Kyle M. Reffett, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kyle M. Reffett (“Reffett”) pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony auto theft ¹ and was sentenced to two years in the Indiana Department of Corrections (“the DOC”). Reffett appeals his sentence raising the following two issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 2, 2024, Reffett broke into Tiffany Ethridge's (“Ethridge”) vehicle, which was parked in her driveway, and stole a bag that contained the vehicle's keys. The next day, Reffett returned to Ethridge's home and stole the vehicle. Ethridge subsequently reported the vehicle stolen and forwarded video footage of the theft to law enforcement. On February 4, 2024, the police were dispatched to Rodeway Inn where they found Ethridge's stolen vehicle. The police were told by bystanders standing outside that the vehicle was associated with two people in room 112.

[4] The police spoke with the occupants of the room and were told by one of them that Reffett, who was sitting in the room, was the one driving the vehicle. Reffett initially told the police that “ ‘some girl’ ” had given him the car. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 45. After being told that the theft was caught on camera, Reffett admitted that he took the bag from the vehicle on February 2, 2024, and then stole the vehicle the next day.

[5] On February 21, 2024, the State charged Reffett with Level 6 felony auto theft and Class A misdemeanor theft. On May 28, 2025, Reffett entered into a plea agreement, in which he agreed to plead guilty to Level 6 felony auto theft, and in exchange for his guilty plea, the State would dismiss the Class A misdemeanor theft charge and two other unrelated cases. The plea agreement left Reffett's sentence to the trial court's discretion but capped the executed portion of his sentence at two years. On June 25, 2025, the trial court held a guilty plea hearing, at which it found the factual basis sufficient, accepted the plea agreement, and ordered a presentencing investigation report (“PSI”) to be completed.

[6] The PSI revealed that Reffett was born and raised in Brazil, Indiana, and was primarily raised by his mother. The PSI also reflected that Reffett reported being diagnosed with “ADHD” and “PTSD” and that he attended counseling at Hamilton Center once per week. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 38. From 2014 to 2018, as a juvenile, he had four adjudications with three of the adjudications relating to theft and was placed on probation for each adjudication. In three of the cases, petitions to revoke probation were filed but ultimately dismissed. As an adult, he had been convicted of seven misdemeanors and three felonies, and of three grants of probation, he successfully completed only one.

[7] At the sentencing hearing on July 30, 2025, the State presented testimony from Ethridge where she stated that Reffett discarded several sentimental items from her vehicle and that she and her family now feel unsafe in their home. The State argued that, given his extensive criminal history and the nature of the offense, the trial court should impose a two-year sentence to be executed in the DOC, which was the maximum sentence permitted under the plea agreement. Reffett made a statement in allocution in which he took responsibility for his past and current actions and offered an apology to the Ethridge family and the city of Brazil. Reffett also argued that he has been engaging in treatment that was not court-ordered and requested that any sentence imposed be suspended to probation so that he can be rehabilitated.

[8] The trial court found a mitigating factor in his guilty plea because he spared the State and the victim the burden of a jury trial. The trial court found the aggravating factors to be his “stark” criminal history and the nature of the offense. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 23. In explaining the aggravators, the trial court noted that the offense was a “deliberate plan” rather than a “spur of the moment” decision in which he exercised bad judgment. Id. The court also noted that his criminal history was a more serious aggravator than the planning of the offense. The court explained that as a juvenile, Reffett had multiple rehabilitation attempts through probation and noted that there were multiple petitions filed to revoke probation. Further, the court noted that as an adult he has been incarcerated numerous times, and when placed on probation as an adult, there were again multiple petitions to revoke probation filed. The court found that the aggravating circumstances “far outweigh” the mitigating circumstances and imposed a two-year sentence executed in the DOC. Reffett now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[9] Reffett argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. The trial court has discretion in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See generally Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement that includes a “reasonably detailed recitation of the ․ reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. If the sentencing statement “includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id. “The reasons given, and the omission of reasons arguably supported by the record, are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 491.

[10] Reffett argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider his remorse and mental health treatment as mitigating factors.² Reffett contends that although the trial court found his guilty plea to be a mitigating factor, it failed to fulfill its obligation to separately consider his expression of remorse. Reffett also asserts that the record supported that he was participating in mental health treatment and that the trial court abused its discretion by not finding it a mitigating factor.

[11] When the defendant claims “the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor,” the defendant must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. However, “[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)). The trial court is not required to give the same credit or weight to the proffered mitigating circumstance that the defendant does. McBride v. State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[12] Reffett's argument that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider his remorse as a mitigating factor is unavailing. We generally grant the trial court substantial deference in evaluating a defendant's remorse. Howard v. State, 266 N.E.3d 304, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “A trial court's determination of a defendant's remorse is similar to a determination of credibility and, without evidence of some impermissible consideration by the trial court,” we will accept the trial court's determination. Id. (citing Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002)). Here, Reffett does not allege any impermissible consideration. Instead, he points to his allocution statement where he expressed that he was sorry to Ethridge and the city of Brazil and that he takes responsibility for his past and current offenses. However, Reffett's reference to his allocution statement expressing remorse is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion. Snyder v. State, 176 N.E.3d 995, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)) (“But a defendant's ‘reference to statements articulating [their] remorse is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion.’ ”). Furthermore, the evaluation of a defendant's remorse is better left to the trial court, which observes the defendant's apology and demeanor firsthand and is therefore better able to assess the defendant's credibility. Hollins v. State, 145 N.E.3d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Accordingly, Reffett has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in not finding his remorse a mitigating factor, and we conclude that not finding it as such was within the trial court's discretion.

[13] Reffett's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not finding his voluntary mental health treatment a mitigating factor is also unavailing. Reffett was required to show that the mental health treatment is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. Additionally, a trial court need not consider proffered mitigating circumstances that are highly disputable in their nature, weight, or significance. Kedrowitz v. State, 199 N.E.3d 386, 406 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Here, the PSI revealed under “Mental Health” that Reffett reported that he was diagnosed with “ADHD,” “PTSD,” and “attends counseling” once a week. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 38. Although Reffett's attorney stated that “he's engaging in treatment that ․ he's not court-ordered to engage in[,]” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 18, the record contains no other evidence to corroborate Reffett's mental health treatment or demonstrate its significance. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not considering Reffett's engagement with mental health treatment as a mitigating factor.

[14] We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Reffett.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[15] Reffett also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). “That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).

[16] The question on appellate review is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Hambel v. State, 119 N.E.3d 1142, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We generally defer to the trial court's sentencing decision, since our principal role is to leaven the outliers rather than achieve a perceived correct sentence. Cornell v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1135, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[17] “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of Appellate Rule 7(B) are separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “Reviewing courts ‘must consider’ both factors, but the defendant need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 219). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[18] Reffett was convicted of Level 6 felony auto theft. A person who commits a Level 6 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six months and two and one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Here, the trial court sentenced Reffett to two years executed in the DOC.

[19] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers “the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense.” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). To the extent Reffett addresses the nature of the offense, he appears to argue that, while serious, the offense “was not a particular[ly] egregious case of auto theft” because the vehicle was recovered the day after it was stolen. Appellant's Br. p. 10.

[20] As to the nature of the offense, the evidence established that Reffett broke into Ethridge's car, stole her bag containing the vehicle keys, and then returned the following day to take the vehicle. Furthermore, in his theft of Ethridge's vehicle, he discarded several sentimental items from the vehicle. Although the vehicle was recovered and returned to Etheridge, it was not because of any actions by Reffett. Reffett has failed to demonstrate compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offense in a positive light, accompanied by restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. The lack of compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offenses in a positive light means Reffett must make an even stronger showing regarding his character to prevail. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127.

[21] When we look to a defendant's character, we engage in “a broad analysis of the defendant's ‘qualities, life, and conduct.’ ” Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied). Reffett argues that his sentence should be revised primarily because he expressed remorse at sentencing and that he engaged in voluntary mental health treatment.³ We acknowledge that Reffett apologized to Ethridge and her family and reported that he voluntarily engaged in counseling for his mental health; however, that does not offset his extensive criminal history.

[22] “A defendant's criminal history is one relevant factor in analyzing character, the significance of which varies based on the ‘gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.’ ” Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). “Additionally, although a record of arrests by itself is not evidence of a defendant's criminal history, it is appropriate to consider such a record as a poor reflection on the defendant's character, because it may reveal that he or she has not been deterred even after having been subjected to the police authority of the State.” Rutherford, 866 N.E.2d at 874. Even a minor criminal history reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[23] Reffett's PSI reveals an extensive criminal history. Reffett, who was twenty-six at the time of sentencing, had four juvenile delinquency adjudications and fourteen adult criminal convictions. As a juvenile, he was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of theft and one count of conversion, which is significant given the relation to his current offense of auto theft. See Smoots, 172 N.E.3d at 1290. As an adult, he has been convicted of seven misdemeanors and three felonies, and of three probation sentences, he has successfully completed only one. Reffett's criminal history demonstrates that over the last decade he has not been deterred from committing crimes, even after being subjected to the State's police authority, and that reflects poorly on his character. See Rutherford, 866 N.E.2d at 874. We conclude that Reffett has not demonstrated substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character to portray his character in a positive light such that sentence revision is warranted. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. We, therefore, conclude that Reffett has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

Conclusion

[24] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Reffett and that his sentence is not inappropriate.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(i).

2.   To the extent Reffett argues the trial court did not give proper weight to his proffered mitigating factors, we note that our Supreme Court has explained that the degree of weight a trial court assigns to a particular mitigating or aggravating factor is not an appropriate basis for appeal. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (“Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, ․ a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.”).

3.   In arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, Reffett references his proffered mitigating circumstances, claiming that the trial court failed to consider them in sentencing him, resulting in improper balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However, whether a trial court has abused its discretion in its recognition of mitigators and whether a defendant's sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) are two distinct analyses. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.