law. J.Q.R. v. State, 252 N.E.3d 919, 924 (Ind. 2025).

[26] The juvenile court's discretion with placement decisions is regulated by statute. R.A. v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). In placing a delinquent child, the juvenile court must exercise its discretion within the parameters of Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6. This statute provides, among other things, that “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that is in the least restrictive ․ and most appropriate setting available; and ․ imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child․” Id.

[27] Although the juvenile court is required to select the least restrictive placement that is appropriate, it is recognized that in certain situations “the best interest of the child is better served by more restrictive placements.” M.M. v. State, 189 N.E.3d 1163, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). And even if a less harsh option may exist at the time of a juvenile's disposition, commitment to a suitable public institution might still be in the best interest of the juvenile and of society. D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Placement in a DOC facility is not a punishment, but ensures that the juvenile “receives, in a secure environment, the extended rehabilitative counseling” that he needs. M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[28] In this case, fourteen-year-old V.E. initially became involved in the juvenile justice system in December 2024, when he ran away from home. When confronted by law enforcement, he was taken into custody after refusing to comply with the police officer's directive to return home with D.G.

[29] A short time later, V.E. resisted law enforcement after fleeing the scene of an automobile accident. At a detention hearing in January 2025, the juvenile court released V.E. from electronic monitoring to home detention. V.E., however, violated the conditions of his release approximately one week later when he used marijuana and again ran away from home.

[30] At V.E.’s dispositional hearing on May 20, 2025, the juvenile court released V.E. from detention so he could take advantage of various court programs and services to correct his behavior. Three months later, however, V.E. was taken into custody for multiple probation violations. The juvenile court then released V.E. to home detention with his aunt. The juvenile court ordered that V.E. have no access to electronic devices, including cell phones and computers.

[31] In September 2025, a female victim identified V.E. as the individual who inappropriately fondled her in a park while he was armed with a handgun. While that investigation was ongoing, an APD officer discovered V.E.’s Instagram account under a “street name” that displayed images of what was thought to be a concealed firearm and an advertisement for selling marijuana. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 131-32. After being taken into custody for those offenses, V.E. tampered with his drug screen and subsequently tested positive for marijuana.

[32] While in secure detention, V.E. battered and threatened to kill the staff and their families on three separate occasions. The State charged V.E. accordingly and he was adjudicated delinquent. V.E.’s violent and noncompliant behavior did not cease regardless of his placement. He continued to commit offenses, including battery against public safety officials and intimidation.

[33] In light of V.E.’s continued year-long pattern of delinquency, it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that granting wardship of V.E. to the DOC was “consistent with the safety of the community as well as in the best interest and special needs of the child” because it was “not realistic for [V.E.] to be released out into [the] community.” Id. at 148. See, e.g., A.C. v. State, 144 N.E.3d 810, 813-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (finding no abuse of discretion in making the juvenile a ward of the DOC when he continued to violate probation and did not respond positively to a residential treatment program).

[34] The evidence also established that the DOC was the only viable placement for V.E. because alternative placements options were exhausted. To be sure, V.E. was rejected from five residential treatment facilities because of his violent behavior, and it was determined that his relatives were not able to provide for him. Moreover, as the juvenile court determined, the Youth Center could not adequately provide the treatment that V.E. needed. See, e.g., J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (finding no abuse of discretion in ordering DOC wardship when other options failed to rehabilitate the child), trans. denied.

[35] Notwithstanding the above, V.E. maintains that “special circumstances”— including his mental health and some unresolved grief regarding the death of his father—warrants a less harsh disposition. Appellant's Brief at 13-15. While the juvenile court considered V.E.’s grief, it determined that the severity and escalation of V.E.’s conduct over the course of more than a year warranted the disposition that it imposed. Moreover, the record demonstrates that the mental health treatment that V.E. had received was insufficient to address his needs or curtail his delinquent behavior.

[36] By the time of the dispositional order on December 5, 2025, V.E.’s ongoing pattern of delinquent conduct supported the juvenile court's conclusion that a structured DOC placement was necessary to protect the community and give V.E. the best opportunity for rehabilitation. For these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in making V.E. a ward of the DOC.

[37] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Za” is slang for marijuana and “tap in” is slang for “message me.” Id. at 132.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.