Antoine Lemont Beech, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Antoine Lemont Beech appeals his conviction for Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, arguing that the trial court committed fundamental error in making certain statements at trial. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November 2023, the State charged Beech with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (SVF). About a week before the November 2025 jury trial, Beech moved to bifurcate so that the jury could first determine whether he possessed a firearm and then, if necessary, determine whether he was an SVF. The trial court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial.

[3] At the beginning of voir dire, the trial court introduced the prospective jurors to the case:

This is a criminal trial in which the defendant, Antoine Beech, is accused of committing certain crimes. That action began when the State of Indiana filed an information alleging that the defendant committed the following act. On or about October 19th of 2023, Antoine Lemont Beech, having previously been convicted of a serious violent felony, to-wit: Dealing in Cocaine in Marion County Superior Court 21, under cause number 49D21-1903-F3-011537, on or about August 12th of 2021, did knowingly or intentionally possess a firearm, that is[,] a gun.

Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 16-17. After voir dire, defense counsel told the court that Beech, who had gone “round and round” about his prior felony conviction, had finally decided to “stipulate” to it. Id. at 69, 71. Beech took the stand, and the court confirmed that was what he wanted to do. See id. at 71-72. There was no discussion of how, if at all, this stipulation would impact the trial.

[4] During preliminary instructions, the trial court instructed the jury:

In this case, ․ the State of Indiana has charged the defendant, Antoine Beech, with Count I: Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a Level 4 felony. The charge reads as follows. On or about October 19th of 2023, Antoine Beech, having been previously convicted of a serious violent felony, to-wit: Dealing in Cocaine, under cause number 49D21-1903-F3-011537, did knowingly or intentionally possess a firearm.

Id. at 75; see also Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 214 (Preliminary Instruction No. 4). Beech did not object to the SVF language.

[5] During trial, the State offered Exhibit 14, which was the parties’ stipulation reduced to writing:

The State of Indiana and the Defendant, through counsel, stipulate that the following facts are true and may be considered as evidence in your deliberations:

1. On or about March 25, 2019, the following named defendant ANTOINE BEECH had previously been charged with a Felony in a Marion County Superior Court under cause number 49D21-1903-F3-011537 and that on August 12, 2021, the Defendant was found guilty under said cause.

2. That the aforementioned conviction classifies the Defendant as a Felon under Indiana Code 35-47-4-5(b), which prohibits him from possessing a firearm.

3. That the aforementioned Antoine Beech is the same Antoine Beech charged under this cause.

Ex. p. 61; Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 197-98. The trial court admitted Exhibit 14 into evidence.

[6] During final instructions, the trial court instructed the jury:

In this case, the State of Indiana has charged the defendant, Antoine Beech, with Count I: Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a Level 4 felony. The charge reads as follows. Count I: on or about October 19th of 2023, Antoine Beech, having been previously convicted of a serious violent felony, to-wit: Dealing in Cocaine under cause number 4[9]D21-1903-F3-011537, did knowingly or intentionally possess a firearm.

Before you may convict the defendant, the State must have proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant, Antoine Beech, knowingly or intentionally, possessed a firearm, to-wit: a handgun, and finally, after the defendant had been convicted of the Indiana offense of Dealing in Cocaine, which the Court instructs you is an offense enumerated in Indiana Code 35-47-4-5. If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of Serious Violent Felon[ ] in Possession of a Firearm, a Level 4 felony, as charged in Count I.

Tr. Vol. 2 p. 226; see also Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 231 (Final Instruction No. 3). Again, Beech did not object to the SVF language.

[7] The jury found Beech guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in prison.

[8] Beech now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Beech purports to raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to bifurcate the trial and (2) whether, given that the stipulation referred to him only as a “Felon,” the trial court erred by using the SVF language at trial. But Beech doesn't develop an argument on the first issue. To the contrary, he acknowledges that “ ‘this Court has consistently held that bifurcation is not required’ ” where, as here, the only charge is unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF. Appellant's Br. pp. 11-12 (quoting Bowens v. State, 24 N.E.3d 426, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). We therefore limit our review to the second issue.

[10] Beech did not object to any of the trial court's SVF language or request a mistrial. Therefore, he must establish fundamental error. “An error is fundamental, and thus reviewable on appeal, if it made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (quotation omitted)).

[11] We have held that when a defendant stipulates to being an SVF, steps should be taken “to avoid prejudice to the defendant,” such as by “removing direct references to SVF,” phrasing the stipulation to read “in violation of Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5,” “excluding evidence regarding the underlying facts of the prior felony,” and “limiting prosecutorial references thereto.” Bowens, 24 N.E.3d at 428; Dugan v. State, 860 N.E.2d 1288, 1293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied; Spearman v. State, 744 N.E.2d 545, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Here, many of these precautions were taken: the stipulation referred to the statutory citation, the prosecutor never once, at any point during the trial, used the SVF language, and the underlying facts of the prior felony were not presented to the jury.¹ Although the trial court used the SVF language, it did so on only three occasions, and only when identifying the formal charge against Beech. See Appellant's Br. p. 8 (citing Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 16, 75, 226). And at the time of the first reference during voir dire, the parties had not yet entered into the stipulation, so the trial court had no stipulation to guide its phrasing. This leaves the references during preliminary and final instructions.² Given the precautions that were taken and the limited use of the SVF language, Beech has not established that the trial court committed fundamental error.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Beech claims that the underlying facts were admitted through Exhibit 13, which are records from F3-011537. The State offered Exhibit 13, and Beech did not object. When the trial court asked whether anything needed to be redacted, however, the State responded that the exhibit “wasn't going ․ back with the jury” and that it was “for the record only.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 199. Thus, although Exhibit 13 was technically admitted, it was not read or shown to the jury, and the jury never received it during deliberations.

2.   Beech cites Flowers v. State, No. 23A-CR-1582, 2024 WL 165204 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2024) (mem.), trans. denied, for the proposition that the SVF language is grounds for a mistrial. Appellant's Br. p. 15. That case is distinguishable in several respects. Flowers involved a bifurcated SVF proceeding in which a State's witness called the defendant a “serious violent felon” during the first phase in violation of a granted motion in limine, and defense counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. Here, by contrast, Beech was tried on a single, unbifurcated SVF charge, didn't object to the trial court's references, and neither sought an order in limine nor moved for a mistrial.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.