IN RE: H.K. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.C. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's finding that her six children (“Children”) are children in need of services (“CHINS”). On appeal, Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial court's determination. We conclude, however, that the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court's determination that Children are CHINS is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] Mother is the parent of: H.K., born in October 2010; M.K., born in December 2011; N.L., born in November 2015; Je.L., born in January 2017; K.L., born in May 2018; and R.L., born in May 2021.¹ Mother was convicted of maintaining a common nuisance, a Class A misdemeanor, in July 2014,² neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony, and possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, in June 2019.³ Mother participated in an Informal Adjustment regarding H.K., M.K., and N.L. from October 2016 through July 2017. And Children, except for R.L., were adjudicated CHINS in April 2019, due to the parents’ use of illegal substances. That CHINS action was closed in January 2020.

[4] Mother and Children lived in Paoli, and Children went to school in Paoli Community Schools, except for R.L., who was not yet in school. In the 2024-2025 school year, N.L., Je.L., K.L., and M.K. had “severe” attendance issues.⁴ Tr. Vol. II p. 36. In approximately March 2025, Mother and Children moved into a residence in Mitchell.

[5] On March 28, 2025, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report alleging poor home conditions, educational neglect, and Children's poor hygiene. Additionally, Children were very hungry in the mornings. A Family Case Manager (“FCM”) from DCS made an unannounced visit to Mother's residence in Mitchell, but Mother would not allow the FCM to enter. Mother again denied the FCM entry into the residence on April 1, 2025. On April 9, 2025, DCS received another report alleging domestic violence between Mother and an unknown boyfriend, educational neglect, and Children's poor hygiene.

[6] Mother allowed the FCM to enter the residence in early May 2025. The FCM discovered that the residence had missing interior walls, holes in the living room and bathroom ceilings, exposed wiring, and extension cords hanging from the ceiling. The girls, except for R.L., shared a mattress on the floor, and the boys shared another mattress on the floor. The home was cluttered, and dirty dishes were in the bathtub. One of the bathrooms was unusable because it had holes in the ceiling and plywood flooring.

[7] Mother agreed to an Informal Adjustment, which the trial court approved on May 28, 2025. Ireland Home Based Services (“Ireland”) worked with Mother regarding budgeting, home conditions, and resourcing for the home conditions and repairs. Ireland provided Mother with a dumpster, and Mother was able to clean the front yard, backyard, and get “rid of a lot of trash and clutter.” Tr. Vol. II p. 115. Twice during the Informal Adjustment, Ireland assisted Mother to re-establish her electricity and provided transportation to Mother when necessary. Ireland provided Mother with fire extinguishers, smoke alarms, and pest control supplies. Ireland also assisted Mother with obtaining community resources, and Mother was able to obtain bunk beds for Children in November 2025.

[8] Concerns regarding H.K. continued throughout the proceedings. Beginning in October 2024, H.K. was on juvenile probation for truancy and trespassing. Mother was required to “bring [H.K.] in once a month,” to ensure that H.K. followed the conditions of his probation, went to school, and “stay[ed] out of trouble.” Id. at 45. H.K., however, was not compliant with his juvenile probation. H.K.’s probation officer was unable to locate him between November 2024 and June 2025. In June 2025, the parent of another juvenile probationer informed the probation officer that H.K. had been “living with them and she wanted him to go home.” Id.

[9] H.K. submitted to a hair test in June 2025 and tested positive for methamphetamine and THC, and a petition to modify H.K.’s probation was filed. Mother and H.K. did not appear for the hearing on the matter. The trial court issued a warrant for Mother, and H.K. was eventually sent to a detention facility, where he remained for forty-eight hours. The trial court ordered H.K. to complete a substance abuse evaluation and to report for day reporting until the termination of his probation. H.K. was placed “under verbal house arrest” until further order of the trial court. Ex. Vol. I p. 13. H.K.’s probation ended in October 2025.

[10] Mother enrolled Children in Mitchell Community Schools for the 2025-2026 school year, and the attendance for N.L., Je.L., and K.L. improved. DCS discussed a need for childcare for R.L. and suggested Head Start, but Mother did not enroll R.L. In October 2025, concerns surfaced about H.K., who had not attended school in three weeks. Instead, H.K. had been staying home and supervising the other children with the assistance of Mother's father. H.K. did not attend school until mid-December 2025, when he enrolled at Beacon V Prep, an online school. Additionally, H.K.’s teenage girlfriend was pregnant at that time.

[11] During visits by DCS in August, September, and October 2025, the home conditions had not significantly improved. The residence still had exposed wiring, clutter, holes, leaks, and missing paneling. The washing machine was outside and connected with an extension cord for approximately one month. The electricity at Mother's residence was turned off in August 2025 and October 2025, and the residence was infested with roaches and mice. Children wanted to keep the baby mice as pets.

[12] Mother refused to participate in drug screens requested by DCS. In October 2025, Mother's father moved into Mother's residence; he was out on bond for charges of dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony, and possession of methamphetamine, a Level 3 felony. DCS requested a background check and drug screen from Mother's father, but he refused. As of the date of the fact-finding hearing, Mother's father was living in a camper behind Mother's residence.

[13] Mother was working at a Dollar Tree as a cashier. But in October 2025, Mother quit her employment because DCS informed her that she was required to have a sober caregiver for Children. Mother returned to work at Dollar Tree in November 2025, and at the time of the fact-finding hearing, she was an assistant manager.

[14] Although Mother generally cooperated with Ireland's Family Preservation Specialist, Mother denied the Family Preservation Specialist access to the residence on two occasions. Mother was referred to Ireland to complete a parenting assessment. Mother started the intake session, but she failed to log in for the next two sessions. Mother never completed the parenting assessment.

[15] At a Child and Family Team Meeting (“CFTM”) scheduled at Mother's residence on October 3, 2025, Mother “became very frustrated with the situation, cursed, [ ]went into the home,” and did not come back out. Tr. Vol. II p. 153. Although Mother allowed the FCM into the residence the following week, Mother denied the FCM access to the residence after that date. Mother did continue allowing Ireland's employees access to the residence except on two occasions.

[16] DCS was concerned because Mother had not made “significant improvements.” Id. at 149. On November 3, 2025, DCS filed petitions alleging that Children were CHINS. DCS alleged that H.K., M.K., N.L., Je.L., and K.L. were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (general neglect) and due to educational neglect.⁵ DCS alleged that R.L. was a CHINS pursuant to only Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (general neglect) because she was not school-aged yet. DCS alleged that: “Despite services being provided to this family, there were continued concerns with budgeting/financial issues, safe, sanitary and suitable housing, lack of supervision, and lack of planning.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 100. The trial court then discharged the Informal Adjustment as unsuccessful.

[17] A fact-finding hearing was held on the CHINS petitions on January 23, 2026. An Ireland employee testified that Mother has been working on her goals, but the goals were not fully completed. Although Mother made progress on remodeling the residence, it still had mice and roaches, the floors were not “flush completely,” and Mother still needed to work on making “sure that electricity runs through the entire home and weatherization.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 125, 136. Mother's residence did not have a functioning furnace. Mother was heating the residence with electric heaters, but she purchased a wood stove on the day before the hearing.

[18] At the time of the hearing, Mother claimed that both H.K. and M.K. were attending Beacon V Prep. Mother testified that M.K. had been attending Mitchell Community Schools, was “failing everything,” and that he has “ADHD, ADD, and [oppositional defiant disorder] that is severely affecting him.” Id. at 58. M.K. was suspended from school for vaping. M.K. had “his first day of orientation” at Beacon V Prep on the day of the hearing. Id. DCS, however, was unable to confirm H.K.’s or M.K.’s enrollment.

[19] On January 30, 2026, the trial court entered an order finding that Children are CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. A dispositional hearing was held on February 23, 2026.⁶ The trial court then entered a dispositional order on February 25, 2026. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[20] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that Children are CHINS. CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. R.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020).

[21] Here, the trial court entered, sua sponte, findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting the CHINS petition. “ ‘As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475 (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment “ ‘will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). We will reverse a CHINS adjudication only if it is clearly erroneous. R.L., 144 N.E.3d at 689.

[22] DCS must prove three elements for a trial court to adjudicate a child as a CHINS: (1) the child is under the age of eighteen; (2) one of eleven different statutory circumstances exists that would make the child a CHINS; and (3) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he or she is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475.

[23] Here, the trial court found Children were CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (general neglect), which provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[24] “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but rather is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without the intervention of the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child ․ [T]he acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.

A. Serious Endangerment

[25] Mother first argues that Children were not seriously endangered or impaired because she made significant improvements to the residence. The trial court found that Children's physical or mental conditions were seriously impaired or seriously endangered “due to the home conditions and the safety issues that need rectified including a stable heat source, safe structural repairs, safe and reliable electricity, and lack of rodents/pests; an unstable, inconsistent, or nonexistent current education for [H.K. and M.K.]; and financial instability that impedes the ability to provide working utilities, food, clothing, and shelter provided for the minor children.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 88; see I.C. § 31-34-1-1(1).

[26] Mother claims that the remaining issues with her residence—mice and roaches, weatherization, flooring issues, and electrical work in her bedroom—were insufficient to support a CHINS determination. Mother does not appear to challenge the finding of an “unstable, inconsistent, or nonexistent current education” for H.K. or M.K. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 88. But Mother notes that the trial court found insufficient evidence to show that N.L., Je.L., and K.L. were having school attendance issues for the 2025-2026 school year.

[27] DCS presented evidence that, in March and April 2025, it received reports of poor home conditions in Mother's residence; domestic violence between Mother and a boyfriend; educational neglect of Children; and Children's poor hygiene. Despite the Informal Adjustment in May 2025, Mother failed to address the issues; the conditions leading to the Informal Adjustment persisted.

[28] Mother made little progress on the interior of the residence. Mother refused drug screens, and her father, who was facing charges for dealing in methamphetamine, moved onto the property. Further, there were ongoing concerns about H.K.—he tested positive for methamphetamine in June 2025; he failed to comply with his juvenile probation; he failed to attend school; and his girlfriend was pregnant. Mother also failed to complete a parenting assessment. Mother became angry at DCS in October 2025 and denied the FCM further access to the residence in mid-October.

[29] At the January 23, 2026 fact-finding hearing, an Ireland employee testified that, although Mother made progress on remodeling the residence, the residence still had mice and roaches,⁷ the floors were not “flush completely,” and Mother still needed to work on making “sure that electricity runs through the entire home and weatherization.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 125, 136. Mother's residence did not have a functioning furnace, and she was heating the residence with electric heaters. DCS, however, was unable to inspect the residence as Mother was still denying DCS access. Further, although the younger Children were no longer missing significant days of school, H.K. and M.K. continued to have issues with school. Mother claimed that they were both enrolled in an online school, but DCS was unable to verify that claim.

[30] Given the continued educational issues with H.K. and M.K. and the continued unsafe home conditions, we conclude that the trial court's finding regarding serious endangerment is not clearly erroneous. Mother's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

B. Coercive Intervention

[31] Finally, Mother argues that DCS failed to present evidence that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary. Mother contends that she had enrolled H.K. and M.K. in online schooling and that she had improved the residence.

[32] This CHINS element “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.’ ” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017) (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287) (emphases in original). “[C]ourts ‘should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.’ ” Id. (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290). “Doing so avoids punishing parents for past mistakes when they have already corrected them.” Id. at 581.

[33] Although Mother did make some progress while working with Ireland to rectify some of the issues during the Informal Adjustment, many of the concerning home conditions remained an issue. Mother's relationship with DCS broke down; Mother started to refuse DCS entry into her residence; and Mother failed to cooperate with DCS. Even during the Informal Adjustment period, H.K. failed to attend school, and both H.K and M.K. only recently enrolled in online schooling. Given Mother's failure to cooperate, DCS was unable to confirm that enrollment.

[34] Mother has still refused to fully comply with the Informal Adjustment to rectify the issues and has refused to allow DCS into her residence. In fact, the FCM testified that Mother said, “she has done it alone all these years and done a decent job of it, and that she works better when alone and feels that DCS involvement is not necessary and at this point is hindering her life with her children.” Tr. Vol. II p. 152. Under these circumstances, the trial court's finding that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary is not clearly erroneous. Again, Mother's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

Conclusion

[35] The trial court's finding that Children are CHINS is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.K. is the father of H.K. and M.K.; J.L. is the father of N.L., Je.L., and K.L.; and J.C. is the father of R.L. The fathers of Children do not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother was charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and maintaining a common nuisance. She pleaded guilty to maintaining a common nuisance and the other charges were dismissed.

3.   Mother was charged with four counts of neglect of a dependent, Level 6 felonies; possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. Mother pleaded guilty to neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony, and possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony. Mother was sentenced to 730 days with 718 days suspended to supervised probation.

4.   N.L. had forty absences, with at least thirty-five being unexcused; Je.L. had between twenty-five and thirty absences, with approximately twenty-five being unexcused; and K.L. had thirty-five to forty absences, with only five being excused. Mother testified that the absences were caused by a lack of transportation.

5.   See Ind. Code Chapter 20-33-2, the Compulsory School Attendance Law.

6.   The FCM testified at the dispositional hearing that, at that time, H.K. and M.K. were not attending school and had been unenrolled from Beacon V Prep.

7.   The trial court found that “Ireland paid for pest control services twice,” but Mother contends that Ireland merely provided pest control traps and sprays. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 82. We agree with Mother that the evidence does not demonstrate that Ireland paid for outsourced pest control services; rather, the evidence shows that Ireland provided Mother with pest control traps and sprays on two occasions. We conclude, however, that the error is harmless and does not impact the ultimate conclusions here.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.