Norman D. Henson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After a jury found Norman Henson guilty of Level 5 felony dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance and Henson admitted to being a habitual offender, the trial court imposed an aggregate twelve-year sentence, consisting of a six-year sentence on the underlying Level 5 felony enhanced by another six years for being a habitual offender. Henson appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing; and (3) his sentence is inappropriate and should be revised under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support Henson's conviction and the trial court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing. Moreover, though the nature of Henson's present offense was not violent or heinous and didn't involve a large quantity of drugs, the evidence showed that he was engaged in repeated acts of drug dealing, and he has failed to demonstrate good character traits that make his sentence inappropriate. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2024, Wabash County Sheriff Deputy Devin Bechtold was investigating Amber Parsons for suspected drug activity. When a search warrant was executed at Parsons’ home during that investigation, she was found in possession of methamphetamine and alprazolam.¹ Thereafter, she was charged with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance under Cause No. 85C01-2408-F6-875.²

[4] After Parsons was charged with those crimes, she expressed interest in serving as a confidential informant. Bechtold agreed and asked Parsons to make a list of people she thought could be targets of controlled drug buys. Parsons identified Henson as one such person and arranged to purchase alprazolam from him on August 30, 2024. On that date, Parsons purchased fifty alprazolam pills from Henson for $250. The State then charged Henson with one count of Level 5 felony dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance ³ and filed notice of its intent to seek a habitual offender sentence enhancement.⁴

[5] Henson's two-day jury trial was scheduled to begin on February 10, 2026. That morning, the sheriff's department received a tip that Henson was fleeing the state to avoid trial. Around 8:30 a.m.—the same time Henson had been ordered to appear in court—deputies found him and his adult daughter filling the tank of their vehicle at a gas station. From there, the deputies followed as Henson and his daughter drove into the adjacent county. The deputy prosecutor asked the sheriff deputies following Henson to detain him, so they pulled him over near Akron, Indiana at around 8:46 a.m. Henson had a packed suitcase and duffel bag in the back seat, and his daughter told the deputies that she and Henson were driving to North Carolina. Henson told the deputies a different story, specifically that “he was going [to Akron] to talk to a lady to get some evidence for court ․” Transcript Vol. 2 at 101. Henson was arrested and taken to the Wabash County Courthouse to begin his trial.

[6] The State called Bechtold as its first witness. Bechtold testified that since 2023, he had been assigned to the drug task force of the Wabash County Sheriff's Department. Bechtold executed a search warrant at Parsons’ home after she was the subject of two controlled drug buys. Bechtold subsequently recruited her to be a confidential informant. Bechtold explained the confidential informant process as follows:

[M]ost of the time, a confidential informant is someone that actually has pending criminal charges. A lot of times through that, we'll have some sort of contract with them or tell them ․ in an agreement when we first meet on how many people they need to get for us in order to either lessen their charges or dismiss their charges.

Id. at 122. Bechtold uses confidential informants to conduct controlled drug buys. He testified that the normal process for conducting a controlled drug buy involves meeting with the confidential informant shortly before the buy, searching the informant to make sure she is not in possession of money or drugs, and providing the informant traceable currency with which to purchase drugs from the target.

[7] On August 29, 2024, Parsons informed Bechtold that she had arranged to purchase alprazolam from Henson the next day, but she did not tell Bechtold what time the buy would take place. On the 30th, Bechtold was in the middle of conducting a different controlled buy with another confidential informant when Parsons called him to say that Henson was on the way to her house. Bechtold and another deputy “tried to rush [to Parsons’ home] as quick as [they] could to get [there] prior to [Henson].” Id. at 130. However, a few minutes before Bechtold arrived, Parsons called him again and said that Henson was already at her house. Consequently, Bechtold could not meet with Parsons before the buy, and he did not conduct a pre-buy search of Parsons.

[8] When Bechtold pulled up to Parsons’ residence in an unmarked vehicle, he saw Henson's pickup truck parked in the driveway. Henson was sitting in the driver's seat, and Parsons was standing near the passenger side. Bechtold— who was in plain clothes—exited his vehicle, met with Parsons outside of Henson's truck, and gave her $250 in traceable cash. Parsons got into the passenger seat of Henson's vehicle, and Bechtold watched Parsons and Henson's subsequent interaction while standing near the open passenger door. Bechtold held a camera down by his side, a recording from which was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 4. Bechtold testified that he “watched [Parsons] hand over the money to [Henson]” before the pair “mess[ed] around near the center console area[.]” Id. at 134. He “then ․ observed a clear plastic baggie with a bunch of blue pills in it[,]” which Henson gave to Parsons. Id.

[9] Parsons got out of Henson's truck and, as Henson remained in the driveway, she walked with Bechtold into her house. Bechtold took the plastic baggie and searched her “to make sure there was no extra U.S. currency, money, anything illegal located on her person.” Id. at 135. Finding nothing on her, Bechtold handed Parsons the camera and told her that he and the other deputy were going to leave and would be monitoring the camera's live feed. Parsons then went back outside, got into Henson's truck, and continued to speak with him after the deputies left the scene. During that conversation, Parsons asked Henson if he would be able to get her more “bars.” State's Ex. 4, file SCI24-139, at 05:59-06:01. Henson said yes and explained that he would also be able to sell her more “blues” because he had “plenty of them left.” Id. at 06:21-06:28. “Bars” and “blues” are slang terms referring to alprazolam.

[10] After Bechtold, the State called Andrew England, a drug analyst with the Indiana State Police Forensic Services Division. England testified that he performed a laboratory analysis on the baggie of pills Henson gave to Parsons. Based on that analysis, England concluded that the baggie contained fifty alprazolam tablets with a net weight of 6.51 grams. After England's testimony, the State rested its case-in-chief.

[11] Henson re-called Bechtold as his sole witness. Henson's attorney asked Bechtold about the details of various drug charges filed against Parsons before digging deeper into why Bechtold did not perform his normal pre-buy routine with Parsons. Bechtold also clarified that he did not see Henson hand Parsons the pills, explaining,

The only parts that I saw from the truck when she got in, she laid the money there, and then while I'm standing outside the truck glancing in, at some point, I did see a baggie with the pills on the center console area.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 225. When asked if he knew whether the baggie came from Parsons or Henson, Bechtold said he “did not see who set them on the console.” Id.

[12] After Bechtold's testimony, Henson rested his case, and the State indicated that it had no rebuttal evidence. The jury heard closing arguments from the State and the defense, received final instructions from the court, and after short deliberations, found Henson guilty of Level 5 felony dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance. Henson waived jury trial on the habitual offender enhancement and admitted to being a habitual offender. The trial court accepted that admission, entered a judgment of conviction on the guilty verdict and habitual offender admission, and ordered the State to prepare a presentencing investigation report (PSI).

[13] The State filed the PSI on March 2, 2026. The PSI indicated that Henson's criminal history spanned several decades from 1989 to 2026 and had resulted in eight prior felony and five prior misdemeanor convictions. Henson had another felony case pending under Cause No. 85CO1-2602-F6-156, which involved a Level 6 felony failure to appear charge stemming from his attempt to flee the state before the start of his trial here. The PSI also twice noted that Henson told the probation officer conducting the pre-sentence investigation “that he does not have any physical health issues.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 90, 98.

[14] At the start of Henson's sentencing hearing on March 12, 2026, Henson's attorney told the trial court that he had no “comments or corrections” to make to the PSI. Tr. Vol. 3 at 31. He also said he had no “alternative written statements[,] ․ testimony[,] or evidence” to present, and instead would simply provide a brief argument. Id. During that argument, Henson's attorney claimed that though Henson said otherwise during the pre-sentence investigation, his “health is not actually that good.” Id. at 32. Henson's attorney claimed that Henson “has a lower back problem that's been recommended for surgery” and explained that his “clients ․ seldom get the medical care they need” while incarcerated. Id. The defense asked for an aggregate sentence of six years, arguing that “[t]he amount [of alprazolam] involved was relatively small[.]” Id.

[15] The State asked that Henson receive a total executed sentence of twelve years, the maximum permitted by statute. It argued there were several aggravating circumstances, including Henson's extensive criminal history, his attempt to flee the state on the first day of his jury trial, and that his trial “was a complete waste of time” given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at 34. The trial court declined to recognize Henson's failure to plead guilty as an aggravator but noted that Henson's insistence on going to trial “was ․ pretty ridiculous” because “[t]he evidence was overwhelming.” Id. at 35.

[16] Ultimately, the court imposed a six-year sentence on the underlying Level 5 conviction, enhanced by another six years on the habitual offender enhancement, for a total executed sentence of twelve years. In a written sentencing statement, the court found that Henson's “significant criminal history” and “attempt[ ] to flee [the] jurisdiction” were aggravating factors, and it found no mitigating circumstances. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 26 (capitalization omitted). The court recommended Henson for Purposeful Incarceration and ordered that upon completion of that program, it would “consider a motion for modification of [Henson's] sentence if appropriate and if agreed upon by the State ․”⁵ Id. at 27.

[17] Henson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[18] Henson first argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that it is the fact-finder's role, not ours, “to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). Additionally, “[w]e consider only the evidence most favorable to” the conviction, together with any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could have found “the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[19] To convict Henson of Level 5 dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance as alleged, the State had to prove that he “knowingly or intentionally ․ deliver[ed] ․ a controlled substance ․, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule IV” and that “the amount of the drug involved [was] at least five (5) grams but less than ten (10) grams[.]” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-3(a)(1)(C), (d)(1) (2019). Henson disputes only the element of delivery, and he argues “the [S]tate failed to present sufficient [evidence] that he sold the drugs in question.” Appellant's Brief at 14. According to Henson, the fact that Bechtold failed to perform a pre-buy search of Parsons “call[s] into question the true source of where the contraband emanated from.” Id. In other words, Henson claims that Parsons may have had the alprazolam in her possession before the buy occurred.

[20] Henson has cited no case law to support this argument, much less a case holding that a drug dealing conviction cannot be sustained where officers failed to conduct a pre-buy search of a confidential informant. As the State notes in its brief, one case on point is Watson v. State, where this Court reversed a conviction because the confidential informant was not searched before the controlled buy and did not testify at the defendant's trial.. 839 N.E.2d 1291, 1294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). As the Watson panel explained,

Presumably, the pre-buy search establishes the person making the purchase for the police does not have contraband prior to the transaction with the target. Surveillance during the transaction establishes the target as the source of the contraband and excludes other sources of contraband. Thus, any contraband discovered during a search after the transaction is attributable to the target of the controlled buy. Here, where the [confidential informant] was not searched initially, such an inference cannot be made.

Id.

[21] While Henson's case shares some factual similarities with Watson, that case simply held that without more, the fact-finder cannot reasonably infer the defendant was the source of the contraband when police failed search the confidential informant before a controlled buy. However, our Supreme Court has affirmed a drug dealing conviction where officers conducted an “inadequate pre-buy search of the informant” because there were other considerations from which the jury could have inferred that the defendant was the source of the drugs at issue. Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 368 (Ind. 1999). In Toney, the informant testified that he purchased drugs from the defendant, and the defendant was arrested with the “buy money” in his possession. Id. at 369. To hold that evidence insufficient, the Court reasoned, would require it to reassess the credibility of the informant's testimony and weigh conflicting evidence. Id.

[22] Here, as in Toney, the jury had ample evidence to infer that the alprazolam at issue came from Henson, not Parsons. Though Parsons did not testify, Bechtold testified that he observed the drug transaction through the open passenger door of Henson's vehicle. Bechtold saw Parsons give Henson $250 in cash, after which Bechtold observed a baggie of pills appear on the center console. Bechtold did not see Henson produce that baggie, but he did retrieve it from Parsons after she exited Henson's vehicle, and Parsons had no drugs or money on her during the post-buy search. The jury also heard a recording of the conversation Parsons had with Henson minutes after the transaction, in which Henson said he could provide Parsons with more alprazolam. That statement would make little sense had Henson not already sold alprazolam to Parsons. It was therefore reasonable for the jury to find that Henson sold Parsons fifty alprazolam tablets, as alleged. To conclude otherwise would require us to reweigh the evidence and question Bechtold's credibility, which we will not do.

[23] We therefore affirm Henson's conviction.

2. Sentencing Discretion

[24] Henson next argues that the trial court erred by declining to recognize any mitigating factors at sentencing. Sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and are subject to appellate review only for abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). A trial court can abuse its discretion in four ways: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement; (2) citing an aggravating or mitigating factor that is not supported by the record; (3) failing to cite factors that the record clearly supports; and (4) relying on reasons for imposing a sentence that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.

[25] Here, Henson argues the trial court omitted reasons from its sentencing statement that he advanced for consideration at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, “that [he] ha[s] medical issues for which incarceration would prove hardship and that he admitted to the [habitual offender enhancement], thus saving substantial time and court resources.” Appellant's Br. at 15. A trial court need only recognize the “mitigating circumstances it finds to be significant.” Rawson v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1049, 1056 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. As such, to prove the court erred by not recognizing a mitigating factor, the defendant must show not only that the factor was supported by the record, but that it carried significant mitigating weight. Id.

[26] Starting with Henson's claimed medical issues, that factor was not supported by the record. According to Henson's PSI, he “reported that he does not have any physical health issues.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 90, 98. Henson did not testify or offer any evidence to the contrary at the sentencing hearing. While Henson's attorney argued that he “has a lower back problem that's been recommended for surgery[,]” the defense offered no evidence to support that assertion. Tr. Vol. 3 at 32. Henson also presented no evidence that he will be unable to receive the care he needs while incarcerated. See Henderson v. State, 848 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming trial court's failure to recognize the defendant's poor health as a mitigating factor when “she did not present any evidence demonstrating that her medical conditions would be untreatable during incarceration or would render incarceration a hardship”). Therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to recognize Henson's lower back problem as a significant mitigating factor.

[27] Turning to Henson's claim that the trial court should have recognized his habitual offender admission as a mitigating factor, we first note that his attorney did not advance that factor for consideration at the sentencing hearing. It is well-settled that “the trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to consider a mitigating factor that was not raised at sentencing.” Anglemeyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492. In any event, the State is right that “any mitigating weight attributable to [Henson's] admission to the habitual offender enhancement was minimal at best[.]” Appellee's Br. at 14.

[28] As this Court explained in Jackson v State, “[a] guilty plea can be a significant mitigating factor when the State reaps a substantial benefit from the defendant's act of pleading guilty; this act conserves the State's resources ․” 973 N.E.2d 1123, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. However, when, as here, the defendant admits to being a habitual offender after being found guilty of the underlying crime, the admission does “not provide the same benefit[ ] to the State ․” Id. Such mid-trial habitual offender admissions “only relieve[ ] the State of its burden of proving the nature and chronology of [the defendant's] prior convictions, a burden that involves far fewer resources than a [complete] trial.” Id. Thus, we see no error in the trial court's failure to recognize Henson's habitual offender admission as a significant mitigating factor.

[29] For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing.

3. Appellate Rule 7(B)

[30] Finally, Henson asks us to revise his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Under Rule 7(B), we may revise a defendant's sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We grant considerable deference to the trial court's sentencing decision. Wilson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 667, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Absent “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character)[,]” we will affirm the sentence. Id. (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). It is the defendant's burden to prove his sentence is inappropriate. Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[31] We begin by looking at the advisory sentence for the relevant offenses. Id. In our review, “we ‘focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.’ ” Norton v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014)). The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, and the advisory sentence is three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). Moreover, the habitual offender statute required the court to enhance Henson's sentence by another three to six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(2) (2023). Thus, Henson's twelve-year aggregate sentence was the maximum sentence permitted by law.

[32] Our Supreme Court has explained that “maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for the worst offenders.” Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Evans v. State, 725 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ind. 2000)). That said, when reviewing a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), we will not “second guess[ ] the trial court[ ]” and will instead endeavor to “ ‘leaven the outliers’ rather than achieve what is perceived as the ‘correct’ result.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)), reh'g denied. And after considering the nature of Henson's offense and his character, Henson has not met his burden to convince us that his sentence is an outlier in need of revision.

[33] Starting with the nature of Henson's offense, we consider “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)). “We also consider whether the offense was ‘accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.’ ” Burkhart v. State, 259 N.E.3d 347, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)), trans. denied.

[34] Henson sold Parsons fifty tablets of alprazolam, amounting to 6.51 grams— 1.51 grams more than necessary to elevate the offense from a Level 6 felony to a Level 5 felony. See I.C. § 35-48-4-3(c)(1), (d)(1). This Court has, in some circumstances, been willing to characterize non-violent drug offenses involving controlled buys of relatively small amounts of drugs as “innocuous.” See, e.g., Norris v. State, 27 N.E.3d 333, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). However, we are less willing to do so when a defendant engages in repeated acts of drug dealing, rather than a one-off transaction. Cf. Hubbert v. State, 163 N.E.3d 958, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (revising a sentence where the evidence suggested the defendant was “not a professional drug dealer”) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. Here, the amount Henson sold to Parsons, as well as his statement to her that he could sell her more “blues” because he had “plenty of them left” indicates that he was in the market and willing to sell drugs. State's Ex. 4, file SCI24-139, at 06:21-06:28. That significantly undercuts Henson's effort to downplay his present offense as “de minimis.” Appellant's Br. at 18.

[35] Turning to Henson's character, we must “engage in a broad consideration of [his] qualities[.]” Burkhart, 259 N.E.3d at 355 (quoting T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211). This includes “whether [he] has ‘substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122). Henson's significant criminal history demonstrates an exceptionally poor character. See Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” (quoting Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020))). According to Henson's PSI, he has numerous convictions for alcohol and drug-related offenses, including driving under the influence and possession of marijuana. He has also repeatedly been convicted of operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator and driving with a lifetime suspension—both of which are already based upon a series of previous convictions or offenses—showing his continued failure to abide by our laws. He does not have many violent offenses on his record, though he was convicted of two counts of misdemeanor battery in 2005. Under the circumstances, we find that Henson's history of offenses related to alcohol and substance abuse justified the trial court's imposition of a harsh punishment, which Henson will have the opportunity to petition to modify if he completes the Purposeful Incarceration program.

[36] We also agree with the State that Henson's attempt to flee the jurisdiction on the first day of trial in no way exemplified good character. That Henson tried to leave the state instead of facing the consequences of his crime demonstrated a flagrant disrespect for the rule of law and certainly justified a harsh sentence.

[37] In sum, Henson has not met his burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

Conclusion

[38] For these reasons, we affirm Henson's conviction and sentence.

[39] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Alprazolam is commonly referred to as Xanax, a well-known brand name. Alprazolam is a schedule IV controlled substance. Ind. Code § 35-48-2-10(a), (c) (2024).

2.   We've used our Odyssey Case Management System to access the records for Cause No. 85C01-2408-F6-875—the existence of which the trial court took judicial notice of at Henson's trial. Transcript Vol. 2 at 227.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-3(a)(1), (d)(1) (2019).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(c) (2023).

5.   As previously explained by this Court, Purposeful Incarcerationis a project with Indiana Court Systems, through which the [Department of Correction (DOC)] works in collaboration with Judges who can sentence chemically addicted offenders and document that they will consider a sentence modification should the offender successfully complete a DOC Therapeutic community․ Although a trial court may make a recommendation, actual participation in the program is left to the discretion of the DOC. Trial courts themselves have no authority to require the DOC to place a particular defendant into a program. This Court has explained that a trial court's limited role in relation to purposeful incarceration is simply to identify which defendants should be flagged as individuals most likely to benefit from participation in the program.Sargent v. State, 158 N.E.3d 783, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied.

DeBoer, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur