Martin Sweet and Anat Hakim, Appellants-Defendants v. Elizabeth Greaves, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Martin Sweet and Anat Hakim (collectively, the “Employers”) hired Elizabeth Greaves to help manage their household. After approximately six months, the Employers terminated Greaves and offered her four weeks’ severance pay as required by the employment contract. Greaves accepted but later requested 90 days’ severance pay, which the Employers rejected. The Employers then refused to give Greaves any severance pay, so Greaves sued in small claims court. Following a bench trial, the small claims court ordered the Employers to pay Greaves the full four weeks’ severance. The Employers now appeal and raise one issue for our review: Whether the small claims court clearly erred by entering judgment in favor of Greaves.

[2] We affirm

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In December 2024, Greaves and the Employers entered into a contract ¹ (the “Contract”) for Greaves to be a “House Manager and Family Assistant.” Ex. Vol. I at 4. The Contract specifically stated that “[a]lthough the employment relationship will be at-will, its duration is hoped to be long term (one year or longer).” Id. Greaves was to work “up to 40 hours” per week and earn $46 per hour. Id. The Contract also contained the following termination provision:

Termination Notice:

Absent unusual circumstances or termination for cause, there should be at least four (4) weeks prior notice to termination. If employment termination is requested by the employers - and not for poor employee performance, a severance pay of four (4) weeks will be offered to the employee after at least three (3) months service.

Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).

[4] In early January 2025, Greaves officially began working for the Employers. On June 21, Hakim verbally terminated Greaves's employment, and Hakim and Greaves “agreed also in that phone conversation that [Hakim] would go ahead and give [Greaves her] 4 weeks’ severance pay.” Tr. Vol. II at 16. Also during that phone call, Greaves asked Hakim if she could work “part[-]time”; Hakim's response “was equivocal because [the Employers] didn't want [Greaves] working for” them. Id. at 36.

[5] Later that day via text message, Greaves requested 90 days of severance pay:

I respect your decision to no longer retain my services[;] however, this is going to cause a huge and completely unexpected financial burden.

I agreed to a one[-]year employment contract and have structured my finances with that in mind. I signed a one[-]year lease only after verbally confirming with [Sweet] that I would still be needed after his plans for DC changed.

I respectfully ask for 90-day severance pay not only because this is the industry standard, but also due to the fact my release was not performance related.

Ex. Vol. I at 26. In response, Hakim “remind[ed]” Greaves that she had been an “at-will” employee and stated that “there were mixed reasons” for Greaves's termination, including “performance[-]related reasons.” Id. at 28. Because the Employers believed they terminated Greaves for cause and because they considered Greaves's 90-day severance pay request to be a “counteroffer,” the Employers “decided to give [Greaves] zero” severance pay. Id. at 30.

[6] Greaves sued the Employers in small claims court for breach of contract, alleging they owed her $7,467.00—$7,360.00 in severance pay plus a $107.00 filing fee. After a bench trial, the small claims court rejected the Employers’ assertions that (1) they terminated Greaves for cause and (2) Greaves's 90-day severance pay request was a counteroffer that extinguished her right to recover four weeks of severance pay. The small claims court thus entered judgment in favor of Greaves for $7,467.00. In a subsequent order denying the Employers’ motion to correct error, the small claims court explained that Greaves's 90-day severance request was not a counteroffer and the Contract “obligat[ed]” the Employers to pay her 4 weeks of severance regardless of Greaves's “request to modify an original term of the [C]ontract.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 19. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Small Claims Court Did Not Clearly Err by Entering Judgment in Favor of Greaves

[7] The Employers argue the small claims court erred by entering judgment in favor of Greaves. Judgments rendered by a small claims court are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). “We generally review small claims judgments for clear error, giving considerable deference to the small claims court and its assessment of witness credibility.” Piccadilly Mgmt. v. Abney, 215 N.E.3d 1078, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Muldowney v. Lincoln Park, LLC, 83 N.E.3d 130, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). “This deferential standard of review is particularly important in small claims actions, where trials are informal, ‘with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice’ between parties according to the rules of substantive law.” Branham v. Varble, 952 N.E.2d 744, 746 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008)).

We consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. [Berryhill v. Parkview Hosp., 962 N.E.2d 685, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).] However, we still review issues of substantive law de novo. Id. The burdens of proof are the same in a small claims suit as they would have been if suit had been filed in a trial court of general jurisdiction. Martin v. Ramos, 120 N.E.3d 244, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Josh's Lawn & Snow, LLC, 130 N.E.3d 1191, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[8] Before addressing the merits, we note that Greaves did not file an appellee's brief, so we will reverse the small claims court's judgment if the Employers’ brief presents a case of prima facie error. See Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014)). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at 758).

[9] The Employers specifically challenge the small claims court's interpretation of the Contract as requiring them to pay Greaves four weeks’ severance pay regardless of whether she accepted or rejected the offer thereof. We need not address the merits of this challenge because even if we assume arguendo that it is meritorious, the fact remains that Greaves accepted the Employers’ four weeks’ severance offer when it was made. For a contract to be formed, there must be offer, acceptance, and consideration. Land v. IU Credit Union, 218 N.E.3d 1282, 1287 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Reitenour v. M/I Homes of Ind., L.P., 176 N.E.3d 505, 510–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)), aff'd on reh'g, 226 N.E.3d 194 (Ind. 2024). Greaves testified that she and Hakim had “agreed” to the contractual four weeks’ severance pay during the phone call in which Hakim terminated Greaves's employment, Tr. Vol. II at 16—“[Hakim] said [Greaves] will still get [her] four weeks’ severance pay and [Greaves] said okay, thank you very much, [she] appreciate[d] that,” id. at 8.

[10] Nevertheless, the Employers claim that Greaves did not actually accept their offer because she made two counteroffers: (1) she asked to work part-time and (2) she asked for 90 days’ severance pay. The small claims court expressly concluded that Greaves did not make any counteroffers and the terms of the four weeks’ severance pay agreement were not altered by her requests, Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 19–20; we agree. First, the only evidence about Greaves's alleged request to work part-time was Hakim's testimony, and it is unclear if Greaves made this request before or after she accepted the four weeks’ severance pay offer. Considering the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment, we must conclude that Greaves accepted the four weeks’ severance pay offer and later asked to work part-time. See Josh's Lawn & Snow, 130 N.E.3d at 1193 (citing Berryhill, 962 N.E.2d at 689). Second, the record is clear that Greaves's 90-day severance request was made after she accepted the 4-week severance offer. Consequently, both of Greaves's alleged counteroffers were actually attempts to modify the four weeks’ severance pay agreement; or, to use the small claims court's language, her requests were “simply ․ entreat[ies],” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 17. Neither of these entreaties affected the formation of the four weeks’ severance pay agreement nor became a term thereof. See Zimmerman v. McColley, 826 N.E.2d 71, 78 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Hamlin v. Steward, 622 N.E.2d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)) (holding rejected attempt to add provision to already formed contract neither affected formation thereof nor altered agreed terms); Land, 218 N.E.3d at 1287 (citing Stelko Elec., Inc. v. Taylor Cmty. Sch. Bldg. Corp., 826 N.E.2d 152, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)) (explaining contract modification requires all elements of a contract).

[11] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the small claims court clearly erred by entering judgment in favor of Greaves. We therefore affirm that decision.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the Contract was entitled “Offer for Employment,” Ex. Vol. I at 4, the small claims court determined it was a “valid and enforceable” contract, Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 15. The Employers do not challenge that determination on appeal. Appellants’ Br. at 7–8.

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.